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Abstract 
This thesis examines Jung's relation to Buddhism, in particular the Tibetan and Zen 
Buddhist traditions from a hermeneutic perspective. It addresses the way Jung 
attempted to make a dialogue between Analytical Psychology and Buddhism and the 
extent to which he was successful. Jung's approach to Buddhism is sometimes 
affected by Eurocentric prejudices, which led him to misunderstand some of the 
concepts of Buddhism. Moreover, from the standpoint of a psychologist, Jung had a 
tendency to reduce Buddhist thought to its psychological aspects, and not to pay 
sufficient attention to its traditional meanings. Jung was also highly selective in his 
use of Buddhist texts and focussed on those texts which appeared to confirm, or 
conform to, his psychological thinking, but dismissed other Buddhist materials which 
had no common base with his psychology. 
To contrast his approach, this thesis examines the theory of the 
phenomenology of religion, which emphasises the recognition of the irreducibility of 
religious phenomena and claims that we must understand religion within its own 
cultural context. From the perspective of the phenomenology of religion, Jung's 
methodology lacks objectivity and fails to exercise epoche, which means a suspension 
of one's own judgement or the exclusion of every possible presupposition. Rather, 
Jung seems to over-emphasise eidetic vision, which is a form of subjectivity that 
implies an intuitive grasp of the essentials of a situation in its wholeness. 
There are important achievements in Jung's engagement with Buddhism and 
indeed Jung should be regarded as a pioneer in this field of research. Jung's writings 
on Buddhism had a major influence on later studies of the various Buddhist traditions 
and meditation in relation to Western psychology and its therapeutic techniques. 
From this more positive perspective, this thesis explores in detail the strengths and 
shortcomings of Jung's engagement with the different Buddhist traditions, in order to 
assess its potential contribution to the contemporary dialogue between East and West. 
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0.1 Issues addressed in the thesis 
The religious traditions of India, China, and Japan, particularly Buddhism, Taoism 
and Yoga are of considerable important for Carl Gustav Jung. Western enthusiasm 
for Eastern thought grew during the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries. 
The ways and ideas of Eastern religions fascinated Jung and were recurrent 
preoccupations throughout his life. Jung moved outside the European tradition and 
attempted to explore the religious and philosophical ideas of the East. Jung played a 
pioneering role in this field of research, addressing the possibility of a fruitful 
dialogue between psychology and Buddhism. Jung's writings on Eastern thought had 
a major influence on later studies of the various traditions of Buddhism and 
meditation in relation to Western psychology and its therapeutic techniques. 
This thesis examines Jung's hermeneutcial engagement with Buddhism, in 
particular the Tibetan and Zen Buddhist traditions. It considers the way in which Jung 
attempted to establish a dialogue between Western psychology and Buddhism and the 
extent to which he was successful. There is a range of sources addressing Jung's 
engagement with Eastern thought and the link between Jung's psychological concepts 
and Eastern religions. Those who read Buddhism through the conceptual lens of 
Jung's Analytical Psychology have tended to accept Jung's interpretation of 
Buddhism uncritically. However, a careful examination of Jung's understanding of 
Eastern philosophies and religions shows considerable limitations in his 
understanding of Buddhism. However those who approach Jung from a background 
in religious studies and knowledge of Buddhism find that the definitions of classic 
Buddhist texts are sometimes distorted and modified to fit his psychological 
framework, and his use of certain Buddhist concepts is at odds with their vernacular 
Buddhist usage. 
This thesis is not merely trying to argue the esoteric aspect of Jungian studies 
or to find points of contact between Jung's Analytical Psychology and Buddhism, 
since there are a number of literatures previously published on these issues. The 
central purpose of this thesis is to critically examine these issues in depth from a 
perspective of the theory of hermeneutics and the phenomenology of region in order 
to show that Jung's relation to the Orient is in fact more complex and problematical 
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than has previously been discussed. This thesis, by using the available writings on 
Jung and the East, attempts to examine in detail Jung's relation to Buddhist thought 
from both the standpoints of Jung's Analytical Psychology and of the Buddhist 
religious tradition in order to understand in what way they are different and for what 
reason such a chasm appears to exist between the two systems. Moreover, this thesis 
seeks a possible mutual point of dialogue between Jung's psychology and Buddhist 
thought, by considering their commonalties. In this way this thesis strives for a 
contribution to illustrate a whole view of Jung's engagement with Buddhism. 
The thesis provides an assessment of the impact of Buddhism on Jung's life 
and his psychological thinking. Jung was greatly influenced by Eastern thought, 
especially the teachings of Buddha, which were very important in the formation of 
Jung's psychological theory. Jung's interest in Buddhism is considered from his 
perspective as a physician. After his break with Freud, Jung needed to establish his 
own psychology based on the scientific observation of psychic phenomena. Jung was 
especially concerned with the Buddhist emphasis on the experience of the individual. 
Christianity in its traditional orthodox mode emphasised reliance on the authority of 
the Church and on faith. Buddhism, on the other hand, emphasised a direct 
experience of the inner-path to self-discovery, that is, an individual's discovery of his 
own path to salvation. Jung believed studying Buddhism enabled us to take a more 
objective look at ourselves with regard to issues such as the concept of psychic 
integration and the reconciling of the conscious and unconscious elements of the 
psyche into a balanced and harmonious whole. Thus Buddhism for Jung functioned 
as a support for his psychological assertions and endeavours. 
Jung's primary concern was that people in the West in the twentieth century 
were undergoing what he termed a spiritual crisis. Jung claimed that since the 
Enlightenment, European culture tended to overlook its ancient traditions, which were 
rich in sources of archetypal myths, images and rituals and instead tended to focus on 
the external, materialistic environment. Consequently, Europeans had lost touch with 
their sources of individual and cultural meaning. Jung paid considerable attention to 
the religious symbolism of the East, which he believed offered a way to give life 
meaning. Furthermore, Jung believed the symbolism of the East in general expressed 
a deep need for healing and wholeness. The discoveries from his study of Buddhism 
and his empirical evidence from his own experiences and those of his patients offered 
Jung confirmation of his psychological insights. Jung's psychology, and his 
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understanding of Buddhism, were not static throughout his life however. One issue 
considered in detail is Jung's understanding of karma. In his earlier works Jung 
interpreted karma as a psychic inheritance and rejected personal karma. However, 
shortly before his death, Jung appears to have softened his view on personal karma 
and adopted a very close position to the Buddhist theory of karma 
The thesis addresses the issue of Orientalism in relation to Jung's engagement 
with Eastern thought. 'Orientalism' here is used in the sense developed by Edward 
Said, that is as a description and explanation of the ways in which Western authors 
created particular images of the Orient to serve their own purposes. Jung's approach 
to Buddhism was sometimes influenced by a 'Eurocentric' prejudice, which led him 
to misunderstand some of the concepts of Buddhism by projecting Western concerns 
and ideas onto Buddhist thought. The thesis aims to demonstrate that Jung suffers 
from a colonial frame of mind which not only reifies East and West but places them in 
a relationship of domination and servitude for the sake of affirming European identity 
and superiority. For instance, Jung believed that the Eastern mentality is 
fundamentally different from the Western one as it has emerged from quite different 
history and cultural traditions. Jung elaborated East/West psychic relativism in terms 
of the introverted and extraverted distinction. However, Jung's psychic relativism 
seems to be over-simplified and sharply contrasts the extraverted attitude of the West 
and the introverted attitude of the East. Furthermore, Jung sometimes seems to speak 
as ifhe has some kind of intellectual authority over Asian religions and to suggest that 
his psychological interpretation is the correct one. This attitude contradicts Jung's 
relativistic standpoint, that is, there is no final definitive interpretation of the text. 
This t~sis will examine Jung's ambiguous and unclear attitude towards Buddhism. 
A discussion of Gadamer's theory of hermeneutics is presented in order to 
contrast it with Jung's approach to Buddhism. Jung's approach generally 
demonstrates elements of hermeneutics such as a holistic and open-ended 
interpretation based on a tendency for contexualism and relativism. Jung was aware 
of the 'difference' of Eastern religions and of the difficulties inherent in 
understanding ideas which were quite foreign to European thought. However, within 
a hermeneutical framework Jung attempted to make sense of these foreign ideas by 
way of the method of amplification, which aimed at clarifying obscure meanings 
through the use of metaphors and analogies derived from mythological and religious 
contexts. In this way Jung interpreted the religious symbolism of the Buddhist 
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tradition to reveal its meaning and context in a creative manner. For instance, lung 
interpreted the Tibetan tantric mandala as a symbol of psychic wholeness which helps 
to integrate the conscious and the unconscious parts of the psyche into a balanced 
whole personality. Thus lung suggested that the mandala best symbolises the 
archetype of the self. lung also examined a number of mandala images derived from 
the dreams and fantasies of his patients and discovered these mandala images tend to 
appear in conditions of psychic dissociation. lung interpreted this tendency of 
mandala images as a expression of need to resolve psychological tensions. Thus 
working though these images, for lung, could bring these psychic disorientations into 
mutual reconciliation from both the conscious and the unconscious. 
To provide a contrast with lung's hermeneutcial method, the 
phenomenological approach to religion is examined. A phenomenological approach 
emphasises the recognition of the irreducibility of religious phenomena and claims 
that we must understand religion within its own cultural context. From the 
perspective of the phenomenology of religion, lung's methodology lacks objectivity 
and fails to exercise epoche, that is, suspension of one's own judgement or the 
exclusion of every possible presupposition. Rather, lung seems to over-emphasise 
eidetic vision, which is a form of subjectivity and implies an intuitive grasp of the 
essentials of a situation in its wholeness. Also, lung's use of the method of 
amplification, described above, demonstrates important hermeneutical principles. 
This thesis examines the extent to which lung's hermeneutical approach to 
understanding Eastern religions is compatible with his claims to also adopt a 
phenomenological approach. 
lung frequently claimed that it is not his aim to introduce Buddhist teachings 
to the West. As a psychologist, lung tended to focus on the 'psychological' aspects of 
Buddhism and paid insufficient attention to its traditional meanings. This leaves him 
open to the criticism of engaging in psychological reductionism. It must be noted that 
lung was not concerned with the significance of Tibetan mandalas within their own 
cultural context. In his writings lung did not discuss mandalas as religious teachings 
and ritual instructions which the practitioner must follow under the guidance of his or 
her lama, whose main task is to help the him or her to properly understand and 
practise the teachings and oral instructions. lung was mainly concerned with 
psychological aspects of the mandala symbols which he discovered from his empirical 
research. lung was also highly selective in his use of Buddhist texts, namely he 
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selected only those Buddhist texts (or parts of texts) which appeared to suit his 
psychological thinking while ignoring or dismissing other Buddhist materials which 
shared no common base with his psychology. Thus Jung's hermeneutical 
understanding of Buddhism ignored the crucial issue that the 'right' understanding is 
pivotal in any Buddhist tradition. 
This thesis argues that Jung's attitude toward Buddhism may seem to be 
ambivalent at times: on the one hand Jung demonstrates his positive attitude toward 
the teachings of Buddha, but on the other hand he displays his negative attitude 
toward Western application of Buddhist meditations and spiritual practices. Within 
the framework of post-Kantian empiricism Jung could not understand the final stage 
of yoga, samadhi, in which the flow of consciousness is so completely identified with 
the object alone that there is a complete loss of ego consciousness, since he cannot 
conceive of any consciousness without reference to an ego. Jung claims that a direct 
application of yoga is not suitable for Europeans. Instead, Jung invented a method 
called 'active imagination' aiming at spontaneously bringing the unconscious contents 
to the conscious, while the ego is at work to some extent. 
Jung's 'misinterpretation' of Eastern religion is a crucial issue in this thesis. 
In his study of Buddhism, Jung believed that through the method of amplification he 
discovered a number of similarities between Buddhist thought and his psychological 
theory. For example, Jung amplified the meaning of tantric mandala and equated it 
with his concept of archetype of the self. Jung seems to suggest to the reader that 
what Analytical Psychology is doing is in fact Buddhism in Western form. This 
thesis extensively examines and compares Buddhist thought and Jung's understanding 
of it. It attempts to disclose that there is a chasm between Jung and Buddhism, since 
Jung unfortunately failed to understand Buddhist concepts within the traditional and 
cultural context, and thus provided a misrepresentation of Buddhism. 
0.2 The literature on Jung and Buddhism 
This research has relied principally on primary sources, in particular an extensive 
reading and detailed examination of Jung's psychological writings from the twenty 
volumes of The Collected Works o/C.G. Jung CW 11, Psychology and Religion: West 
and East. This is especially significant to this thesis as it contains many of Jung's 
writings on Eastern religions and philosophies. In addition, the lectures and seminars, 
which Jung delivered, such as The Zofingia Lectures (1896-1899), The Seminars: 
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Dream Analysis (1928-1930), and The Seminars: Nietzche's Zarathustra (1934-1939), 
and Jung's correspondence published as Letters Vol. 1: 1906-1950, and Vol. 11: 1951-
1961, and his autobiography, Memories, Dreams, Reflections (1993) are also useful, 
since they include his psychological discussion on Eastern thought. 
F or Buddhist texts, this thesis mainly relies on English translations of 
Buddhist material. For Tibetan Buddhist texts, W.Y. Evans-Wentz' edition of The 
Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation (1954) and The Tibetan Book of the Dead 
(1960) are essential for this research, since Jung wrote psychological commentaries to 
these texts and had a fruitful correspondence with the editor. However, Evans-Wentz' 
texts have serious translation problems. F. Fremantle and C. Trungpa (1975), and 
Robert A.F. Thurman (1994) re-translated The Tibetan Book of the Dead, and 
attempted to reveal a closer understanding of the original text of the Bardo Thadol. 
John Myrdhin Reynolds (1989) retranslated and commented on The Tibetan Book of 
the Great Liberation. Reynolds' translation is particularly useful, as it has an 
excellent discussion of important misconceptions about Tibetan Buddhism and the 
Eastern mind in the writings of Jung based on the errors of Evans-Wentz. 
For Zen Buddhism, D.T. Suzuki produced a large number of writings on Zen 
Buddhism in English. Of particular importance for this thesis is Introduction to Zen 
Buddhism (1969), which Jung relied on in his understanding of Zen Buddhist 
teachings and wrote a foreword to. Daniel J. Meckel and Robert L. Moore's Self and 
Liberation (1992) contains English translations of the Jung and Hisamatsu 
conversation which took place in 1958. But Meckel and Moore's translation is 
problematic and has a number of misunderstandings and mistranslations. Shoji 
Muramoto (1998) clarified mistranslations in the original transcription of the 
dialogue. Muramoto's transcription is clearly superior and is the one used in this 
thesis. The Jung-Hisamatsu conversation is particularly significant because of the 
question it generates regarding a possible mutual point of dialogue between Jung's 
Analytical Psychology and Buddhist thought. 
Recent years have seen a growing interest in the relationship between C.G. 
Jung's psychology and Eastern philosophies and religions and there is a growing 
literature on these questions in English. These literatures are of great importance to 
this dissertation as they principally deal with Jung's engagement with Eastern thought 
in general and Buddhism in particular. J.J. Clarke's book, Jung and Eastern Thought 
(1994) offers an excellent examination of Jung's psychological writings on Eastern 
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thought, particularly Taoism, Hinduism, and Buddhism, and discusses this issue in the 
context of the West's dialogue with the East. Clarke's analysis of Jung's dialogical 
approach from the perspective of hermeneutics and his discussion of recent 
controversies about Orientalism in relation to Jung are the most useful for this 
research. Another important scholar who has written at length on this topic is Harold 
Coward. Coward's book, Jung and Eastern Thought (1985) provides a critical 
examination of Jung's relation to Eastern thought, particularly looking at his 
understanding of yoga and Indian traditions. Luis O. Gomez (1995) and Donald S. 
Lopez, Jr. (1995 and 1998) are particularly beneficial and they examine the manner in 
which an Orientalist bias and a colonial frame of mind manifest themselves in Jung's 
writings on Eastern religions by exploring his ambivalent attitude towards the East, 
i.e., the positive and negative attitude which Jung adopted. Richard H. Jones's article 
"Jung and Eastern Religious Traditions" in Religion (1979) is particularly important 
in the context of my thesis and provides a highly critical examination of Jung's 
understanding of Eastern religions and criticises Jung for distorting these religious 
traditions through the conceptual framework of his psychological thinking. Eric J. 
Sharpe (1975) offers a detailed survey of the history of comparative religion, and 
discusses this issue in the context of Jung's approach to the study of religion. 
There are literatures which undertake a biographical account of general works 
of Jung's psychology. These literatures are particularly important in the context of 
my thesis in order to understand the history and the context of development of Jung's 
psychological ideas. G. Wehr (1988) provides an excellent biography of Jung, which 
includes useful chapters on Jung's relation to Eastern thought, the Eranos conference 
and his trip to India. The appendix is particularly beneficial and offers a critical 
examination of Jung's engagement in a dialogue between East and West. Frank 
McLynn (1996) gives a chronological account of Jung' psychological works, 
including a chapter on his relation to Eastern thought. 
A range of work addresses Jung's relation to Tibetan and Zen Buddhist 
traditions. Literatures of this kind are beneficial in the context of my thesis, since 
they offer a detailed examination of Jung's understanding of the specific tradition of 
Buddhist teachings and practices. Radmila Moacanin (1986) discusses the link 
between Jung's Analytical psychology and Tibetan Buddhism. However, this work is 
less concerned with differences between the two systems, and is sometimes not only 
led astray but also generates a series of highly problematic conclusions regarding 
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Tibetan spirituality. Moacanin seems to blindly rely on Jung's view of Tibetan 
Buddhism, which often contains a number of fundamental errors and 
misinterpretations of the text. With more particular reference to Tibetan Buddhism, 
Peter Bishop (1993) provides important discussion of the use and misuse of Eastern 
ideas in the West, and focuses in particular on Jung's understanding of Tibetan 
Buddhism. 
J. Marvin Spiegelman and Mokusen Miyuki (1985) provide a collection of 
writings which seek a link between Analytical Psychology and Zen Buddhism. 
Miyuki highlights some striking similarities between a series of Zen Buddhist ox-
herding pictures and Jung' s theory of the individuation process. Erich Fromm (1950 
and 1960) provides a critical examination of Jung's relation to Buddhism and argues 
that Jung misunderstood the nature of the satori experience in Zen because of his 
general relativistic position with regard to the truth of religious experience. There are 
many other significant writings which focus on Jung's relationship with Buddhism. 
Through a solid analysis of the available pUblications on this issue, this thesis 
attempts to demonstrate a whole view of Jung's engagement with Buddhism. 
0.3 Methodology 
This thesis principally focuses on Jung's relation to Buddhism. This study is 
conducted by an extensive reading and detailed examination of primary sources, both 
Jung's psychological writings on the East and English translations of Buddhist 
material. In addition it is essential to carry out a comprehensive analysis of secondary 
sources, especially publications and articles on Jung's Analytical Psychology 
including biographies of Jung; books on Buddhism; and publications dealing with 
Jung's relation to Eastern thought in general and his understanding of Buddhism in 
particular. A chronological survey and a historical account of Jung's dialogue with 
the East is developed, which attempts to illustrate the impact of Buddhism on the 
formation of his psychological thought in relation to Oriental ideas. Buddhism is of 
great significance in understanding Jung and his psychoanalytic theory as he 
frequently discussed Buddhist teachings and practice throughout his writings. Jung's 
interest in Buddhism started in his youth and discussed Buddhist thought at the 
Zofingia Lectures in his student days. His enthusiasm for Buddhism lasted until the 
end of his life. This study also seeks to explore Jung's dialogue with the East in the 
wider historical context, and discusses the recent controversies about Orientalism in 
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relation to Jung. From the Nineteenth Century, with the growth of Orientalism, 
Buddhism gradually became a popular subject in the West and has been discussed in 
various fields of research. Buddhism particularly had an impact on Western 
philosophers such as Schopenhauer, through whose work Jung undoubtedly became 
familiar with the philosophy and religions of the East. It is a crucial task to address, 
from the perspective of Edward Said's discussion of Orientalism, the issue of 
prejUdices and assumptions which Jung inherited from the intellectual traditions in the 
West, and to examine Western attitudes of superiority and cultural hegemony which 
have seriously distorted Jung's perception of non-Western cultures. 
A conceptual framework for the examination of Jung's relation to Buddhism is 
provided, by presenting a detailed account of Hans-Georg Gadamer's theory of 
hermeneutics, which is a key subject to understand Jung's dialogical approach to 
Eastern religions. Secondly the theory of the phenomenology of religion mainly from 
the perspectives of W. Brede Kristensen and G. ven der Leeuw is addressed, in order 
to contrast it with the hermeneutical approach and demonstrate how religious 
experiences and traditions can be interpreted. This thesis argues that Jung's method 
of interpreting Buddhist texts is characterised as holism, contexualism, open-
endedness and historical relativism, all of which are the features of a hermeneutical 
understanding. By contrast, as this develops, a different approach to the 
understanding of religion is discussed through methods of epoche and eidetic vision, 
which are important concepts in the phenomenology of religion. Within the 
framework of hermeneutics and phenomenology, this thesis attempts to highlight the 
strengths and weaknesses of Jung's approach to Buddhism. 
This thesis principally focuses its attention on Jung's relationship to 
Buddhism. Firstly, because in the limited space, this thesis cannot comprehensively 
address whole areas of Eastern religions and philosophies which Jung was interested 
in, and there is a growing number of scholars who have already paid critical attention 
to a wide range of Eastern religious traditions, such as Hindu yoga and Chinese 
Taoism, in relation to Jung's psychological thought. Secondly, Jung's attachment to 
Asian religions is most noticeable in the case of Buddhism. Jung's life-long 
enthusiasm for the teachings of Buddha and its traditions appears throughout his 
writings. Furthermore, Jung's frequent reservations concerning the adoption in the 
West of Eastern practices seems to be quieter in the case of Buddhism, and late in his 
life his position became extremely close to the ways and ideas of Buddhist traditions. 
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Consequently there is a discussion of Jung's relation to Buddhism by dealing with 
specific texts and concepts, ranging through the major historical traditions of 
Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhism. 
This is followed by a detailed examination of Jung's relation to Tibetan 
Buddhism and Zen Buddhism. This thesis looks in detail at Jung's relation to 
Mahayana Buddhist traditions, particularly the Tibetan and Zen Buddhist traditions. 
These texts were significant in the formation of Jung's psychological theory, and 
offered a number of confirmations for his psychological thinking. Another area that 
receives only general attention is Jung's relation to Pure Land Buddhism. Jung only 
discussed particular types of Mahayana meditation, that is, Pure Land, Tantric and 
Zen Buddhist meditation practices. 
0.4 Outline of thesis 
The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter One examines Jung's relationship with 
Eastern thought in general. In his early career, Jung was interested in mythological 
and religious studies in relation to schizophrenics. Consequently Jung discovered a 
connection between schizophrenic delusions and mythical motifs, and argued that the 
collective symbols of mythology and world religions could transform libido from an 
unconscious to a conscious level. Jung developed this from a variety of sources, 
including the myths and symbols of Hindu and Buddhist literatures. It is argued that 
Jung's enthusiasm for studying Eastern religion resulted from his profound concern 
with the spiritual crisis of the West, that is, his belief that Europeans tend to focus 
their attention on the materialistic outer environment at the cost of their inner psychic 
needs. However, Jung believed that the myths and religious symbols of the East are 
involved with the direct experience of the inner world of the self-knowledge, and that 
understanding the teachings of the Oriental religions would help in the formation of a 
spiritual cure for the West. 
A chronological examination of Jung's study of Chinese Taoism, Hindu 
philosophy, yoga, and Buddhism is then given. Jung believed that a dialogue with the 
East was a way to discover what had been lost in the West. Thus, for Jung, studying 
Eastern religion and philosophy was very important as it offered him a confirmation 
of the existence of the human psyche as a teleological system which seeks the 
integration of consciousness with the unconscious. Having discussed the 
development of Jung's dialogue with Eastern thought, this chapter, then, addresses 
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this issue in view of recent controversies following the publication of E. Said's 
Orientalism (1978), and seeks to examine the manner in which an Oriental bias and a 
colonial frame of mind manifest themselves in lung's writings on Eastern religions. 
Chapter Two examines lung's approaches to understanding Eastern religion 
from the perspective of Gadamer's theory of hermeneutics. It is argued that lung's 
method of understanding patients, alchemy, mythology, Occidental and Oriental 
religions shows the features of a hermeneutical approach. Above all, lung's 
hermeneutical strategy is expressed by explaining his method of amplification, which 
seeks to clarify psychic contents by linking them within a network of meanings 
expressed in symbols and images through using metaphors and analogies derived 
from mythological and religious contexts. lung applied the method of amplification 
in his interpretation of Buddhist thought largely through the postulation of analogies. 
I also examine the problem with lung's tendency to make parallels between the 
spiritual method of the East and the practice of psychotherapy, as a result of which 
Eastern spiritual disciplines are squeezed to fit into his own model of psychological 
development. lung's psychological reductionism can be seen throughout his writings 
on the Eastern religions. By contrast, the phenomenology of religion is discussed as 
this develops a different understanding of religion in order to argue that lung's 
methodology lacks objectivity and fails to exercise epoche, which indicates 
suspension of judgement and the exclusion from one's mind of every possible 
presupposition. However, from the perspective of eidetic vision, which is the 
observer's capacity for seeing the essentials of a situation as opposed to what it has 
been or ought to be, the phenomenology of religion inevitably involves a certain 
degree of SUbjectivity and is closer to lung's hermeneutical position. 
Chapter Three examines the history and context of lung's relation to the 
Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhist traditions. It is argued that lung focussed on the 
'psychological' aspects of Buddhism, which he regarded as a useful tool and possible 
basis of therapeutic method. lung studied Buddhism from a particular perspective and 
with a particular aim. Thus lung's understanding of Buddhist concepts such as 
nirvana develops sharp contrasts with its meaning within its traditional and cultural 
context. lung's selective approach to Buddhist materials is also discussed as lung did 
not offer a systematic account of Buddhism. lung paid considerable attention to 
Mahayana Buddhism, and wrote psychological commentaries for translations of 
particular Mahayana texts of Tibetan and Zen Buddhism. He also gave lectures on 
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Pure Land Buddhist meditation. However, Jung only looked at these specific texts 
and teachings. Most of the other Mahayana traditions are excluded from his attention. 
For instance, Jung had very little to say about the significant concepts of Mahayana 
Buddhism such as the Bodhisattva or Nagarjuna's concept of the Middle Way. A 
careful examination of Jung's study of Buddhism shows that Jung was more familiar 
with Hinayana Buddhist thought and thus Mahayana Buddhism was sometimes 
interpreted through his knowledge of Hinayana Buddhism. However Jung hardly 
discussed Theravada meditation practices such as vipassana meditation. 
Chapter Four considers in detail Jung's understanding of Tibetan Buddhism: 
his study of the W.Y. Evans-Wentz edition of The Tibetan Book of the Dead (1935), 
and The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation (1939), for which Jung wrote 
psychological commentaries, and Tibetan tantric mandalas, which he discussed at 
great length in his writings. Jung's understanding of karma, which is the main 
argument of his psychological commentary on The Tibetan Book of the Dead is 
discussed. Jung interpreted karma as psychic heredity, namely, the inheritance of 
psychic characteristics, and equated the Chonyid Bardo with his developing notion of 
archetypes. At this stage Jung rejected the notion of personal karma, but later in his 
life Jung appeared to modify his theory of karma and became much closer to 
traditional Buddhist thought. Jung's scepticism concerning the Tibetan concept of the 
Dharmakaya as a complete identification of the ego with the archetypes, which in his 
view leads to psychosis is also discussed. In order to make sense of the Tibetan text 
to Europeans, Jung recommended that it should be read in reverse order. Jung's 
commentary on The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation, contains several 
misunderstandings, which may have been caused by Evans-Wentz' faulty translation 
of the text. Finally, Jung's hermeneutical understanding of Tibetan tantric mandalas, 
which Jung equated with the archetype of the self is addressed. 
Chapter Five examines Jung's relation to Zen Buddhism, particularly his 
foreword to D.T. Suzuki's An Introduction to Zen Buddhism (1939). Compared to his 
relation to Tibetan materials, Jung adopted a relatively close position to Zen 
Buddhism. Jung's understanding of satori, which is one of the most important 
concepts in Zen Buddhism is considered first. Jung interpreted satori as a break-
through by a consciousness limited to the ego-form into the non-ego-like self. Jung 
went on to say that in the satori experience the ego becomes itself the object of an 
another subject, the self. This is extremely similar to Jung's idea of the individuation 
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process in which there is the shifting of the centre of gravity from the ego to the self. 
Jung never conceived of the consciousness without ego but his claim of the 
objectification of the ego does not seem to indicate the loss of the ego but is similar to 
the concept of emptiness or Hakuin's concept of Great Death, in which one has to 
objectify one's ego in order to abandon any intentional standpoint at all and thus 
create empty consciousness. The Jung-Hisamatsu conversation of 1958 is considered 
in detail, in particular the key theme of Jung's affirmative answer to the question 
posed by Hisamatsu on the possibility of liberation from the collective unconscious. 
Lastly, the Christian-Zen Buddhist dialogue and the relationship between the Zen ox-
herding pictures and Jung's theory of the individuation process are addressed in order 
to display a possible dialogue between Western psychology and Buddhism. 
Chapter Six, the concluding chapter, offers an overall appraisal of Jung's 
engagement with Buddhist traditions. I recapitulate the main features of my argument 
in each of the chapters and evaluate the significance and importance of Jung's study 
of Buddhism. In the light of the generally, though not exclusively, critical approach 
to Jung's interpretation of Buddhism in this thesis, the final chapter raises the question 
of why Jung's 'misinterpretation' of Buddhist traditions is an issue. This dissertation 
examines the reservations and qualifications arising from Jung's own reflections on 
his task, and discusses some of the apparent shortcomings which are found in Jung's 
hermeneutical approach, by examining his warnings concerning the adoption of 
Eastern spiritual techniques by Westerners. Furthermore, it examines Jung's 
inconsistent attitudes towards the metaphysical assumption of the East, i.e., on the one 
hand Jung dismisses such assumptions, but on the other hand Jung himself is involved 
with the metaphysical position by addressing such a concept as the archetypes. 
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Chapter One: 
Jung's Dialogue with the East 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents a history of lung's interest in Eastern thought. lung 
enthusiastically studied Eastern thought, such as Chinese philosophy, the Hindu 
tradition and Buddhist ideas throughout his life. lung was, on the one hand, an 
enthusiastic admirer of Oriental religious ideas, yet, on the other hand, he repeatedly 
warned against the uncritical adoption of Eastern spiritual methods. Nevertheless, the 
influence of Oriental thought on lung's Analytical Psychology was particularly 
significant, in that he believed the East offered a confirmation of his psychological 
ideas. lung was concerned with the 'psychic imbalance' of Europeans due to what he 
believed was a one-sided emphasis on external materialism at the expense of inner 
psychic needs. lung called this situation, 'a spiritual crisis,' and sought a solution to 
it. He suggested that since the Enlightenment and the Scientific Revolution in the 
West, European culture had tended to overlook its religious traditions and rituals and 
eventually lost touch with these sources of individual and cultural meaning. For lung 
however, the fullness of human life requires a quest for ultimate meaning in the realm 
of myth and religion. lung believed the religious function involved the activity of 
harmonising in symbolic form. The archetypal symbolism of things in myth and 
religion become meaningful when appropriated into the experiential world of the 
individual. Thus, lung's enthusiasm for Eastern thought can be seen as closely linked 
to his concern with the one-sidedness of the European psyche and his psychological 
justification of religious symbolism. 
This chapter firstly examines lung's interest in religion and mythology in his 
early career as an analytical psychologist. lung became interested in mythological 
and religious studies in relation to schizophrenics. lung saw a connection between 
schizophrenic delusions and mythical motifs, and argued that the collective symbols 
of mythology and world religions could transform libido from an unconscious to a 
conscious level. lung developed this from a variety of sources, including the myths 
and symbols in the oriental philosophies and religions. Secondly, the chapter 
examines lung's relationship with Chinese philosophy, in particular Richard 
Wilhelm's translations of the I Ching and The Secret of the Golden Flower. It is 
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argued that familiarity with Chinese philosophy led to a significant change in Jung's 
theory. The third section addresses Jung's engagement with Indian philosophy and 
yoga. Jung's attitude towards Hinduism was more complex than his attitude to 
Chinese alchemy, he was not as enamoured by India and Indian philosophy and was 
especially critical of the practice of yoga by Westerners, which he believed may lead 
to psychic dissociation illness such as schizophrenia, namely, a complete 
identification of the ego with unconscious materials. This is followed by an 
examination of Jung's relationship with Buddhism. Contrary to his negative view of 
Hinduism, Jung was especially interested in Buddhist thought and his fascination with 
Buddhism lasted until the end of his life. Lastly, this chapter discusses the issue of 
Orientalism in relation to Jung's dialogue with Eastern religions and philosophies. 
1.1 The history of Jung's interest in Eastern thought 
1.1.1 The spiritual problem of modern man 
Jung claimed that many people in the West in the twentieth century were undergoing 
what he termed a spiritual crisis. Jung asserts, "Spiritually the Western world is in a 
precarious situation, and the danger is greater the more we blind ourselves to the 
merciless truth with illusions about our beauty of soul" (CW 10: 183). Elsewhere he 
writes, "everywhere the mental state of European man shows an alarming lack of 
balance. Weare living undeniably in a period of the greatest restlessness, nervous 
tension, confusion, and disorientation of outlook" (CW 11: 514). The development of 
science and technology in the West had led, he believed, to over-attention to the outer 
material world at the expense of the inner psychic world. Jung was critical of too 
much emphasis on materialism, as it could create a situation in which, "a real human 
psyche appears to be excluded" (CW 10: 498). Jung believed this spiritual crisis in 
Western man can be traced back to the Enlightenment and the Scientific Revolution. 
As a consequence of these developments, European culture tended to overlook its 
ancient traditions which were rich in sources of archetypal myths, images and rituals. 
As a result, Western man had lost touch with his sources of individual and cultural 
meaning, and thus became a slave to social and political forces. Jung argued, 
Ordinary reasonableness, sound human judgement, science as a compendium of 
common sense ... afford no answer to the question of psychic suffering and its 
profound significance. A psychoneurosis must be understood, ultimately, as the 
suffering of a soul which has not discovered its meaning. But all creativeness in 
the realm of the spirit as well as every psychic advance of man arises from the 
suffering of the soul, and the cause of the suffering is spiritual stagnation, or 
psychic sterility. 
(CW 11: 497) 
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In order to understand Jung's answer to the spiritual problems of the West, it is 
important to look at his view of religion. In his early life Jung was ambivalent 
towards Christianity and had complex emotions about his father, Paul Jung, a 
Lutheran pastor. In his school days Jung had a terrifying thought that God dropped a 
enormous turd and shattered Basel Cathedral (MDR: 52-6). Far from feeling that he 
would suffer divine wrath for his vision, Jung had a sense of the closeness of divine 
grace. Jung describes, 
I felt an enormous, an indescribable relief. Instead of the expected damnation, 
grace had come upon me, and with it an unutterable bliss such as I had never 
known. I wept for happiness and gratitude. The wisdom and goodness of God 
had been revealed to me now that I had yielded to His inexorable command. 
(MDR: 56) 
His experience of this vision of God made Jung conclude that God could be terrible 
and raised in his mind the issue of the problem of evil. Jung asserts, "This was what 
my father had not understood, I thought; he had failed to experience the will of God, 
had opposed it for the best reasons and out of the deepest faith" (MDR: 56-7). Jung 
became more doubtful about everything his father said, and "what he said sounded to 
stale and hollow" (MDR: 59). When he was eighteen Jung had many discussions 
with his father about religion but the discussions came to an unsatisfactory end. His 
father claimed, "You always want to think. One ought not to think but believe" 
(MDR: 60). However, Jung said to himself, "No, one must experience and know" 
(MDR: 60). Attending the communion became a chore for Jung. Jung asserts, "this 
ceremony contained no trace of God - not for me, at any rate" (MDR: 72). In the 
communion Jung observed no sign of union, becoming one with God. Jung asserted, 
The communion proved hollow; more than that, it had proved to be a total loss. 
I knew that I would never again be able to participate in this ceremony. 'Why, 
that is not religion at all,' I thought. 'It is an absence of God; the church is a 
place I should not go to. It is not life which is there, but death'. 
(MDR: 73) 
None of these events such as the communion, the religious sermons in the Church or 
the theological discussions with his father, revealed divine experience to Jung as his 
vision of Basel cathedral had. 
Some years later Jung states in his writing, "the soul possesses by nature a 
religious function" (CW 12: 14). The soul is used broadly by Jung in the same sense 
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as the totality of human psyche as a unity of the conscious and unconscious mind. In 
his definition of religion, Jung states, "Religion, as the Latin word denotes, is a 
careful and scrupulous observation of what Rudolf Otto aptly termed the 
numinousum, that is, a dynamic agency or effect not caused by an arbitrary act of 
will" (CW 11: 6). Hence, M. Watanabe argues that statements of Jung's such as, "the 
soul is by nature religious function" seem to imply that, "the human subject is 
equipped with an innate disposition to revere the numinous" (Watanabe, 1991: 25). 
In the Zojingia Lectures, Jung discussed 'causal instinct' in connection with a human 
religiosity.l Marie-Louise von Franz (1983) argues that 'causal instinct' is an 
individual urge to understand the causes of things, in other words, a drive towards the 
discovery of meaning (von Franz, 1983: xx). Jung maintained, 
Man wants to know why and what for, just as he wants his own actions and 
those of his fellow men to have a purpose. Man is a Prometheus who steals 
lightening from heaven in order to bring light into the pervasive darkness of the 
great riddle. He knows that there is a meaning in nature, that the world conceals 
a mystery which it is the purpose of his life to discover. 
(CWA: 194) 
Watanabe asserts, "through this passionate desire for knowledge, the human being 
asks after the meaning of the world and a raison d'etre for being alive, not satisfied 
with what the realm of philosophy and science can deliver but pressing on to ultimate 
meaning in the realms of myths and religion" (Watanabe, 1991: 26). Thus Jung's 
notion of 'causal instinct' is the inclination that gives rise to myth and religion. Jung 
claims, 
In every healthy, reflective person the simple need to satisfy the principle of 
causality develops into a metaphysical longing, into religion. When the first 
man asked: 'why?' and tried to investigate the reason for some change, science 
was born. But science alone does not satisfy anyone. It must be expanded into 
what DeWitte calls a philosophy 'full of faith and enthusiasm, which alone 
merits the exalted name of wisdom.' Every genuine philosophy, as the 
complete expression of metaphysical desire, is religion. Religion is the mother 
who receives her children with loving arms when they flee to her terrified by the 
confusion and the 'merciless tumult of nature stripped of its gods,' and driven to 
despair by the shattering enigma of existence. 
(CWA: 181) 
Therefore, in Jung's view, in order to live a fully human life, one requires myth and 
religion. The lack of such meaning can only lead us to affliction. Jung points out, 
I Marie-Louise Von Franz argues that lung borrowed the term 'causal instinct' from Edward von 
Hartmann (von Franz, 1983: xx). 
Man positively needs general ideas and convictions that will give a meaning to 
his life and enable him to find his place in the universe. He can stand the most 
incredible hardships when he is convinced that they make sense; but he is 
crushed when, on top of all his misfortunes, he has to admit that he is taking 
part in a 'tale told by an idiot.' 
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(CW 18: 566) 
From this perspective, Jung claimed, "It is the purpose and endeavour of religious 
symbols to give a meaning to the life of man" (CW 18: 567). However, there is a 
clear distinction in Jungian psychology between individual meaning and collective 
meaning in symbolism. Watanabe argues, "The collective meaning contained in the 
archetypal symbolism of things like myth is psychologically meaningless as far as its 
surface content goes, and it is only when it has been appropriated into the experiential 
world of the individual that it becomes meaningful" (Watanabe, 1991: 31). In the 
same sense, 'religion' for Jung, has always to be kept distinct from a 'creed.' 
Confession of a particular creed belongs to a definite religious organisation and 
provides a position of worldly authority, whereas religion, "expresses a subjective 
relationship to certain metaphysical, extramundane factors" (CW 10: 507). Thus, for 
Jung, "the meaning and purpose of religion lie in the relationship of the individual to 
God (Christianity, Judaism, Islam) or to the path of salvation and liberation 
(Buddhism)" (CW 10: 507). This means that the true meaning which mystical and 
religious symbolism has for us is not exhausted by merely knowing about the symbol 
but by our appropriating it as an inner fact. 
For Jung the religious function involves the activity of harmonising the 
balance between ego-consciousness and the collective unconscious in symbolic form, 
and thus maintains the health of the psyche. Jung speaks of the "religious instinct for 
wholeness" (CW 10: 653). Watanabe explains this as, "the human person is disposed 
to seek psychic integration and to heal the inner dividedness of the psyche" 
(Watanabe, 1991: 28). Watanabe claims this may lead to Jung's idea of the 
transcendent function, which is a spontaneous unconscious activity which co-
ordinates the various functions of the psyche, such as thought, feeling, sensation and 
intuition, and transforms the one-sidedness of consciousness by uniting the opposites 
of the conscious and the unconscious mind into a single totality. Jung speaks of this 
activity as the process of individuation. 
1.1.2 JUllg's engagement with Eastern religion 
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In the early years of his career Jung became interested in mythological and religious 
studies in relation to schizophrenics. In 1911 Jung was working on Symbol of 
Transformation in which he used mythological studies to show that there is a 
similarity between the cosmogonies of primitive races and the fantasies of 
schizophrenics. 
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Jung investigated Theodore Flournoy's pUblication of the fantasies 
of Miss Frank Miller. Miss Miller produced three main fantasies which became vital 
evidence for Jung to link schizophrenic delusions with mythical motifs. Jung also 
came to argue that the collective symbols of mythology and world religions could 
transform libido from the unconscious to a conscious level. In Symbol of 
Transformation Jung used a variety of sources including Sanskrit and Hindu 
literatures and the myths and symbols of Eastern cultures. 
At this point a significant disagreement emerged between Freud and Jung on 
the subject of the libido. For Freud, the concept of libido remained primarily 
psychosexual in nature, whereas, for Jung, it referred to a more neutral sense of 
psychic energy. Freud disregarded Jung's argument of the libido on the basis of data 
drawn from religion, mythology and occultism. In 1913 their disagreement 
eventually led to the breakdown of their collaboration and friendship. During 1913-
14, after the break with Freud, Jung became more mentally and psychologically 
unstable. Jung reflected in later life that, "a period of inner uncertainty began for me. 
lt would be no exaggeration to call it a state of disorientation" (MDR: 194). From 
1912 to 1920, Jung was undergoing a process of radical introversion and he became 
preoccupied with his inner images and the materials that burst forth, such as dreams 
and waking fantasies. For instance, Jung often sketched in a notebook mandala-like 
figures which he thought corresponded to his inner situation at the time. In Sanskrit, 
mandala means circle and its typical features are quaternity, and a circle containing a 
cross, a star and a square. The most sophisticated mandalas are seen in Tibetan 
Buddhism. Jung also found mandala figures in dreams and the fantasies of 
schizophrenics. In the therapeutic process Jung considered the appearance of 
mandalas in dreams and fantasies as an indication that psychic healing is taking place. 
Later Jung argued the mandala symbol was an expression of the self, the goal of 
psychic development. 
2 Symbols of Transformation is composed of three parts: the fIrst part was published in the 1911-12 
edition of Jabrbuch, and the second and third parts in the 1912-13 edition (McLynn, 1998). 
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Jung characterised the images and fantasies as archetypes, which, as 
autonomous psychic entities, are never directly apprehended by consciousness, and 
are located in the collective unconscious. Jung later refined his concept of archetype 
by introducing the distinction between 'psychoid,' the archetype as it is in itself, and 
'archetypal image,' the archetypes as they manifest themselves in myths, dreams and 
fantasies and are shaped by the idea required by the conscious mind. Jung went on to 
theorise the 'archetypes as psychoid' as transcendent realities and therefore 
transpsychic. Furthermore, they are form without content and thus are 
irrerepresentable in nature. F.X. Charet argues that the formulations of the concept of 
archetypes, "moved Jung beyond the limits of empirical science and involved his 
psychology in metapsychological questions that are fundamentally religious in 
nature" (Charet, 1993: 293). This can be seen in Jung's statement on the aspect of the 
archetypes. 
The archetypes have, when they appear, a distinctly numinous character which 
can only be described as 'spiritual,' if 'magical' is too strong a word. 
Consequently this phenomenon is of the utmost significance for the psychology 
of religion. .. It not frequently happens that the archetype appears in the form of 
a spirit in dreams or fantasy-products, or even comports itself like a ghost. 
There is a mystical aura about its numinosity, and it has a corresponding effect 
upon the emotions. It mobilizes philosophical and religious convictions in the 
very people who deemed themselves miles above any such fits of weakness. 
(CW 8: 405, Jung's italics) 
According to Jung, when the spiritual characteristics of archetypes are experienced by 
consciousness, this has a therapeutic function, that is, it prevents a person from, 
"sinking back into the instinctual sphere, which would only lead to blank 
unconsciousness or, worse still, to some kind of intellectual substitute for instinct" 
(CW 8: 414). 
Jung continued to study Oriental ideas throughout his life. His key interests in 
Eastern thought were with Chinese, Indian and Buddhist materials and he wrote 
several commentaries on texts from these traditions. Jung believed he saw similarities 
between Eastern religion and his psychological thinking, such as, an emphasis on 
inner psychic experience, a belief in the possibility of self-transformation, a notion of 
a pair of opposites between the conscious and the unconscious, and the idea of the self 
as the manifestation of psychic wholeness. In Jung's view, for instance, The Secret of 
the Golden Flower provided a useful illustration of psychic integration, that is the 
reconciliation of the conscious and unconscious elements of the psyche. I will 
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address this in more detail in the next section. For Jung the idea of complementary 
opposites in Eastern thought - shiva/shakti in Hindu tradition and yin/yang in Taoism 
- became a significant point of contact with his psychological ideas. Moreover, 
through the discovery of what he saw as an Eastern mentality, Jung was convinced 
that Eastern and Western psychologies are divided by fundamental differences in 
orientation. While the West developed the extraverted aspect of the psyche which 
tends to emphasise rational understanding of the external world, the East, by contrast, 
developed the introverted aspect of the psyche which focuses on the understanding of 
the inner world. Jung argued the problem of Western man is that he has developed an 
extraverted attitude at the expense of the introverted. Thus, "in the West, the outer 
man has gained the ascendancy to such an extent that he has been alienated from his 
innermost being" (CW 11: 785). What is needed for Western man is not a Christian 
faith or belief but experientially based self-knowledge. R. Aziz asserts, 
Certainly Jung's great respect for the religious systems of the East such as 
Taoism, Zen Buddhism, and Indian yoga stems from his understanding that they 
offer, through their respective methods leading to the systematic unfoldment of 
personality, so much more to the individual on the experiential level than 
Christianity. The outstanding attraction of these Eastern systems for Jung is 
that they call for the cultivation of knowledge, particularly self-knowledge, 
through direct experiential involvement. 
(Aziz, 1990: 22) 
Jung was particularly interested in Buddhist thought which attempted to explore and 
understand the world-view within the individual psyche and to find one's Buddha-
nature within oneself. Jung asserts, "Oriental philosophy has been concerned with 
these interior psychic processes for many hundreds of years and is therefore, in view 
of the great need for comparative material, of inestimable value in psychological 
research" (CW 7, p. 124-5). The East gave Jung an important confirmation of the 
existence of the human psyche. Jung points out that the East, "finds the essence of all 
things grounded in the psyche. Between the unknown essences of spirit and matter 
stands the reality of the psychic - psychic reality, the only reality we can experience 
immediately" (CW 8: 748). Furthermore, Jung believed he had discovered an 
essential connection between Eastern thought and his idea of the psyche as a 
teleological system which seeks the integration of the conscious and unconscious 
mind. In his study of Zen Buddhism Jung believed he had discovered, "[An] Eastern 
method of psychic 'healing' - i.e., 'making whole'" (CW 11: 905) which matched his 
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conception of the self. Jung also interpreted mandala symbols in Tantric Buddhism as 
symbol of psychic wholeness. 
However, it is important to note that Jung had serious reservations about the 
application of Eastern spiritual practices such as yoga and meditation in the European 
context. J ung asserts, 
I wish particularly to warn against the oft-attempted imitation of Indian 
practices and sentiments. As a rule nothing comes of it except an artificial 
stultification of our Western intelligence. 
(CW 11: 933) 
Jung was, "in principle against the uncritical appropriation of yoga practices by 
Europeans" (CW 11: 939), because, he argued, the rationalistic Western mind easily 
undervalues what it does not know and does not understand, and it is also unwilling 
and unprepared to face the dark comers of its unconscious. Jung was concerned that 
the adoption of Eastern methods would alienate individuals from their own authentic 
psychic background and thus produce the very reverse of what these systems seek to 
achieve. Jung writes, 
If we snatch these things directly from the East, we have merely indulged our 
Western acquisitiveness, confirming yet again that 'everything good is outside,' 
whence it has to be fetched and pumped into our barren souls. It seems to me 
that we have really learned something from the East when we understand that 
the psyche contains riches enough without having to be primed from outside, 
and when we feel capable of evolving out of ourselves with or without divine 
grace. 
(CW 11: 773) 
Jung claims that individuals who would truly learn from the East must look for 
Eastern values within their own psyche, rather than seeking them outside of 
themselves. Only through coming to terms with Western, "spiritual pride and 
blasphemous self-assertiveness" and through overcoming their fear of their 
unconscious, could Western individuals discover the "self-liberating power of the 
introverted mind" (CW 11: 773, Jung's italics). Thus, Jung's attitude towards Eastern 
thought appears to be ambivalent: he was an enthusiastic admirer of the East; yet at 
the same time he was sceptical of the value of an uncritical imitation of Eastern 
spiritual methods. 
1.2 Jung and Chinese philosophy 
1.2.1 The Secret of the Golden Flower 
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Although Jung never went to China and could not read Chinese, he felt a great affinity 
for Chinese philosophy, particularly Taoism, which was a major influence on the 
formation of Jung's psychological thought.3 L. Van der Post points out that, "when 
Jung spoke of the East as he often did, the East that he had mainly in his mind was 
that represented by China" (Van der Post, 1976: 57). Jung first met Richard Wilhelm 
through Count Hermann Keyserling, during a meeting of the 'School of Wisdom' in 
Darmstadt in 1922.4 Wilhelm was an ex-missionary to China and was intrigued by 
Chinese culture. He translated the I Ching and The Secret of the Golden Flower into 
German. Jung invited him to lecture at the Psychological Club in Zurich the 
following year, and they became close friends. In 1928 Wilhelm invited Jung to write 
a commentary on The Secret of the Golden Flower. However, in 1930 Wilhelm 
became ill in Frankfurt and was diagnosed as suffering a recurrence of the amoebic 
dysentery he had picked up in China. Jung was concerned with Wilhelm's state of 
mind on his return to Europe. Jung felt Wilhelm had been powerfully influenced by 
China and he, "seemed completely Chinese, in outward manner as much as in his way 
of writing and speaking" (MDR: 407), and also that he had been too quickly re-
assimilated into European society. Jung recounted that, "His dreams were filled with 
memories of China, but the images were always sad and gloomy, a clear proof that the 
Chinese contents of his mind had become negative" (CW 15: 94). Jung argued that 
the conflict between Wilhelm's love of Chinese culture and his Christian faith became 
so painful for him that this may have caused his terminal illness. Jung argued that it 
is, "a conflict between consciousness and the unconscious, which in his [Wilhelm's] 
case took the form of a clash between West and East" (MDR: 408). Wilhelm died on 
1 March, 1930, and Jung was aggrieved at the loss of his friend. 
John Clarke (1994) argues that Wilhelm's death, "may have been significant 
in convincing Jung of the dangers for a Westerner in becoming too closely identified 
3 According to B. Hannah (1976), there was an offer for Jung to go to China in about 1934 and the 
proposal originated with Erwin Rousselle, who was then director of the China Institute in Frankfurt, but 
Jung declined the offer (Hannah, 1976: 240-1). 
4 Jung fIrst met Herman Keyserling in 1922, who was a founder of the Darmstadt' School of Wisdom' . 
Paul J. Stem (1976) argues that enamoured of philosophy, a restless cultural entrepreneur, Keyserling 
was "a super-intellectual, a man who in Jung's opinion lived too exclusively in his head" (Stem, 1976: 
202). His intellectual interest was to bring about a synthesis of the wealth of Eastern and Western 
thought. The 'School of Wisdom' in Damstadt provided a forum for leading Western Eastern 
intellectuals, and Jung was among them. Keyserling fIrst became aware of Jung in the early 1920s 
through Psychological Types. Keyserling met Jung and they became friends. However, Keyserling felt 
that "even after they had known each other for years, a true intimacy never developed between them" 
(Stem, 1976: 203). For more details of his relationship to Jung, see P. Stem (1976). 
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with a non-European culture" (Clarke, 1994:197). In light of this, we can understand 
why Jung developed the idea of a fundamental psychic relativism between East and 
West. For example, Jung frequently identified an antithetical opposition between the 
introverted psychological type in the East and the extraverted in the West. Because of 
these differences, in Jung's view, it is almost impossible for Westerners to engage in 
Eastern religious practices like yoga. Jung pointed out, 
The historical development of our Western mentality cannot be compared in any 
way with the Indian. Anyone who believes that he can simply take over Eastern 
forms of thought is uprooting himself, for they do not express our Western past, 
but remain bloodless intellectual concepts that strike no chord in our inmost 
being. Weare rooted in Christian soil. 
(CW 9ii: 273) 
Jung continued, "The spiritual development of the West has been along entirely 
different lines from that of the East and has therefore produced conditions which are 
the most unfavourable soil one can think of for the application of yoga" (CW 11: 
876). These statements emphasise that it is necessary for Europeans not to lose their 
own tradition when they take on Eastern ideas and spiritual practices. To do this, 
Jung suggests that people in the West need to develop their own yoga based on the 
Christian tradition. 
During the years between 1918 and 1920 Jung had been drawing a number of 
mandalas without knowing their purposes and meanings. In 1928 Jung received from 
Wilhelm the Taoist-alchemical treatise, The Secret of the Golden Flower, which 
provided for Jung a conclusive proof that the mandala was a symbol of the self. 
Around the same time, Jung had a dream which also provided him with a 
confirmation of his ideas about the centre and the self. Jung described this 'Liverpool 
dream' as follows, 
I found myself in a dirty, sooty city. It was night, and winter, and dark, and 
raining. I was in Liverpool. With a number of Swiss - say, half a dozen - I 
walked through the dark street. I had the feeling that there we were coming 
from the harbour, and that the real city was actually up above, on the cliffs. We 
climbed up there. It reminded me of Basel, where the market is down below 
and then you go up through the Totengasschen ('Alley of the Dead'), which 
leads to a plateau above and so to the Petersplatz and the Peterslirche. When we 
reached the plateau, we found a broad square dimly illuminated by street lights, 
into which, many streets converged. The various quarters of the city were 
arranged radically around the square. In the centre was a round pool, and in the 
middle of it a small island. While everything around about was obscured by 
rain, fog, smoke, and dimly lit darkness, the little island blazed with sunlight. 
On it stood a single tree, magnolia, in a shower of reddish blossoms. It was as 
though the tree stood in the sunlight and was at the same time the source of 
light. My companions commented on the abominable weather, and obviously 
did not see the tree. They spoke of another Swiss who was living in Liverpool, 
and expressed surprise that he should have settled here. I was carried away by 
the beauty of the flowering tree and the sunlit island, and thought, 'I know very 
well why he has settled here.' Then I awoke. 
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(MDR: 223) 
Jung added further details of the dream and described how the individual quarters of 
the city were themselves arranged radically around a central point, which formed a 
small open square illuminated by a large street lamp, and constituted a small replica 
of the island. This dream represented Jung's personal situation at the time - just like 
the dream he felt extremely unpleasant and dark and at the same time he had a vision 
of unearthly beauty, that is, a 'pool of life' as he interpreted the word 'Liverpool.' 
The dream also provided Jung with a sense of finality, as he saw the centre in the 
dream as representing the goal towards which everything is directed. Thus the dream 
was significant in confirming Jung's idea that, "the self is the principle and archetype 
of orientation and meaning" (MDR: 224), and that this is where the healing function 
lies. 
In Wilhelm's translation of The Secret a/the Golden Flower Jung believed he 
discovered a parallel between his theory of anima/animus archetypes and the concept 
of hun and p '0. Jung defined anima and animus as manifesting in the unconscious, 
complementary to the character of the consciousness, and containing, "all those 
common human qualities which the conscious attitude lacks" (CW 6: 804). In the 
light of the Taoist concept of yin and yang Jung argues that the yin or female aspect of 
a male unconscious is called p '0, and the yang or masculine aspect of a female 
unconscious is hun. Jung interpreted hun as a, "'cloud-demon,' a higher breath-soul 
belonging to the yang principle and therefore masculine" (CW 13: 57). The Chinese 
characters p '0, which for Jung were equivalent to anima, mean, "'white ghost,' 
belongs to the lower, earthbound, bodily soul, the yin principle, and is therefore 
feminine" (Ibid., 57). 
Jung argues the Tao is, "the method or conscious way by which to unite what 
is separated ... the realization of the opposite hidden in the unconscious - the process 
of 'reversal' - signifies reunion with the unconscious laws of our being" (CW 13: 30). 
Jung believes that a re-establishment of balance between the yin and yang in the Tao 
has a parallel with the goal of psychotherapy, that is, a balancing of the psychic 
opposites between the conscious and the unconscious in the experience of the self. 
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Coward (1996) argues that in comparison with Hindu thought, in which the external 
world is mere maya and ultimately disappears, leaving a universal consciousness, 
Jung's notion of the self is not the same as the universal consciousness, which he 
believes is equivalent to the unconscious. Rather, "The Taoist insistence on a balance 
between inner and outer, between yin and yang, confirmed in Jung's mind that both 
sides were essential for the development of the self' (Coward, 1996: 484). Moreover, 
Coward points out that Jung was critical of the Hindu Upanisadic teaching in which 
the Brahman becomes one-sidedly identified as pure consciousness and is no longer 
in interrelation with the physical world. In Jung's view, losing the balance between 
the external world and the inner psychic world leads to a pathology, namely, being 
either caught up in the unconscious or over-focussed on the external consciousness. 
However, Cowards asserts, "Taoism is structured such that an overbalance on one 
side is necessarily compensated by a stress on the other so that within the personality 
the two sides are always seeking to be in balance" (Coward, 1996: 484). Thus the 
connection between the pairs of opposites is never lost. For this reason, Jung had 
much more in common with a Taoist model for the development of the self than with 
Hindu thought. 
1.2.2 The I Ching 
In 1920 Jung began studying the I Ching, the Chinese book of hexagrams, in the 
English translation by James Legge. Jung spent his spare time casting reed sticks and 
trying to find parallels between the message of the reeds and external events. Jung's 
interest in I Ching developed further after he met Wilhelm in Darmstadt in 1922. 
Wilhelm translated the I Ching into German and in 1949, twenty years after 
Wilhelm's death, Jung wrote an introduction to the I Ching, seeking to convey the 
spirit of its method to Westerners. Ira Progoff states, "Jung's association with 
Wilhelm was of major importance in the development of his conception of 
synchronicity, for it gave him an opportunity to draw upon Wilhelm's knowledge of 
the non-causal sense of 'patterning' that plays so important a role in ancient Chinese 
thinking" (Progoff, 1973: 21). 
Jung first used the term synchronicity in his memorial address for Richard 
Wilhelm in 1930. Jung defined synchronicity as, "the simultaneous occurrence of a 
certain psychic state with one or more external events which appear as meaningful 
parallels to the momentary subjective state" (CW 8: 850). It also refers to the cases of 
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similar or almost identical thoughts and dreams occuring in different places at the 
same time, which are not causally but meaningfully connected. Jung went on to state: 
"Synchronistic events rest on the simultaneous occurrence of two different psychic 
states" (CW 8: 855): one is the normal state which is causally explicable; the other is 
critical experience which cannot be derived causally from the first and whose 
objective existence can only be verified afterwards. Jung states, 
They are evidently not synchronous but are synchronistic, since they are 
experienced as psychic images in the present, as though the objective event 
already existed. An unexpected content which is directly or indirectly 
connected with some objective external event coincides with the ordinary 
psychic state. 
(CW 8: 855, Jung's italics) 
A. Jaffe argues that Jung's definition of synchronicity does not mean an astronomical 
simultaneity depending on clock time but, "a relative simultaneity, to be understood 
as the SUbjective experience of an inner image coinciding with an outer event. Only 
in this experience is the time difference abolished, since the event, whether in the past 
or future, is immediately present" (Jaffe, 1968: 20, Jaffe's italics). 
In such an experience, an a priori category of time and space is not at work, 
and accordingly causality also disappears along with it. For this reason, Jung claims, 
"synchronistic phenomena cannot in principle be associated with any conceptions of 
causality. Hence the interconnection of meaningfully coincident factors must 
necessarily be thought of as acausal" (CW 8: 855). One example of a synchronistic 
event frequently cited involved a session Jung had with a female patient recounting a 
dream she had had, in which someone had given her a golden scarab beetle; at that 
very moment a scarab beetle was tapping at the window behind Jung. Jung pointed 
out that the golden scarab was an Egyptian symbol of rebirth and that this 
synchronistic event enabled the therapeutic session to make satisfactory progress later 
on. (CW 8: 982) 
Jung frequently sought evidence for synchronistic phenomena. He drew 
attention to a treatise of Schopenhauer's, "On the Apparent Design in the Fate of the 
Individual" which deals with 'chance', that is, 'simultaneity of unconnected 
causality.' Jung particularly looked at Schopenhauer's idea of a geographical 
analogy, "where the parallels represent the cross-connection between the meridians, 
which are thought of as causal chains" (CW 8: 828). Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-
1716) provided Jung with a confirmation of synchronistic phenomena. Jung 
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discussed Leibniz's idea of pre-established hannony, which is "an absolute 
synchronism of psychic and physical events" (CW 8: 937).5 In addition, lung cited an 
American psychologist, l.B. Rhine's ESP experiments, a physicist, Wolgang Pauli's 
contribution to quantum physics, lung's own astrological experiment, and the method 
of the Chinese oracle book, the I Ching, or Book of Changes as further evidence of 
synchronistic phenomena. 
lung argued that the I Ching is, "the experimental foundation of classical 
Chinese philosophy" and is, "one of the oldest known methods for grasping a 
situation as a whole and thus placing the details against a cosmic background, the 
interplay of Yin and Yang" (CW 8: 863). Its method is that the random throw of the 
forty-nine yarrow stalks have to be counted off according to fixed rules, although 
lung used the rather simpler method in which three coins are thrown six times, each 
throw giving one of the six lines that constitute the hexagram, of which there are 
sixty-four in all. To each line is appended an oracle text with a commentary. 
Therefore, 
The I Ching ... consists of a collection of sixty-four interpretations in which the 
meaning of each of the possible Yin-Yang combinations is worked out. These 
interpretations formulate the inner unconscious knowledge that corresponds to 
the state of consciousness at the moment 
(CW 8: 865) 
lung argued that the I Ching technique seeks to explain, "the simultaneous occurrence 
of a psychic state with a physical process as an equivalence of meaning" (CW 8: 865, 
lung's italics). This provided a confirmation of lung's idea that there is a connection 
between our inner psychic realm and the external cosmos. Coward draws his 
attention to the Chinese doctrine T'ien-jen chih chi ('the interrelation of heaven and 
man') and lung's notion of archetype. Coward claims, "Like the Chinese doctrine of 
the interrelation of the individual with the cosmos, lung conceived of the archetype as 
interrelating the meaning content of the inner psyche with the meaning content of the 
external cosmos" (Coward, 1996: 481). Coward goes on to state, 
The inherent patterning activity by the archetype is not only present at the level 
of the collective unconscious but, under Chinese influence, came to be regarded 
by lung as a psychophysical continuum present throughout the cosmos. Thus 
the deepest levels of the collective unconscious were seen to participate in the 
underlying patterns of the external world of nature. When the two are brought 
5 It is important to note here that Leibniz was also deeply concerned and interested in Chinese thought 
and his idea of 'established harmony' may have derived from the Chinese tradition. See 11 Clarke 
Oriental Enlightenment (1997: 47-48). 
together a significant moment of synchronicity IS experienced, and the 
archetypal meaning is revealed. 
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(Coward, 1996: 482) 
Jung was highly influenced by Chinese thought in this respect, and took a standpoint 
not based on Western ideas of cause and effect but on the Taoist idea of the 
interdependence between the human and nature coming together synchronistically in a 
meaningful whole. 
1.3 Jung and Indian thought 
Jung's systematic engagement with Indian thought can be identified with his 
involvement with the Eranos conference. In 1930 when Jung attended the Darmstadt 
'School of Wisdom,' he met a wealthy Dutch woman called Olga Frobe-Kapteyn. 
She, coming from the Anglo-Indian theosophical tradition, was a founder of the 
Eranos conferences held annually in the grounds of her estate at Ascona near Lake 
Maggiore in Switzerland. Initially the conferences had no title, but later Rudolf Otto 
suggested the term Eranos, the Greek for a banquet at which the guests bring their 
own contributions. In the Foreword to the first Eranos Yearbook (1933), in which the 
texts of the individual lectures were printed in their original languages (German, 
English, and French), Frobe-Kapteyn described her original intention as follows, 
The Eranos conferences have set themselves the goal of mediating between East 
and West. The task of this mediation, and the need to create a place for the 
promotion of such an understanding of the spiritual realm, have become ever 
clearer. .. The question of a fruitful confrontation of East and West is above all 
a psychological one. The clear-cut questions posed by Western people in 
matters of religion and psychology can undoubtedly find added, meaningful 
fructification in the wisdom of the Orient. It is not the emulation of Eastern 
methods and teachings that is important, nor the neglecting or replacing of 
Western knowledge about these things, but the fact that Eastern wisdom, 
symbolism, and methods can help us to rediscover the spiritual values that are 
most distinctively our own. 
(Frobe-Kapteyn cited by Wehr, 1988: 263) 
The first meeting took place in August 1933 when Jung delivered a lecture on "A 
Study in the Process of Individuation,,6. Jung attended most years between 1933 to 
1951 and presented ideas on alchemy, archetypal theory, and synchronicity. There 
were a wide range of participants including Martin Buber, Joseph Campbell, Jean 
Danielou, Mircea Eliade, Erwin R., Friedrich Heiler, E.O. James, Karolu Kerenyi, 
Gerardus van der Leeuw, Erich Neumann, Raffaele Pettazzoni, Laurens van der Post, 
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Paul Radin, C.A.F. Rhys Davis, Gershom Scholem, D.T. Suzuki, Paul Tillich, 
Giuseppe Tucci, R.C. Zaehner and Henrich Zimmer (Sharpe, 1975: 211-2). 
1.3.1 Indian philosophy 
Jung's relationship to Indian thought shows his ambivalence towards Eastern thought 
more distinctly than in the case of Chinese thought. Nevertheless, Indian philosophy 
played an important role in the development of Jung's theory of Psychological Types 
(1921). In Psychological Types Jung believed he had discovered that the self as a 
primordial image was similar to the ideas in the Atman-Brahman teachings of the 
Upanishads. Jung stated, 
The Indian conception teaches liberation from the opposites, by which are to be 
understood every sort of affective state and emotional tie to the object. 
Liberation follows the withdrawal of libido from all contents, resulting in a state 
of complete introversion... As a result of the complete detachment of all 
affective ties to the object, there is necessarily formed in the inner self an 
equivalent of objective reality, or a complete identity of inside and outside, 
which is technically described as tat tvam asi (that art thou). 
(CW 6: 189) 
Dvandva is the Sanskrit term for the pair of opposites in Indian thought, and includes 
the individual experience of opposites such as hot and cold, love and hate, male and 
female, and good and evil. Jung argues the purpose of this concept was to, "free the 
individual altogether from the opposites inherent in human nature, so that he can 
attain a new life in Brahman" (CW 6: 329). For Jung the Brahman is, "the union and 
dissolution of all opposites, and at the same time stands outside them as an irrational 
factor" (CW 6: 330). In Indian thought rta is a principle of dynamic regulation by 
withdrawing energy from any imbalance existing between the pairs of opposites until 
a balance is achieved. For Jung rta was a symbol for libido. Jung argued, "the 
optimum can be reached only through obedience to the tidal laws of the libido, by 
which systole alternates with diastole - laws which bring pleasure and the necessary 
limitations of pleasure, and also set us those individual life tasks without whose 
accomplishment the vital optimum can never be attained" (CW 6: 356). 
Coward argues that in the teachings of the Upanishads the Brahman (Divine 
Spirit) which is seen manifested in the external world all around you was the same 
spirit thought of as your true self within (Atman). The ignorant person (avidya) at 
first takes the conscious ego to be one's true inner self. However, the Upanisadic 
6 It was later revised and is in CW 9i. 
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teachings say that one's true self is not the self-conscious ego but the moment of 
highest insight in which the Alman is seen to be identical with the life essence of all 
the external universe, the Brahman. Jung paid particular attention to this uniting of 
the internal and the external in the Alman-Brahman symbol. What struck Jung about 
the Alman-Brahman symbol for the development of the self is that, "it is not the 
individual ego which speaks, thinks, and acts, but rather the universal Brahman, 
which speaks through the individual and so uses the individual as a means of 
expression" (Coward, 1985: 53-4). 
Jung found a close agreement with the Indian view of the relationship between 
the pairs of opposites. However, Jung did not agree with the possibility of moving 
beyond the pair of opposites in this life. Coward argues that the Hindu concept of 
moksa means a complete liberation from the tensions of the pairs of opposites 
(Coward, 1985: 16). However Jung asserts, 
It is certainly desirable to liberate oneself from the operation of opposites but 
one can only do it to a certain extent, because no sooner do you get out of the 
conflict than you get out of life altogether. So that liberation can be only a 
partial one. It can be the construction of a consciousness just beyond the 
opposites. Your head may be liberated, your feet remain entangled. Complete 
liberation means death. 
(Letters I: 247) 
Jung's disagreement results from his dualistic view of the psychic structure. The ego 
is the centre of the consciousness, and all our experience of the outer and inner worlds 
must pass through our ego in order to be perceived. Thus, the thing which is not 
perceived through the ego-consciousness is the unconscious. The complete freedom 
from the pair of opposites in Indian thought requires the eradication of the ego 
altogether. But for Jung if there is no ego, there is no knower and therefore no 
consciousness. Abolishing the ego to transcend the opposites for Jung simply means 
the unconscious. Jung states, "One assumes however that there is a consciousness 
without ego, a sort of consciousness of the alman. I'm afraid this supreme 
consciousness is at least not one we could possess. Inasmuch as it exists, we do not 
exist" (Letters I: 247). 
1.3.2 Indian yoga 
In the formation of his psychological theory Jung was strongly influenced by Indian 
yoga, particularly Kundalini yoga and Patanjali's Yoga Sutras. In the autumn of 1932 
the Indologist, J. W. Hauer came to Zurich to give a seminar on Kundalini yoga. 
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Following Hauer's exposition, Jung devoted four lectures to an interpretation of 
Kundalini yoga. Jung was already familiar with the Tantric chakra system through 
his reading of Arthur Avalon's The Serpent Power.7 In his lectures, Jung presented 
Kundalini yoga as a parallel to the process of individuation. Coward argues that 
Jung's approach was to examine the meaning of each of the seven chakras of 
Kundalini Yoga, and, "provide added insight into his understanding of the process of 
individuation, not an accurate description of Kundalini" (Coward, 1985: 123). Here I 
will focus only on Jung's psychological interpretation ofKundalini Yoga. 
Jung understood chakras as symbols and they have three aspects: sthula or 
things as we ordinarily see them; suksma, the level of theoretical understanding, or 
wisdom; and para, the transcendent level beyond sense experience. Kundalini Yoga 
aims to transcend sthula, discover the reality in the suksma, and go further into the 
para or completely 'other worldly'. The first chakra, the Muladhara Chakra, is 
characterised as our ordinary world in which the self is asleep and the ego is awake. 
Jung states, "we may assume that the place where the Self, the psychological non-ego, 
is asleep, is the most banal place in the world - a railway station, a theatre, the family, 
the professional situation - there the Gods are sleeping, there we are just reasonable, 
or as unreasonable as unconscious animals. And this is muladhara" (Jung, 1975: 10). 
The Svadhisthana Chakra, Jung says, must be understood as below and 
unconscious, as the muladhara must be seen as above and ego-consciousness. This is 
the reverse of Kundalini Yoga, but Jung thought this order necessary for Westerners 
to understand it. Jung asserted, "we begin in our conscious world, so our muladhara 
might be not down below in the belly, but up in the head. You see that puts 
everything upside down" (Jung: 1975: 12). Jung argues that in the awakening of 
Kundalini, one needs the urge which will not let one tum back, and pushes one 
forwards, because Jung believed Kundalini is the anima in the unconscious (Jung, 
1975: 14). The third, the Manipura Chakra, is the point where one begins to realise 
one's true self, symbolised as fire. The Anahata Chakra is located at the level of the 
heart and lungs, and is the point where its withdrawal occurs, where one is no longer 
identical with them and begins to discover the Self. Jung points out, 
In anahata individuation begins ... individuation is becoming that thing which is 
not the ego, and that is very strange. Nobody understands what the Self is, 
because the Self is just what you are not - it is not the ego. The ego discovers 
7 Arthur Avalon is a pseudonym of J.G. Woodroffe. 
itself as a mere appendix of the Self in a sort of loose connection. The ego is 
always far down in muladhara and suddenly becomes aware of something up in 
the fourth story, above, in anahata, and that is the Self. 
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(lung, 1975: 30-1) 
The Visuddha Chakra is, lung says, "a full recognition of the psychical essences or 
substances as the fundamental essences of the world, and not by virtue of speculation 
but by virtue of fact, as experience" (lung, 1976: 7, lung's italics). At the visuddha 
chakra, lung drew a line of the possibility of the assimilation of Kundalini Yoga into 
Western experience. lung argues the last two chakras are completely beyond 
Western reach. Coward asserts that at this level lung believes "the psychological 
interpretation of Kundalini Yoga useful to Westerners has been completed" (Coward, 
1985: 122). 
The sixth, the Ajna Chakra, lung argues, consists of nothing we can 
experience. In the ajna, there is only psychic reality in which one is united with 
Shiva, and the ego completely disappears into the self. This is something which lung 
believed to be psychologically impossible. In the last, the Sahasrara Chakra, lung 
asserts, 
There is no object, no God, there is nothing but brahman. There is no 
experience because it is one, it is without a second. It is dormant, it is not, and 
therefore it is nirvana. 
(lung, 1976: 17) 
lung says it, "is merely a philosophical concept with no substance whatever for us: it 
is beyond any possible experience," and therefore, "is without practical value for us" 
(lung, 1976: 17). 
lung's relationship to Patanjali's Yoga Sutra, which is derived from the 
Sankhya-Yoga school of thought of the fourth century, is equally important in the 
formation of his psychological theory. In 1939 lung gave lectures on Patanjali's 
Yoga Sutra at the Eidgen6ssiche Technische Hochschule, Zurich. 8 lung argues, 
"yoga is ... the perfect and appropriate method of fusing body and mind together so 
that they form a unity that can hardly be doubted. They thus create a psychological 
disposition which makes possible intuitions that transcend consciousness" (CW 11: 
867). However, lung's standpoint differs on the point of the last stage of yoga, 
8 Unpublished manuscript by B. Hannah, 'Notes on Lectures given at the Eidgenossiche Technische 




In the Yoga Stutra of Patanjali, samadhi means that the flow of 
consciousness is so completely identified with the object alone that there is a 
complete loss of ego consciousness. Cowards asserts: "one is so 'caught-up' in the 
object that there is no room left for a separate awareness of one's own ego as the thing 
that is having the experience. One has forgotten oneself' (Coward, 1985: 138). 
Moreover, the final stage of samadhi transcends the limitation of time and space. 
Thus, "the yogin is so completely one with the object that he is one with all its past 
states, as well as its present moment, and shares fully in the various possibilities of the 
future" (Coward, 1985: 138-9). Furthermore, the highest level of the Patanjali yoga is 
reached when even the limitation of focusing on a finite object is left behind. Now 
the consciousness becomes one with its own self-luminous nature, and there remains 
only the existence of the reality itself which is revealed to be nothing other than the 
pure discriminative consciousness of the true self (purusa) (Coward, 1985: 139). 
In contrast, while yogins considered samadhi as a state of pure consciousness, 
Jung identified it with a trance-like or unconscious state. Jung asserts, 
One hopes to control the unconscious, but the past masters in the art of self-
control, the yogis, attain perfection in samadhi, a state of ecstasy, which so far 
as we know is equivalent to a state of unconsciousness. It makes no difference 
whether they call our unconscious a 'universal consciousness'; the fact remains 
that in their case the unconscious has swallowed up ego-consciousness. They 
do not realize that 'universal consciousness' is a contradiction in terms, since 
exclusion, selection, and discrimination are the root and essence of everything 
that lays claim to the name 'consciousness.' 
(CW 9i: 520) 
As mentioned earlier, for Jung something which is not perceived through the ego-
conscious is fundamentally the unconscious. Working within this framework, Jung 
cannot conceive of any consciousness without reference to an ego. Coward argues a 
possible cause of Jung's failure to understand the last stage of samadhi as being 
connected to his empiricist and post-Kantian perspectives. In Jung's view, 
The Indian lacks the epistemological standpoint just as much as our own 
religious language does. He is still 'pre-Kantian.' This complication is 
unknown in India and it is still largely unknown with us. In India there is no 
psychology in our sense of the word. India is 'pre-psychological': when it 
speaks of the 'self,' it posits such a thing as existing. Psychology does not do 
this. It does not in any sense deny the existence of the dramatic conflict, but 
reserves the right to the poverty, or the riches, of not knowing about the self. 
(CW 11: 956, Jung's italics) 
9 In Patanjali yoga, there are four stages of increasingly pure object samadhi, and the fmal state is 
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Moreover, Coward asserts. "Jung is a 'healer,' a psychotherapist, and his whole 
system is built for the function of this healing process" (Coward, 1985: 164). Jung's 
idea of good mental health is, "the self as the essence of psychic wholeness, i.e., as 
the totality of conscious and unconscious ... because it does in fact represent 
something like a goal of psychic development, and this irrespective of all conscious 
opinions and expectations" (CW 11: 959, Jung's italics). Jung went on to say, 
"everything requires for its existence its own opposite, or else it fades into 
nothingness. The ego needs the self and vice versa" (CW 11: 961). Therefore the 
final stage of samadhi is not only acceptable to Jung but also, he believes, " [is] 
almost unattainable to Western man" (CW 11: 961). 
1.3.3 Jung's trip to India 
In late autumn 1937 Jung accepted the invitation of the British Government of India 
to take part in the celebrations connected with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
University of Calcutta where Jung would be awarded the honorary degree of Doctor 
of Law on 7 January 1938. His desire to go to India was quickened by two visitors 
from India in the early summer of 1937: Subramanya Iyer, spiritual adviser to the 
Maharajah of Mysore, and Paul Brunton, an English writer and specialist on India, 
and a pupil of the famous guru Ramana Maharashi, whose work had so fascinated 
Somerset Maugham (McLynn, 1998: 398). Jung travelled out to India by ship, and 
arrived in Bombay in December 1937. Bombay did not interest Jung and he soon 
travelled north to Delhi, where he was attracted by its Islamic influence. Jung had a 
long-standing interest in Islam as he once recounted, 
I positively do not believe that Christianity is the only and the highest 
manifestation of the truth. There is at least as much truth in Buddhism, and in 
other religions too. If for instance I had to choose between the Greek Orthodox 
Church and Islam, I would opt for Islam. 
(Letters I: 127) 
Jung then proceeded south-east to Agra, where he found the Taj Mahal a revelation 
and visited the stupas at the hill of Sanchi, where Buddha delivered his fire sermon. 
The visit to the stupas of Sanchi impressed Jung greatly and he said, 
A new side of Buddhism was revealed to me there. I grasped the life of the 
Buddha as the reality of the self which had broken through and laid claim to a 
personal life. For Buddha, the self stands above all gods, a unus mundus which 
represents the essence of human existence and of the world as a whole. The self 
objectless. See Coward, Jung and Eastern Thought (1985: 134-40). 
embodies both the aspect of intrinsic being and the aspect of its being known, 
without which no world exists. Buddha saw and grasped the cosmogonic 
dignity of human consciousness; for that reason he saw clearly that if a man 
succeeded in extinguishing this light, the world would sink into nothingness. 
Schopenhauer's great achievement lay in his also recognising this, or in 
rediscovering it independently. 
(MDR: 309) 
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In fact Jung admitted that the Buddhism of Sanchi was the most impressive thing in 
India, as impressive as the Himalaya mountains in the North of India (Letters I: 242), 
where Jung moved to next. At the monastery of Bhutia Busty near Darjeeling, Jung 
had a conversation about mandalas with a Lamaic rimpoche, Lingdam Gomchen (CW 
12: 123). When Jung went to Trivanndrum, the capital of Travancore, he met a 
disciple of Ramana Maharashi. However, Jung carefully avoided meeting Shri 
Ramana Maharashi himself. J ung recalled, 
Perhaps I should have visited Shri Ramana. Yet I fear that if I journeyed to 
India a second time to make up for my omission, it would fare with me just the 
same: I simply could not, despite the uniqueness of the occasion, bring myself 
to visit this undoubtedly distinguished man personally. For the fact is, I doubt 
his uniqueness; he is of a type which always was and will be. Therefore it was 
not necessary to seek him out. I saw him all over India. .. Shri Ramana is, in a 
sense, a hominum homo, a true 'son of man' of the Indian earth. He is 
'genuine,' and on top of that he is a 'phenomenon' which, seen through 
European eyes, has claims to uniqueness. But in India he is merely the whitest 
spot on a white surface 
(CW 11: 952) 
For Jung the Maharashi was not so unique, as he could be seen everywhere in India. 
Thus Jung believed it is not necessary to seek him. G. Wehr (1988) argues that, "at 
bottom, Jung said to himself, the truth of these initiates of the East is not a truth for all 
the world" (Wehr, 1988: 290). Here we can see Jung's psychic relativism in which 
what was true in India was not necessarily an absolute truth for Western man, or vice 
versa. Jung must have been satisfied with his own truth. This may explain why Jung 
avoided contact with a so-called 'holy-man.' 
I did so because I had to make do with my own truth, not accept from others 
what I could not attain on my own. I would have felt it as a theft had I 
attempted to learn from the holy men and to accept their truth for myself. Nor 
in Europe can I make any borrowings from the East, but must shape my life out 
of myself - out of what my inner being tells me, or what nature brings to me. 
(MDR: 305) 
Jung travelled south-west to Orissa province to visit the temple at Konarak. He was 
accompanied by a Hindu pundit, and objected to the man's explanation that the 
lingam and yoni symbols were purely spiritual, because in his Western sensibilities 
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Jung believed that young men could not so easily forget their sexuality. However, the 
pundit simply replied to Jung that they could not become spiritualised until they had 
first fulfilled their karma. 
Jung's failure to understand the notion of karma resulted from the fact that he 
did not know the Hindu concept of the four stages of life (varnasrama-dharma). 10 
TJ. Hopkins (1971) asserts that the Dharma Sutra established Brahminical rules for 
the social as well as ritual activities of every member of society. Its basic focus was 
not the goal beyond society but the arrangement of life within the social system. The 
basic principle of this arrangement of life was summarised in the four stages of life: 
(1) as a student, (2) householder, (3) a hermit who has retired to the forest, and (4) a 
sannyasin (a 'renounced' person) who has completely severed his ties to society 
(Hopkins, 1971: 73-5). Studentship was a time of rigorous discipline during which 
the student learned a way of life: rituals, values, duties, and patterns of behaviour. 
Householdership began with marriage, the most single ritual in a person's life. At this 
stage sexuality is necessary because it produces offspring for the second generation 
and provides for the continuing support of society. According to Hopkins, "the 
dharma of householders is in fact largely the fulfilment of artha (economic and 
political activity) and kama ('desire' especially sexual desire), since it is the 
householders' production and procreation that satisfies society'S debts to the gods and 
ancestors and supports those who preserved the tradition. Therefore, the householder 
purified the desires for wealth and sensual enjoyment carried over from his past lives 
and transformed them into spiritual benefits for himself, his family, and society" 
(Hopkins, 1971: 78). However, Jung simply did not know the Hindu concept of this 
particular stage of life, in which sexuality is regarded as a purely spiritual task to be 
fulfiled. As a result, Jung failed to understand the significance of the lingam and yoni 
symbols. 
When this stage is completed those who are qualified should go on to seek 
release. The vanaprastha in effect is retired from active household life to live as a 
hermit in the forest. He practises restraint of the senses and performs austerities, 
seeking constantly to achieve purity and self-control. The final and highest stage of 
life is that of the sannyasin whose life was aimed more distinctly at the attainment of 
10 According to Hopkins, The Dharma Sastras made a similar point in their discussion of the four main 
goals of life: dharma, artha, kama, and moksa. Moksa is a release from rebirth and the supreme goal, 
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moksa or release from rebirth. Sannyasinhood is entered by means of a formal ritual 
in which the initiate renounce all worldly ties including all relationships with wife and 
family. His life should be characterised by restraint of speech (observance of silence), 
restraint of action (non-injury to any creature), and restraint of mind (performance of 
breath control, meditation, and other yogic practices); by these he would gradually 
purify himself, attain desirelessness (vairagya) , and achieve knowledge of self and 
Brahman that would bring final release from the transitoriness of samsara (Hopkins, 
1971: 76-83). Jung simply overlooked these four stages of life in Hindu tradition, and 
therefore he could not understand the mechanism of karma which one has to fulfil at 
each stage of life in order to attain the final release from rebirth. 11 
When he returned to Calcutta, Jung went down with dysentery and was unable 
to attend the honorary degree ceremony. When Jung recovered, he had a Grail dream 
(MDR: 310-2). The dream essentially had European contents, which was expressed 
in the quest for the Holy Grail, when Jung, in reality, had barely worked his way out 
of the overwhelming mass of Indian impressions. Jung asserts, "Imperiously, the 
dream wiped away all the intense impression of India and swept me back to the too-
long-neglected concerns of the Occident" (MDR: 312-3). This Grail dream had been 
significant in convincing Jung to look for Western material. Jung points out, 
It was as though the dream were asking me, 'What are you doing in India? .. I 
was taken out of the world of India, and reminded that India was not my task, 
but only a part of the way - admittedly a significant one - which should carry 
me closer to my goal. 
(MDR: 313) 
Jung sailed to Ceylon, and then headed for the hilly country of the interior, visiting 
the old royal city of Kandy and the Dalada-Maligawa temple, which contains the relic 
of the Holy Tooth of Buddha. Jung embarked at Colombo for his homeward voyage 
to Europe and did not bother to disembark when the ship docked a second time in 
Bombay. His journey to India eventually led Jung to reaffirm his interest in the 
Western alchemical texts. 
1.4 Jung and Buddhism 
1.4.1 Jung's encounter with Buddhism 
but only a few could attain it in their present lives. The attainable goals for the majority of men are 
artha and kama. (Hopkins, 1971: 78). 
11 lung's relation to karma in Tibetan Buddhist tradition is discussed in Chapter Four. 
39 
In contrast to his relationship with the Hindu tradition, Jung was particularly attracted 
to Buddhist thought. Buddhist ideas played an important role throughout Jung's life. 
In 1960, shortly before he died, he was still studying Buddhist sermons and said, "I 
am trying to get nearer to the remarkable psychology of the Buddha himself, or at 
least of that which his contemporaries assumed him to be" (Letters II: 548). As 
mentioned earlier, during his student years Jung made an extensive reading of 
Schopenhauer whose major work, The World as Will and Representation, drew a 
close affinity between his own philosophy and that of both the Hindu and Buddhist 
philosophies. Hence Schopenhauer may have provided Jung with this important 
influence in the shaping of his interest in Buddhism. Jung's brief remark on Buddhist 
ideas first appears in the Zojingia Lectures (1896-99). Jung was familiar with Edwin 
Arnold's poetic version of the story of Buddhism, The Light of Asia, which was first 
published in 1879, and was cited by Jung in Symbols of Transformation (1911-2). By 
the time Jung wrote Psychological Types (1921), he had acquired an extensive 
knowledge of Hinayana as well as Mahayana Buddhist thought. 
In his study of Buddhism, Jung's central focus of attention is on the notion of 
the self. As mentioned earlier, the visit to the stupas of Sanchi made a great 
impression on Jung, and he saw in Buddha an embodiment of the archetype of the self 
(MDR: 309-10). For Jung the Buddha's teaching was essentially about psychic 
healing. Jung claims that the model of good mental health is the self. Moreover, the 
self is the goal of psychotherapy, namely, a balancing between the psychic opposites, 
the conscious and the unconscious, in the experience of the self. In other words, the 
shifting of the centre of gravity of the personality from the ego to the self plays a vital 
role in Jung's Analytical Psychology. Jung saw a similarity between his process of 
individuation and the Buddhist path to salvation, as both methods are built not so 
much on the medium of an external agency - the acceptance of doctrine and the 
reliance on faith - but on the agency of the autonomous individual, the direct 
experience of the individual seeker.12 
What drew Jung to Buddhist thought was neither the history of religion nor the 
study of philosophy, but his professional interest as a doctor whose task was, "the 
treatment of psychic suffering" (CW 18: 1575). Jung asserts, 
12 There is one exception in Pure Land Buddhism, which emphasises the element of faith in Amitabha 
Buddha. 
The study of Buddhist literature was of great help to me, since it trains one to 
observe suffering objectively and to take a universal view of its causes. 
According to tradition, it was by objectively observing the chain of causes that 
the Buddha was able to extricate his consciousness from the snares of the ten 
thousand things, and to rescue his feelings from the entanglements of emotion 
and illusion. So also in our sphere of culture the suffering and the sick can 
derive considerable benefit from this prototype of the Buddhist mentality, 
however strange it may appear. 
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(CW 18: 1575) 
His approach to Buddhism was embodied by his belief that the Western traditional 
sources of psychic healing were dying out due to the fact that, "the Christian ritual has 
lost its meaning or the authority of religious ideas has collapsed" (CW 18: 1577). 
Hence Jung claims that the teachings of the Buddha, "offer Western man ways and 
means of disciplining his inner psychic life, thus remedying an often regrettable 
defect in the various brands of Christianity" (CW 18: 1577). 
However, there is one important difference over the issue of suffering between 
Buddhism and Jung's Analytical Psychology. Jung did not agree with the Buddhist 
notion of a complete liberation from suffering, which he held to be impossible. R. 
Moacanin argues, "unlike Buddha, Jung does not perceive the possibility of an end to 
suffering. In his view happiness and suffering represent another pair of opposites, 
indispensable to life, and one cannot exist without the other" (Moacanin, 1986: 85). 
Jung argued, 
Man has to cope with the problem of suffering. The Oriental wants to get rid of 
suffering by casting it off. Western man tries to suppress suffering with drugs. 
But suffering has to be overcome, and the only way to overcome it is to endure 
it. 
(Letters I: 236) 
For Jung, Buddhist concepts such as nirvana, In which an individual is finally 
released from suffering, is a condition irreconcilable with the condition of being 
human. Just as Jung rejected the possibility of a state in which the Brahman one-
sidedly identified with pure consciousness, so he could not make sense of the 
condition in which the dynamic interrelation between the inner psychic world and the 
external empirical world is suspended by an overbalance on one side or the other. 
Thus Jung claims, "Complete redemption from the sufferings of this world is and 
must remain an illusion ... The goal is important only as an idea; the essential thing is 
the opus which leads to the goal: that is the goal of a lifetime. In its attainment 'left 
and right' are united, and conscious and unconscious work in harmony" (CW 16: 400, 
Jung's italics). 
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1.4.2 Tibetan Buddhism 
Following, the pUblication of The Tibetan Book of the Dead (edited by the American 
scholar W.Y. Evans-Wentz in 1927), Jung became familiar with Tantric Buddhism. 
Jung wrote a psychological commentary for the German edition of 1935. The book is 
an instruction for the dead and the dying, and a guide for the soul of the departed in its 
passage of forty-nine days from death to rebirth. Jung considered the visions of the 
wrathful as well as the peaceful deities attributed to the dead soul as samsaric 
projections of the human psyche and at the same time as a metaphysical reality (CW 
11: 833). Jung claimed that, "Metaphysical assertions, however, are statements of the 
psyche, and are therefore psychological" (CW 11: 835). Thus Jung believed that 
these visions of the deities in the Bardo Thado/ were psychological truth. Jung 
interpreted all kind of symbolic figures in the methods of visualisation in Tibetan 
Buddhism in terms of his theory of archetypes and the collective unconscious. But 
Jung rejected the possibility of individual karma and insisted the idea of karma is only 
understood as psychic heredity, that is to say, "there is inheritance of psychic 
characteristics such as predisposition to disease, traits of character, special gifts, and 
so forth" (CW 11: 845).13 
Jung also wrote a psychological commentary on The Tibetan Book of the 
Great Liberation, published in the introduction to Evans-Wentz's edition of 1939. In 
his commentary Jung addressed the difference between East and West in relation to 
his theory of introversion and extraversion. For example, Jung argued that Western 
man projects meaning into objects, whereas Eastern man seeks wisdom within 
himself. Jung recognised the need of the extraverted Western mentality to be 
supplemented with the introverted Eastern attitude. Jung argued, however, that East 
and West each represented half of the universe and that each of these standpoints, 
"however contradictory, have their psychological justification" (CW 11: 786). I 
discuss this issue in detail in Chapter Four. 
1.4.3 Zen and Pure Land Buddhism 
Jung became familiar with Zen Buddhism through the Japanese Zen scholar Daisetz 
T. Suzuki's book, An Introduction to Zen Buddhism, for which Jung wrote a foreword 
13 Jung later changed his opinion concerning individual karma. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
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to the Gennan edition in 1939. Jung found in Zen, "the most crashing nonsense" 
(CW 11: 882) or "the bizarre surface of individual satori experiences" (CW 11: 883). 
But he also points out at the same time that, "just as the obviously absurd chemistry of 
alchemy was a half-conscious blind for a very real spiritual longing, the secret passion 
which keeps Zen and other spiritual techniques alive through the centuries is 
connected with an original experience of wholeness - perhaps the most important and 
unique of all spiritual experiences" (Letters II: 602). Jung believed the Zen koan 
represented a method of breaking through from the conscious to the unconscious 
level, namely, "the complete destruction of the rational intellect" (CW 11: 895) 
aiming at one's inner potential to be realised in a special moment of illumination. The 
teachings of Zen Buddhism provided Jung with a great deal of confinnation in his 
psychological thinking. I discuss this in more detail in Chapter Five. 
Jung also discussed Pure Land Buddhim to a great extent. During March-May 
1943 Jung delivered a lecture on 'The Psychology of Eastern Meditation' in Zurich, 
Basel and Bern. 14 In the lecture Jung had undertaken to describe a yoga text, "which 
allows a deep insight into the psychic processes of yoga." (CW 11: 912) This 
Buddhist text is called Amitayur-dhyana-Sutra, the Sutra of Meditation on Amitayus, 
written in Chinese and translated from the original Sanskrit dating from A.D. 424. 
The text is used in Japan as a major source of the Buddhist tradition and also as a 
visualisation text. Jung pointed out that Eastern meditation provides a way of 
exploring the psyche which the extraverted tendencies of the West had ignored or 
even repressed. However Jung emphasised a clear difference of orientation between 
the Eastern and Western mind, "The West is always seeking uplift, but the East seeks 
a sinking or deepening" (CW 11: 936). For this reason Jung particularly warned 
against the frequent attempt to imitate Eastern meditation by Western man. What the 
European needs is to achieve a balance between these two movements, not by 
negating the upward and extraverted tendency, but by developing the capacity to 
move downward to explore the unconscious, and consequently to find their lost 
spiritual life. Jung's interpretation of Pure Land Buddhism is examined further in 
Chapter Three. Enough has been discussed thus far regarding Jung's dialogue with 
Eastern thought. In the next section we shall look at this issue in the wider historical 
context and discuss the recent controversies about Orientalism in relation to Jung. , 
14 The lecture can be found in CW 11: 908-949. 
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1.5 Jung and Orientalism 
1.5.1 Orientalism 
To examine in depth Jung's dialogue with Eastern thought, it is crucial to explore 
some of the attitudes, prejudices, and stereotypes which have developed Western 
attitude towards the East. Edward Said (1978) critically examined the Western 
conception of the Orient, and what he named 'Orientalism.' According to the Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary, 'Orientalism' is defined as follows: 
1. Oriental character or style; an oriental trait or idiom. 
2. Oriental scholarship; knowledge of Oriental languages. 
(Williams, 1996: 141) 
Said's concept of Oriental ism, the Western understanding of Asian societies and 
cultures, includes both of the definitions above. To these, however, he added a third 
definition: 
3. A Western political ideology or discourse about the Orient which has 
stressed its sensuality, its tendency to despotism, its aberrant mentality, its 
habits of inaccuracy, its backwardness, as a justification for European, 
American and Israeli colonization of Asia 
(Williams, 1996: 142) 
According to Said, the Orient is an idea and is, "almost a European invention, and had 
been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and 
landscapes, remarkable experiences" (Said, 1995: 1). Thus, Orientalism means the 
Western understanding of societies and cultures of the East. Said was influenced by 
Michel Foucault's 'powerlknowledge' theory, and argues that Orientalism is "the 
corporate institution for dealing with the Orient - dealing with it by making 
statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, 
ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, 
and having authority over the Orient" (Said, 1995: 3). He also states, "Orientalism is 
more particularly valuable as a sign of European-Atlantic power over the Orient than 
it is as a veridic discourse about the Orient (which is what, in its academic or 
scholarly form, it claims to be). Nevertheless, what we must respect and try to grasp 
is the sheer knitted-together strength of Orientalist discourse, its very close ties to the 
enabling socio-economic and political institutions, and its redoubtable durability" 
(Said, 1995: 6). In the light of this, Orientalism, in Said's sense, does not suggest a 
true picture of the Orient but a representation of it. Clarke argues that Said's 
argument of Orientalism means "reconstruction, in effect a 'colonising' knowledge, 
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created by the conqueror to comprehend the conquered, and designed to confirm the 
West's own distinctive identity, and to enhance the West's political and cultural 
hegemony over Asian peoples" (Clarke, 1997: 22). In Said's view, therefore, 
Orientalism represents "the expression and justification of the global authority of the 
modem West" (Clarke, 1997: 22). 
Said says, "Orientalism is the genenc term... to describe the Western 
approach to the Orient; Orientalism is the discipline by which the Orient was (and is) 
approached systematically, as a topic of leaning, discovery, and practice" and 
Orientalism also designates that "collection of dreams, images, and vocabularies 
available to anyone who has tried to talk about what lies east of the dividing line" 
(Said, 1995: 73). The images and ideas of Orient were "based more or less 
exclusively upon a sovereign Western consciousness out of whose unchallenged 
centrality an Oriental world emerged, first according to general ideas about who or 
what was an Oriental, then according to a detailed logic governed not simply by 
empirical reality but by a battery of desires, repressions, investments, and projections" 
(Said, 1995: 8). Orientalism in Said's view, therefore, is "a kind of Western 
projection onto and will to govern over the Orient" (Said, 1995: 95). For instance, 
many terms are used to express the relation between Orient and Occident: "The Orient 
is irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, 'different': thus European is rational, 
virtuous, mature, 'normal'" (Said, 1995: 40). Clarke argues that the West 
constructing such an image and articulating such a frame of discourse in order to 
"establish a 'significant other' by means of which to define Europe's (or the West's) 
own self-identity, and to establish thereby Europe's superiority and right to rule" 
(Clarke, 1997: 24). Said argues that, "The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is 
also the place of Europe's greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its 
civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most 
recurring images of the Other" (Said, 1995: 1). In Said's view, Orientalism 
constitutes the image of other, which is opposite to Europe as strange and alien, and it 
is this otherness which helps to confirm the self-image of the West and to define its 
self-identity. Said, thus, argues that Orientalism is "a collective notion identifying 
'us' Europeans as against all 'those' non-Europeans, and indeed it can be argued that 
the major component in European culture is precisely what made that culture 
hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one 
in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures (Said, 1995: 7). 
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It is important to note that the Orient which Said is mainly concerned with is 
not that of China, Japan, or India but the Middle East, the Islamic countries. Said 
argues, "I. .. already limited [my] (but still inordinately large) set of questions to the 
Anglo-French-American experience of the Arabs and Islam, which for almost a 
thousand years together stood for the Orient" (Said, 1995: 16-7). Clarke argues that 
Said is primarily concerned with the Middle East, since the Islamic world "has 
historically represented a very real threat to the survival of Christendom. It has 
inflicted on the West a number of humiliating defeats, and it is therefore not 
surprising that it has provoked in the West a need to assert its superiority" (Clarke, 
1994: 23). By contrast with Islam, "neither India nor China has been a military threat 
to Europe in the modern period, nor has Christianity been theologically intertwined 
with the religions of East and South Asia" (Clarke, 1997: 23). Therefore, in Said's 
view, the whole history of the Arab/Islamic world has been tied to that of Europe 
politically, religiously and intellectually. In this sense, Said claims that the Middle 
East sharply contrast with the rest of Asia. While Said's explanation of Orientalism 
could generally apply to the present study of many Asian countries, his association of 
Orientalism with colonising power may represent rather a narrow and limited view of 
the Orient. Clarke argues that "The narrowness of the Saidian explanation ... arises 
from its inclination towards reductionism, and its tendency to ignore much of the 
richness and complexity of orientalism and of its accompanying motivations and 
impulsions, or else to constrain these to fit into an overly simple mould" (Clarke, 
1997: 27). Using the Saidian model of Orientalism, we shall now look at Jung's own 
dialogue with the East. 
1.5.2 Jung's dialogue with the East in the context of Orientalism 
It is essential at this point to discuss the issue of Jung and Orientalism. The Western 
discovery of the Orient has not been merely the extension of Western hegemony or 
colonisation of the East in a Saidian sense, but has also represented a self-criticism 
and self-renewal on the Western part. Clarke argues that Western dialogue with the 
East played an important role, "first, in the critical self-awareness of the West, as a 
mirror in which to examine its own shortcomings, and to inspire, renewal; and, 
secondly, in the emergence of a sense of universalism, a conception of the unity of 
mankind that transcends all its local and historical variations" (Clarke, 1994: 23). The 
Western discovery of the philosophies of China and India in the period of economic 
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and political expansion, for instance, enabled Europe to step outside of its history and 
inquire into its own beliefs and self-understanding in search of something which the 
West believed it had lost. This phenomenon seems to be conspicuous in Jung's own 
engagement with the East. The purpose of Jung's dialogue with the East was not 
absorbing and integrating Eastern religions and philosophies into a single global 
belief system. However, Jung was rather sceptical about the value of modernity and 
of Western civilisation, which, he believed, was the possible cause of the one-
sidedness of the Western psyche. Thus Jung attempted to find a cure for Western 
culture through a dialogue with the East. Clarke argues that for Jung, "the East could 
lead the West to the rediscovery of the inner cosmos, of the worlds of the imagination, 
of intuition, of the unconscious, but only in its own terms and with its own methods" 
(Clarke, 1994: 145). 
Luis Gomez (1995) examines the manner in which an Oriental bias and a 
colonial frame of mind manifest themselves in Jung's writings on Eastern religions by 
exploring his ambivalent attitude towards the East, that is, the positive and negative 
attitude which Jung envisaged. Gomez states, 
Jung reveals the fundamental contradictions and ambiguities of his position vis-
a-vis Buddhism and 'the East.' On the one hand, he makes the sweeping 
statement that 'religions are systems of healing for psychic illness'; on the other 
hand, he privileges psychotherapy over religion. On the one hand, he will use 
the authority of Western culture and religion in support of his own concept of 
the self; on the other, he uses the authority of 'Eastern' religion and culture as a 
basis for a critique of Western views of the individual. Conversely, he uses the 
Western model to criticize his own construct of the East. In the end, Jung 
emerges from this ambiguity triumphant as the one who has not only bridged, 
but transcended the two worlds he created for his readers. 
(Gomez, 1995: 200) 
Clarke (1994) also acknowledged Jung's ambivalent, rather paradoxical, attitude 
towards Eastern thought. Clarke argues that, on the one hand, Jung highly admired 
Eastern thought, and, "often seems to rank it above Western culture, using it. .. as a 
tool for criticising, even for undermining, the European cultural tradition," but on the 
other hand, "he was careful to distance himself from it," his writings on Eastern 
religions are "full of reservations and qualifications," and he repeatedly "warned of 
the dangers for the Westerner in approaching the East too c1osely"(Clarke, 1994: 
143). Jung was fascinated by Wilhelm's translation of the Secret of the Golden 
Flower (1929), in which he believed he had discovered a confirmation of his theories 
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of mandala symbolism. 1s What is more important in this text is that Jung became 
more interested not in Chinese but in Western alchemy. The Chinese text in some 
way led Jung away from the East. Jung wrote, "Light on the nature of alchemy began 
to come to me only after I had read the text of the Golden Flower, that specimen of 
Chinese alchemy which Richard Wilhelm sent me in 1928. I was stirred by the desire 
to come more closely acquainted with the alchemical texts" (MDR: 230). In fact the 
bulk of Jung's work thereafter was with Western sources, i.e., on alchemy, on 
Gnosticism, and on Christian theology, all of which took an important role in the 
formation of his psychological theories such as individuation, the collective 
unconscious, the archetypes, and the transformations of the unconscious. 
Yet, Jung's enthusiasm for the East and admiration of the teaching and 
spiritual practice of Asian religions never ceased until the end of his life. It has been 
discussed earlier that the Eastern religions and philosophies are indeed of 
considerable significance in the formation of Jung's psychological ideas. It is equally 
important to recognise "Jung's sense of self-recognition in Asian symbols that 
alternated with his sense of distance" (Gomez, 1995: 206). Jung kept a certain 
distance from the Eastern religions and regarded them as exotic and alien, and 
repeatedly warned Europeans not to attempt the practice of yoga. Jung believed that 
Eastern spirituality cannot simply be absorbed by Europeans, as it is foreign to 
Western history and culture. Jung said, "I wish particularly to warn against the oft-
attempted imitation of Indian practices and sentiments. As a rule nothing comes of it 
except an artificial stultification of our Western intelligence" (CW 11: 933). 
Gomez examines Jung's ambivalence, his admiration and caution of Eastern 
thought from the point of view of Orientalism, and the history of the Western view of 
Asia. Under the influence of the nineteenth-century Western perception of the East, 
Jung's distinction between East and West was a questionable one. For Jung, the East 
seems to represent any non-European groups and is hardly distinguishable from 
Africa and native America. Furthermore, Jung considered non-western religion as 
illustrating the mentality of the primitive. Jung compared the primitive mind and 
Eastern religions in the following passage, 
The only known analogy to this fact is the mental condition of the primitive, 
who confuses dream and reality in the most bewildering way. Naturally we 
hesitate to call the Eastern mind primitive, for we are deeply impressed with its 
IS For a detailed discussion of Jung's understanding of Tibetan tantric mandala, see 4.3. 
remarkable civilization and differentiation. Yet the primitive mind is its matrix, 
and this is particularly true of that aspect of it which stresses the validity of 
psychic phenomena. 
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(CW 11: 800) 
Jung was influenced by Levy Bruhl's notion of the psychology of the primitive. In 
his writings, although he tended to reject any attempt to establish an order between 
East and West, Jung frequently made comments which may appear as rather naIve. 
For example, Jung asserts, "compared with it [the Western intellect] the Eastern 
intellect must be described as childish" (CW 13: 8). This demonstrates one of the 
problems posed by Said regarding the dangers of projecting Western prejudices onto 
other cultures. Clarke argues that although Jung qualified this remark by denying that 
this had anything to do with intelligence, "the suspicion must remain in the mind of 
the reader that he was implicitly ranking the Western mentality above the Eastern" 
(Clarke, 1994: 193). In his observation of Indians, Jung wrote, 
I have, so it seems to me, observed the peculiar fact that an Indian, inasmuch as 
he is really Indian, does not think, at least not what we call 'think.' He rather 
perceives the thought. He resembles the primitive in this respect. I do not say 
that he is primitive, but that the process of his thinking reminds me of the 
primitive way of thought-production. The primitive's reasoning is mainly an 
unconscious function, and he perceives its results. We should expect such a 
peculiarity in any civilization which has enjoyed an almost unbroken continuity 
from primitive times. 
(CW 10: 1007) 
However, Jung also gave the Eastern mind a certain advantage over Europe by 
arguing that the Indian psyche is spiritually superior to that of Europeans, and Indians 
experienced a development from the most primitive to the most spiritual state of 
consciousness (Letters II: 39-41). Gomez argues that, for Jung, the primitive 
represents two aspects: "It is the so-called dark side, the unconscious, but it is a 
dimension that must be touched and accepted, a dimension that cannot be ignored, 
although it must be explored with caution" (Gomez, 1995: 208). Jung says, "the 
East. .. , cultivates the psychic aspect of primitivity together with an inordinate amount 
of abstraction," whereas, "the West simply cultivated ... , the scrupulously accurate 
observation of nature at the expense of abstraction" (CW 11: 800). In his perception 
of the East, Jung tends to vacillate between viewing it negatively, for example as 
strange, childlike and incomprehensible, and viewing it positively, for example as 
spiritual, symbolic and experientially superior. 
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Jung's ambivalent attitude towards Eastern thought can be understood in the 
context of the historical development of interpretations of Buddhism in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. P. Almond (1988) argues that the Western attitude towards 
Buddhism in the Victorian period displays ambivalence: Buddhism was ideally 
constructed and positively esteemed on one hand, and negatively evaluated on the 
other. Almond states, 
Permeating Victorian discourse about Buddhism we find a persistent polarity of 
acceptance and rejection, of sameness and otherness. Most often, that which is 
inherently incapable of assimilation in the West and that which is most at odds 
with Victorian values is described as a feature of or ascribed to the Oriental 
mind. In contrast to its Occidental counterpart (though this term was rarely 
used, the first person plural pronoun substituting for it), the Oriental mind was 
less intelligent, more fanciful, childish and simple, prone to exaggeration, 
generally indolent, and lacking in originality. 
(Almond, 1988: 41) 
Almond argues that Western hegemony "provided a fundamental and governing mode 
of organizing the East. More specifically, it provided a filter through which those 
aspects of Buddhism acceptable in the Victorian context could be assimilated, and by 
means of which those aspects essentially unassimiliable could be rejected. This 
polarity of assimilation and rejection of Buddhism expressed latently and manifestly 
through the image of the Oriental mind was to underlie much of the discourse on 
Buddhist that developed in the Victorian age" (Almond, 1988: 52-3). It would seem 
that Jung was influenced by the dominant view of Buddhism in the West, and that 
consequently he became a victim of Western ignorance on Buddhism. 
It is important to note at this point that the way Jung constructs his argument 
often demonstrates the way he came to conceive of the Orient, which is the issue that 
has been brought up by Said. Jung was not interested in Eastern religions within their 
cultural context. Nor was Jung a convert himself to Eastern thought or a scholar of 
Eastern religions. Clarke states that Jung was not interested in "absorbing and 
integrating Eastern thought into a super-philosophy"(Clarke, 1994: 145). For 
instance, Jung was highly critical of movements such as Theosophy which sought to 
merge East and West in a universal philosophy. Jung claims, "You cannot mix fire 
and water. The Eastern attitude stultifies the Western, and vice versa"(CW 11: 772). 
The chief purpose of Jung's engagement with Eastern thought was to "set out to 
explain, and somehow make accessible to a Western audience, the practice of yoga, 
an aspect of a culture that Jung regarded as not only unfamiliar to the European ('dem 
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Europaer ungewohnte') but in fact alien and inaccessible (,fremdartig und 
unzuganglich')" (G6mez, 1995: 209-10). Jung altered Asian religious teachings for 
the Westerner to understand and utilise them for the cure of Western psychic ills. 
Jung concentrated on finding an Asian parallel to his psychological theory such as the 
individuation process. In interpreting Asian religious texts, Jung states, "If we wish to 
understand at all, we can do so only in the European way" (CW 11: 934). Clarke 
argues, 
The exalted image of the East which frequently - thought not, it would be 
added, exclusively - emerges from Jung's writings does indeed represent a 
refreshing antidote to Western arrogance, and is a welcome corrective to some 
of the distorted perceptions Europeans have had of their own civilisation and its 
place in world history. But at the same time it may, in its tum, represent a 
subtle form of cultural imperialism. .. there is a danger that his own approach to 
the East falls into the same trap, a danger that the East becomes an ideal, unreal 
object controlled and manipulated for our own purposes, a vision which is 
effectively blind to the real East, deaf to its real voice. 
(Clarke, 1994: 165) 
G6mez argues that at the heart of Jung's ambivalence towards the East there is a quest 
for Jung's own self-confirmation. Eastern thought appears as a pre-text, which Jung 
used as confirmatory data for a self-concept. Donald S. Lopez (1998) summarises 
Jung's appropriation of Tibetan Buddhism in the following, 
Jung ... uses the Bardo Thodol (as he did the other Asian texts about which he 
wrote) as raw material for his own theories. Like the colonial industrialist, he 
minded Asian texts (in translation) for raw materials, without acknowledging 
the violence (both epistemic and otherwise) that he did to the texts in the 
process; revising the order of the three bardos is but one example. He then 
processed these war materials in the factory of his analytic psychology, yielding 
yet further products of the collective unconscious. These products were then 
marketed to European and American consumers as components of a therapy and 
exported back to Asian colonials as the best explanation of their own cultures. 
(Lopez, 1998: 59) 
G6mez argues, "In an ironic twist to 'Orientalism,' Buddhism and yoga become 
methods of psychic healing, 'in the Jungian sense,' for those who would adopt Asian 
religious practices. The Asian practice is re-conceived and appropriated through the 
lens of a reconception and appropriation of Jungian ideas" (G6mez, 1995: 223). Thus 
G6mez states, 
The Buddha could be right too ... but only if he agrees with Europe - needless 
to say, with Jung's Europe. Or, perhaps it is better to say the Buddha's 
teachings (like alchemy) could become intelligible only if his teachings are 
those of yoga, and if the teachings of yoga represent at least one aspect of 
Jungian metapsychology. 
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(Gomez, 1995: 228) 
Gomez defined the Orientalist bias and colonial frame of mind as follows: "the 
European maintains his control over Asia first by conceding authority to the alien 
culture, then by assuming that authority for himself, and last by asserting the 
difference that separates him from the other" (Gomez, 1995: 229). The above 
exposition of Jung's view on the East thus far would reveal that he was influenced by 
Orientalism in Said's sense, that is to say, the Orientalist bias and colonial stance 
appear in Jung's writings on Eastern religions. Lopez (1995) argues, "throughout, 
true understanding rests only with Jung, who uses the authority of his Asian texts to 
claim a privileged access to a tradition, over which he then claims authority. The 
healing power of Asia only heals when mediated through Jung's theories, with Jung 
serving as the intermediary between East and West, both as diagnostician and healer." 
(Lopez, 1995: 17). 
1.6 Conclusion 
In the early years of his career Jung was researching the fantasies of schizophrenics. 
Jung believed that these fantasies are similar to mythical motifs and religious 
symbolism, and that these collective symbols could make a bridge between the 
unconscious and the conscious through the transformation of libido. Jung's interest 
went further to the myths and symbols of Eastern religions. The fantasies and dream 
images are, for Jung, archetypes in the collective unconscious. Jung maintains that 
the archetypes have a numinous character which can be described as spiritual. The 
spiritualistic character of the archetypes is significant for the psychology of religion, 
for when it is experienced by the individual, it becomes a therapeutic function which 
prevents one from falling into a psychic imbalance between the conscious and the 
unconSCIOUS. 
A meeting with Richard Wilhelm spurred Jung's interest Eastward. Jung 
found many similarities between Taoism and his psychological thought. In Richard 
Wilhelm's translation of The Secret of the Golden Flower Jung discovered the 
similarity between his theory of anima/animus archetypes and the Taoist concept of 
hun and p '0. Furthermore, Jung argued that the attempt to establish a balance 
between the yin and yang in the Tao has a parallel in the goal of the individuation 
process, namely, a balancing of the psychic opposites between the conscious and the 
unconscious in the experience of the self. Jung was interested in the I Ching, the 
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Chinese oracle book, which was of major importance in the development of his 
conception of synchronicity. Jung's concept of synchronicity took a standpoint not 
based on Western ideas of cause and effect but on Taoist ideas of interdependence 
between the human and nature coming together synchronistic ally in a meaningful 
whole. In this respect, it can be said that Chinese Taoism, rather than Hinduism, 
provided the fundamental influence in the development of Jung's psychological 
thinking. 
Nevertheless, it is certainly true that Indian philosophy and yoga contributed 
to the development of Jung's psychological theory. Yet Jung could not agree with the 
Hindu concept moksa, a complete liberation from the tension of pairs of opposites, 
which requires the eradication of the ego altogether. Nor could he agree with the last 
yogic state of samadhi, complete absorption, in which the ego is dissolved. For Jung 
abolishing the ego to transcend the opposites simply means unconsciousness. In the 
same way, the state of samadhi, in Jung's view, is equivalent to unconsciousness. 
Jung's idea of good mental health is the self, namely, a psychic totality of the 
conscious and the unconscious, and thus the self needs the ego and vice versa. For 
this reason, Jung believed that the notion of moksa and samadhi are unattainable to 
Westerners. 
In contrast to his relationship with the Hindu tradition, Jung was attracted to 
Buddhism. Jung found the Buddhist path to the salvation was similar to his concept 
of the individuation process, since both methods are based on the direct experience of 
the individual rather than the acceptance of doctrine and the reliance on faith. Jung 
had reservations concerning the Buddhist concept of suffering. He believed it was 
impossible to be completely liberated from suffering. In Jung's view happiness and 
suffering are indispensable to life, and one cannot exist without the other. Therefore, 
for Jung, the Buddhist notion of nirvana, in which an individual is finally released 
from suffering, is irreconcilable with the condition of being human. The essential 
thing in Jung's Analytical Psychology is to achieve a harmony between a pair of 
opposites - the conscious and the unconscious. 
Lastly this chapter discussed the issue of Orientalism in relation to Jung's 
dialogue with the East, particularly from the perspective of Edward Said. Jung's 
approach to understanding Oriental religions was influenced by Western prejudices, 
which Jung tends to project onto Eastern cultures. Furthermore, Jung's reification of 
East and West appeared to be questionable, since he was sometimes inclined to put 
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them in a relationship of domination for the sake of affirming Western superiority. In 
the next chapter I will develop my discussion of Jung's relation to Eastern thought by 
addressing in more detail the hermeneutical and phenomenological issues that 
underlie Jung's Analytical Psychology. 
Chapter Two: 
Hermeneutical Issues in Jung's 
Approach to Eastern Religion 
2.0 Introduction 
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This chapter examines the hermeneutical issues in Jung's approach to Eastern 
religion. There are a number of different ways of interpreting Oriental religious texts. 
Central to this chapter is a discussion of the ways Jung understood Oriental materials 
and to what extent his understanding of religious traditions is related to his Analytical 
Psychology. These issues enable us to understand the difficulties which stand in the 
way of Jung's hermeneutical dialogue with Eastern thought. This chapter firstly 
examines Jung's approach to understanding religious texts from the perspective of 
Gadamer's model of hermeneutics in order to illustrate that Jung's method of 
constructing a bridge of understanding between Western psychology and Eastern 
religion was characterised by typical features of a hermeneutical approach. An 
overview of Gadamer's theory of hermeneutics is given, followed by an examination 
of Jung's hermeneutical understanding of Oriental texts. The methodological 
problems with hermeneutical understanding are addressed, and Gadamer's model of 
hermeneutics is contrasted with Jung's method of interpretation. The hermeneutical 
situation involves a dialogical structure of understanding, fusion of horizons, 
hermeneutic circle, and the opening up of interpretation. These characteristics of 
hermeneutics may have a danger of lapsing into relativism. The relativistic standpoint 
can also be seen in Jung's method of interpretation of Eastern materials. 
Secondly, this chapter examines the phenomenological approach to 
understanding religion in order to demonstrate how religious experiences and 
traditions can be interpreted. In contrast to the hermeneutical approach to 
understanding religious texts, the phenomenology of religion emphasises the 
recognition of the irreducibility of religious phenomena and claims that we must 
understand religion in its own cultural context. Following this overview of the 
concept of the phenomenology of religion, the objective and empirical status of the 
phenomenology of religion are examined, particularly from the viewpoints of 
Kristensen and Vander Leeuw. The methodological problems with the 
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phenomenology of religion, namely, the tension between the objectivistic approach in 
the study of religion and the scholarly subj ectivity in interpreting the religious 
phenomena are also discussed. Thirdly, a critical discussion of Jung's hermeneutics 
of Eastern thought is presented, demonstrating his ambivalent attitude towards 
Eastern religion, namely, his fascination with - as well as his concerns over - Eastern 
thought, his relativistic standpoint and his tendency to reductionism in interpreting 
religious experiences. 
2.1 Jung and hermeneutics 
2.1.1 Gadamer's theory of hermeneutics 
This section firstly provides an overview of Gadamer's theory of hermeneutics. 
Hans-Georg Gadamer is one of the most important contemporary exponents of 
hermeneutics and published Warheit und Methode in 1960 (translated into English in 
1975 as Truth and Method), in which he presented a traditional model of 
hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is defined as the art of interpreting texts from the past 
whose meaning may seem to be obscure. Gadamer (1975) asserts that understanding 
is primarily an agreement between two people. When the common subject matter 
between them is disturbed, misunderstandings arise, because one's opinion is 
unintelligible to the other. Then the task of understanding becomes awareness of the 
individuality of the other and taking account of his uniqueness. In the hermeneutical 
situation there is a historical distance between the text and the interpreter. But this 
temporal distance is not something that we must overcome, but a positive and 
productive condition in which, "we must transpose ourselves into the spirit of the age, 
think with its ideas and its thoughts, not with our own, and thus advance toward 
historical objectivity" (Gadamer, 1975: 297). The task of seeking the true meaning of 
a text is never finished because it is an infinite process. Nevertheless, the temporal 
distance brings about genuine understanding of the object to emerge clearly as such, 
by distinguishing our prejudices and misunderstandings. Gadamer emphasises the 
hermeneutical rule that in interpreting the text, "we must understand the whole in 
terms of the detail and the detail in terms of the whole" (Ibid., 291). In this 
hermeneutical circle the anticipation of meaning in which the whole is envisaged 
becomes actual understanding when the parts which are determined by the whole 
themselves also determine this whole. Thus, "harmony of all the details with the 
whole is the criterion of correct understanding" (Ibid., 291). 
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Gadamer observed that all human thinking is historically embedded, and 
human reason exists only in concrete and historical terms. Thus all thinking 
presupposes a tradition in which the thinker participates, and to which the sense of his 
thinking is subject. Therefore we can never abandon prejudices because our thinking 
always carries them with it. The important thing is, Gadamer asserts, "to be aware of 
one's own bias, so that the text can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its 
own truth against one's own fore-meanings" (Gadamer, 1975: 269). Once we 
recognise our judgement and prejudices, the fundamental suspension of our prejudices 
can be achieved through a constant questioning of our analysis of the hermeneutical 
situation. The interpretation always involves a relation to the question that is asked of 
the interpreter. Thus the interpreter must question what lies behind what the text 
actually says, and understand it as an answer to a question. What is more important 
is, "the question that the text puts to us, our being perplexed by the traditionary word, 
so that understanding it must already include the task of the historical self-mediation 
between the present and tradition" (Gadamer, 1975: 373-4). In order to answer the 
question put to us, we must reconstruct the question to which the traditionary text is 
the answer. Reconstructing the question to which the meaning of a text is understood 
as an answer merges with our own questioning. The close relation between 
questioning and understanding gives the hermeneutic experience its true dimension. 
Questioning brings out the undetermined possibilities of the interpretation of the text. 
Gadamer says, "Questioning opens up possibilities of meaning, and thus what is 
meaningful passes into one's own thinking on the subject" (Ibid., 375). 
'Application,' which is the important issue for Gadamer, is the essential 
element in the process of hermeneutical understanding. Gadamer argues, 
"understanding always involves something like the application of the text to be 
understood to the present situation of the interpreter" (Gadamer, 1975: 274). This 
approach indicates that the task of interpreter is not only to reproduce what is said in 
the text or discussion he is translating, but to express what is said in the way that 
seems necessary to his considering the real situation of the dialogue. A task of 
application in hermeneutical understanding, "serves the validity of meaning, in that it 
explicitly and consciously bridges the gap in time that separates the interpreter from 
the text and overcomes the alienation of meaning that the text has undergone" 
(Gadamer, 1975: 278). Gadamer asserts, "all reading involves application, so that a 
person reading a text is himself part of the meaning he apprehends. He belongs to the 
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text that he is reading. It will always happen that the line of meaning that is revealed 
to him as he reads it necessarily breaks off in an open indefiniteness." (Ibid., 304). 
From this it follows that the reader must accept the fact that future generations will 
understand differently what he has read in the text. Through the method of 
application, therefore, the text is to be understood at every moment, in every 
particular situation, in a new and different way. Gadamer claims, "in the human 
sciences the interest in tradition is motivated in a special way by the present and its 
interests," furthermore, "the theme and area of research are actually constituted by the 
motivation of the enquiry," and therefore, "it is senseless to speak of a perfect 
knowledge of history, and for this reason it is not possible to speak of an object in 
itself towards which its research is directed" (Ibid., 253). For Gadamer, 
To think historically always involves establishing a connection between those 
ideas and one's own thinking. To try to eliminate one's own concepts in 
interpretation is not only impossible, but manifestly absurd. To interpret means 
precisely to use one's own preconceptions so that the meaning of the text can 
really be made to speak for us. 
(Gadamer, 1975: 358) 
The method of hermeneutical understanding is a dialogue through which a 
transformation of its participants develops, namely, one's willingness to move 
forward and to allow one's initial position to develop. Gadamer states, "To reach an 
understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward and 
successfully asserting one's own point of view, but being transformed into a 
communion in which we do not remain what we were" (Gadamer, 1975: 379). 
Consequently, there can be no single correct interpretation of a text, and therefore the 
interpretation of the text will open up. As Gadamer puts it, 
There cannoL.be anyone interpretation that is correct 'in itself,' precisely 
because every interpretation is concerned with the text itself. The historical life 
of a tradition depends on constantly new assimilation and interpretation. An 
interpretation that was correct 'in itself would be a foolish ideal that failed to 
take account of the nature of tradition. Every interpretation has to adapt itself to 
the hermeneutical situation to which it belongs. 
(Gadamer, 1975: 358) 
Historical tradition can be understood as something always in the process of being 
defined by the course of events. For it is the course of events that brings out new 
aspects of meaning in historical material. By being re-actualised in understanding, 
texts are drawn into a genuine course of events in the same way as are events 
themselves. This follows that every actualisation in understanding can be regarded as 
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a historical potential of what is understood. Thus Gadamer argues that it is the 
historical finitude of our being that we are aware that others after us will understand 
in a different way, and therefore, "henneneutical reduction to the author's meaning is 
just as inappropriate as the reduction of historical events to the intentions of their 
protagonists" (Gadamer, 1975: 373). It is important to emphasise here that 
Gadamer's view could be described as a fonn of relativism. I will discuss this in 
detail later in this chapter. 
The henneneutical understanding constitutes the 'horizon,' which is the range 
of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point. 
Gadamer asserts, "working out the henneneutical situation means acquiring the right 
horizon of inquiry for the questions evoked by the encounter with tradition" 
(Gadamer, 1975: 269). Gadamer argues, "the historical movement of human life 
consists in the fact that it is never utterly bound to anyone standpoint, and hence can 
never have a truly closed horizon" (Gadamer, 1975: 271). The horizon is, rather, 
"something into which we move and that moves with us. Horizons change for a 
person who is moving" (Ibid., 271). Hence the historical horizon is always in motion. 
When we enquire into the historical horizon, we are not passing into alien worlds 
unconnected with our own, but together they constitute "the one great horizon that 
moves from within and, beyond the frontiers of the present, embraces the historical 
depths of our self-consciousness" (Gadamer, 1975: 271). Thus Gadamer believes that 
understanding of the past requires an historical horizon. Gadamer argues, however, 
"it is not the case that we acquire this horizon by placing ourselves within a historical 
situation. Rather, we must always already have a horizon in order to be able to place 
ourselves within a situation" (Gadamer, 1975: 271). For Gadamer, this placing of 
ourselves is 
not the empathy of one individual for another, nor is it the application to another 
person of our own criteria, but it always involves the attainment of a higher 
universality that overcomes, not only our own particularity, but also that of the 
other. 
(Gadamer, 1975: 272) 
Every encounter with tradition involves the experience of a tension between the text 
and the present. In the henneneutical situation, "understanding is always the fusion of 
these horizons supposedly existing by themselves" (Ibid., 273), and this process of 
fusion of horizons is continually going on, for, "there old and new are always 
combining into something of living value, without either being explicitly 
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foregrounded from the other" (Ibid., 306). In other words, the fusion of horizons that 
takes place in understanding mediates between the text and its interpreter. 
Gadamer argues that all understanding is grounded in tradition and 
understanding therefore can only arise through the mediation of a shared tradition. 
Gadamer states, "Understanding is not to be thought of so much as an action of one's 
subjectivity, but as the placing of oneself within a process of tradition, in which past 
and present are constantly fused" (Gadamer, 1975: 258). From this we may assume 
that it must inevitably be frustrated for any attempt to fuse one's horizon with one 
from a tradition as different as the East is from the West would be impossible. It is 
important to emphasise here that in Truth and Method Gadamer does not discuss the 
possibility of transcending the European tradition. Gadamer, however, sees the 
possibilities of hermeneutical dialogue only within the European tradition. 
W. Halbfass (1988) discusses the issue of the East-West dialogue with the use 
of Gadamer's model of hermeneutics. He accounts for some of the characteristics of 
the Western attitude towards with Indian thought in the nineteenth and twentieth 
century. Halbfass argues, in the context of Gadamerian hermeneutics, that the 
recognition of the other, the foreign, as such is a decisive step on the way to its 
understanding. Gadamer's hermenutics can encourage one to see the fact that in one's 
approach to Indian thought one carries with one Western perspectives and 
presuppositions. These are not just an impediment and aggravation, but also a 
necessary and positive ingredient of understanding itself. Moreover, in Gadamer's 
hermeneutics, it is indispensable to accept prejudices and to discard the vacuous ideal 
of unprejudiced understanding. Therefore understanding ancient Indian thought 
cannot mean 'becoming like the ancient Indians,' thinking and seeing the world 
exactly like them. We are not capable of such 'objectivity,' and if we were, we 
would obviously not be 'like the Indians.' The goal of a radical 'philosophical 
E1t0Xll,' an unqualified abstention from one's own background and 
presuppositions, is unrealistic and undesirable. We cannot and need not 
'disregard' ourselves in the process of understanding. 
(Halbfass, 1988: 164) 
Halbfass claims, in line with Gadamer, that what is needed is not 'extinction of one's 
self but the conscious assimilation of one's own fore-meanings and prejudices. The 
important thing is to be aware of one's bias, so that the Indian text may present itself 
in all its newness and therefore be able to assert its own truth against one's own fore-
meanings. Despite the exclusion of non-European materials from Gadamer's work, 
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Halbfass believes that Gadamer's hermeneutics can be applied to the general 
encounter between India and Europe. 
There is... no compelling reason why its hermeneutical concepts and 
perspectives should not be applicable in a wider, trans-cultual context. Indeed, 
we belong to the European tradition which has its origins in Greece. But this 
tradition has its own modes of openness and self-trans-transcendance. Within 
the European tradition itself, there has been a 'fusion' of different cultural 
horizons - Greek, Roman, Hebrew, etc. That we relate to other traditions, does 
not imply that we are estranged from 'our own' tradition. The phenomena of 
understanding and misunderstanding, which occur 'within' a particular 
tradition, need not be fundamentally different from those which we encounter 
when we try to approach other traditions. 
(Halbfass, 1988: 165) 
Halbfass argues that understanding, as well as misunderstanding, is an inevitable 
result in the European encounter with Oriental thought, "just as it takes place in 
Europe's relationship with its own Greek sources, and just as it has taken place in the 
encounter between other traditions" (Ibid., 166). 
However, F. Dallmayr (1996) argues that Halbfass's approach to seek for a 
cross-cultural understanding or dialogue, "is complicated by Western hegemony and 
the ongoing process of Westernization of the globe" (Dallmayr, 1996: 130). In 
Halbfass's view, the conditions and perspectives of the two sides of the encounter are 
fundamentally different, and the relationship is an asymmetrical one. Therefore he 
considers that the modem India finds itself in a historical situation created by Europe 
and it has difficulties speaking for itself. Consequently, understanding under such 
conditions requires a special effort to transcend Eurocentrism in the direction of 
greater reciprocal openness. For, 
in the modem planetary situation, Eastern and Western 'cultures' can no longer 
meet one another as equal partners. They meet in a Westernized world, under 
conditions shaped by Western ways of thinking. 
(Halbfass, 1988: 169) 
Dallmayr argues that under present conditions of Westernization, cross-cultural 
understanding is liable to be intensely agonising. Halbfass's argument shows 
ambivalence in this regard: on the one hand, Halbfass "strongly defends the 'merit of 
Anglo-American analysis'" (Dallmayr, 1996: 123), and, in the pursuit of objectivity, 
he approves the instrumental value of modem formal and analytical models; on the 
other hand, "objectivity may well be an elusive and perhaps even deceptive standard" 
(Ibid., 123), and, in fact, analysis and the search for conceptual precision can be 
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obtrusive and interfere with the task of translating and understanding non-Western 
traditions in their own context and dimensions. 
The crucial question is whether it IS really possible to move from 
Eurocentrism to anti-Eurocentrism in the dialogue between East and West. In the 
globalizing context, is there not still room and need for cross-cultural understanding 
beyond the confines of Eurocentrism? To answer this, Dallmayr argues, "an exit from 
Orientalism in our time seems to accord a certain privilege to an 'ontology of 
openness' over an 'ontology of (objectified) substances'; whatever its other 
corollaries may be, openness implies at least a certain willingness to transcend 
established categories in favour of a freer recognition of alien life-forms, thus 
permitting otherness 'to be' in an non-possessive way" (Dallmayr, 1996: 130). Yet, 
further questions arise: How far can openness to the other extend? Are there 
normative limits to understanding? Or, "Are there perhaps legitimate aspects of 
'Europeanization' - beyond the pale of colonial domination and technological or 
economic supremacy?" (Dallmayr, 1996: 130). 
To this, Dallmayr focuses on the issue of equality and inequality in terms of 
the dominant comparisons of East and West. Dallmayr argues, "It is clear that much 
depends on the meaning of terms such as liberty and equality, which cannot simply be 
left to Eurocentric preferences" (Dallmayr, 1996: 131). In the modem West liberty 
and equality are usually regarded as qualities of individual agents, whereas 
distinctions or differenciations ought to be justified against the standard of equal 
liberty. By contrast, the Western conception of equality has little corresponding to the 
Oriental culture, for instance, in India. Thus, 'liberation from the world' in Hindu 
religious practice, for example, cannot or must not be misunderstood as the Western 
model of universalism. Nor should such Hindu expressions as 'unity of life' be 
misread in the sense of a multi-cultural society. Dallmayr asserts, "In traditional 
Indian thought, both the notion of fraternal contextuality and the idea of soteriological 
liberation were closely linked with and even predicated on the assumption of an all-
pervasive differentiation and distinctness of world elements," and "this emphasis on 
differentiation can ultimately be seen as the legitimating underpinning of the Indian 
caste system" (Dallmayr, 1996: 132). From this it follows that, "Indian thought, 
transcendence of difference (or equality) has itself to be justified in light of a 
differentiated dhanna, which is precisely the opposite of modem Western thought 
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where difference or distinction is radically put on the defensive (as In need of 
justification)" (Ibid., 134). Dallmayr points out, 
What is called 'Europeanization' or 'Westernization' of the world is to a large 
extent the militant extension of egalitarianism or the principle of equivalence to 
other parts of the globe (with capital serving as the currency of equivalence). 
Liberty here is not adverse to equality, because it basically means freedom of 
choice (where all choices are equivalent or of equal value). Whatever their 
intrinsic merits may be, the principles of equality and equal liberty are today 
exported around the globe in a missionary and largely unthinking way, without 
much reflection on the premises of such principles and how they (and their 
consequences) might be vindicated. N on-Western societies, which are not 
readily swayed by these principles, are quickly dismissed as illiberal and 
undemocratic. India in particular - given the long legacy of 'homo 
hierarchicus' - is likely to be denounced as a major obstacle on the road to 
world democracy (in a not very subtle resurrection of Orientalism). 
(Dallmayr, 1996: 134) 
This statement is an important contribution to a cross-cultural understanding and 
helps us to re-think such basic philosophical categories as equality or sameness and 
difference in terms of a cross-cultural dialogue between East and West. Commenting 
on Dallmayr, it is important to note that the issues of equivalence and difference 
"need to be articulated jointly, but in a way that resists synthesis, yielding only 
reciprocal destabilization" (Dallmayr, 1996: 134), i.e., beyond the limits of 
assimilation and exclusion. Gadamerian Hermeneutics and other scholars' approach 
to hermeneutical understanding have been discussed thus far in order to illustrate the 
nature of the European discourse on the cross-cultural dialogue between Eastern and 
Western traditions. I will tum to Jung's own hermeneutical approach. 
2.1.2 Jung's hermeneutical approach 
Generally speaking Jung's methodological approach in his psychology is 
hermeneutical. There is a form of dialogue in his method of dealing with patients, 
philosophies, alchemy and with oriental texts. 1.1. Clarke argues that Jung's approach 
to understanding all of these spheres was, "characterised by holism, contextualism, 
open-endedness, tolerance, self-reflectiveness, and historical relativism - all features 
typical of the hermeneutical approach" (Clarke, 1994: 47). For example, when he was 
an intern student and treating schizophrenics at the Burghozli Hospital from 1900 to 
1909, Jung came to realise that their symptoms, such as strange behaviour and 
senseless utterances can be explicable and interpreted in meaningful ways. Jung 
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appropriated hermeneutics In order to reveal the symbolic meanIng of patients 
fantasies. 
The essence of hermeneutics, an art widely practised in former times, consists in 
adding further analogies to the one already supplied by the symbol: in the first 
place subjective analogies produced at random by the patient, then objective 
analogies provided by the analyst out of his general knowledge. This procedure 
widens and enriches the initial symbol, and the final outcome is an infinitely 
complex and variegated picture the elements of which can be reduced to their 
respective tertia comparationis. Certain lines of psychological development 
then stand out that are at once individual and collective. There is no science on 
earth by which these lines could be proved 'right'; on the contrary, rationalism 
could very easily prove that they are wrong. Their validity is proved by their 
intense value for life. And this is what matters in practical treatment: that 
human beings should get a hold of their own lives, not that the principles by 
which they live should be proved rationally to be 'right.' 
(CW 7: 493) 
R.S. Steele (1982) argues that, like Dilthey's theory of hermeneutics, Jung believed 
empathy had an important role in interpretation. Dilthey proposed that empathetic 
and intuitive understanding can be supplemented by a great deal of interpretative 
work in order to make one's insight clear to oneself and to another. Steele asserts that 
Jung's empathetic understanding is seen in his study of symbolism, religion, 
gnosticism, alchemy and in his confrontation with the unconscious. Jung is a good 
hermeneut because he clearly conceptualised what was involved in the activity of 
interpretation. Steel argues, "[Jung] recognized that the interpreter and interpreted -
the unconscious, a patient, or a text - must enter into a genuine dialogue and that from 
this exchange there arises a synthetic understanding" (Steele, 1982: 352). J.L. Jarret 
asserts that in the therapeutic process, "Jung was ever conscious that the 
patient/analyst relationship was inevitably dialectical, but to keep it so, the analyst has 
to remind himself he is not just the wise authority and the analysand is not just a 
helpless other: rather, both are learners, and thus engaged in a conjoint inquiry, 
supplementing each other's observations" (Jarret, 1992: 79). Jung clearly points out, 
It is exactly as if a dialogue were taking place between two human beings with 
equal rights, each of whom gives the other credit for a valid argument and 
considers it worth while to modify the conflicting standpoints by means of 
thorough comparison and discussion or else to distinguish them clearly from 
one another. Since the way to agreement seldom stands open, in most cases a 
long conflict will have to be borne, demanding sacrifices from both sides. 
(CW 8: 186) 
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Jung carried out this hermeneutical method not only with his patients but also with 
mythology, symbolism and Eastern religious texts. In his interpretation of ancient 
texts Jung said, 
The importance of hermeneutics should not be underestimated: it has a 
beneficial effect on the psyche by linking the distant past, the ancestral heritage 
which is still alive in the unconscious, with the present, thus establishing the 
vitally important connection between consciousness oriented to the present 
moment only and the historical psyche which extends over infinitely long 
periods of time. 
(CW 14: 474n) 
Jung's point here is different from Gadamer's hermeneutics in terms of the historicity 
of understanding. According to Jung, history is imprinted in human psyche, that is to 
say, the unconscious contents are the expression from the past. Jung asserts, "it 
became clear to me that without history there can be no psychology, and certainly no 
psychology of the unconscious" (MDR: 232). Jung observed that historical context 
such as myths and religion has a strong connection with archetypal images and 
symbols in the collective unconscious, through which modem man can discover the 
significant meaning of human reality. Ancient texts contain a view of the world 
which has been lost to modem consciousness and thus interpreting such texts 
transforms one's vision of life. However, Gadamer has no such notion of history as 
embedded in the unconscious but regards historical material only as conscious 
content. Jung says, 
The need for mythic statements is satisfied when we frame a view of the world 
which adequately explains the meaning of human existence in the cosmos, a 
view which springs from our psychic wholeness, from the co-operation between 
conscious and unconscious. Meaninglessness inhibits fullness of life and is 
therefore equivalent to illness. Meaning makes a great many thing [sic] 
endurable - perhaps everything. No science will ever replace myth, and a myth 
cannot be made out of any science. For it is not that 'God' is a myth, but that 
myth is the revelation of a divine life in man. It is not we who invent myth, 
rather it speaks to us as a Word of God. 
(MDR: 373) 
Jung had a strong sense of history particularly from a psychological point of view. 
Jung was always aware of his own historical and cultural roots, and recognised that 
his own ideas were highly influenced by the traditions from which he sprang. Clarke 
(1992) argues, "Jung viewed the psyche itself as essentially historical in the sense that 
its development can only be understood in the context of its personal and collective 
past" (Clarke, 1992: 48). Jung asserts, 
He [Man] carries his whole history with him; in his very structure is written the 
history of mankind. This historical element in man represents a vital need to 
which a wise psychic economy must respond. Somehow the past must come 
alive and participate in the present. 
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(CW 6: 571) 
Jung's argument suggests that a knowledge of history is essential to understand the 
present condition of the human psyche. Jung was also aware of the diversity of 
histories and traditions in different societies and cultures. Jung believed that despite 
the diversity of these different historical conditions there lay an underlying psychic 
unity, the collective unconscious, which is, in his view, common to all mankind, and 
would make historical and human understanding possible by deciphering the 
un<;;onscious contents manifested in the form of symbolism and universal archetypal 
patterns. Clarke argues that Jung's theory of archetype explains, "the experience of 
mankind is not entirely contingent upon local and historical circumstances, but is also 
built around certain themes, expressed symbolically, which are common to all 
cultures" (Clarke, 1992: 56). 
However, Jung drew a sharp contrast between the Western and Eastern 
psyche, as he believed that the Eastern mentality is based on its own unique history 
and culture, and therefore it is different from the Western psyche. Thus, although 
Jung was very much inspired by Eastern religions and philosophy, he insisted that 
Indian yoga, and Chinese philosophy remain somewhat foreign to the Western 
mentality. Jung warned Europeans against simply adopting ideas and practices from 
foreign traditions, and discarding their own history, upon which their psyche is built. 
We can see here again Jung's ambivalent approach to Eastern thought: on one hand 
Jung admired the teachings of Asian religions, on the other hand, he emphasised its 
foreign character, and drew a sharp contrast between Eastern and Western psyches. 
Furthermore, Jung formulated the distinction between the extraverted and the 
introverted psychological types. Jung claims that the West has a tendency to 
objectivity, an egocentric disposition, and the development of rational consciousness, 
whereas the East has a less egocentric, more passive character and an insight into the 
unconscious mind. Nevertheless, Jung's claim of psychic difference between East 
and West does not seem to be entirely coherent. Jung wrote, "there is only one earth 
and one mankind, East and West cannot rend humanity into two different halves" 
(CW 8.682). This statement contradicts Jung's insistence on the fundamental chasm 
between East and West in terms of psychic differences. 
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Yet, Jung attempted to find a link between the divisions of East and West, and 
used a method of analogies in order to search for underlying psychological identities. 
Jung postulated the analogies through archetypal motifs and ideas, upon which he 
believed the psyche is built. Clarke argues, however, "At one level Jung's search for 
a common language in which to communicate with foreign or with lost cultures is 
admirable, for it widens the possible dimensions of human sympathy, and enhances 
our sense of the commonality of the human race. But at another level the 
methodology employed lends itself to special pleading and to indulgence in wishful 
thinking" (Clarke, 1994: 169). This problem again leads to the issue of Jung's 
ambivalent attitude towards the East. On the one hand, Jung argues Eastern thought 
can offer something which the West has lost, on the other hand, his writings seem to 
suggest that when Europeans attempt to understand the teachings of Eastern religions, 
they should not progress beyond the level of psychologically inherited archetypes. 
Clarke, asserts, "For all his good hermeneutical intentions, Jung is still vulnerable ... 
to the charge of 'Orientalism' - namely, that the East with which he claims to be in 
conversation is, in the final analysis, something of his own making, a fiction conjured 
out of his own peculiarly Western needs" (Clarke, 1994: 188). Jung's historical 
awareness has its limitations, in that Jung did not pay sufficient attention to the social 
and traditional circumstances of the Asian texts that he was reading. Jung's 
interpretation of the Eastern thought demonstrates the framework of orthodox 
Western understanding. 
In comparison with Jung's approach to the symbolism of myth and religion, 
the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur sought to develop a critical hermeneutical theory 
of myth. Ricoeur was interested in myths of evil and argued that, "the function of the 
myths of evil is to embrace mankind as a whole in one ideal history. By means of a 
time that represents all times, 'man' is manifested as a concrete universal" (Ricoeur, 
1967: 162). In this way, "experience escapes its singularity; it is transmuted in its 
own 'archetype'" (Ibid., 162). Ricoeur claims, "the universality of man, manifested 
through the myths, gets its concrete character from the movement which is introduced 
into human experience by narration" (Ibid., 163, Ricoeur's italics). Thus, "experience 
is no longer reduced to a present experience; this present experience was only an 
instantaneous cross-section in an evolution stretching from an origin to a fulfilment, 
from a 'Genesis' to 'Apocalypse'" (Ibid., 163). Furthermore, "the myths try to get at 
the enigma of human existence, namely, the discordance between the fundamental 
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reality - state of innocence, status of a creature, essential being - and the actual 
modality of man, as defiled, sinful, guilty" (Ibid., 163). Ricoeur claims that the myth 
accounts for this transition by means of a narration because "there is no deduction no , , 
logical transition, between his ontological status as a being created good and destined 
for happiness and his existential or historical status, experienced under the sign of 
alienation" (Ibid., 163). 
Ricoeur asserts, "the myth has a way of revealing things that is not reducible 
to any translation from a language in cipher to a clear language" (Ibid., 163, Ricoeur's 
italics). How the myths reveal their meanings is through symbols. Ricoeur says, "the 
most primitive and least mythical language is already a symbolic language" (Ibid., 9, 
Ricoeur's italics). At this point Ricoeur claims the necessity of hermeneutics in 
understanding the myth. Ricoeur claims that, "what we need is an interpretation that 
respects the original enigma of the symbols, that lets itselfbe taught by them, but that, 
beginning from there, promotes the meaning, forms the meaning in the full 
responsibility of autonomous thought" (Ibid., 349-50). The immediacy of the symbol 
and the mediation of thought can be held by interpretation. Since we no longer hear 
myth in a primitive naIve way, we can only hear it again by interpreting it. Ricoeur 
continues, "it is in hermeneutics that the symbol's gift of meaning and the endeavor to 
understand by deciphering are knotted together" (Ibid., 351). This knot appears in 
hermeneutics as a circle, namely, "We must understand in order to believe, but we 
must believe in order to understand" (Ibid., 351). 
Ricoeur was highly critical of a purely comparative phenomenology such as 
M. Eliade's, l since he believed it limited itself to understanding symbols through 
symbols. Phenomenology is able to, "display the multiple and inexhaustible 
intentions of each symbol, to discover intentional analogies between myths and rites, 
to run through the levels of experience and representation that are unified by the 
symbols" (Ibid., 353). This way of understanding myths and symbols is satisfactory 
in that it is panoramic, but it lacks vital concern. Rather, what the philosopher should 
do is to, "think with the symbols as a starting point, and no longer in the symbols" 
(Ibid., 355, Ricoeur's italics). Thus philosophy starts from symbols and seeks to 
promote or uncover their meaning through creative interpretation. 
I Eliade's phenomenology of religion will be discussed in depth in the next section. 
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In some ways Ricoeur's notion of myth and symbols is similar to Jung's. 
There are, however, distinct differences in their understanding of the symbolism of 
myth. Ricoeur emphasises the ideological, political and social function of myths and 
is much less concerned with myth as a psychological factor. Ricoeur's understanding 
of the symbolism of myth seems to remain at the conscious level and to aim at a better 
understanding of society. By contrast, Jung's view of myth and religion is embedded 
in the unconscious of the individual. Jung argues that the understanding of mythic 
motives and religious symbols gives life meaning. For Jung the true meaning of the 
symbolism of myth and religion cannot be achieved by simply knowing about the 
symbol, but by experiencing and appropriating it as a inner fact within one's 
experiential world. 
In his interpretation of Eastern texts Jung was well aware of the strangeness of 
oriental thought and of difficulties in understanding such ideas which were quite 
foreign to European thought. But Clarke argues that Jung's hermeneutical approach 
is based on the belief that, "in order to understand the other, one must start by 
recognising the chasm which needs to be crossed" (Clarke, 1994: 50). Clarke points 
out that Jung's hermeneutical strategy is best expressed by explaining his method of 
amplification. It is a therapeutic method which seek to clarify psychic contents by 
linking them within a network of meanings expressed in symbols and images through 
using metaphors and analogies derived from mythological and religious contexts. 
Jung asserts that amplification, "is always appropriate when dealing with some 
obscure experience which is so vaguely adumbrated that it must be enlarged and 
expanded by being set in a psychological context in order to be understood at all" 
(CW 12: 403). Jung provided us with a couple of examples as follows, 
In the case of a very rare word which you have never come across before, you 
try to find parallel text passages, parallel applications perhaps, where that word 
also occurs, and then you try to put the formula you have established from the 
knowledge of other texts into the new text. If you make the new text a readable 
whole, you say, 'Now we can read it.' That is how we learned to read 
hieroglyphics and cuneiform inscriptions and that is how we can read dreams. 
(CW 18: 173) 
For the therapeutic setting, particularly dream analysis, Jung gave us another example, 
Let us assume a man dreams about a simple sort of peasant's house. Now do I 
know what a simple peasant's house conveys to that man's mind? Of course 
not; how could I? Do I know what a simple peasant's house means to him in 
general? Of course not. So I simply ask, 'How does that thing appear to you?' 
_ in other words, what is your context, what is the mental tissue in which that 
term 'simple peasant's house' is embedded? He will tell you something quite 
astonishing ... In each case I know what tissue that word or image is embedded 
in. That is amplification. It is a well-known logical procedure which we apply 
here and which formulates exactly the technique of finding the context. 
(CW 18: 174) 
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Clarke argues that the amplification method, "becomes for Jung a hermeneutical key 
with which to unlock the ideas of the East" (Clarke, 1994: 52). Jung applied the 
method of amplification in the interpretation of symbolism in Eastern religion, until 
its meaning and context are "enriched by the stuff of association and analogy and thus 
amplified to the point of intelligibility" (CW 12: 403). 
2.1.3 Methodological problems with hermeneutics 
There are methodological problems with Gadamer's model of hermeneutics, which 
also reflect Jung's hermeneutical approach to oriental texts. Firstly, there is one 
distinctive difference between Gadamer's method of hermeneutics and Jung's 
approach: Jung, like Dilthey, stressed the need for empathic understanding whereas 
Gadamer repudiated it. Dilthey argues that in order to attain a better understanding 
one needs to try to proj ect oneself into, and needs to empathise with, the mind of the 
original writer. In Dilthey's conception, understanding and experience are related to 
each other, since new experiences revise the way in which the past is understood and 
the future anticipated, and at the same time those experiences are interpreted in the 
context of an understanding of past and future. Dilthey locates self-understanding 
within the temporal structure of an individual life. G. Warnke argues Dilthey's view 
of self-understanding is related to the conduct of one's life, and thus, "the way in 
which one lives one's life and the way in which one understands it are mutually 
determining" (Warnke, 1994: 29). Basing his historical study on a psychology of 
understanding, Dilthey claims historical understanding is possible because of the 
homogeneity of human nature. Thus Dilthey sees that one can reach true historical 
understanding by re-experiencing the historical world through sympathy. In this way 
Dilthey's hermeneutics psychologically interprets the text itself and the intention of 
the author behind it by using empathy and by way of the intersubjectivity of the 
communal world. Dilthey's point here is close to one that Jung makes about 
hermeneutics, which inquires into the meaning or intention of the psyche. As Jung 
puts it, 
In the same way that the body needs food, and not just any kind of food but only 
that which suits it, the psyche needs to know the meaning of its existence - not 
just any meaning, but the meaning of these images and ideas which reflect its 
nature and which originate in the unconscious. The unconscious supplies as it 
were the archetypal form, which in itself is empty and irrepresentable. 
Consciousness immediately fills it with related or similar representational 
material so that it can be perceived. For this reason archetypal ideas are locally, 
temporally, and individually conditioned. 
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(CW 8: 476) 
By contrast, Gadamerian hermeneutics does not rely on empathy or an effort to gain 
access to the mind of the author. Therefore Gadamer regards it as futile to try to 
construct what the author had in mind or to imagine how that meaning was derived by 
the original reading audience. 
Secondly, Warnke argues that Gadamer's conception of understanding, "does 
not involve re-experiencing an original understanding but rather the capacity to listen 
to a work of art and allow it to speak to one in one's present circumstances" (Warnke, 
1994: 69). According to Warnke, the problem of Gadamer's hermeneutics is that if 
readers necessarily see the claims of the text in the context of their own situation and 
interpret it in its light, this seems to imply that their interpretation is entirely arbitrary. 
Gadamer does not solve the problem of whether or not our understanding is distorted, 
or how we decide what the appropriate facets of our situation are for understanding 
the historical text. This is also the case with Jung's hermeneutics, particularly his 
method of amplification. Jung's study of Eastern religions is based very largely on 
the postulation of analogies (mandala = the self, karma = archetypes, Kundalini yoga 
= individuation process, etc.). By making these analogies Jung dismissed the 
religious meaning in their own cultural contexts, and instead delivered his own 
desired conclusion. Moreover, Gadamer asserts that although all understanding is 
prejudiced and historically conditioned there is the possibility of assessing the 
adequacy of prejudices or revising them through the hermeneutic circle of whole and 
part interpretation in order to reach a better understanding of the issue. However, "if 
one begins to understand the individual parts of a text in light of an assumption as to 
the meaning of its whole, it is not clear how these parts, so understood, can lead one 
to revise one's understanding as whole" (Warnke, 1994: 84). The hermeneutic circle 
may possibly lead to a viciousness of the hermeneutic circle in which "one's 
understanding of the individual parts of a text confirms one's assumption as to the 
meaning of the whole and vice versa" (Ibid., 84). In the worst case the hermeneutical 
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circle may move the interpreter further away from the meaning of the text and lead 
him to subjectivistic or opportunistic misinterpretation. 
Lastly, Gadamer's theory of the dialogical structure of understanding implies a 
transformation of the participant, namely, the dialogue involves the willingness to 
move forward and to allow one's initial position to develop through the opening up of 
new horizons and possibilities. Consequently, there can be no final or absolutely 
complete interpretation of a text. This could be described as a form of relativism, 
which is the view that "all claim to truth can only be judged in the light of rules and 
principles which are integral to specific historical conditions and which therefore have 
no absolute or culture-free validity" (Clarke, 1994: 45). Jung's method of 
understanding is also characterised by relativism. Jung considered relativism as a 
philosophical position and maintained a relativistic standpoint that there is no single 
correct view of the world but many. This is the case with Jung's method of 
amplification, which involves a task of understanding, a capacity to become aware of 
one's own prejudices and assumptions, and an openness to the possibility of going 
beyond one's present limitations. It follows that the amplification method indicates 
there is no final definitive understanding of symbolic products of oriental texts. In his 
method of amplification the aim is not trying to understand the absolute truth of the 
religious traditions in the East, but is interpreting the symbolism of Eastern religions 
by using its analogies and its parallels. For instance, Jung was sceptical of the 
absolute truth in Christianity and said, "I positively do not believe that Christianity is 
the only and the highest manifestation of the truth. There is at least as much as truth 
in Buddhism, and in other religions, too" (Letters I: 127). 
Judaism has a morally ambivalent God; Christianity a Trinity and Summum 
Bonum; Buddhism has no God but has interior gods. Their truth is relative and 
not an absolute truth - if you put them on the same level 
(CW 18: 1584, my italics) 
Furthermore, Jung claims the modem scientific rationalism of the West is not the only 
possible one but is a prejudice and a bias. This is why Jung's interest turned Eastward 
to obtain a more ample conception of human reality. Jung's attitude is summed up in 
his statement, 
since there is only one earth and one mankind, East and West cannot rend 
humanity into two different halves. Psychic reality still exists in its original 
oneness and awaits man's advance to a level of consciousness where he no , 
longer believes in the one part and denies the other, but recognizes both as 
constituent elements of one psyche. 
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(CW 8: 682) 
An important consequence of this view is that Jung fonnulated a psychic relativism 
between East and West. Jung constructed a grand dichotomy between an introverted 
tendency in the East and an extraverted tendency in the West. Due to this difference, 
Jung believed it was impossible for Europeans to practice Eastern spiritual techniques 
such as yoga and meditation. Jung argued that, "The spiritual development of the 
West has been along entirely different lines from that of the East and has therefore 
produced conditions which are the most unfavourable soil one can think of for the 
application of yoga" (CW 11: 876). 
2.2 The phenomenological approach to the understanding of religion 
2.2.1 The phenomenology of religion 
Having discussed Jung's henneneutical approach, this section exanllnes a 
phenomenological approach to the understanding of religion in order to observe other 
ways of studying religion and to show how religious traditions and experiences can be 
interpreted from the perspective of the phenomenology of religion. There are four 
major different approaches to the study of religion: sociological, anthropological, 
psychological, and phenomenological approaches. Associated with the sociological 
approach to the study of religions are Emile Durkheim, Lucien Levy-Bruhl, Max 
Weber, Joachim Wach, and so forth. Wilhelm Schmidt and Claude Levi-Strauss are 
contributors to the anthropological approach. Freud and Jung made major 
contributions to the psychology of religion. William James also studied religious 
experiences from a psychological perspective. Of all the approaches in the study of 
religions, the phenomenology of religion is arguably the most revolutionary approach. 
Douglas Allen asserts that the phenomenology of religion, "rendered possible 
systematic study of religions and has shaped much of the nature of the History of 
Religions today" (Allen, 1978: 57). The earliest fonn of the phenomenology of 
religion is merely a descriptive phenomenology, which is meant to be a systematic 
counterpart to the history of religion. The main task of the descriptive 
phenomenology is to bring together groups of religious phenomena, such as the object 
of worship, idolatry, sacred stones, trees and animals, nature-worship, the worship of 
men, the gods, magic, and divination, sacrifice and prayer, holy places, times and 
persons, the community, scriptures, doctrines, mythology, dogmas and philosophies, 
ethics and art. Eric J. Sharpe (1975) asserts that it is "an elementary method of cross-
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cultural comparison of the constituent elements of religious belief and practice, as 
opposed to their treatment in cultural isolation and chronological sequence" (Sharpe, 
1975: 223). 
Sharpe argues that the philosopher Edmund Husserl had an influence on the 
phenomenology of religion and provided two important concepts: epoche and eidetic 
vision (Sharpe, 1975: 224). Let us first examine these concepts from the perspective 
of Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl's phenomenology involves the 'bracketing of 
being' or 'disconnecting' from the 'natural attitude,' in which "unacknowledged 
ontological prejudices hinder access to an understanding of the phenomena as they 
would present themselves to a naive consciousness" (Brooke, 1991: 33). Husserl 
called this process epoche, "a certain refraining from judgement which is compatible 
with the unshaken and unshakeable because self-evidencing conviction of Truth" 
(Husserl, 1931: 109, Husserl's Italics). Roger Brooke (1991) argues that, "what is 
bracketed are the ontological and scientific assumptions which prejudicially affirm, 
doubt, or otherwise categorise the phenomena as they primordially appear" (Brooke, 
1991: 33-4). It is, however, extremely difficult to suspend one's own judgement and 
prejudices, since this involves "an abstention that is not given within factual 
existence" (Brooke, 1991: 34). Brooke argues, therefore, "there is no appeal to 
experience in arguing for the value of the reduction, which, in the end, can only be 
grasped in doing and having done it" (Ibid., 34). What is important in the process of 
epoche is to recognise that a complete freedom from presuppositions is in fact 
impossible. Husserl asserts, "as regards the eidetic fields of study on their material 
side, one of these is of such outstanding significance for us that the impossibility of 
disconnexion can be taken for granted: that is, the essential domain of the 
phenomenologically purified consciousness itself' (Husserl, 1931: 177). 
Husserl asserts that the essence (eidos) of a thing is "given within the 
imaginative intuition of the consciousness which discriminates that essence from its 
empirical contingencies" (Brooke, 1991: 37). This is what Husserl called eidetic 
reduction, and it is achieved through using individual intuition. Husserl argues, 
"empirical or individual intuition can be transformed into essential insight (ideation) 
- a possibility which is itself not to be understood as empirical but as essential 
possibility. The object of such insight is then the corresponding pure essence of 
eidos whether it be the highest category or one of its specializations, right down to , 
the fully 'concrete'" (Husserl, 1931: 54, Husserl's Italics). Brooke noted the 
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following points concerning HusserI' s concept of the eidetic reduction: "the essences 
of phenomena are given within the things themselves," but they are different from 
empirical contingencies; "these essences can be intuited by a naIve consciousness," 
which are free from the natural attitude; "these essences are revealed in the mode of 
imagination," and finally, "in the life-world these essences are meaningful relations" 
(Brooke, 1991: 37). 
Let us now examine Sharpe's concept of epoche and eidetic vision, which is 
mainly used in this thesis. According to Sharpe, epoche means 'stoppage,' 
suspension of judgement, and the exclusion from one's mind of every possible 
presupposition. In the phenomenological point of view it emphasises, "the need to 
abstain from every kind of value-judgement, to be 'present' to the phenomenon in 
question purely as an impartial observer, un-concerned with the question of truth and 
falsehood" (Sharpe, 1975: 224). Eidetic vision, on the contrary, is the observer's 
capacity for seeing the essentials of a situation as opposed to what it has been, or 
ought to be. It is a form of subjectivity and implies an intuitive grasp of the essentials 
of a situation in its wholeness. By these two terms, the phenomenologists of religion 
attempt to see, "something of what is essential in religion, not in spite of oddities of 
individual believers, but through the eyes of those who believe or ... those who are 
committed" (Sharpe, 1983: 32) The phenomenology of religion aims to describe and 
to systematise the basic structures and meaning of religious phenomena in a specific 
manner which insists upon the irreducibility and uniqueness of the religious 
dimension of experience. 
Streng asserts the phenomenologists of religion believe that, "any method of 
interpreting religion must include the recognition that religious experience cannot be 
reduced to other elements of human life" (Streng, 1979: 59). The lack of such 
awareness limits the study of religion to non-religious factors. Sharpe argues that the 
division-of-labour approach, which distributes the field of religious studies out among 
technical subject specialists such as philosophers, psychologists, historians, 
sociologists, and the rest, is convenient but is based, "less on a basis of the nature of 
the material to be dealt with than be the accidental criteria of the recent history of 
western scholarship" (Sharpe, 1983: 92). For instance, psychologists tend to see 
religion only from a psychological point of view and fail to see the totality of the 
religious phenomena. Religious phenomena reveal an irreducibly religious 
dimension, such as religious belief, behaviour and experience, which must be 
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approached in their own cultural context. (Allen, 1978: 44). Thus the 
phenomenologists of religion emphasise a detailed study of the peculiarities which 
make religious life significant for the religious adherent, and one should try to learn 
the religious assumptions which give order and meaning to the adherent (Streng, 
1979). 
Sharpe argues there are two ways of studying religion: from a position within, 
and from a position outside the community of those whose lives are shaped by 
religious belief and practices. Those who are inside the religious community are 
"often seeking to make more firm their grasp of the tradition to which they belong, 
while the others ... are looking for intellectual explanations of what, in human terms, 
it is to be religious" (Sharpe, 1983: 18). The former is a believer's position and the 
latter a non-believer's. Sharpe asserts, "Believer and non-believer look at the same 
religious phenomena, but in the end arrive at totally different interpretations of their 
meaning and sources of religious experience" (Sharpe, 1983: 63). Those who are 
religiously committed, "stand in a definite personal relationship to the unseen world 
which is believed to control human destiny," and such a relationship "is one of 
dependence, and involves attitudes of the mind and the will, as well as of the 
emotions" (Ibid., 19). By contrast, those who are outside the religious community can 
only observe intuitively from a distance the divine human relationship which lies at 
the heart of the religious believer. In this sense, the believer knows something which 
the non-believer can never fully grasp. Furthermore, the believer knows, "religion 
actually refers itself to a supernatural or a transcendent order, and were capable of 
demonstrating its control over the universe on the one hand, and its communication 
with the world on the other" (Ibid., 20). Because of his commitment, therefore, "the 
believer has a vast advantage when it comes to an instinctive understanding of 
religion" (Ibid., 21). 
However, this VIew IS not always accurate. Sharpe says, "powerful 
commitment to one religious position has usually led those involved, not to 
appreciate, but to pour scorn, on what they evidently regard as the false or mistaken 
commitment of others" (Sharpe, 1983: 20). Moreover, it would be quite possible that, 
"the stronger the commitment of an individual or a community to one set of religious 
values (which the believer claims to be so helpful when it comes to understanding all 
the others), the less likely they are to give much thought to what other people may 
believe; and if they do notice these alternative values, as a rule they do so only to call 
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them in question or condemn them" (Ibid., 20-21, Sharpe's Italics). It seems, 
therefore, that commitment can be a barrier to the understanding of religion, because, 
"it tends to prevent individuals from seeing religion in any other perspective than their 
own" (Ibid., 21). 
Allen argues that, in studying religious phenomena, the commitment of the 
scholar must be different from the that of the believer. Sharpe asserts that the 
commitment of the believer's position means, "total trust - in a person, In a 
community, in a tradition, in a scripture, or in a combination of all four" (Sharpe, 
1983: 30), whereas the commitment of the intellectual position generally "makes no 
personal demands on the individual, and of itself mediates little of the transcendent" 
(Ibid., 27). The scholar's commitment in the study of religion needs to have, "a 
sympathetic attitude and interest in the religious experiences of humankind, a 
sensitive awareness of what is religious expressed in her or his data, a respect for the 
irreducibly religious nature of the phenomena" (Allen, 1978: 90). The 
phenomenology of religion uses the method of 'sympathy' and 'empathy' and 
attempts to enter into the position of religious believer. Furthermore, with the method 
of epoche (the suspension of jUdgement) and eidetic vision (the capacity to see things 
as wholes), "we shall be able to see something of what is essential in religion, not in 
spite of the oddities of individual believes, but through the eyes of those who believe 
- or if you prefer, those who are committed" (Sharpe, 1983: 31-2). 
2.2.2 Kristensen and Van der Leeuw's phenomenology of religion 
In this section I will consider the approaches of two phenomenologists: W. Brede 
Kristensen and G. Van der Leeuw. Kristensen (1971) asserts the phenomenology of 
religion is the systematic treatment of the History of Religion, and "its task is to 
classify and group the numerous and widely divergent data in such a way that an 
over-all view can be obtained of their religious content and the religious values they 
contain" (Kristensen, 1971: 1). Kristensen's main methodological concern was with 
the problem of value judgements. He believed scholarly presuppositions are 
inadequate for an understanding of religious phenomena. Kristensen states, "Every 
religion ought to be understood from its own standpoint, for that is how it is 
understood by its own adherents" (Kristensen, 1971: 6). Therefore the 
phenomenologists of religion 
must... be able to forget themselves, to be able to surrender themselves to 
others. Only after that will they discover that others surrender themselves to 
them. If they bring their own idea with them, others shut themselves off from 
them. No justice is then done to the values which are alien to us, because they 
are not allowed to speak in their own language. If the historian tries to 
understand the religious data from a different viewpoint than that of the 
believers, he negates the religious reality. For there is no religious reality other 
than the faith of the believers. 
(Kristensen, 1971: 13) 
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In Kristensen's view the believer's own understanding of his faith is given absolute 
priority. He claims, "For the historian only one evaluation is possible: 'the believers 
were completely right'" (Ibid., 14). What the scholar must do is to respect the 
integrity of the believer, to refrain from imposing on him the scholar's own value-
judgement, and to aim at the ideal of integral objective knowledge and total 
understanding. However Kristensen is well aware that this is an ideal, and in fact an 
unattainable one. He says the scholar, "cannot understand the absolute character of 
the religious data in the same way that the believer understands them" (Ibid., 7), for 
there is an inevitable distance between the scholar and the object of the research. 
Thus the phenomenologists can understand the absolute reality only in an 
approximate way by means of empathy. A certain amount of intuition, an indefinable 
sympathy, and a feeling for the religious data are indispensable for the scholar to 
understand the essence and the meaning of the religious phenomena. 
G. Van der Leeuw's2 approach is not only descriptive phenomenology, but 
also the systematic discussion of what appears. Van der Leeuw states: "'appearance' 
refers equally to what appears and to the person to whom it appears" (Van der Leeuw, 
1967: 671). The phenomenon is not an object related subject, and a subject related to 
an object, "its entire essence is given in its 'appearance,' and its appearance to 
'someone. If (finally) this 'someone' begins to discuss what 'appears', then 
phenomenology arises'" (Ibid., 671). Van der Leeuw had a theology background and 
he claimed that the phenomenology of religion is not identical to theology. Religion 
can be observed as an intelligible experience, which is a human phenomenon and can 
be studied as such. On the contrary, the revelation can never be studied, since 
revelation is not a phenomenon, and in this sense it can only be grasped from God's 
2 After World War II, Van der Leeuw became interested in the studies of Jung, who was also concerned 
with the religious experience in the psyche of mankind. Sharpe asserts, "as a participant in the Eranos 
Conference Van der Leeuw was clearly receptive to the general message of the 'Jungians '" (Sharpe, 
1975: 235). 
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point of view. We can only observe one's response to the divine revelation. Van der 
Leeuw clearly states the goal of understanding is pure objectivity. He writes that 
phenomenology desires to, 
gain access to the facts themselves; and for this it requires a meaning, because it 
cannot experience the facts just as it pleases. This meaning, however, is purely 
objective: all violence, either empirical, logical or metaphysical, is excluded. 
(Van der Leeuw, 1967: 677) 
Van der Leeuw points out, "the phenomenology is neither metaphysics, nor the 
comprehension of empirical reality," but is man's true vital activity ... standing aside 
and understanding what appears into view" (Ibid., 675-6). To be thoroughly 
empirical is the symptom of what Van der Leeuw called the typical twentieth-century 
sickness. He did not entirely dismiss empirical research, but to be exclusively 
empirical is to deny one's own wholeness, and thus fail to attain genuine 
understanding. To sum up, the task of the phenomenology of religion is, firstly, to 
assign names to groups of phenomena, such as sacrifice, prayer, saviour, myths, etc. 
Secondly, we must interpolate the appearances within one's own life and experience 
them systematically.3 In the third place, we must put empirical reality and the truth of 
phenomena in suspension as epoche or restraint of judgement. Fourthly, we attempt 
to clarify what it has seen, and try to comprehend what has appeared. Finally, we 
must confront chaotic reality and testify to what has been understood (Van der Leeuw, 
1967: 688). 
There is a certain weakness in Van der Leeuw's phenomenology of religion. 
Waardenburg argues that Vander Leeuw, "does not distinguish between the 
significance of a phenomenon for the believers concerned and the meaning which it 
acquires for the understanding scholar" (Waardenburg, 1978: 234). Moreover, "Van 
der Leeuw's phenomenology presupposes an objective mind, that is, an objectively 
structured whole of objective meanings to which the scholar ascends through his self-
induced experience of structures and ideal types" (Ibid., 234). Waardenburg criticises 
Vander Leeuw and argues that the religious phenomena which causes one to question 
the reality of the subject and object of understanding is never put by Van der Leeuw. 
In this phenomenology, "all attention is given to the Phenomenon, which is separated 
from its context, introduced into the mental universe of the phenomenologiest, and 
made a building-stone in the construction of the ideal types" (Ibid., 234). In so doing, 
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Van der Leeuw's phenomenology "tends to reduce reality to phenomena of the mind 
clustered into ideal types, and to stop questioning subject and object in favor of 
religious meanings taken nearly as absolutes in themselves" (Ibid., 234). For Van der 
Leeuw, understanding simply indicates, "the pursuit of the psychological experience 
of meaning and the comprehension of the contents of experience in a realm of ideal 
typical structures" (Ibid., 235). Furthermore, Van der Leeuw's phenomenology of 
religion confronts the problem of meaning. Waadenburg states that the notion of 
meaning for Van der Leeuw is a third term between objective facticity and subjective 
evaluation, and this notion of meaning has determined his treatment of the 
significance of religious phenomena. By making his interpretations not only in 
theology but also in phenomenology in view of an ultimate meaning, Van der Leeuw, 
"arrives at a frank absolutization of the whole notion of meaning" (Waadenburg, 
1978: 235). Hence Waardenburg claims in Van der Leeuw's phenomenology the 
significance of the phenomena is cut off from the people for whom it is or was valid, 
and there is a neglect of the role of human intersubjectivity in any 
understanding. The experience of understanding has thus become a lonely 
religious experience, the results of which can be attested but hardly discussed. 
(Waardenburg, 1978: 235) 
Having discussed the fundamental outline of the phenomenology of religion, we can 
now make use of it in order to help illuminate Jung's own engagement with the 
oriental religions. From the perspective of the phenomenology of religion, Jung's 
methodology lacks objectivity and fails to exercise epoche, that is, to suspend his own 
judgement or exclude from his mind every possible presupposition. As mentioned 
earlier, Jung's approach is hermeneutical, which accepts and uses his own 
SUbjectivity. Jung did not see religious phenomena from their own standpoint. For 
instance, Jung claimed a similarity exists between his notion of the self and mandala 
symbols in Tibetan Buddhism. Jung claimed that the mandala symbolised his idea of 
the archetype of the self. Jung was especially concerned with the healing aspect of the 
mandala which was confirmed by the 'empirical evidence' that his patients felt a great 
deal better after they had considered a mandala. Jung clearly stated that, "My 
standpoint is exclusively phenomenological, that is, it is concerned with occurrences, 
events, experiences - in a word with facts. When psychology speaks, for example, of 
the motif of the virgin birth, it is only concerned with the fact that there is such an 
3 Sharpe states that this point, "seems at first sight hard to reconcile with the claim that the aim of 
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idea, but it is not concerned with the question of whether such an idea is true or false 
in any other sense" (CW 11: 4). However, Jung failed to understand the religious 
significance and the ritualistic usage of the Tibetan tantric mandala within their own 
traditions and cultures. In this case Jung's position seems to be un-phenomenological, 
as against his claim that his method is phenomenological. 
After gaining access to the objective facts of religious data, the 
phenomenologist of religion applies the method of eidetic vision, which is a form of 
subjectivity, in order to grasp the essentials of a situation in its wholeness. Kristensen 
argues, one can only understand the absolute reality of the religious phenomena 
approximately by means of a certain amount of intuition and empathy. Vander 
Leeuw also argued that one of the tasks for the phenomenologists of religion is to 
interpolate the appearances of the phenomena within one's own life and experience 
them systematically. The fact that the phenomenology of religion inevitably involves 
a certain degree of subjectivity becomes similar to Jung's position. R.S. Steele argues 
that, like Dilthey's theory of hermeneutics, Jung considered empathy as an important 
role interpretation. Dilthey proposed that empathetic and intuitive understanding can 
be supplemented by a great deal of interpretative work in order to make one's insight 
clear to oneself and to another. Jung's empathetic understanding is seen in his study 
of symbolism, religion, gnosticism, alchemy and in his confrontation with the 
unconscious. At this point we can say that the phenomenology of religion takes a 
similar position to the fundamental hermeneutical principle. 
There is no doubt that Jung's approach to understanding psychological 
phenomena and religious experiences is essentially hermeneutic. Brooke claims that 
Jung's approach illustrates a particular form of hermeneutics called existential 
phenomenology. Existential phenomenology and hermeneutics overlap considerably. 
For, both existential phenomenology and hermeneutics are "embedded within 
language; both are an attempt to conduct a receptive dialogue with the other 
(phenomenon, text, and so on); both recognise the impossibility of asking 
presuppositionless questions and therefore acknowledge that in principle the dialogue 
never ceases, or can be taken up again and again" (Brooke, 1991: 30). Existential 
phenomenology involves a description of reality as it is within lived expenence. 
Brooke asserts, 
phenomenology is 'pure objectivity'" (Sharpe, 1975: 234). 
:0 de~cribe is to retun: repeatedly to the phenomenon itself so that it may show 
Itself In ever deeper, ncher, and more subtle ways. This repetitive return is the 
disciplined and self-critical hermeneutic circle. Description is not opposed to 
interpretation, therefore, but interpretation is required to remain intrinsically 
descriptive. 
(Brooke, 1991: 31) 
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Jung's approach shows an aspect of existential phenomenology. Brooke claims 
Jung's approach is "not restricted to the reading of texts but is expanded to describe 
an approach to the structures of psychological life" (Brooke, 1991: 39). Thus for Jung 
pathological symptoms, dreams and religious experiences are interpreted as texts, 
which express their own meanings. Jung exercised the method of amplification in 
order to specify the essential meaning of these psychological phenomena. It seems, 
therefore, that Jung's hermeneutic method has much in common with existential 
phenomenology. 
2.2.3 Problems with the phenomenological approach in the study of religion 
The difficulty facing the phenomenology of religion is the dilemma between the 
objective status, in which the scholar examines the religious phenomena as objective 
facts, and the subjective position, that is, a certain degree of subjectivity is inevitably 
involved with the scholarly interpretation of the religious data. As far as the majority 
of phenomenologists are concerned, they attempt to apply the principle of epoche and 
to ensure that their material is gathered and verified according to the strict principle of 
historical scholarship. However there are limits to scholarly objectivity. Whatever 
the phenomenologist does in his writing or teaching, he selects, systematises and 
interprets. He, then, establishes types, patterns of the religious data, and arranges 
whatever the material he happens to have available around those patterns. Sharpe 
points out, 
there is very little reason here for the scholar to claim an ideal (an in any case 
wholly unrealisable) state of freedom from presuppositions. Presuppositions are 
writ large across the whole phenomenological enterprise. Materials have been 
acquired under strictly scientific conditions, and the phenomenologist may wish 
to claim that his systematising activity is equally scientific. But in this respect 
at least, science must be content to acknowledge its affinity with art. 
(Sharpe, 1975:245) 
There is a tension between scientifically acquired objective facts and subsequent 
interpretation of those facts which has given rise to scholarly subjectivity. Sharpe 
argues, "the phenomenologist of religion must, if he is honest, confess that the 
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enterprise on which he is engaged cannot but involve the subjective faculty of 
interpretation" (Ibid., 248). Waardenburg thinks the clue to a proper analysis of 
religious materials as well as of scholarly interpretations of such materials is the 
concept of intention. He argues that phenomenological research should be directed 
toward the intentions contained in human expressions of or in human responses to 
given religious data in order to understand both religious and non-religious intentions 
within the same perspective. Waardenburg points out that the phenomenology of 
religion may be an art, since it considers the religious phenomena as human 
expressions, and thus the art of interpretation is necessary to discover the meaning of 
one's religious experience (Waardenburg, 1978: 17-9). 
Mircea Eliade illustrates the dialectical relation of subject and object in the 
study of religion. This approach explores the way in which men relate to the object of 
their attention. Joseph D. Bettis states that what makes a situation 'religious' in the 
dialectic approach is, "neither the SUbjective element nor the objective element, but 
the way in which these elements come into contact" (Bettis, 1969: 199). Eliade 
argues that we experience our environment in two different ways: the modem world 
in which man discovers the empirical world of sense data through his experience; and 
the archaic world which separates experience into sacred and profane. In Eliade's 
view man has traditionally lived in these two realms of sacred and profane. However 
the modem mentality makes it difficult for us to understand what is meant by these 
two spheres. The distinction between sacred and profane lies not in the difference 
between kinds of objects, but in the way men relate to things and events in their 
environment. What we experience is a product of the data in our environment, and 
the images, symbols and expectations we bring to it. These trans-experiential factors 
have a significant influence in shaping our experiential world. Bettis argues, 
"Religious symbols and images provide the fundamental archetypes or paradigmatic 
models for organizing and shaping the religious man's environment" (Bettis, 1969: 
202). Eliade was convinced that reality is not to be identified with what can be 
empirically experienced, but rather, "it is identified by the myths, images, and 
symbols of his religious traditions" (Bettis, 1969: 204). Eliade states, 
Images and symbols and myths are not irresponsible creations of the psyche; 
they respond to a need and fulfil a function, that of bringing to light the most 
hidden modalities of being. Consequently, the study of them enables us to 
reach a better understanding of man - of man 'as he is', before he has come to 
terms with the conditions of History. 
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(Eliade, 1991: 12) 
Sharpe argues that for Eliade, the desire to understand and interpret the archaic world, 
"has been part of a personal confrontation with the Western intellectual heritage and 
its compulsive historicism, and parallels similar attempts made by Jung" (Sharpe, 
1975: 214). Eliade was influenced by Jung's view on the symbolism of myths and 
Eastern religions. Although they both used the term, 'archetypes' there is a 
significant difference in their usage of the term. The archetypal symbols were 
characterised by Jung as unconscious material, whereas, for Eliade, archetypes are 
purely historical and archaic. For Jung, symbols of myth and religion are imprinted in 
the psyche and thus the contents of the collective unconscious manifest themselves 
through archetypal symbols in the therapeutic settings. By contrast, for Eliade, 
interpreting symbols of myth and religion reveals archaic human behaviour. Thus 
Eliade argues that through a study of religious symbolism and traditions the modem 
man, who had lost touch with the archaic world, would, "not only rediscover a kind of 
archaic behaviour, he would also become conscious of the spiritual riches implied in 
such behaviour" (Eliade, 1991: 35). Eliade was deeply concerned with the historicism 
of the Western mind and the value of the archaic mentality. The former is obsessed 
with ideas of progress, evolution, history and making the most of every moment, and 
the latter is dominated by a belief in timelessness, the trance-experience of yogin and 
shaman, and those annually or seasonally repeated rituals and festivals by which 
archaic man has attempted to come to terms with the passage of time. It follows that, 
in contrast to Judeo-Christian man, who feels himself to be placed within an ongoing 
process, "'archaic man' localises himself by constantly attempting to return to the 
mythical time at the beginning of things" (Sharpe, 1975: 215). In this way everything 
is constantly beginning afresh at every moment, and the archaic man is therefore, 
"freed from being in terror of the passage of time, since time itself is constantly being 
regenerated" (Ibid., 216). Eliade asserts, 
If all moments and all situations of the cosmos are repeated ad infinitum, their 
evanescence is, in the last analysis, patent; sub specie infinitatis, all moments 
and all situations remain stationary and thus acquire the ontological order of the 
archetype. 
(Eliade cited by Sharpe, 1975: 216) 
Eliade's point here seems to imply that, "archaic man lives his archetypes, as it were; 
modem man, on the other hand, has fallen out with his" (Sharpe, 1975: 216). Eliade 
attempts to seek for a fruitful dialogue between archaic and modem man, particularly 
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a Western man in search of his lost soul. This is the theme of the Eranos conference. 
Eliade asserts, 
Sooner or later our dialogue with the 'others' - the representatives of the 
traditional, Asiatic, and 'primitive' cultures - must begin to take place not in 
today's empirical and utilitarian language (which can approach only realities 
classifiable as social, economic, political, sanitary, etc.) but in a cultural 
language capable of expressing human realities and spiritual values. 
(Eliade cited by Sharpe, 1975: 216-7) 
This statement suggests that Eliade's approach to understanding religion is similar to 
Jung's methods since both method are hermeneutical in their approach, seeking for 
essential meanings through a dialogue with either the collective unconscious by Jung 
or the archaic world by Eliade through the interpretation of images, symbols and 
myth. 
2.3 A critical discussion of Jung's hermeneutics of Eastern religion 
2.3.1 Jung's metapsychology and Eastern thought 
Having discussed Jung's hermeneutical method of understanding Eastern religion, and 
the theory of the phenomenology of religion this section provides a critical discussion 
of Jung's methodology in the study of religion. Jung's hermeneutical approach 
allows him to observe that his metapsychology has many analogies with Eastern 
religious thought. Jung asserts, "Taoist philosophy as well as Yoga have very many 
parallels with the psychic processes we can observe in Western man... I do not get 
anybody to draw or contemplate mandala pictures as in Yoga, but it has turned out 
that unprejudiced people take quite naturally to these aids in order to find their 
bearings in the chaos of unconscious processes that come to light" (Letters I: 195). 
The idea of complementary opposites, such as the Chinese yin/yang duality, is a 
significant parallel with Jung's own thinking. The Chinese tao is a uniting symbol of 
pair of opposites. Jung uses the term as evidence for the existence of a uniting 
archetype, the self, in the collective unconscious. The tao is hidden and nameless and 
at the same time the source of all creation. The tao manifests itself in the created 
universe by being divided into a fundamental pair of opposites named yang and yin. 
Yang signifies warmth, light, maleness, heaven; yin is cold, darkness, femaleness, and 
earth. In Jung's view psychic danger occurs when a split between the opposites 
becomes too great and causes a serious imbalance between consciousness and the 
unconSCIOUS. Jung says, "The stronger and more independent our [Western] 
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consciousness becomes, and with it the conscious will, the more the unconscious is 
thrust into the background, and the easier it is for the evolving consciousness to 
emancipate itself from the unconscious, archetypal pattern" (CW 13: 13). However, 
Jung utilises Chinese insights to prevent further splits, "When yang has reached its 
greatest strength, the dark power of yin is born within its depths, for night begins at 
midday when yang breaks up and begins to change into yin" (Ibid., 13). From his 
medical investigations Jung argued, "an unconscious that is in full revolt against the 
conscious values, and that therefore cannot possibly be assimilated to consciousness, 
while the reverse is altogether out of question" (CW 13: 15). Thus Westerners need 
to face the question, "as to what has become of the much needed unity of the 
personality, and with the necessity of seeking it" (Ibid., 15). In order to seek its 
answer, Jung strongly felt the West could learn a great deal from the East. 
Jung also discovered the peaceful and wrathful aspects of gods, which playa 
great role in the meditations of The Tibetan Book of the Dead, symbolising the 
opposites. For Jung the peaceful and wrathful aspects of gods are, "archetypal 
thought-forms belonging to the sambhogakaya" (CW 11: 791). They are, "no more 
than human conflicts, but in sambhogakaya they are the positive and negative 
principles united in one and the same figure" (CW 11: 791). Jung observed this 
corresponded to psychological experience. The opposites' appearance as gods comes 
from the simple recognition that they are exceedingly powerful. But their power 
increases the more one tries to separate from them. Jung argues that this is 
characteristic of the Western mentality. Jung asserted that the peaceful and wrathful 
deities, psychologically speaking, are, "projections of the human psyche" (CW 11: 
833). In order to understand one's own psyche, Jung believes the knowledge of the 
unconscious is essential. For, "the more weight we attach to unconscious processes 
the more we detach ourselves from the world of desires and of separated opposites, 
and the nearer we draw to the state of unconsciousness with its qualities of oneness, 
indefiniteness, and timelessness. This is truly a liberation of the self from its bondage 
to strife and suffering" (CW 11: 792). 
Likewise in Indian thought the representation of the divine in artistic forms 
includes the various aspects of the pair of opposites. For instance, the Hindu god, 
Shiva, is balanced by his goddess, Shakti. Tibetan yab-yum images also show the 
same theme. Jung was concerned with the question of evil and its relation to good 
within the context of Christian theological assumptions since his youth, and 
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developed a theoretical structure of the Christian experience of God, which, "can then 
be understood as man's creative confrontation with the opposites and their synthesis 
in the self, the wholeness of his personality" (MDR: 370). Jung's discovery of the 
pair of opposites from his study of Eastern religion was very similar to his view on 
good and evil images of Christ. Jung says, "To the Oriental, good and evil are 
meaningfully contained in nature, and are merely varying degrees of the same 
thing" "(MDR: 305). 
Jung became interested in mandalas as symbols of contemplation through 
Richard Wilhelm's The Secret of the Golden Flower, on which Jung wrote a 
commentary in 1929 (CW 13). Jung's central concern with this text is the concept of 
psychic integration into a harmonious whole. Jung asserts, "the union of opposites on 
a higher level of consciousness is not a rational thing, nor is it a matter of will; it is a 
process of psychic development that expresses itself in symbols" (CW 13: 31). These 
symbols are chiefly of the mandala type. Jung explains that mandala means a magic 
circle, most of them taking the form of a flower, cross, or wheel, and that they, "show 
a distinct tendency towards a quaternity structure" (Ibid., 31). Jung found mandalas 
not only throughout the East but also in the West. For instance, he found mandala-
like figures in the Christian tradition in the Middle Ages, most of which show "Christ 
in the centre, with the four evangelists, or their symbols, at the cardinal points" (CW 
13: 31). Jung asserts that a similar pattern can also be seen in the Egyptian 
symbolism, in Jakob Bohme's book XL Questions concerning the Soul, and in the 
religious paintings of the Pueblo and Navaho Indians. Most interestingly, Jung saw 
his patients producing mandala paintings, and, "among them persons who certainly 
did not have the least idea of any of the connections" (Ibid., 31). 
Jung interprets mandalas as symbols of psychic wholeness, the self, since they 
express both wholeness and balance and also point towards a centre. Jung says when 
the self finds expression in mandala symbols, "the unconscious reacts by enforcing an 
attitude of devotion to life" (CW 13: 36). Consequently, the mandala symbols 
produce a therapeutic effect. Jung asserts, "Its effect is astonishing in that it almost 
always brings about a solution of psychic complications and frees the inner 
personality from emotional and intellectual entanglements, then creating a unity of 
being which is universally felt as 'liberation'" (CW 13: 43). Jung also has a strong 
affinity for Buddhism and says the teachings of the Buddha, "offer Western man ways 
and means of disciplining his inner psychic life... and give him a helpful training 
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when either the Christian ritual has lost its meaning or the authority of religious ideas 
has collapsed, as all too frequently happens in psychogenic disorders" (CW 18: 1577). 
Here again the self is a key term in Jung's study of Buddhism. In Jung's view his 
argument that the symbols of the self are indistinguishable from the God-image fits 
well with Buddhist thought that in Mahayana Buddhism the true self is emptiness or 
Buddha-nature. As Jung puts it, 
I grasped the life of the Buddha as the reality of the self which had broken 
through and laid claim to a personal life. For Buddha, the self stands above all 
gods, a unus mundus which represents the essence of human existence and of 
the world as a whole. 
(MDR: 309) 
So far it has been shown that Jung observed the parallels and affinities between his 
metapsychological theory and Eastern religion by means of the method of 
amplification. But Jung was also aware of the differences. The Eastern idea of 
liberation and Jung's idea of the individuation process differ over a fundamental 
point. The Hindu concept of moksa means complete freedom from all worldly bonds 
and transcendence of the tensions of the pairs of opposites. Similarly the Buddhist 
notion of nirvana is a liberation from the wheel of rebirth and from attachment to 
illusions and desires. However, for Jung there is no possibility for man to achieve 
ultimate perfection. He says, 
It is certainly desirable to liberate oneself from the operation of opposites but 
one can only do it to a certain extent, because no sooner do you get out of the 
conflict than you get out of life altogether. So that liberation can be only a very 
partial one. It can be the construction of a consciousness just beyond the 
opposites. Your hand may be liberated, our feet remain entangled Complete 
liberation means death. 
(Letters I: 247) 
In Jung's view the dynamic interplay of opposites between consciousness and the 
unconscious is the driving force of life, and the human psyche aims not at perfection 
but at a balance of forces leading to dynamic equilibrium. Therefore Jung asserts that 
suffering is not something we can overcome completely through the individuation 
process. Jung argues, 
The Oriental wants to get rid of suffering by casting it off. Western man tries to 
suppress suffering with drugs. But suffering has to be overcome, and the only 
way to overcome it is to endure it. 
(Letters I: 236) 
Jung's disagreement with these Eastern ideas of cessation of suffering and of 
complete liberation from the pairs of opposites is rooted in his view of ego-
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consCIousness. For Jung the experience of oneself as an individual ego is an 
experience of separation of oneself from other objects. But if there is no ego there is 
not knower and then no consciousness. If you abolish the ego altogether to transcend 
the pair of opposites, then you create merely unconsciousness. Thus, "there must 
always be somebody or something left over to experience the realization, to say 'I 
know at-one-ment, I know there is no distinction'" (CW 11: 817). For this reason 
Jung could not understand the non-dualistic standpoint of Eastern thought. The 
higher state of consciousness known as samadhi in Vedanta philosophy, in which the 
individual conscious ego is dissolved, represents for Jung a psychological 
impossibility. The disappearance of ego-consciousness in his theory can only lead to 
psychosis, caused by psychic imbalance. For Jung, a healthy mental condition means 
to have a good balance between consciousness and the unconscious. Loosing the 
balance between the two can only lead to psychic illness. As Jung argues, 
One assumes however that there is a consciousness without ego, a sort of 
consciousness of the atman. I'm afraid this supreme consciousness is at least 
not one we could posses. 
(Letters I: 247) 
Despite his desire to incorporate the insights of Eastern cultures into his 
understanding of the situation of Western man, Jung found a fundamental difference 
between Eastern and Western mentalities. He says, 
In the West there is the mania for 'objectivity,' the asceticism of the scientist or 
of the stockbroker, who throwaway the beauty and universality of life for the 
sake of the ideal, or not so ideal, goal. In the East, there is the wisdom, peace, 
detachment, and inertia of a psyche that has returned to its dim origins, having 
left behind all the sorrow and joy of existence as it is and, presumably, ought to 
be. 
(CW 11: 786) 
The West tends to have a typically extraverted point of view and the East has a 
tendency to be introverted. Jung says both are one-sided because, "they fail to see 
and take account of those factors which do not fit in with their typical attitude" (CW 
11: 786). 
The differences Jung observed consequently gave him serious misgivings over 
Westerners attempting simply to imitate Eastern spiritual practices such as yoga. 
Jung asserts, "Unfortunately, the spiritual beggars of our time are too inclined to 
accept the alms of the East in bulk and to imitate its ways unthinkingly. This is a 
danger about which too many warnings cannot be uttered" (CW 14: 88). Rather, Jung 
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suggests that confrontation with the spirit of the East should be taken as a sign that 
Western man is beginning to relate to alien elements within himself. 
Denial of our historical foundations would be sheer folly and would be the best 
way to bring about another uprooting of consciousness. Only by standing 
firmly on our own soil can we assimilate the spirit of the East. 
(CW 13: 72) 
Jung developed the concept of active imagination, which he believed is the Western 
equivalent of Eastern yoga. Active imagination consists of, "a special training for 
switching off consciousness, at least to a relative extent, thus giving the unconscious 
contents a chance to develop" (CW 11: 875). In practice, patients are asked to place 
themselves in a relaxed state of mind and to suspend rational judgement as far as 
possible in order to allow images and fantasies to emerge. Its purpose is to bring 
unconscious material into consciousness and to integrate it with the whole personality. 
2.3.2 Jung's tendency to reductionism 
In his interpretation of religion Jung tends to reduce religion to no more than a 
subjective phenomenon. Jung's tendency toward psychologism is frequently found in 
his writings on religion. For instance, Jung sawall the peaceful and wrathful gods in 
The Tibetan Book of the Dead as archetypal contents of the unconscious. He also 
states, "the world of gods and spirits is truly 'nothing but' the collective unconscious 
inside me" (CW 11: 857). James A. Heisig defined the characteristics of Jung's 
psychology of religion and categorised them into three stages, 
(1) the gathering of the primary data; (2) the search for parallels, analogies, and 
comparative material among the documents of history; and (3) the interpretation 
of the former in the light of the latter. 
(Heisig, 1983: 142) 
These characteristics can be seen through his use of archetypes, though Jung 
frequently made analogies to Eastern religious symbolism. Jung claims that the 
parallel images which exist in world religions and mythology are the archetypes in the 
collective unconscious. Michael Palmer claims that in so doing Jung is, in fact, 
"postulating its existence as a conceptual necessity required to explain the patterns 
and repetitions of psychic phenomena" (Palmer, 1997: 176). For example, mandala 
symbols found in different cultures, for Jung, are expressive of psychic wholeness 
because of their patterns and diagrams. The Tibetan notion of the passage of the dead 




Palmer argues, however, that these parallels Jung made only reveal, 
"the extreme sUbjectivity of Jung's method, in which evidence must conform to 
Jung's own convictions" (Palmer, 1997: 174). Moreover Jung's theory of archetypes 
further exemplifies the weakness of his empirical method and his tendency to rush to 
a definition having once established cogently similar information. As Gardner 
Murphy puts it, 
Jung's method - it is no more than a friendly exaggeration to say this - is to 
argue that because A is somewhat like Band B can, under certain 
circumstances, share something with C, and C has been known on occasion to 
have been suspected of being related to D, the conclusion in full-fledged logical 
form is that A=D. As the language of science this is meaningless. 
(Murphy cited by Palmer, 1997: 174-5) 
The important point here is that Jung was not interested in religious symbolism in the 
East as it is experienced within the East's own traditions and cultures. Nor is he 
attracted by its practice or metaphysical beliefs. Jung was only concerned with the 
exploration of the inner world of the human psyche. Brooke argues, "Jung is guilty of 
enclosing psychological life into a solipsistic inner world from which, among other 
things, it is impossible to speak coherently of any real relationships with other beings. 
In other words Jung is guilty of psycho log ism" (Brooke, 1991: 66). In contrast with 
Jung's methodology, the phenomenology of religion attempts to systematise the 
elements of religious phenomena such as religious belief, practice and experiences, 
and compare and examine these accumulated data in a specific way in which the 
irreducibility of religious phenomena is regarded as an essential aspect in the study of 
religion. From this point of view, Jung's approach to both Western and Eastern 
religion falls into psychologism. Moreover, the concept of epoche and eidetic vision 
are important methodological issues in the phenomenology of religion. Jung's 
methodology lacks an objectivistic approach in the study of religion, namely, Jung 
fails to suspend his own judgement or exclude from his mind every possible 
presupposition. Thus Jung did not see the religious phenomena from believers' own 
standpoint. 
Jung thought Buddhism's emphasis on self-awareness and self-realization 
matched well with his concept of the individuation process through which one can 
become a fully developed individual. However, there is, in fact, a clear difference 
between the Buddhist notion of self-realization and Jung's concept of the 
4 See Chapter 4. 
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individuation process, which is discussed in depth later. For lung, the goal of 
individuation is the realization of the self: to unite the conscious and unconscious 
sides of the psyche. In the course of individuation our images and visions generated 
from the unconscious are expressed by way of dreams, myths, fantasies, and 
drawings. Among these images there is the image of God, which lung believes is not 
distinguishable from archetypal images of the self as symbols of psychic wholeness. 
These symbols reveal therapeutic significance in that they show the stage of 
individuation reached by the individual personality. Palmer points out that lung 
describes these images and symbols as religious not because their contents are 
religious but because, "through them is opened up a specific dimension of psychic 
reality, the collective dimension, which transcends the individual even as he or she 
apprehends it" (Palmer, 1997: 188). For example, lung claims there is a similarity 
between his notion of the self and mandala symbols in Tibetan Buddhism. He 
believes the mandalas are symbols of the self. lung states, "the mandala symbolizes 
either the divine being hitherto hidden and dormant in the body and now expected and 
revivified, or else the vessel or the room in which the transformation of man into a 
divine being takes place" (CW 11: 166). For lung the mandalas are religious not 
because they are determined and depicted by the Tibetan religious tradition but 
because they simply have archetypal contents. This is confirmed by his empirical 
evidence that the patients felt a great deal better after they had had the vision of the 
mandala. Palmer argues that in his study of the symbolism of the East lung 
formulated, "a generalized truth about the human psychic condition - the archetypal 
disposition towards the realization of Self - which could just as easily be presented in 
other images, such as images of Buddha or Purusha or Tao" (Palmer, 1997: 190). 
These images are divine because lung believes they reveal psychological significance. 
Thus they have archetypal contents and their validity is ensured by its psychic effects. 
lung asserts, 
Religious experience is absolute; it cannot be disputed... No matter what the 
world thinks about religious experience, the one who has it possesses a great 
treasure, a thing that has become for him a source of life, meaning, and beauty, 
and that has given a new splendour to the world of mankind... That is the 
reason why I take careful account - religio! - of the symbols produced by the 
unconscious. They are the one thing that is capable of convincing the critical 
mind of modem man. 
(CWl1:167) 
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Jung's psychologism is the tendency to reduce religious expenence to the 
psychological level and to claim that religious statements about God, spirit and the 
transcendent are really statements about the psychological reality of the archetypes. 
One of the accusations of Jung's psychological reductionism was made by the Jewish 
theologian, Martin Buber. In his book, The Eclipse of God (1957), Buber criticised 
Jung's psychological account of God in terms of a God archetype which does indeed 
reduce God into an entity that has reality only within the human psyche. Thus, Buber 
accuses Jung of overstepping "the boundaries of psychology in its most essential 
point" (Buber, 1957: 78). 
According to Buber, Jung's explanation of religion is in relation to psychical 
events which do not depend upon consciousness but take place in the collective 
unconscious of the archetypes. Buber claims that Jung "conceives of God not as a 
Being or Reality to which a psychical content corresponds, but rather as this content 
itself' (Buber, 1957: 80). For Jung religion is not related to the transcendent God, but 
God is seen as a function of the contents of the unconscious. However, Buber 
believes that Jung's psychological approach to religion is by no means valid, for it is 
opposed to the orthodox conception of God. Buber compared Jung's view with the 
Kantian conception of noumena, which is not recognised through any categories 
because it is not phenomena but is only conceived of as an unknown something. Jung 
repeatedly emphasises that he avoids metaphysical statements about God transcending 
beyond the psychic experience. For Jung the archetypal image of God has to be 
psychically experientiable within the individual psychic reality. 
Buber also points out that Jung tends to emphasise knowledge and abhor 
Christian faith. For Jung the importance of religion lay not in beliefs and doctrines 
but in an inner psychic experience of the God image. Jung claims that modem 
consciousness needs to tum towards the unconscious, the only sphere in which one 
can experience the divine. Furthermore, Buber considers Jung a Gnostic, due to 
Jung's concept of God, "in whom good evil are bound together" (Buber, 1975: 85). 
This is, in fact, of essential significance for Jung's psychological theory of 
individuation process and archetype of the self. From the standpoint of the basic 
Gnostic view, the orthodox theological conception of God, Jung added the Satanic 
aspect. Jung, thus enlarged the Trinity into the Quatemity, in which the autonomous 
devil is included as the fourth. 
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In his rebuttal of Buber, Jung consistently denied the accusation of 
psychologism. Jung claims that his method was based on psychology and empirical 
science, not on theology. Jung did not affirm or deny the existence of the traditional 
viewpoint of a transcendent God. In reply to Buber, Jung states, 
One can, of course, believe that the concepts of the conscious mind are, through 
the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, direct and correct representations of their 
metaphysical referent. But this conviction is possible only for one who already 
possesses the gift of faith. Unfortunately I cannot boast of this possession. .. I 
have merely expressed an opinion about something that can be experienced, that 
is, about one of the very palpable 'powers of the unconscious'... What I 
described is a psychic factor only, but one which exerts a considerable influence 
on the conscious mind. 
(CW 18: 1505) 
Jung does not actually identify God from the traditional religious viewpoint with 
psychic images of God. He leaves the theologians and metaphysicians to talk about 
the possibility of the existence of the transcendent God. Jung's primary concern is 
not God as the transcendent reality, which he believes is a matter of faith, but the 
psychology of the God-image, and God-as-he-is-experienced. Shelburne (1988) 
argues that it is hard to avoid perceiving the manifest incompatibility between Jung's 
treatment of religion and the traditional religious viewpoint, since, "the Jungian image 
of humankind with its archetypal understanding of the spirit is in real conflict with a 
traditional religious viewpoint based on faith" (Shelburne, 1988: 78). The question 
remains, however, to what extent psychologism is a valid criticism for Jung's 
treatment of religion in relation to the archetypal theory. Shelburne claims that "if. .. 
the claim is made that the psychological perspective is the only valid way to 
understand a religious, philosophical, or aesthetical work or event, then there exists 
the manifest possibility of an illegitimate reductionism" (Shelburne, 1988: 80). 
Shelburne points out that Freud's psycho logistic understanding of religion and art in 
terms of sublimation of sexuality seems an example of religion as 'nothing but' 
psychological application of a theory. 
But a similar example can be found in Jung's treatment of religion when he 
fails to appreciate religious phenomena in anything but his own terms and reduces it 
to psychological elements. As a psychologist Jung sometimes seems to admit 
agnosticism concerning religious and metaphysical claims. In his commentary on 
'The Secret of the Golden Flower' Jung claims, "Every statement about the 
transcendental is to be avoided because it is only a laughable presumption on the part 
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of a human mind unconscious of its presumptions" (CW 13: 54). Jung insists that any 
statement about the transcendent reality such as God or Tao is not to be taken literally. 
He says, "I suspect them of being symbolical psychologists, to whom no greater 
wrong could be done than to take them literally. If it were really metaphysics that 
they mean, it would be useless to try to understand them" (CW 13: 74). Clarke argues 
that "the problem is that Jung wanted to leave open the possibility of making 
metaphysical assertions, while at the same time offering us a psychological theory 
which purports to close the door to them" (Clarke, 1994: 176). It is important to note 
here that we can see Jung's ambivalent attitude manifested in his writings on Eastern 
thought. Jung suggests that the European can learn something important from Eastern 
religion, yet at the same time that the European should not progress beyond the level 
of psychology - Jung's psychology of the archetypes, whereby the Oriental materials 
are to be treated as a projection of the collective unconscious. 
2.3.3 Methodological problems in Jung's understanding of religion 
Jung repeatedly stresses that psychology is only concerned with certain observable 
psychic facts or phenomena. They are regarded as a psychic reality which includes 
dreams, fantasies, visions, pathological states and religious experiences. Jung argues, 
Psychic existence is the only category of existence of which we have immediate 
knowledge, since nothing can be known unless it first appears as a psychic 
image. Only psychic existence is immediately verifiable. To the extent that the 
world does not assume the form of a psychic image, it is virtually non-existent. 
(CW 11: 769) 
Jung claims in the West, the realization of psychic existence is rather neglected but 
the East, on the contrary, "bases itself upon psychic reality, that is, upon the psyche as 
the main and unique condition of existence" (CW 11: 770). Jung was largely 
concerned with Eastern religions such as Buddhism where primacy is given to psyche 
or mind. Thus he says, "The East is wiser, for it finds the essence of all things 
grounded in the psyche" (CW 8: 748). The psychic reality is crucial concept in Jung's 
psychological thinking. 
In his study of religion Jung insists that his approach IS empirical and 
scientific based on a phenomenological standpoint. Jung says, 
I am an empiricist and adhere as such to the phenomenological standpoint... I 
approach psychological matters from a scientific and not from a philosophical 
standpoint. Inasmuch as religion has a very important psychological aspect, I 
deal with it from a purely empirical point of view, that is, I restrict myself to the 
observation of phenomena and I eschew any metaphysical or philosophical 
considerations. 
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(CW 11: 2) 
Jung believes his standpoint is purely phenomenological because, "it is concerned 
with occurrences, events, experiences - in a word, with facts," and "its truth is a fact 
not a judgement," and therefore it is "psychologically true inasmuch as it exists" (CW 
11: 4). Jung uses the term phenomenology in a very loose and broad sense, and he 
also uses it in the same way as the term empiricism. Reisig (1983) points out that 
Jung's usage of the term cannot be identified with Brentano or Russerl's 
phenomenology. Reisig asserts, "Phenomenology means for Jung simply a concern 
with the observable world of facts that is unprejUdiced by theoretical presuppositions -
in contrast to what were for him the empty abstractions of speculative metaphysics" 
(Reisig, 1983: 111). Brooke examines Jung's usage of phenomenology and argues 
that, "although Jung referred to phenomenology with a broad understanding of its 
aims, and although he made use of some of its essential guidelines, phenomenology 
was not a consistent methodological home" (Brooke, 1991: 50). In his writings Jung 
did not make use of the methodological conventions of phenomenology in a 
systematic way. Brooke asserts, "Jung's success as a phenomenologist owes to his 
skill as a psychologist and hermeneut, but the necessary philosophical understanding 
was severely lacking. Thus the heart of the method, the phenomenological reduction, 
was entered without sufficient rigor or self-criticism" (Brooke, 1991: 50). As 
discussed earlier, Jung did not make use of the phenomenological method, epoche, 
and brought his own psychological assumptions into his interpretation of Eastern 
thought. It would seem, therefore, that Jung's failure to understand the religious 
significance of the East within its own traditions is a consequence of his misuse of the 
phenomenological method. 
In Jung's psychological theory, there is a clear antithesis between metaphysics 
and science, and knowledge and faith. For Jung states, "psychology as the science of 
the soul has to confine itself to its subject and guard against overstepping its proper 
boundaries by metaphysical assertions or other professions of faith" (CW 12: 15). 
Reisig argues in Jung's view, metaphysics indicates philosophical speCUlation about 
the unknowable, and faith is in this category. On the contrary, science refers to the 
knowable, and "knowledge is synonymous with the fruit of reflection on 'experience'" 
(Reisig, 1983: 121). Jung desired himself to be known in the latter category as a 
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scientist in order to establish his own Analytical Psychology. Indeed Jung insists in 
several places of his writings that he is not concerned with the metaphysical 
assumptions lying behind religious experience. Jung claims, 
Not being a philosopher, but an empiricist, I am inclined in all difficult 
questions to let experience decide. Where it is impossible to find any tangible 
basis in experience, I prefer to leave the questions unanswered. It is my aim, 
therefore, always to reduce abstract concepts to their empirical basis, in order to 
be moderately sure that I know what I am talking about. 
(CW 8: 604) 
Jung's methodological statements essentially result from his emphasis on the primacy 
of experience, and he tends to identify fact and reality with experience. Jung affirms 
the primacy of experience by drawing attention to its hypothetical nature and says, 
The methodological principle in accordance with which psychology treats the 
products of the unconscious is this: Contents of an archetypal character are 
manifestations of processes in the collective unconscious. Rence they do not 
refer to anything that is or has been conscious, but to something essentially 
unconscious. In the last analysis, therefore, it is impossible to say what they 
refer to. Every interpretation necessarily remains an 'as-if.' 
(CW 9i: 265) 
Jung was convinced that the truth of his theories was a function of their effectiveness 
in therapeutic practice. Reisig however argues that despite his insistence on calling 
himself a scientist, Jung's psychological theory lacks sufficient scientific evidence, 
verification, or falsification. This is because Jung did not seem to admit that, 
"repeated therapeutic failure can falsify a theory or decrease its probability; nor had 
he adequately allowed for the operation of factors other than use of psychological 
theory that might be significant in any given cure (e.g., the passing of time, the 
personality of the therapist, the conditions external to the encounter of doctor and 
patients, etc.)" (Reisig, 1983: 141). 
Jung's suspicion of faith as metaphysical speculation is seen in his writings on 
Eastern religion. It seems that Jung sometimes slips into the mode of criticising and 
dismissing such metaphysical assumptions. Clarke argues that in his studying of 
Eastern religious texts Jung, "attempted to set on one side all metaphysical claims, 
treating them with agnostic indifference, and concentrating his attention on their 
psychological nature and significance" (Clarke, 1994: 150). Jung asserted, 
I must confess that I cannot detach a certain feeling of dishonesty from any 
metaphysical assertion - one may speculate but not assert. One cannot reach 
beyond oneself, and if somebody assures you he can reach beyond himself and 
his natural limitations, he overreaches himself and becomes immodest and 
untrue. 
(CW 18: 1670) 
Thus J ung went on to state, 
Every statement about the transcendent is to be avoided because it is only a 
laughable presumption on the part of a human mind unconscious of its 
limita~ions. Therefore, when God or the Tao is named an impulse of the soul, or 
pSYChIC state, something has been said about the knowledge only, but nothing 
about the unknowable, about which nothing can be determined 
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(CW 13: 82) 
For this reason Jung was highly sceptical concerning Indian metaphysical 
speculations which he perceived as lacking a firm empirical ground. Jung asserts, 
The modem Indian, as I can testify from my own experience, has largely 
adopted European habits of language, 'self or 'atman' being essentially 
synonymous with 'God.' But, in contradiction to the Western 'man and God,' 
the Indian posits the opposition (or correspondence) between 'ego and self.' 
'Ego,' as contrasted with 'man,' is a distinctly psychological concept, and so is 
'self - to our way of thinking. We might therefore be inclined to assume that 
in India the metaphysical problem 'man and God' has been shifted on to the 
psychological plane. On closer inspection it is clear that this is not so, for the 
Indian concept of 'ego' and 'self is not really psychological but - one could 
well say - just as metaphysical as our 'man and God.' The Indian lacks the 
epistemological standpoint just as much as our own religious language does. 
He is still 'pre-Kantian.' This complication is unknown in India and it is still 
largely unknown with us. In India there is no psychology in our sense of the 
word. India is 'pre-psychological': when it speaks of the 'self,' it posits such a 
thing as existing. Psychology does not do this. It does not in any sense deny 
the existence of the dramatic conflict, but reserves the right to the poverty, or 
the riches, of not knowing about the self. Though very well acquainted with the 
selfs peculiar and paradoxical phenomenology, we remain conscious of the fact 
that we are discerning, with the limited means at our disposal, something 
essentially unknown and expressing it in terms of psychic structures which may 
not be adequate to the nature of what is to be known. 
(CW 11: 956) 
However, in his engagement with Eastern thought, Jung's scepticism about 
metaphysics seems ambiguous at times. Jung claims that, "Metaphysical assertions, 
however, are statements of the psyche, and are therefore psychological" (CW 11: 
835). Jung went on to say, 
My admiration for the great philosophers of the East is as genuine as my 
attitudes to their metaphysics is irreverent. I suspect them of being symbolical 
psychologists, to whom no greater wrong could be done than to take them 
literally. If it were really metaphysics that they mean, it would be useless to try 
to understand them. But if it is psychology, we can not only understand them 
but can profit greatly by them, for then the so-called 'metaphysical' comes 
within the range of experience. 
(CW 13: 74) 
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His statements like those above clearly show that Jung is not interested in interpreting 
Eastern religious ideas in their own terms, but he rather claims that these ideas really 
are psychological ones. Jung clearly imports his own psychological assumptions into 
his account of the phenomenal experience of Oriental religions. Here again, we can 
see Jung's tendency to psychologism, that is, to reduce the religious ideas to merely 
an expression of psychological forces. This is what phenomenologists of religion try 
to avoid. Jung is certainly inconsistent here: on the one hand he insists that he is a 
phenomenologist; on the other hand, he falls into psychological reductionism. For 
phenomenologists of religion believe that any method of interpreting religion must 
include the recognition that religious experience cannot be reduced to other elements 
of human life. Thus, however strange and peculiar they may appear to us, we must 
understand religious phenomena as they are experienced within their own traditions. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Gadamer's theory of hermeneutics explains the task of understanding historical texts 
through the dialogic structure of understanding. Any dialogue with the text must take 
account of the historical situation both of the text itself and that of the reader. This 
can allow the text to speak for itself and also allow the reader to recognise his own 
prejudices. Furthermore, the task of interpreting the historical text can never be 
completed and there is no interpretation which is absolute or correct in itself. In many 
ways Jung's method of understanding is hermeneutical. Jung's manner is different 
from Gadamer's in that Jung stressed the need for sympathetic understanding in the 
therapeutic process but Gadamer dismissed it and denied the necessity of reproducing 
the author's intentions of the original text. Jung was concerned with interpreting 
symbols, religious texts, mythology and alchemy through which he sought for the 
meaning of human existence. However, in the light of hermeneutics, Jung's method 
of interpreting Eastern religious texts shows a relativistic standpoint. 
The phenomenology of religion, by contrast, has a different emphasis in the 
study of religion. In Kristensen's view of the phenomenology of religion he asserted 
the scholar must suspend his presuppositions in order to understand religious 
phenomena from its own standpoint. He claims a believer's understanding of his faith 
is always true but the scholar will never be able to understand the absolute character 
of the religious phenomena in the same as the believer understands them. The 
phenomenologists of religion can only understand them approximately through a 
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certain amount of intuition and sympathy. Van der Leeuw's approach focused on the 
manifestation of the religious phenomena. He attempted to see the elements of 
religious phenomena as objects by assigning names to them. With the methods of 
epoche and eidetic vision the scholar can comprehend the appearance of these 
phenomena. The problem with the phenomenology of religion is that there is a 
conflict between objectivistic approach in the study of religion and the scholarly 
subjectivity in interpreting the religious phenomena. Eliade sought for a dialectical 
relation of subject and object in the study of religion. In Eliade's view men have 
traditionally lived in the archaic world which is divided between sacred and profane. 
However it is hard for the modem mentality to understand what is meant by these two 
spheres. What is needed is a dialogical relationship between man and the archaic 
world, in which man relates to things in the environment through religious images and 
symbols. 
Jung tends to reduce religious elements to psychological ones, and to study the 
symbolism which he accumulated from world religion in order to confirm his 
metapsychological theory. This is because Jung was primarily concerned with the 
cure of psychic illness of Western man who had lost the meaning of life, or what Jung 
would call, loss of the soul. Jung found the way to cure modem man's illness through 
religious symbols and images, which he believed had certain connections with images 
and ideas in the patients' dreams or fantasies. In his study of Eastern religion Jung 
saw a number of parallels between his psychology and the religious data he collected. 
Jung found that the mandala symbols in Tibetan Buddhism, for instance, are the best 
expression of the archetype of the self. However careful consideration of his 
approach reveals that Jung was highly selective of Eastern materials, and only chose 
religious data which could confirm his psychological observations. Jung was 
ambivalent towards metaphysical concepts in religion. On the one hand, Jung 
dismissed the transcendental religious phenomena as metaphysical concepts, and thus 
considered them of no use in practice. On the other hand, Jung regarded metaphysical 
concepts of Eastern religion as statements of the psyche. But again this falls into the 
category of psychologism, in that Jung tended to reduce religious data to 
psychological concepts. The following chapter discusses Jung's relation to Buddhism 
by dealing with specific texts and concepts, ranging through the major historical 
traditions of Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhism. 
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Chapter Three : 
Jung's Approach to Buddhism: History and Context 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter examines Jung's understanding of Buddhism and suggests that while 
Jung was familiar with both the Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhist traditions, he 
tended to impose Hinayana concepts onto the Mahayana tradition. Jung was 
particularly attracted by the psychological aspects of Buddhism, which he regarded as 
a useful tool and possible basis of a therapeutic method. Thus Jung studied Buddhism 
from a particular perspective and with a particular aim. It must be remembered that 
there are a number of Buddhist traditions which are not considered by Jung, and also a 
number of conceptual confusions where he failed to address, as well as distinctions 
between different Buddhist traditions he did not understand. In this chapter the way 
in which Buddhism was interpreted and modified by Jung to enable it to become a 
psychotherapeutic device for Europeans is analysed. In addition, this chapter 
considers aspects of Buddhism which Jung did not consider. The chapter consists of 
three parts: the first examines Jung's understanding of the Hinayana Buddhist 
tradition, the second assesses his interpretation of Mahayana Buddhism, and the third 
considers his study of Buddhist meditation. 
3.1 Hinayana Buddhist tradition 1 
3.1.1 The Pali Canon texts 
This section will examine the way in which Jung came to know Hinayana Buddhism. 
'Hinayana' literally means the small or lesser vehicle of salvation and the term was 
created by Mahayana Buddhists to distinguish this school of Buddhism from their 
own Mahayana or greater vehicle school. Approximately one hundred years after the 
Buddha's death, the Buddhist order split into two schools: the Theravadins (Skt. 
Sthaviravadins), 'Followers of the Teaching of the Elders,' and the Mahasanghikas 
(Skt.), the 'Great Community.' The Theravadins claim to possess the unadulterated 
tradition of the Buddha's word, and it is their canon which in complete form is handed 
I Pali is used for Buddhist terminology in this section. 
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down to us in Pali. On the canon of the Mahasanghikas which was written in Sanskrit 
interspersed with dialectisms, only one work, the Mahavatsu is extant today. 
Numerous sub-schools split off from the Theravada and the Mahasanghika2 
(Schumann, 1973: 84-5). The Theravada survived in the south until the seventeenth 
century, and then withdrew to its stronghold in Sri Lanka. All other pre-Mahayana 
schools of thought died out in India (Harvey, 1990: 73-89). 
The Theravadin 'Pali Canon' is preserved in the Pali language, which is based 
on a dialect, Old Magadhi, spoken by Buddha. It is the most complete early canon 
and contains some of the earliest known Buddhist material.3 The Pali canon is 
divided into three collections called 'basket' (pitaka),4 the Vinayapitaka, which 
contains the rules for monastic discipline (vinaya); the Suttapitaka, which contains the 
sermons (sutta) of the Buddha and his monks; and the Abhidharmapitaka, which 
contains systematic philosophy, a scholastic elaboration of doctrine, especially as 
regards the analysis of mind (Gombrich, 1988: 4). The Suttapitaka is subdivided into 
five collections (nikaya): Dighanikaya (collection of long suttas); Majihimanikaya 
(collection of medium-long suttas); Samyuttanikaya (collection of suttas grouped 
according to topics); Anguttaranikaya (collection of suttas in gradual order, i.e., 
according to the number of topics); and Khuddakanikaya (collection of smaller texts), 
which consists of fifteen individual works. (Schumann, 1973: 36). 
It is vital to consider the texts through which Jung gained his knowledge of 
Buddhism, in particular the fact that throughout his writings, the Buddhist concepts 
which Jung most frequently considered were mainly based on the Hinayana Buddhist 
tradition: Jung typically quotes the Buddha's teaching from translations of the Pali 
Canon texts.5 There are numerous references to the Pali Canon, although Jung was 
2 The most important ones in Hinayana schools are the Puggalavada (Skt. Pudgalavada), the 
Sarvastivada (Skt.) and the Sautrantika (Skt.). Their origins are traced back to the Theravada. 
3 The canon in Pali was compiled and edited by three monastic councils: the First Council was 
assembled just a few months after the Buddha's death (483 B.C.) in Rajagaha and recounted his 
sermons and put them together to form a canon; the Second Council was assembled about a hundred 
years later (around 383 B.C.) in Vas ali and was responsible for the inclusion of sermons and poems by 
monks and nuns into the canon and for the screening of the material; and the Third Council was 
assembled in 225 B.C. in Pataliputta (today's Patna) and revised the texts anew and added to the two 
older Pitakas scholastic works (Schumann, 1973: 34-5). 
4 This expression arises from the fact that the texts were written on dried palm leaves and were kept in 
baskets. 
5See inter alia CW 5: 437, CW 6: 494, CW 9i: 200, 248, 596, CW 10: 991, CW 18; 745, Letters II: , 
103 548 and NZ II: 1436. / .. \',," , , 
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highly selective in his choice of texts in his study of Buddhism. The texts Jung 
mentioned are the Majihimanikaya, the Samyttanikaya, the Maha-Parinibbana Sutta, 
and the Sutta-Nipata. The source of these texts can be found in the bibliographies of 
The Collected Works of C.G. Jung. For the Mahajimanikaya Jung cited from The 
First Fifty Discourses from the Collection of the Middle Length Discourses (Majihima 
Nikaya) of Gotama the Buddha (1912-13), edited and translated by Bhikku Silacara 
(CW 9i: 596f and Letters II; 548f). For Samyutta-Nikaya, Jung used The Book of the 
Kindred Sayings (Sangyutta-Nikaya), Part II: The Nidana Book (Nidana-Vagga) 
(1922), translated by Mrs. C.A.F. Rbys Davids, and also Dialogues of the Buddha, 
Part II (1951), translated by T.W. and C.A.F. Rbys Davids (CW 9i: 200f, 248, CW 
18: 745f, Letters II: 103f, NZ II: 1436). Jung was also familiar with the Pali Canon 
text, the Maha Parinibbana Sutta (CW 10: 991), which is the one of the long suttas 
from Dighanikaya and includes the sermon of the Great Decease or passing into the 
final nibbana (Humphreys, 1994: 120).6 Jung cited a passage from Victor Fausboll's 
translation of Sutta-Nipata (1881) (CW 5: 437f). Sutta-Nipata, which is one of the 
texts from the Kuddaka Naikaya, contains the 'Group of Discourses,' a collection of 
71 verse Suttas (Harvey, 1990: 322). Jung also cited a passage of the Fire Sermon of 
the Buddha from H.C. Warren's translation of Buddhism in Translations (1900) (CW 
6: 494f). Jung's bibliographies on the Pali cannon texts show that he was relatively 
familiar with the fundamentals of Hinayana Buddhism. 
3.1.2 Life of Buddha 
In his discussions of Buddha, Jung sometimes saw Buddhism in connection with 
Hinduism, and identified the Buddha with the Hindu god, Vishnu. Jung asserts, "the 
great Hindu Reformation, Buddhism, is grounded, in true Indian fashion, on yoga, 
and, in India at least, it was almost completely re-assimilated by Hinduism in less than 
a millennium, so that today the Buddha himself is enthroned in the Hindu pantheon as 
the avatar of Vishnu" (CW 9ii: 272). From the Hindu perspective, the Buddha is 
regarded as the ninth and latest avatar, or incarnation, of the god Vishnu. Of 
significance here is P. Almond's (1988) argument that, "Part of the confusion in 
determining the relation of Buddhism to the religion of India and in ascertaining a 
6 lung did not provide a reference for the Maha Parinibbana Sutta. 
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clear picture of Buddhism was the reliance of many early investigators on information 
related to them by Hindu pundits" (Almond, 1988: 15). Furthermore, Almond points 
out that in nineteenth century in Europe it was often assumed that Buddhism was not 
simply of Indian origin and there were claims, for instance, of the existence of 
Buddhism in Persia or Mongolia. These assumptions can also be seen in Jung's 
writings. Jung believed Persia was the meeting point between Buddhism and 
Christianity, 
We spoke of the Persian origin of Christianity, but a great deal came also from 
Egypt, something from India even, because already in the second century B.C. 
there were Buddhistic monasteries in Persia, so through Persia the Buddhistic 
ideas probably crept into the formation of Christianity. 
(NZ I: 41) 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, since his youth Jung had a long-standing 
interest in Buddhism, which had a great impact on his psychological thought. When 
Jung visited the stupas at the hill of Sanchi in India, he was particularly impressed by 
the significance of Buddhism, and convinced that the life of the Buddha signified, 
the reality of the self which had broken through and laid claim to a personal life. 
For Buddha, the self stands above all gods, a unus mundus which represents the 
essence of human existence and of the world as a whole. The self embodies 
both the aspect of intrinsic being and the aspect of its being known, without 
which no world exists. Buddha saw and grasped the cosmo gonic dignity of 
human consciousness: for that reason he saw clearly that if a man succeeded in 
extinguishing this light, the world would sink into nothingness. 
(MDR: 309) 
A problem is that it seems to be unclear which Buddhist tradition Jung was discussing 
in this statement. If Jung was dealing with Theravada Buddhism, this statement 
suggests that he had misread the Theravada Buddhist tradition. Jung seems to equate 
human consciousness with the light. By contrast, the concept of nibbana in 
Theravada Buddhism, means extinction of a fire. Everything internal and external to 
a person is 'burning' with the 'fire' of attachment, hatred, and delusions, and of birth, 
ageing and death. In this sense the 'fire' refers to the cause of suffering (dukkha) and 
suffering itself. Hence one has to destroy these fires of defilement in order to attain 
nibbana, which is a condition of calm and absence of desire. (Harvey, 1990: 61). It 
may be assumed that Jung is referring here to the Yogacara view that without 
mind/consciousness there is no world. Yet, this assumption appears to be strange, 
because the Buddhist stupa Jung visited at Sanchi in India belongs to the Hinayana 
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Buddhist tradition. Y ogacara is the one of the schools of Mahayana Buddhism. Thus 
it seems to be odd for Jung to think of the Y ogacara teaching when he was in the 
Hinayana Buddhist stupa at Sanchi. I shall examine Jung's understanding of nibbana 
in more detail later. 
For Jung the Buddha represents a symbol of the self, which depicts a psychic 
totality, that is, a higher unity of conscious and unconscious. This statement is 
different from a Buddhist point of view, since the Buddhist believes in not-self 
(anatta): not a permanent, self-secure, happy, independent self or I. It is 'empty' 
(sunna) of such a self, or anything pertaining to such a self. The Buddhists deny 
liberating a person's true self (Skt. atman, Pali. aUa), because it is the unchanging 
substantial entity. In Brahmanism this atman was seen as a universal Self identical 
with Brahman. The Buddha argued that anything subj ect to change, anything not 
autonomous and totally controllable by its own wishes, anything subject to the 
disharmony of suffering, could not be a such a perfect true self. Moreover, in 
Buddhism to take a single independent entity as atman is to lay the basis for much 
suffering. (Harvey, 1990: 52-1). Jung's concept of the self is more likely in the 
category of the Brahmanical concept of self, as he substantiated it. Jung argued, 
The Lord Buddha was a man like Jesus; he was real, but he has become a 
symbol. He is not even called by his real name; that is a ritual name. Or he is 
called the Tathagata, meaning, 'the perfect one, the accomplished one.' He is a 
symbol; he is the idea of perfection. 
(NZ I: 212) 
For Jung, Christ in the West, Khidr in the Near East, Atman, Tao or the Buddha in the 
Far East, and Mondamin in the Far West represent the same archetype, that is, all 
these religious figures represent a psychic wholeness and the symbol of the self (CW 
10: 779). M.L. von Franz argues, "Christ for Jung was not the only god-man as the 
Christian doctrine maintains. We know from his later writings that the Buddha was 
for him also such a god-man" (von Franz, 1983: xxiii, italics in original). We can 
clearly see that Jung's hermeneutical approach does not aim at introducing these 
Buddhist teachings to the West but at interpreting them within his psychological 
thinking in order to make sense of these foreign ideas by making analogies. Clarke 
argues that, "What he [lung] hoped to uncover through the accumulation of such data 
was evidence of the underlying archetypal structure of the human psyche, and 
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confinnation of his belief that this structure applied universally and, as such, was part 
of the inheritance of mankind" (Clarke, 1994: 137). However, Fromm criticised 
Jung's approach to religion as a standpoint of psychological reductionism, which, "is 
in its spirit fundamentally opposed to religions like Judaism, Christianity, and 
Buddhism. These consider the striving for truth as one of man's cardinal virtues and 
obligations and insists that their doctrines whether arrived at by revelation or only by 
the power of reason are subject to the criterion of truth" (Fromm, 1950: 16). 
Any account of Jung's interest in the Buddha's life would be incomplete 
without reference to the Mara episode. Jung found a parallel between his idea of evil 
and the Mara episode in the Buddha's life (CW 17: 319 and NZ II: 1304). The 
Buddhist canonical text refers to a Satan-like figure known as Mara, a deity who uses 
his power to entrap people in sensual desire and attachment, so as to stay within the 
realm of rebirth and repeated death. Mara came to urge Gotama to abandon his quest 
and take up a conventional religious life to generate merit. Gotama replied that he had 
no need of more merit and scorned Mara's spiritual faults such as sense-desire, 
jealousy, hunger, thirst, and craving. Mara then retreated in defeat. Harvey asserts, 
"the conquest of Mara is commemorated as a victory over evil by countless images 
and paintings" (Harvey, 1990: 21). Jung interpreted Mara as the inner voice which 
comes from the unconscious, which most people have difficulty in facing or 
confronting. Jung says, 
The fear that most people naturally have of the inner voice is not so childish as 
might be supposed. The contents that rise up and confront a limited 
consciousness are far from harmless, as is shown by the classic example of the 
temptation of Christ, or the equally significant Mara episode in the Buddha 
legend. 
(CW 17: 319) 
According to Jung, what the inner voice whispers to us is generally something 
negative, tempting, and convincing in order to make us succumb. This is called the 
shadow in Jung's tenninology. Jung wrote, 
If we do not partially succumb, nothing of this apparent evil enters in to us, and 
no regeneration or healing can take place (I say 'apparent,' though this may 
sound too optimistic.) Ifwe succumb completely, the contents expressed by the 
inner voice act as so many devils, and a catastrophe ensues. But if we can 
succumb only in part, and if by self-assertion the ego can save itself from being 
completely swallowed, then it can assimilate the voice, and we realize that the 
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evil was after all, only a semblance of evil, but in reality a bringer of healing 
and illumination. 
(CW 17: 319) 
There is a clear difference between Jung's understanding of Mara and the Buddhist 
conception of it. Jung's interpretation is that the ego can only assimilate the evil 
aspect of the unconscious. For Jung this creates a totality, in which the opposites are 
united, and brings a synthesis between ego-consciousness and the unconscious. In 
Buddhism, on the other hand, Gotama was able to completely conquer the evil Mara 
in the end. Jung argues, "How Buddha himself could obtain such insight without 
losing himself in a complete mental inflation borders on a miracle (But any genius is a 
miracle)" (Jung's bracket, CW 10: 1003). This statement suggests that it is a miracle 
that one can overcome the evil completely, and it is only the Buddha that can achieve 
this through miraculous power. But Jung believes that ordinary people cannot do this. 
Jung argues that one must not identify oneself with the evil aspect of the unconscious. 
In his idea of psychic structure, Jung claims that the ego must always be a part of the 
psyche, "as a reference-point of cognition" (Letters II: 259), and its identification with 
the unconscious materials leads to what he called 'inflation,' or psychosis. Jung 
believed it was impossible for ordinary people to conquer evil completely, in contrast 
to the Mara experience of Buddha. Jung asserts, 
When he [the Buddha] was attacked by the devil with his whole host, the city of 
Buddha was empty. He had the great simplicity to say, 'What is all this talk 
about the great Buddha? He is not, he is a void.' We wonder how he should 
say of himself that he was the perfect one, the accomplished one, the Tathagata, 
but that was because he knew he was a void, that he did not even exist; such as 
big sounding word as Tathagata can only be compensated by a void. If you 
have reached the stage where you are not even the dumme Michel, where you 
are less than the simpleton, then you can use a very big word on the other side 
without being attacked by the devil. But as long as you are feeling that you are 
something, the devil will attack you. So you had better doubt it. We are not 
Tathagata. 
(NZ II: 1304) 
3.1.3 Jung's understanding of the teaching of the Buddha 
Jung regarded Buddhism as a potentially helpful remedy for psychic illness in the 
West. He claims that the teachings of the Buddha, "offer Western man ways and 
means of disciplining his inner psychic life, thus remedying an often regrettable defect 
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in the various brands of Christianity" (CWI8: 1577). As mentioned in Chapter One, 
Jung's approach to Buddhism was shaped by his belief that the traditional orthodox 
mode of Christianity put too much emphasis on the authority of Church and faith but 
it did not help to solve the problem of psychic suffering. Jung argues, 
In most cases the Christian faith of which people speak simply isn't there, and 
no one can tell how it might be obtained (except by the special province of 
God), it is a truism that anything known becomes so familiar and hackneyed by 
frequent use that it gradually loses its meaning and hence its effect... If a 
Christian insists so much on his faith when it does not even help him to ward off 
a neurosis, then his faith is vain, and it is better to accept humbly what he needs 
no matter where he finds it, if only it helps. 
(CW 18: 1576) 
Jung asserted, "It is neither the history of religion nor the study of philosophy that 
first drew me to the world of Buddhist thought, but my professional interests as a 
doctor" (CW 18: 1575). From this standpoint, Jung's main concern was, "How does 
one come to tenns in practice with the unconscious? This is the question posed by the 
philosophy of India, and particularly by Buddhism and Zen" (CW 8, pp. 67-8). 
Suffering was a central issue for Jung's psychological theory. The treatment 
of psychic suffering in the West was a key reason Jung became acquainted with the 
views and methods of the teaching of the Buddha, "whose principal theme was the 
'chain of suffering, old age, sickness, and death'" (CW 18: 1575). Jung argued that 
the essence of the Buddha's teaching is, "deliverance from suffering through the 
maximum development of consciousness, as one of the supreme helpers on the road to 
salvation" (CW 18: 1578). Jung went on to state, 
The study of Buddhist literature was of great help to me, since it trains one to 
observe suffering objectively and to take a universal view of its causes. 
According to tradition, it was by objectively observing the chain of causes that 
the Buddha was able to extricate his consciousness from the snares of the 
thousand things, and to rescue his feelings from the entanglements of emotion 
and illusion. So also in our sphere of culture the suffering and the sick can 
derive considerable benefit from this prototype of the Buddhist mentality, 
however strange it may appear. 
(CW 18: 1575) 
Jung's point here is very close to the Buddhist position concerning the notion of 
suffering. The statement above seems to imply that Jung was in agreement with the 
Buddhist position in which one can transcend suffering. However, Jung's 
understanding of suffering is quite inconsistent: on the one hand, Jung showed his 
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positive attitude towards the Buddhist treatment of the problem of suffering; on the 
other hand, he showed a negative attitude towards the Buddhist teaching of the 
termination of the suffering and rejected its possibility. In contrast with Jung's 
passage above, he argued, 
The Oriental wants to get rid of suffering by casting it off. Western man tries to 
suppress suffering with drugs. But suffering has to be overcome, and the only 
way to overcome it is to endure it. 
(Letters I: 236) 
For Jung suffering and happiness are a pair of opposites that are indispensable to life, 
and the one cannot be eliminated by the other. Jung claims that, "None can escape the 
chain of suffering that leads to sickness, old age and death" (CW 10: 680), and quotes 
from Schopenhauer (who was also profoundly influenced by Indian thought)7 that, 
"there can be no happiness unless there is suffering" (Letters I: 247). For Jung, 
therefore, man has to cope with suffering in order to achieve happiness. Jung asserts, 
man's real life consists of inexorable opposites - day and night, wellbeing and 
suffering, birth and death, good and evil. Weare not even sure that the one will 
prevail against the other, that good will overcome evil, or joy defeat pain. Life 
and the world are a battle ground, have always been and always will be, and, if 
it were not so, existence would soon come to an end. 
(CW 18: 564) 
Although Jung's maIn concern was the healing of the sick, Jung was bound to 
recognise that, "there are many diseases and states of suffering which, not being 
susceptible of a direct cure, demand from both patient and doctor some kind of 
attitude to their irremediable nature" (CW 18: 1575). Jung's emphasis on the 
therapeutic necessity of adopting some kind of attitude to the problem of suffering is 
summed up in the following passage: 
Suffering that is not understood is hard to bear, while on the other hand it is 
often astounding to see how much a person can endure when he understands the 
why and the wherefore. A philosophical or religious view of the world enables 
7 Schopenhauer in fact denies such influence and does not believes that the development and 
expression of his ideas is in any way depend on the ideas expressed in the Hindu or Buddhist texts. 
However, Moira Nicholls (1999) argues that Schopenhauer was keen to demonstrate parallels between 
his own doctrines and those of the East. Schopenhauer was profoundly interested in Hindu and 
Buddhist thought and frequently refers to these Eastern ideas in his works. Nicholls, therefore, claims 
that, "Schopenhauer's increasing knowledge of and admiration for Eastern thought actually influenced 
his thinking, giving rise to changes in his views concerning the knowability, nature, and ways of 
describing the thing-in-itself' (Nicholls, 1999: 175). For a detailed discussion on Schopenhauer and 
Eastern thought, see Nicholls (1991: 171-212). 
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him to do this, and such views prove to be, at the very least, psychic methods of 
healing if not of salvation. 
(CW 18: 1578) 
Jung saw the Nidana-chain of causes as the very essence of Buddhism. In Buddhist 
doctrine there is a principle of conditionality: that all things, including mental and 
physical things, arise and exist due to the presence of certain conditions and cease 
once their conditions are removed. In this sense nothing is independent except 
nibbana. The main application of this principle is in the form of a series of 
conditioned links (nidana). A series of twelve nidanas are: 
(1) spiritual ignorance (avijja) ~ (2) constructing activities (sankhara) ~ (3) 
(discriminative) consciousness ~ (4) mind-and-body (nama-rupa) ~ (5) the six 
sense-bases (ayatana) ~ (6) sensory stimulation (phassa) ~ (7) feeling (vdana) 
~ (8) craving (tanha) ~ (9) grasping (upadana) ~ (10) existence (bhava) ~ 
(11) birth (jati) ~ (12) ageing, death (jara-narana), sorrow, lamentation, pain, 
grief, and despair, 'Thus is the origin of this whole mass of dukkha'. 
(Harvey, 1990: 55) 
Jung asserts, "Again and again Buddha says that coming into existence causes such-
and-such desires and illusions, and that man produces through that chain of causes and 
effects, invariably ending in disease, old age, and death; and the only means to disrupt 
that inexorable chain of cause and effect is knowledge and understanding" (NZ II: 
1382). Jung continues, 
Now if you stop the avidya of the beginning, there is no becoming, and if you 
stop the becoming there is no birth. If you stop birth there is no age and death. 
So the whole world of suffering is abolished. 
(NZII: 1315) 
Jung argued that in the West people cultivated an extraverted tendency in which they 
tended to focus their attention on the outer world at the expense of their own inner 
world. Jung asserted that in the East, however, the Western tendency of extraversion 
is, "deprecated as illusory desirousness, as existence in the samsara, the very essence 
of the nidana-chain which culminates in the sum of the world's sufferings" (CW 11: 
770). Among a series of twelve nidanas, Jung discussed the first two nidanas: avidya 
(Skt. Pali. avijja) and samskara (Skt. Pali. Sankhara).8 Jung saw the state of avidya 
as, "ignorance or unconscious" (CW 12: 123) and also as, "a cardinal evil for 
Buddhists" (Letters I: 488). In some places Jung's usage of the term samskara seems 
to be identical with the concept of samsara. Samskara is the second link in the chain 
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of nidanas and indicates the action-intentions which precede the execution of the 
action. Whereas samsara is the cycle of rebirth. In Buddhist cosmology the death of 
an unliberated person is necessarily followed by his rebirth, in which the suffering of 
living and dying is repeated. Thus samsara is regarded as a long and often aimless 
process. lung says the samskara is "the cycle of repeated incarnations" (NZ II: 1526). 
In other places lung interpreted samskara as "the unconscious formative forces, must 
be transformed through religious self-development" (CW 6: 419). This shows that 
Jung used these terms almost identically and this results in a confusion in 
distinguishing their particular meanings. 
The Third Noble Truth is Nibbana. In the first sermon, the Buddha expressed, 
This, monks, is the Noble Truth of the termination of suffering; the complete 
extinction, destruction, abandonment, rej ection, leaving (and) casting off of this 
very craVIng. 
(Cited by Schumann, 1973: 66) 
When craving comes to an end, suffering ceases. This is equivalent to Nibbana (Skt. 
Nirvana), and is the ultimate goal of Buddhism. It is also known as the 
'unconditioned' or 'unconstructed' (asnakhata). Nibbana literally means 'extinction' 
and the word used for the extinction of a fire. In this case fire refers to the causes of 
suffering (dukkha) or suffering itself. (Harvey, 1990: 61). Dukkha can be ended only 
by enlightenment and nibbana, the 'blowing out' or 'extinction' of desire, a condition 
of complete calm and detachment. It is not that the self has been extinguished or 
eliminated, since there never was a real self; what has ended is the ignorant clinging to 
selfhood and personal identity. The destruction of craving and ignorance eventually 
leads to a termination of the kamma process. A person who is no longer bound to the 
circle of rebirth (samsara) can attain Nibbana. TJ. Hopkins argues that nibbana is, 
not an entity or thing; it is a condition or state of calm and absence of desire. 
Nirvana alone is uncreated and unchanging; all entities are transient, void of 
self-existence, dependent on other phenomena that are themselves in flux. This 
is what the Buddhists called 'dependent origination,' the origination of all 
phenomena from other transient phenomena and not from a single independent 
entity such as Brahman or atman. [In Buddhism] the existence is always 
characterised by dukkha because all phenomena are impermanent. But there is a 
way out of this through elimination of desire, that is to say, the Buddha's Noble 
Eightfold Path, will lead those who follow it to nirvana. 
(Hopkins, 1971: 57) 
8 Jung uses Sanskrit for these terms. 
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Jung argues that in Buddhism, "the attainment of perfect illumination, or 
conSCIousness, means nirvana, positive non-existence" (NZ I: 132). Jung argues, 
however, that Nirvana is not what the West understands as 'non-being,' which refers 
to a mere negation, 
Nirvana is a positive non-being, which we cannot render in our language 
because we have no conception of a thing which is positively non-existing. To 
the Buddhist it is as if non-existence were just as much as a quality as existence. 
(NZ I: 325) 
This view is based on Jung's belief that there are two forms of existence in Eastern 
philosophy: one is a potential existence in which the god is dormant before his 
expansion or his manifestation; and the other is extended or actual existence in which 
the god already appears, the first manifestation of the god. However, this view is not 
from the Buddhist tradition but is based on the Vedanta tradition of Hinduism, in 
particular the advaita (non-dualistic) tradition., This was founded by the Vedanta 
philosopher Sankara (A.D. 788-820) whose main teaching was that both the 
individual self and the phenomenal world are the product of ignorance and illusion, so 
the apparent bondage of the self, which is the false assumption of an individual self, 
can only be removed by knowledge of the pure unqualified Brahman (Hopkins, 1971: 
119-122). Jung then went further to explain nibbana by using the idea of Hindu 
Tantrism, in which potential existence is contained in Shiva bindu, and the actual 
existence contains the corresponding divinity Shakti. Jung asserts, "the world is 
always existing and non-existing at the same time. Inasmuch as there is existence, 
there is non-existence" (NZ I: 326). This statement seems to resemble Jung's theory 
of consciousness and the unconscious, namely, the former belongs to existence and 
the latter to non-existence. Yet, in Buddhism nibbana is not understood as the 
unconscious in Jung's sense. Jung's misunderstanding of nibbana is based on his 
knowledge of Hindu tradition as can be seen in his following statement, 
The assumption is in Buddhism that the attainment of perfect illumination, or 
consciousness, means, nirvana, positive non-existence. The perfect 
consciousness is the complete identity with divinity. Man has returned into the 
deity, the world has returned to God, and nothing is because there is no object 
any longer. 
(NZ I: 132) 
However, Jung was reluctant to accept that one can attain perfect consciousness, since 
perfect consciousness through the complete identity with divinity is what Jung 
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understood as psychosis. Rather, Jung held the view that one can only expand 
consciousness through recognising unconscious projections, so that one can uncover 
what had been previously unconscious. Jung asserts, 
Now of course we don't know whether perfect consciousness is possible, but we 
know that with the progression and extension of consciousness, the number of 
known proj ections becomes diminished, so we assume that if consciousness 
were capable of still greater extension, still more projections would enter the 
field of our vision. We would destroy more of the world, as it were. 
(NZ I: 132) 
The problem with Jung's understanding of nibbana in the Hinayana Buddhist 
tradition is that he ontologised the concept of nibbana and thus he did not understand 
the quality of non-existence. In the Hinayana Buddhist tradition, nibbana is 
'emptiness' (sunnata), in that it is empty of attachment, hatred and delusion, being 
known in this aspect by deep insight into phenomena as 'empty' of a substantial self. 
Harvey argues, "While to a Western-educated person, an extinct fire goes nowhere 
because it does not exist, the Buddha's audience in ancient India would generally have 
thought of an extinguished fire as going back into a non-manifested state as latent 
heat" (Harvey, 1990: 66). From a Buddhist perspective, Jung's statement does not 
convey the correct view of nibbana. Almond argues that the ontologised account of 
nibbana was a dominant view in the nineteenth century in the West. 
Ontologically, the central issue in this hotly disputed question concerned what 
the attainment of Nirvana meant for the existence of the previously suffering 
individual. The majority opinion throughout the nineteenth century was that 
Nirvana, essentially, entailed the annihilation of the individual. 
(Almond, 1988: 102) 
In addition to the annihilationist account of nibbana, there was also a tendency to 
assimilate Hinduism and Buddhism. Almond claims that, "Consequently, Nirvana 
was spoken of in terms of absorption, even though there was often uncertainty about 
what such absorption amounted to." (Almond, 1988: 105). R.C. Zaehner made the 
same kind mistake as Jung in ontologising the concept of nibbana. In his Mysticism 
Sacred and Profane (1971) Zaehner tends to identify nibbana with the eternal being, 
the Brahman in Hindu tradition. Zaehner states that the Buddhist teaches the transient 
and instability of the world can be overcome by the attainment of nirvana. Although 
Zaehner claims that there is nothing in our mortal existence which is free from birth 
and death, coming to be and passing away. Nevertheless, he believes that, "the mere 
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fact of transience is said to imply its opposites, the permanent, the unborn, nirvana, 
immortality" (Zaehner, 1971: 52). In Zaehner's view nirvana is parallel to the 
absolute eternal being, which he also called 'self.' Zaehner argues that, "the Buddha, 
like the Samkhya, recognizes that there is an eternal being transcending time, space, 
and change: and this is the beginning of religion. Moreover the Hindus, 
overwhelmingly, and the Buddhists when they are off their guard, speak of this eternal 
being as the 'self" (Zaehner, 1971: 126). 
In Buddhist doctrine the way to the termination of suffering is called the Noble 
Eightfold Path (Middle Way). The Path has eight factors: (1) right view (samma-
ditthi), (2) right directed thought (samma-sankappa), (3) right speech (samma-vaca), 
(4) right action (samma-kammanta), (5) right livelihood (samma-ajiva), (6) right 
effort (samma-vayama), (7) right mindfulness (samma-sati), and (8) right meditation 
(samma-samadhi).9 Right view is the true wisdom and knowledge of the nature of 
reality in a profound insight. This is based on the Middle Way of Conditioned 
Origination which, "avoids the extremes of 'eternalism' and 'annihilationalism': the 
survival of an eternal self, or the total annihilation of a person at death" (Harvey, 
1990: 58). Right directed thought concerns emotions, free from sensuality and away 
from ill-will and cruelty to loving kindness and compassion. Right speech is 
abstaining from lying, harsh speech, gossip and idle talk. Right action is avoiding 
taking of life, taking what is not given, and wrong conduct in regard to sense-pleasure. 
Right livelihood is abstaining from making a living which causes suffering to others, 
such as trickery and greed or trade in weapons, living beings, meat, alcoholic drink or 
poison. Right effort is to avoid and overcome the arising unskilful states of mind 
which express attachment, hatred or delusion, to aim at the meditative development of 
skilful states of mind and maintain and stabilise it. Right mindfulness is a state of 
keen awareness of mental and physical phenomena as they arise within an individual. 
Right meditation refers to various levels of deep calm known as jhanas .10 Buddhist 
9 Factors 3-5 belong to sila, moral virtue: factors 6-8 belong to samadhi, meditative cultivation of the 
mind (citta); factors 1-2 belong to panna, or wisdom (sila, samadhi, and panna are always given in this 
order) (Harvey, 1990: 68). 
10 Jhana is subdivided into eight stages: (1) Attentive pondering, free from sensual desires, and 
reflection with the feeling of well-being, (2) Desertion of pondering; inner stillness and mental 
concentration on one object with the feeling of well-being, (3) Equanimity, devotion, and clarity-of-
knowledge, (4) drying up of all feelings of bliss and suffering and of the recollection of them; 
equanimity and devotion of greatest purity, (5) Termination of the perception of forms and shapes; 
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scriptures stress the importance of the Eightfold Path for liberation from suffering. A 
person who has completed the Eightfold Path and so has attained the Nibbanic 
experience becomes an Arahat. The tenn Arahat means 'worthy,' that is, worthy of 
great respect. The Arahat is one who has fully completed spiritual training and has 
overcome suffering. 11 
Jung's account of the Noble Eightfold Path was shown in connection with his 
idea of Christians and rationalists: 
I know that the Buddhist would say, as indeed they do: if only people would 
follow the noble eightfold path of the Dhanna (doctrine, law) and had true 
insight into the Self; 12 or Christians: if only people had the right faith in the 
Lord; or the rationalists: if only people could be intelligent and reasonable -
then all problems would be manageable and solvable. The trouble is that none 
of them manages to solve these problems himself. 
(CW 18: 600) 
For Jung, the Buddha's teaching of the Noble Eightfold Path, just as the Christians' 
and rationalists' ideas, does not seem to solve the psychic problem of Western man, 
since it dismisses the significance of the unconscious. Jung states, 
The Buddhist discards the world of unconscious fantasies as 'distractions' and 
useless illusions; the Christian puts his Church and his Bible between himself 
and his unconscious; and the rationalist intellectual does not yet know that his 
consciousness is not his total psyche, in spite of the fact that for more than 
seventy years the unconscious has been a basic scientific concept that is 
indispensable to any serious student of psychology. 
(CW 18: 601) 
Thus Jung interpreted the Buddhist idea of the Middle Way as the natural flow of 
libido between a pair of opposites, namely, the consciousness and the unconscious. 
Jung argues that the split in the psychic energy or libido is a hindrance in the 
individual. "As a result, the vital optimum withdraws more and more from the 
opposing extremes and seeks a middle way, which must naturally be irrational and 
unconscious, just because the opposites are rational and conscious" (CW 6: 326). For 
Jung, the middle path, as the natural flow of libido, means, "complete obedience to 
experience of the infmity of space, (6) Experience of the 'infmity of consciousness' (i.e. experience 
that consciousness is all-pervasive), (7) Realisation of the essential no-thing-ness of all empirical 
things, and (8) the State of 'neither-perception-nor-perception' (= deep trance) (Schumann, 1973: 74). 
II An Arahat is different from a Buddha in that he owes his deliverance to instruction. The honorary 
title 'Buddha' is for those who realise salvation through their own insight. 
12 This statement suggests that Jung did not understand the concept of the no-self (annata) in 
Buddhism. As mentioned earlier Buddhism speaks of no-self, which is not a permanent or independent 
self but is empty of such a self. 
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the fundamental laws of human nature, and there can positively be no higher moral 
principle than harmony with natural laws that guide the libido in the direction of life's 
optimum" (CW 6: 356). He asserts that the vital optimum cannot be found in egoism, 
nor in a craving for individual supremacy. But, "the optimum can be reached only 
through obedience to the tidal laws of the libido, by which systole alternates with 
diastole - laws which bring pleasure and the necessary limitations of pleasure, and 
also set us those individual life tasks without whose accomplishment the vital 
optimum can never be attained" (CW 6: 356). lung went on to state that, "Since the 
middle position, as a function of mediation between the opposites, possesses an 
irrational character and is still unconscious, it appears projected in the form of a 
mediating god, a Messiah" (Ibid., 326). lung argues that in the primitive Western 
form of religion, "the new bearer of life appears as a God or Saviour who, in his 
fatherly love and solicitude or from his own inner resolve, puts an end to the division 
as and when it suits him and for reasons we are not fitted to understand" (Ibid., 326). 
Although this conception may seem to be childish, lung stresses it is an essential 
process. lung observed that in the East this process has been common practice for 
years. lung states, 
The East has for thousands of years been familiar with this process and has 
founded on it a psychological doctrine of salvation which brings the way of 
deliverance within man's ken and capacity. Thus the religions of India and 
China, and particularly Buddhism which combines the spheres of both, possess 
the idea of a redemptive middle way of magical efficacy which is attainable by 
means of a conscious attitude. The Vedic conception is a conscious attempt to 
find release from the pairs of opposites in order to reach the path of redemption. 
(CW 6: 326) 
There is a clear difference between lung's understanding of the Middle Path and the 
Buddhist position. The former indicates the natural flow of libido between the 
consciousness and the conscious, seeking for a psychic totality, whereas the latter 
refers to the path which avoids the extreme of eternalism and annihilationalism and 
leads to a termination of suffering, nibbana. This section has shown that lung was 
familiar with the fundamental concepts of Hinayana Buddhism but has argued, 
however, that lung's interpretation differs from Hinayana Buddhist thought, as lung 
failed to understand Buddhist thought within its own traditions and cultures. We can 
see that the aim of lung's hermeneutical exercise is not to convey Buddhist thought to 
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Westerners but to interpret these Buddhist ideas within his own psychological 
thinking in order to make sense of such foreign ideas to Westerners. 
3.2 Mahayana Buddhist tradition 
This section examines Jung's understanding of Mahayana Buddhism. Mahayana 
Buddhism, also known as the 'Great Vehicle' (across the ocean of suffering), 
appeared in India about four hundred years after the Buddha's death, and as such is a 
more recent tradition than Hinayana Buddhism. Mahayana Buddhism developed new 
ways to emancipation and made this goal accessible to a wider range of human types 
than the older Hinayana Buddhism. While the Mahayanins claim the Hinayana is 
merely the introductory part of the teaching of the Buddha, the Hinayanins call the 
Mahayana a distortion of what Gotama taught. Apparently Jung paid considerable 
attention to Mahayana Buddhism, and wrote psychological commentaries for 
translations of particular Mahayana texts of Tibetan and Zen Buddhism. He also gave 
lectures on Pure Land Buddhist meditation. However, Jung only looked at these 
specific texts and teachings. Most of the other Mahayana traditions are excluded from 
his attention. Jung also knew that Buddhism was divided between the Hinayana and 
the Mahayana traditions, but he did not provide a detailed account of the conceptual 
differences between these traditions. Jung did, however, draw a distinction between 
them in terms of the existence of gods: the former has no gods but the latter has many 
of them. In his account of Hinayana Buddhism, Jung asserts, 
In Hinayana Buddhism - the original small school of Indian Buddhism 13 - there 
were no gods apparently. But if you know that Buddha's first teaching was over 
against a pantheon of two million Hindu gods, you quite understand why he did 
not feel the need of inventing new ones. He was already sick of all those gods 
so he ceased talking of them. 
(NZ I: 69) 
Here Jung misunderstood the Hinayana Buddhist conception of the gods. Hinayana 
Buddhism is not atheistic but transpolythestic. Buddhism incorporated the gods of 
India who were perceived to be less powerful than the Buddha himself. J. M. 
Reynolds argues, 
The Buddha was neither an atheist nor an agnostic in the modern sense. On the 
contrary, since He was the Buddha, the enlightened one, He was one who 
13 This may be Sinhalese but Jung made no mention of it. 
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understood directly the nature of existence - not only human existence, but the 
nature of the existence of all types of sentient beings. The Devas14 have a 
different karmic vision than we do as humanity, resulting from different karmic 
causes. The Devas, therefore, exist in a different dimension than our 
conventional human reality. They are superior to human beings in a large 
number of respects, having great clairvoyant powers and a much longer life-
span, measured in divine years rather than human terms. Nonetheless, they are 
samsaric beings; they are not enlightened beings, nor are they all-knowing or all 
powerful. 
(Reynolds, 1989: 96) 
In his account of the distinction between Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhism, Jung 
went on to state, 
When Buddhism first reached the barbarous people behind the borders of India, 
it came quite naked, without gods, because there were already two million gods 
in India. They were simply swamped by them, so, of course, as Buddhism was a 
sort of protest against the prevailing Hinduism, they thought they did not need 
them. They thought the decisive action took place in the sphere of man and not 
of the gods; even the gods had to become men in order to be redeemed. But 
when Buddhism reached Nepal, Tibet, and China, that condition of the 
Hinayana, the so-called small vessel, did not fit. They found there only the old 
tribal gods and fetishes and shamans, and all sort of black magic, like the Bung 
religion in Tibet. So Buddhism instantly felt the need of gods again, and they 
had a series of prophets who revealed the existence of the Mahayana deities. 
The ideas of the boddhisatvas [sic], who became even more important than 
Buddha himself, originated then, and all the goddesses, like Kwan Yin and the 
white Tara. They naturally had to invent female gods, of course, not artificially, 
but through special revelation for this purpose, coming from the unconscious. 
(NZ I: 97) 
Jung's account of Mahayana Buddhism also contains erroneous statements. In India, 
there were 330 million gods and not two million. In contrast with Jung's statement on 
the gods in Buddhism, Indian Mahayana Buddhism developed many transcendent 
Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, existing in many regions of the universe. A number of 
these saviour beings, Buddhas and Bodhisattvas became objects of devotion and 
prayer, and greatly added to the appeal and missionary success of the Mahayana 
(Harvey, 1990: 91). These deities are later assimilated and transformed in Tibet and 
China. Jung's account of the distinction between Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhism 
is very far from the historical truth and is imprecise due to his lack of reading and 
knowledge of Buddhist materials. 
14 Devas are Sanskrit terms for gods. They are not the creator of the world but represent only one type 
of sentient existence within the world. 
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In comparison with Jung's VIew of the differences between Hinayana and 
Mahayana Buddhism, Schumann summarises as follows (Schumann, 1973: 91-3): 
firstly the Hinayana tradition regards suffering as real, whereas the Mahayana 
tradition regards it as an illusion. Secondly, the Hinayana tradition denies a 'true 
being' or transcendental self behind phenomena and avoids making metaphysical 
statements, whereas the Mahayana tradition teaches an Eternal Absolute, which is 
both transcendent and imminent in Samsara. Thus Gotama, the Buddha, is considered 
as a projection of the Dharmakaya (truth-body) and the Absolute in the Mahayana. 
By contrast, the Hinayana tradition regards him as only a natural man himself and a 
teacher. IS Thirdly, Hinayana Buddhism insists that liberation can only be achieved by 
one's own effort, whereas the Mahayana tradition considers assistance from outside as 
a possible way to deliverance. Moreover, Harvey points out that Mahayana Buddhism 
emphasises the Bodhisattva path - the person who enters this path aspires to be 
compassionate and self-sacrificing in order to build up moral and spiritual perfections 
not only for his own exalted state of Buddhahood, but also as to be able to aid others 
by teaching, good deeds, 'merit' transference, and offering response to prayers 
(Harvey, 1990: 94). Fourthly, The Hinayanins, except Mahasanghikas, see their 
immediate goal in reaching nirvana (Pali. nibbana). Most Mahayanins, on the other 
hand, have set themselves the intermediate goal of Bodhisattvahood in order to lead 
all beings to liberation, since for them their own liberation is of secondary importance. 
The primary importance for the Mahayanins is to aid others and transfer merit for 
them. Fifthly, the Hinayana tradition understands nirvana as victory over samsara 
and the final exit from the world. On the contrary, the unconditioned nirvana is not 
seen as a dharma different from conditioned dharmas of samsara, in that both are 
found to be emptiness. Harvey points out that: "Nirvana is not attained by the 
eradication of anything real, namely defilments, but by the non-construction of the 
conditioned world of samsara. .. Nirvana and samsara are not two separate realities, 
but the field of emptiness, seen by either spiritual ignorance or true knowledge" 
15 Beatrice Lane Suzuki (1981) argues that the Mahasangikas school of Hinayana Buddhism viewed the 
Buddha not only as a man like us but also as an eternal and ideal infmite power (B.L. Suzuki, 1981: 
31). M. Pye (1979) asserts that the tale of the Buddha's life was often mythologised in cosmic terms in 
which the Buddha could scarcely be conceived of as an ordinary man but as the major identifier, 
almost the revealer, of the basic character of human existence. Pye argues that, "Since he himself was 
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(Harvey, 1990: 103). Furthennore, the Mahayanists believe that nirvana is something 
already present in samsara. This non-duality of samsara and nirvana is fully realised 
when Buddhahood - nirvana in the highest sense - is reached. Harvey asserts that, 
"The nature of Buddhahood, 'Buddhaness' (buddhata), is of course emptiness, as is 
the nature of everything. Because of this all beings are seen to have a nature which is 
non-different from Buddhaness" (Harvey, 1990: 104). Thus the task of beings is not 
to attain something they do not already possess, but to uncover and know their 
Buddhaness (Harvey, 1990: 104). One of the central Mahayana concepts is skilful 
means (upaya-kausa/ya). The task of the Bodhisattva is to not only seek to mature his 
or her own wisdom but also to skilfully help beings to achieve enlightenment. The 
skilful means enable him to reconcile the wisdom (prajna) with his compassion 
(karuna), and thus urges him to work for the salvation of all beings, for such empty 
fluxes do experience themselves as suffering beings. 
3.2.1 Bodhisattvas 
The Bodhisattva is one of several core teachings of Mahayana Buddhism. The 
Bodhisattva is the name for those beings (sattva) who strive systematically for 
enlightenment (bodhi), that is Buddhahood. Their task is to compassionately help 
beings to achieve enlightenment while maturing their own wisdom (prajna). The way 
of achieving enlightenment is called the Bodhisattva path. The purpose of the 
Bodhisattva path is to strive for Buddhahood for its own sake, and for the sake of 
helping suffering beings. The Bodhisattva-path is practised by developing a number 
of perfections (paramita) and progressing through the ten Bodhisattva stages 
(bhumi).16 Jung was familiar with the idea of the bodhisattva in relation to his concept 
of archetypes but he did not address the Bodhisattva Path directly in his writings. In 
his account of the Bodhisattva as the archetypal figure, Jung asserts, 
In India ... there is the idea of the savior or reaper that appears every thousands 
years, in the series of the incarnated bodhisattvas; for instance, the bodhisattva 
taken to represent in person the principle of enlightenment, it is perhaps not surprising that he was 
declared to be a 'great man' or indeed a 'superman' (Pye, 1979: 4). 
16 The ten stages are: (1) the perfection of generosity (dana), (2) the perfection of moral virtue (sila), 
(3) the perfection of patience (/(santi), (4) the perfection of vigour (virya), (5) , the perfection of 
meditation (dhyana), (6) the perfection of wisdom (prajna) , (7) the perfection of the skilful means 
(upaya), (8) the perfection of transferring the kamic merit to unliberated beings (parinamana), (9) the 
perfection of the power (bala), and (10) the perfection of knowledge (jnana) (Harvey, 1990: 122-4). 
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of the past world, Buddha Amitabha, and Buddha Sakya Muni of the real actual 
world, and Buddha Maitraya of the coming worlds; and there are many others 
because there have been many other worlds. Buddha Amitabha is one of the 
most important ones. Particularly worshipped in Japan, he is the Buddha of 
clarity, of truth; and Maitraya, who is still to come, is the Buddha of perfect 
love. It is the same idea of periodicity. And this is based upon such experience 
as Nietzche's of the archetypal figure of the wise old man: that is, an 
exceedingly historical figure which brings with it the flavor of past centuries, a 
feeling of the actual presence of remote times, as if time were at a complete 
standstill, and 5000 B.C were just in the next room to A.D 2000. 
(NZ I: 13) 
Jung did not make a significant distinction between the Buddha and the Bodhisattva 
in his writings. For Jung both are projections of the archetypal contents of the 
unconscious, that is to say, the symbol of the self, representing a totality of the 
psyche, both the conscious and the unconscious. 
3.2.2 Trikaya (the three bodies): Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya, Nirmanakaya 
By around 300 AD, the early Mahayana ideas on the nature of Buddhas were 
systematised by the Yogacarins into the Trikaya or Three-body doctrine. I7 The 
framework of Mahayana belief sees Buddhahood as having three aspects: the 
Nirman akaya , the Sam bhogakaya , and the Dharmakaya. The Nirmanakaya or the 
transformation body refers to earthly Buddhas, such as the historical Buddha Gotama, 
who expounded the dharma in the world. They are seen as teaching devices 
compassionately projected into the world to show people the path to Buddhahood. 
Some texts see them as actual beings of flesh and blood, whereas others, such as the 
Suvarna-bhasottama Sutra, see them as mere appearances. At death they are 
generally withdrawn back into the heavenly Buddha, or even Great Being 
Bodhisattva, who manifested them (Harvey, 1990: 126). The Sambhogakaya or the 
body of bliss (enjoyment body) is seen as the transcendent Buddhas, for it is a form in 
which he can appear to and teach beings through visionary experiences. The 
Sambhogakaya Buddhas are seen as mental creations, as ideations of the 
Bodhisattvas: to the Bodhisattva his ideal becomes so vivid and alive that it takes 
shape as a subjective reality. The transcendent Buddhas are held to be manifestations 
of the Buddhahood and therefore of a higher degree of reality than the objects of the 
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material world (Schumann, 1973: 103-4). The mechanism and purpose of these 
creations is that they are mental projections for teaching as skilful means (upaya). 
Each Sambhogakaya Buddha is seen as presiding over his· own 'Buddha Land' 
(Buddha-ksetra), the world-system where he finally attained Buddhahood in its 
Akanistha heaven. Such lands are called 'Pure Land,' mystical universes created by 
the appropriate Buddha. The most popular transcendent Buddha is Amitabha who is 
also called Amitayus or Amida in the Pure Land Sukhavati. In the Mahayana, the 
Dharmakaya or the dharma-body refers to the ultimate nature both of Buddha and 
reality, and has two meanings. The first is the 'Knowledge-body' (Jnana-kaya), 
which is the inner nature shared by all Buddhas, that is, their Buddha-ness (buddhata). 
It is the omniscient knowledge, perfect wisdom and spiritual qualities through which a 
Bodhisattva becomes a Buddha. The second is the 'Self-existent-body' (Savbhavika-
kaya), which refers to the ultimate nature of reality, thusness and emptiness (sunya), 
that is, their dharma-ness (dharmata). It is attaining Buddhahood, Nirvana (Harvey, 
1990: 125-8). 
Jung discussed the concept of Trikaya in his psychological commentary on 
The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation (1939). Very significantly, Jung argues, 
"the Trikaya is the All-Enlightened Mind itself' (CW 11: 790). In this sentence, the 
Mind, for Jung, means, "the Eastern equivalent of our concept of the unconscious, 
more particularly of the collective unconscious" (CW 11: 807). Thus Trikaya is the 
realisation of the One Mind, namely, the unconscious. Jung explained each of the 
Three-bodies as follows, 
The unconscious is the root of all experience of oneness (dharmakaya), the 
matrix of all archetypes or structural patterns (sambhogakaya), and the conditio 
sine qua non of the phenomenal world (nirmanakaya). 
(CW 11: 790) 
Jung argues the peaceful and wrathful deities, which play a great role in the 
mediations of The Tibetan Book of the Dead, symbolise a pair of opposites. Such 
gods are, "archetypal thought-forms belonging to the sambhogakaya" (CW 11: 791). 
Tibetan Buddhists regard the sambhogakaya as an important concept for the 
understanding of the deities of the Bardo visions. In Sambhogokaya, which belongs 
17 Yogacara is one of the philosophical schools in Mahayana Buddhism. The details will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
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to the sphere of spiritual experience beyond sensory images and perceptions, the 
reality manifests itself in radiant beings like the Bodhisattva and the meditation-
buddhas. In the realm of the Sambhogakaya is the Chonyid bardo (one of the three 
intermediate states between death and rebirth), where the dead person slowly 
perceives the rays of the five elements, which develop into light and visionary images 
of the peaceful and wrathful deities. If the person can recognise that these visions are 
projections of his own mind and overcome the fear they inspire to be able to move 
towards them, he will be liberated and will not be subjected to further rebirth. But if 
not, one passes into the third intermediate state after death, the Shidpa bardo. Jung's 
exposition of Sambhogakaya and that of Tibetan Buddhism are similar, in that both 
emphasise that visions of the deities are mental creations or projections of one's own 
mind. I will discuss in detail Jung's relationship to Tibetan Buddhist materials in 
Chapter Four. 
Jung asserts, "In the nirmanakaya these opposites are no more than human 
conflicts, but in the sambhogakaya they are the positive and negative principles united 
in one and the same figure" (CW 11: 791). In dharmakaya these opposites are 
dissolved into absolute unity and formlessness. Jung argues, 
The psyche is ... all-important; it is the all-pervading Breath, the Buddha-
essence; it is the Buddha-Mind, the One, the Dharmakaya. All existence 
emanates from it, and all separate forms dissolve back into it. 
(CW 11: 771). 
It is important to emphasise here that Jung made a close parallel between the Buddhist 
doctrine of Trikaya and the path of the individuation process. This statement above 
demonstrates Jung's psychological reductionism, that is, Jung brought his own 
psychological assumption into the concept of Dharmakaya, and interpreted it as a 
psychic unity of both the conscious and the unconscious, which is a goal of the 
individuation process. Jung's theory of the individuation process envisages the 
possibility of there being certain processes in the unconscious which compensate for 
the defects of the conscious attitude. When these unconscious compensations are 
made conscious through the analytical technique, they produce a change in the 
conscious attitude, which Jung regarded as a new level of consciousness. Jung 
asserts, "The first effect, however, is usually a conflict, because the conscious attitude 
resists the intrusion of apparently incompatible and extraneous tendencies, thoughts, 
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feelings, etc." (CW 11: 779). Jung interpreted these human conflicts as occurring in 
the state of nirmanakaya, which is the phenomenal world. Jung then argues that the 
incompatible contents must not be suppressed again but must be accepted and 
integrated. The conscious suspension of suppressing the incompatible unconscious 
contents, then, is a new compensatory reaction in the unconscious. This reaction, 
which is usually manifested in dreams, is brought to conscious realisation in turn. 
The images in the dream are manifestations of the unconscious and Jung called them 
archetypes. Jung asserts, 
it is necessary to give special attention to the images of the collective 
unconscious, because they are the source from which hints may be drawn for the 
solution of the problem of opposites. From the conscious elaboration of this 
material the transcendent function reveals itself as a mode of apprehension 
mediated by the archetypes and capable of uniting the opposites. By 
'apprehension' I do not mean simply intellectual understanding, but 
understanding through experience. An archetype, as we have said, is a dynamic 
image, a fragment of the objective psyche, which can be truly understood only if 
experienced as an autonomous entity. 
(CW 7: 184) 
These archetypes or structural patterns, for Jung, are in the sphere of sambhogakaya. 
Jung argues that, "the unconscious compensation of a neurotic conscious attitude 
contains all the elements that could effectively and healthily correct the one-sidedness 
of the conscious mind if these elements were made conscious, i.e., were understood 
and integrated into it as realities" (CW 7: 187). Thus the healing factor is brought 
about through the unconscious compensation and consequently the conflict is 
satisfactorily resolved. Jung argued that in the state of dharmakaya these conflicts are 
dissolved into oneness, a psychic unity. This process as well as method is what Jung 
called the transcendent function. The transcendent function, "facilitates the transition 
from one psychic condition to another by means of the mutual confrontation of 
opposites" (CW 11: 780). Jung argues the transcendent function is a purely natural 
process which can sometimes be accomplished in the face of opposites. The meaning 
and purpose of the process is, "the realization, in all its aspects, of the personality 
originally hidden away in the embryonic germ-plasm; the production and unfolding of 
the original, potential wholeness" (CW 7: 186). This is what Jung called the 
individuation process. 
124 
It is important to note this psychological reductionism by Jung as he equated 
the Dharmakaya with his idea of the individuation process, and dismissed the 
meaning of the Dharmakaya in its own traditional context. Jung's approach to 
understanding Dharmakaya lacks what the phenomenologist of religion calls epoche, 
"the need to abstain from every kind of value-judgement, to be 'present' to the 
phenomenon in question purely as an impartial observer, un-concerned with questions 
of truth and falsehood" (Sharpe, 1975: 224). Thus Jung reduced the concept of these 
three-bodies into his idea of the transcendent function, in which the conflict between 
the conscious and the unconscious is resolved. Jung interpreted the Dharmakaya as a 
psychic totality of the conscious with the unconscious, which is the purpose of the 
individuation process. Hence, the concepts of Trikaya have a significant meaning for 
Jung, as he believed they provided him with a confirmation of his theory of 
individuation. Jung claims, "These formulations are extremely valuable from the 
psychological point of view as they provide a fitting terminology for such 
experiences" (Letters I: 257). Nevertheless, there are fundamental ontological 
differences between the concept of Trikaya in Mahayana Buddhism and Jung's use of 
it. In Mahayana Buddhism the Trikaya refers to the three aspects of Buddhahood, and 
is a teaching device to show people the path to Buddhahood, nirvana, whereas Jung 
interpreted it as the individuation process, seeking a psychic wholeness. Buddhist 
teaching does not discuss nirvana in terms of ontology, whereas Jung's discussion of 
the self, the goal of the individuation process, can be interpreted as assuming such an 
ontology, namely, a substance-like thing. Given that Jung's formative education was 
grounded in the Western tradition, which generally assumes a substance ontology, 
Jung failed to understand the difference between Buddhism and his psychology and 
interpreted Buddhist literatures in terms of the ontological assumptions with which he 
was familiar. 
3.2.3 Madhyamika school 
The Mahayana perspective is expressed both in Sutras and Sastras (treatises). These 
systematically present the outlook of particular Mahayana schools, based on Sutras, 
logic and meditation experience. In India the Mahayana developed two main 
philosophical schools: the Madhyamika school (or also known as Sunyatavada), and 
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Yogacara school (or Vijnanavada). Both schools have had a major influence on 
Northern (Tibet, Nepal, and Sikkim) and Eastern Buddhism (Vietnam, China, Korea, 
and Japan). In the Madhyamika school there are two fundamental Sutras: the 
Prajnaparamita and the Saddharmapundarika. The Madhyamika school was founded 
by Nagarjuna (c. AD 150-250), who was born into a brahmin family in Central 
India. IS The Prajnaparamita or 'Perfection of Wisdom' Sutra regards the world as a 
deceiving phenomenon or illusion (maya). For instance, there is something in 
experience which one can describe, but it does not have substantial existence. That is 
to say, what we experience does not exist in an absolute sense, but only in a relative 
way. Nagarjuna's understanding of the Middle Way indicates that the nature of all 
things lies in between absolute non-existence and substantial existence (Harvey, 1990: 
95-8). 
From the Sunyatavadin perspective, each phenomenon lacks inherent nature, 
and thus all are said to share an empty 'non-nature' as their 'nature'. In other words, 
their shared 'nature' is 'emptiness' (sunyata). Emptiness is not the substance of the 
world like the Brahman of the Upanishads. It implies that no such self-existent 
substance exists, because the world is a web of fluxing, interdependent, baseless 
phenomena. Harvey points out that, "Emptiness, then, is an adjectival quality of 
'dharmas', not a substance which composes them. It is neither a thing nor is it 
nothingness; rather it refers to reality as incapable of ultimately being pinned down in 
concepts" (Harvey, 1990: 99). The Madhyamika school claims that there are two 
levels of truth to the Buddha's teachings: the conventional truth (samvrtisatra) and the 
ultimate truth (paramarthasatya). The conventional truth employs conventional terms 
and makes use of logical arguments. Most people only understand this kind of 
language, as they are unable to think of what is beyond the phenomenal realm. The 
ultimate truth is expressed in terms of dharma, and is trans-logical, that is, transcends 
the language at the level of conventional truth. F or instance, when the emptiness of 
all appearances is indicated as the absolute, we must apply the ultimate truth. 
However, the ultimate truth, such as attaining the bliss of Nirvana, is an inconceivable 
and inexpressible reality. The Sunyatavadin literature contains an elusive series of 
18 The following works of Nagarjuna were preserved in Sanskrit: Madhyamikasastra, 
Vigrahavyavartani, Ratnavali, Catuhstava, Mahayanavimsika, Sharmasangraha, and Suhrllekha 
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subtle allusions to that which lies beyond words. This is the notion of tathata, 
thusness or suchness, and is equivalent to emptiness. In Sunyatavadin thought 
Nirvana is not seen as a dharma different from conditioned dharmas of samsara. The 
conditioned and the unconditioned cannot be differentiated because both are found to 
be emptiness. This means that all dharmas are nirvanic from the very beginning. 
Thus Harvey asserts, "Nirvana and samsara are not two separate realities, but the 
field of emptiness, seen by either spiritual ignorance or true knowledge" (Harvey, 
1990: 103). In other words, to become aware of one's essential emptiness is to 
achieve liberation from the cycle of rebirth. 
Jung did not mention the Madhyamika school of Mahayana Buddhism. Nor 
did he discuss the concept of the Middle Way, which is one of the most important 
concepts of the Madhyamika school. As mentioned earlier, for Jung, the middle way 
simply indicates the natural flow of libido between a pair of opposites, namely, the 
conscious and the unconscious. However, the Madhyamika school is concept of the 
Middle Way, between affirming and non-affirming, was not discussed or properly 
understood by Jung. Yet, Jung did discuss the concept of sunyata, which is an 
essential concept in the Madhyamika school and also a key concept in order to 
understand Zen Buddhism. Jung argues, 
'As long as Sunyata is cognized by a subject it remains object.' But when the 
subject enters Sunyata and becomes identical with it, the subject itself is 
Sunyata, namely void. And when the void is really void, there is not even a 
cognizing subject in it. The subject has vanished and there cannot be a 
consciousness of this fact, because there is nothing left any more. There can 
also be no memory of it, because there was nothing. 
(Letters I: 263, Jung's italics) 
This statement suggests that Jung ontologised the concept of sunyata. In the 
Sunyatavadin perspective, sunyata is neither a thing nor is it nothingness. Jung went 
on to state that sunyata is the Buddhist paradox, "the non-existent existence, the being 
which is non-being, or the consciousness that is absolutely void" (DA: 467). Yet, this 
is not sunyata in the Mahayana Buddhist sense, as it is emptiness of 'own-being.' 
Jung attempted to see sunyata objectively but sunyata is non-objectifiable or non-
substantial. Jung saw the idea of the void of consciousness as, "a consciousness that 
is not dominated by its contents" (DA: 467). Jung goes on to say, 
(Schumann, 1973: 142) 
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These contents attack our consciousness with the fire of desire and we become 
possessed by them. The Buddhist idea of liberation is that we should not be 
devoured by them, we should rather be their masters; therefore one has to empty 
the conscious, as it were, of those overpowering contents. 
(DA: 467-8) 
Again this statement does not seem to indicate the concept of sunyata in the 
Sunyatavadin standpoint. Jung claims, however, "To experience Sunyata is ... an 
impossible experience by definition" (Letters I: 263), because, "it is absolutely 
impossible to know what I would experience when that'!, which could experience 
didn't exist any more" (Ibid., 263). This statement again suggests that Jung did not 
understand the experience of sunyata, because in the experience of sunyata 'I' does 
not disappear. Sunyata means that'!, is empty of own being. According to Jung's 
theory of psychic structure, the psyche consists of two complementary but antithetical 
spheres: the conscious and the unconscious. The ego is the centre of consciousness, 
and all our experience of the outer and inner worlds must pass through our ego in 
order to be perceived. Thus, "relations to the ego that are not perceived as such are the 
unconscious" (CW 6: 700). From this dualistic standpoint as well as his 
misunderstanding of sunyata in which the ego disappears, Jung came to a conclusion 
that sunyata signifies the unconscious. Jung asserts, 
All psychic functioning without an ego has peculiar characteristics that adhere 
to every psychic fragment which is not the result of conscious functioning. 
Dreams, for instance, are not the result of conscious functioning in the main. 
They have therefore a peculiar character which we call unconscious. If the 
Indians would call sublime psychic experience 'psyche' or something equivalent 
to it, I would agree with them, but to call it consciousness cannot be 
substantiated by any evidence. If the highest psychic condition is Sunyata, then 
it cannot be consciousness, because consciousness is by definition the 
relationship between the subj ect and a representation. One is conscious of 
something. As long as you are conscious of Sunyata it is not Sunyata, because 
there is still a subject that is conscious of something. Void is even the void of 
conSCIousness 
(Letters I: 249-50) 
Jung went on to say, 
void, is perhaps better described as a vast unconsciousness, holding so many 
contents that there is nothing there because nothing matters. This is the nearest 




This statement seems to indicate that Jung was unable to grasp the concepts of 
sunyata and nirvana. Jung was apparently content with locating these concepts in the 
category of the unconscious. The closest Jung came to understanding sunyata is his 
statement regarding 'positive non-being.' But this is similar to Jung's idea of Gnostic 
pleroma. In his own Gnostic myth, the 'Seven Sermons to the Dead' (1916) Jung 
asserts, 
Nothingness is the same as fullness. In infinity full is no better than empty. 
Nothingness is both empty and full. As well might ye say anything else of 
nothingness, as for instance, white is it, or black, or again, it is not, or it is. A 
thing that is infinite and eternal hath no qualities, since it hath all qualities. 
This nothingness or fullness we name the PLEROMA. Therein both 
thinking and being cease, since the eternal and infinite possess no qualities. In it 
no being is, for he then would be distinct from the pleroma, and would possess 
qualities which would distinguish him as something distinct from the pleroma. 
In the pleroma there is nothing and everything. It is quite fruitless to think 
about the pleroma, for this would mean self-dissolution. 
(Jung in Segal, 1992: 181-2) 
R.A. Segal argues that Jung's idea of Gnostic pleroma stands for primordial 
unconsciousness, since it is, "undifferentiated, so that none of the commonly assumed 
distinctions is yet made" (Segal, 1992: 39). Yet, sunyata is not the same as the 
unconscious in Jungian sense. Jung has ontologised the void into Gnostic pleroma. 
As mentioned earlier, Jung did not discuss the concept of the Middle Way from the 
Madhyamika school perspective. But the Middle Way is closely linked with the 
concept of sunyata. M. Abe (1992) argues, 
the ultimate Buddhism is neither conditioned nor unconditioned, neither relative 
nor absolute, neither temporal nor eternal. Therefore, the Buddhist ultimate is 
called sunyata - that is, 'Emptiness.' It is also called the 'Middle Way,' 
because it is neither an eternalist view which insists on the existence of an 
unchanging eternal entity as the ultimate, nor an annihilationist view which 
maintains that everything is null and void. 
(Abe, 1992: 130) 
Why did Jung go wrong with understanding the concept of sunyata? One possible 
answer to this question lies in the historical development of interpretations of 
Buddhism in the West. Almond (1988) provides a historical survey of the discovery 
of Buddhism in the West, particularly in the Victorian period in Britain. Almond's 
survey shows how Europeans interpreted Buddhism in the nineteenth and the 
twentieth centuries and demonstrates distinct features in their understanding of 
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Buddhism. Almond argues that it was not unusual that among Victorians Buddhism 
was understood from an ontological perspective. From an ontological point of view, 
for instance, "the majority opinion throughout the nineteenth century was that 
Nirvana, essentially, entailed the annihilation of the individual" (Almond, 1988: 102), 
and consequently, "the annihilationaist interpretation of the doctrine of Nirvana came 
to determine the overall picture of Buddhism" (Ibid., 106). It is precisely in this 
approach that the concept of sunyata was understood by lung. Thus, it is not 
surprising to recognise that under the influence of nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
Western thought lung became a victim of Western ignorance on Buddhism. lung's 
ontological account of Buddhism can also be found in his approach to the concept of 
no-mind in Zen Buddhism. I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter Five. 
3.2.4 Y ogacara school 
The Yogacara school emerged in the third century AD. The fundamental texts of the 
Yogacara school are the Lanikavatara, the Avatamsaka and the Sandhinirmocana 
Sutras of which only the first is preserved in Sanskrit. The Y ogacara was founded by 
Asanga (fourth/fifth century). His teacher was Maitreya-(natha) (third/fourth 
century). 19 In time Asanga converted his half-brother Vasubandhu (fourth/fifth 
century) to Mahayana.2o Asanga and Vasubandhu developed and systematised ideas 
of the Y ogacara school. Asanga was a religious practician and particularly 
emphasised meditation (dhyana). He regarded the way to deliverance as the practice 
of yoga and he called the system Yogacara, 'conduct in Yoga'. Vasubandhu, on the 
other hand, was more of a theoretician and explained all that exists as consciousness 
or mind and he called the system Vijnanavada, 'consciousness doctrine' (Schumann, 
1973: 150). 
The Yogacara school distinguishes between two layers of the mind (citta): the 
storehouse-consciousness (alayavijnana) and the thought-consciousness 
(manovijnana or manas). The storehouse-consciousness is an underlying unconscious 
level of mind, and all existing things spring from it. When a person performs actions 
19 Maitreya's historicity is questioned by scholars: he may have been a human teacher, or the heavenly 
Bodhisattva (Harvey, 1990: 104). 
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or karmas, seeds of his future kannic effects sink into the alaya ( storehouse), a 
receptacle which actively stores them. Within the alaya, the kannic seeds are matured 
by the kannic impressions (vasana). Then these karmic seeds ripen into thinking 
(manas) or the thought-consciousness (manvoijnana). Manas splits the flow of 
experience into an experiencing subject and object. It then generates other forms of 
delusory discrimination (vikalpa), and takes the supposed subject as a real permanent 
self or I. This I-delusion becomes the source of craving, which eventually generate 
karmic seeds again to be stored in the alaya till they ripen into the future flow of 
experience. This cycle takes place within the mutual relationship between alaya and 
manas, and the Yogacarin see it as the wheel of rebirth (see Figure 3.1). 
According to the Yogacara everything perceptible is only thought (cittamatra). 
In other words, our actual world is merely thought or a representation produced by 
conSClOusness. The central Y ogacarin concept is the three modes of natures 
(svabhava): (1) the imagined (parikalpita), (2) the other dependent (paratantra), and 
(3) the absolutely accomplished (parinispanna). The parikalpita is what is structured 
by the subject/object discrimination. It is the common sense world of self, people and 
things but is just an illusory appearance. The paratantra is the level of relative reality 
in the fonn of the flow of changing mental phenomena, arising dependent on one 
another. It is not the highest level of reality because it generates the subject/object 
duality and constructs the unreal world. The parinispanna is the highest nature at the 
absolutely real level without subject/object duality, in which knowledge is perfected 
due to directly knowing the world as representation only. 
The first two natures are the basis of defilement and thus of suffering. In deep 
meditation the mind gradually overcomes the tendency to interpret experiences as 
external obj ects. As this tendency diminishes, consciousness is perceived as more real 
than the 'objective' world. Then, the transcending of any object leads to the collapse 
of any notion of subject, and so arises the experience of transcendent knowledge 
beyond the SUbject/object duality. This is the realisation of the 'absolutely 
accomplished'. Nirvana is reached by the reversal of basis (asraya-paravrtti), which 
is a momentous spiritual transition or a shattering upheaval which takes place in alaya 
20 Asanga and Vasubandhu were brothers from a brahmin family ~ Purusapura, (today's Peshawar, in 
Pakistan). Before their conversion to Mahayana they are saId to have been adherents of the 
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in its form as manas. It is where the usual flow of the worldly mind suddenly stops, 
so that the main senses of consciousness no longer present information. Having 
stopped discriminating 'obj ects' in the flow of the six consciousness, manas turns 
around from these and attains direct intuitive knowledge of alaya at its base. Because 
of this, alaya is no longer capable of carrying karmic seeds, as its deluding nature is 
seen through. The intuition thus penetrates to the non-dual depths of alaya, the 
Dharma-realm which is ultimate reality, so that everything is seen as 'thought-only in 
the highest sense'. In the mirror of manas, the unknowing alaya has gained 
knowledge of its inner nature, so that nirvana is the alaya-consciousness realised 
inwardly, after a reversal has taken place (Harvey, 1990: 104-112). 
Jung did not use the term Y ogacara but he discussed some of the concepts of 
the Y ogacara school in his commentaries on Tibetan Buddhism, which was influenced 
by the Yogacara school of thought. Moreover, Jung frequently took up the issue of 
the Buddhist concept of the wheel of birth and discussed it a great deal. There are 
similarities between the Y ogacara school's concept of the storehouse consciousness 
(alayavijnana) and Jung's idea of the unconscious. J.M. Reynolds (1989) asserts, "In 
Buddhist terms, what Dr. Jung is talking about when he speaks of the unconscious is 
the Alaya or Kunzhi (kun-gzhi), 'the receptacle or store-house of consciousness'" 
(Reynolds, 1989: 111). R. Moacanin (1986) examines this similarity, and argues that, 
like the alaya, Jung's concept of the unconscious includes, "future contents of the 
conscious psyche, and anticipates future conscious processes," and also contains 
ancestral deposits accumulated since immemorial time" (Moacanin, 1986: 74). These 
two aspects of the unconscious are based on the fact that the unconscious is "the 
matrix of all potentialities" (CW 14: 253), as well as "a creative factor" (CW 16: 62). 
Moacanin argues that the unconscious is like a treasure-house, which, "is the source 
of all inspiration, creativity and of wisdom" (Moacanin, 1986: 74). The role of the 
unconscious is to correct the biases of the conscious mind through a symbolic 
language, and compensate its one-sidedness with a non-rational perception which 
reveals a more comprehensive meaning. Moacanin asserts, therefore, "the 
unconscious may be a valuable guide pointing the way to one's true destination, a 
Sarvastivada school (Schumann, 1973: 149). 
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destination that is true to one's self and not falsified by prejudices of the conscious 
mind" (Moacanin, 1986: 75). 
The later developments of Mahayana Buddhism - the Tantric, Pure Land, and 
Zen traditions which spread into Northern and Eastern parts of Asia - are of great 
significance to understanding Jung and the development of his ideas. Jung's 
understanding of Tantric and Zen Buddhism is discussed in Chapters Four and Five 
respectively. Jung's understanding of Pure Land Buddhism, particularly its method of 
meditation, is examined in the following section. 
3.3 The practice of Buddhist meditation 
3.3.1 Theravada meditation: Calm and insight mediation (Jhanic and formless 
state meditation) 
Harvey argues that Buddhist meditation practice is the most important method in the 
development of wisdom (Pali. panna, Skt. prajna). Meditation requires the guidance 
of a meditation teacher, known in the Theravada tradition as one's 'good friend' 
(kalyanamitta) , as meditation involves a subtle skill which cannot be properly 
conveyed by written teachings. The teacher guides his pupil through difficulties and 
guards against inappropriate use of the powerful means of self-transformation which 
meditation provides. Most meditation is performed with the legs crossed in the lotus 
position, with the hands together in the lap, and the back straight. The general effects 
of meditation are a gradual increase in calm and awareness. The practice of 
meditation differs according to the different traditions and schools of Buddhism 
(Harvey, 1990: 244-5). 
Theravada meditation is based on a moral virtue to use right effort, right 
mindfulness and right concentration as mental tools in order to cultivate one's own 
wisdom. Right effort helps to develop and sustain the meditative state and prevent the 
meditator from falling into an unskilful state of mind. Right mindfulness is an 
awareness which does not drift along the surface of things but is a thorough 
observation. Thus mindfulness observes without judgement or habitual reaction, and 
acknowledges what is actually there in the flow of experience. Right concentration is 
a state of samadhi, in which one's full attention is focussed on a chosen object, and 
his or her mind becomes free from all distraction, in a state of inner stillness. This 
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will be achieved on the basis of right effort as well as right mindfulness. The 
development of concentration and mindfulness to high degrees is called Samatha, or 
'Calm' meditation, in which an object is chosen, and concentration is focussed on it 
until a state of tranquillity arises (see Table 3.1). Kasina-mandala or 'universal-
circles' are used as chosen objects for the meditation. A meditator concentrates on the 
circle until he can clearly see a mental image in his mind. Mindfulness of breathing 
(anapana-sati) is also a common calm meditation. The breathing method induces 
calm, and at a certain state a mental image or sign (nimitta) arises, which becomes a 
focus of attention in a state of deep inner stillness. 
As the meditator learns to work with the mental image, he has to gradually 
suspend the five hindrances which obstruct further progress: (1) sensual desire, (2) ill-
will, (3) sloth, (4) restlessness and worry, and (5) fear of commitment. Once the 
hindrances are suspended, the image becomes much brighter and subtler in form. 
This is the stage of 'access concentration' (upacara-samadhi), which is access to the 
full concentration of jhana. Working with the image constructs the five factors of 
jhana: (1) applied thought, the process of projecting the mind onto the object; (2) 
examination, which leads to the mind remaining on the object; (3) joy, a feeling of 
bliss pervading the entire body; (4) happiness, a feeling of deep concentration; and (5) 
'one pointedness of mind,' which is a unification of the mind on the object. In fact 
these factors are the first of a set of four jhanas. As the meditation proceeds, the 
meditator drops certainjhana factors and cultivates a deeper degree of calm until he 
reaches the fourth jhana, in which the mind rests with unshakeable equanimity. 21 
From this point the further four 'formless attainment' (arupa-samapatti) can be 
pursued. The meditator concentrates on: (1) infinite space, (2) infinite consciousness, 
(3) nothingness, and (4) neither-cognition-nor-non-cognition. From the highest 
formless state, a meditator can reach the level of the attainment of cessation (nirodha-
samapatti), in which the mind totally shuts down, without any cognition or feeling, 
and he can attain Nirvana. However, it is said that only Arhat can attain this state. 
21 From the fourth jhana, higher knowledge (abhinna) can also be developed: Psychic powers (iddhi), 
Clairaudience (the ability to hear sounds at great distance, including the speech of the gods), Mind-
reading, memory of previous lives, Clairvoyance, and Nirvana. The last three are called threefold 
knowledge (tevijja) and lead to the attainment of Nirvana (Harvey, 1990: 252). 
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3.3.2 Theravada meditation: Insight meditation (Vipassana meditation) 
The second principal way of meditation, known as 'Insight' meditation (Vipassana), 
is to generate a high degree of mindfulness, based on right effort and concentration. 
Insight meditation is often combined with calm meditation, as both calm and insight 
are necessary elements for the experience of Nibbana. 22 The fundamental framework 
for developing Insight practice is known as 'the four foundations of mindfulness' 
(sati-patthana) which are described in the Maha-sati-patthana Sutra. The four 
foundations are body, feelings, states of mind, and dhammas. During meditation, the 
mind observes various physical sensations as they occur. Then feelings are observed 
as they arise and pass away. Mindfulness then moves on to states of mind, observing 
moods and emotions as they arise. Finally, mindfulness investigates dhammas, 
notices when they are present and absent, and how they come to arise and cease. The 
aim of these investigations is to recognise their shared features, which is known as the 
'three marks of conditioned things': impermanence, illness, and not-self. E. Conze 
(1975) argues all the conditioned phenomena which take place in the interval between 
birth and death are impermanent because of their constant arising and ceasing. Since 
the conditioned phenomena are impermanent, therefore they are also ill, "owing to the 
fact that they are constantly molested (by rise and fall), that they are hard to bear, that 
they are the basis of suffering, and that they are opposite to Ease" (Conze, 1975: 148). 
They are also not-self because of the fact that they are empty of ability, or cannot be 
controlled at will, as opposed to the self. Once these have occurred during the 
meditation, the mind can come to turn away from them and perceive Nibbana. 
The stages of development within insight meditation are based on a scheme of 
seven purifications. The first two relate to morality and Calm, and the other five 
relate to Insight. In the third purification, no being is seen apart from changing mental 
and physical phenomena. In the fourth purification, insight into Conditioned 
Origination starts to develop, so that the tendency to think of self-identification starts 
to diminish. In the fifth purification, clearer insight leads to the arising of ten 
defilements of insight, such as flashes of light and knowledge and great joy. In the 
sixth purification, a series of direct forms of knowledge develop, such as focusing on 
135 
the cessation of each passing phenomena, and a desire for deliverance from such 
conditioned phenomena. In the seventh purification, the mind finally lets go of 
conditioned phenomena, and attains the unconditioned Nibbana. 23 
3.3.3 Jung's understanding of Buddhist meditation 
Eastern meditation was frequently addressed and considered by Jung. However, Jung 
did not provide a comprehensive account of meditation in the Theravada Buddhist 
tradition, but more frequently discussed particular types of Mahayana meditation: the 
Pure Land, Tantric and Zen Buddhist meditation practices. Jung frequently used the 
term yoga which, in his view, also means meditation. H. Coward (1985) argues, 
For Carl Jung, yoga is a general term indicating all of Eastern thought and 
psychological practice. In his writings yoga is used to designate Eastern 
traditions as diverse as Hinduism, Indian Buddhism, Tibetan Buddhism, 
Japanese Buddhism and Chinese Taoism. 
(Coward, 1985: 3) 
Thus, it is confusing that Jung invariably did not specify which yoga tradition or 
Buddhist meditation practice he was discussing. Nevertheless, Buddhist meditation 
has a significant status in terms of Jung's idea of the unconscious. Jung says, 
Through dhyana, through the sinking and deepening of contemplation, the 
conscious has evidently taken on form. It is as if the light of consciousness had 
ceased to illuminate the objects of the outer world of the senses and now 
illuminates the darkness of the unconscious. 
(CW 11: 938) 
P. Bishop (1993) argues that, "Jung did not fully appreciate Buddhist meditation. He 
tended to see meditative concentration and absorption (samadhi) as an unconscious 
state" (Bishop, 1993: 49). Jung interpreted the state of samadhi as, "the dissolution of 
the consciousness in the unconscious" (NZ II: 1364). The problem of the concept of 
samadhi is that in Jung's view the state of samadhi, in which "the unconscious has 
swallowed up ego-consciousness" (CW 9i: 520), is equivalent to a state of psychosis. 
Thus the ego-consciousness has to exist along with the unconscious. Jung asserts, 
22 There are three ways of developing meditation: Insight preceded by Calm, which is known as 
'vehicle of Calm' (Samatha-yana); Calm preceded by Insight, known as 'vehicle of Insight' 
(Vipassana-yana); and Calm-and-Insight-yoked-together' (Harvey, 1990: 253-4). 
23 This is perceived either as the signless, which is devoid of graspable signs; as the undirected, which 
lies beyond goal-directedness in the conditioned phenomena; or as emptiness (sunnata), which is void 
of ego-feeling and incapable of conceptualisation. (Harvey, 1990: 256). 
136 
The yogi attains the state of nirdvandva (freedom from opposites) in the rigid 
lotus position of non-conscious, non-acting samadhi. But the ordinary man 
stands between the opposites and knows that he can never abolish them. There 
is no good without evil, and no evil without good. The one conditions the other, 
but it does not become the other or abolish the other. 
(CW 18: 1417) 
lung believes that the psyche of the European is differently constituted from that of 
the Asian and that consequently the practice of yoga in the West must be regarded as 
damaging to the psychic development of the individual. lung drew a sharp contrast 
between Eastern and Western mentalities, which lung believed are important 
differences. lung saw, for instance, the East/West differences such as Western 
materialism and rationalism on the one hand, and Eastern spirituality and mysticism 
on the other. lung elaborated East and West psychic relativism in tenns of the 
introverted and extraverted distinction. Clarke argues, "lung's discussion of the 
relationship between Eastern and Western mentalities is pervaded by the assumption 
that East represented a distinct and opposites, though complementary, psychological 
type" (Clarke, 1994: 22). lung believed that both Western and Eastern mentalities are 
one-sided - incomplete science and incomplete yoga, and that both are understood in 
tenns of complementary opposites. lung observed that, 
the two standpoints, however contradictory, each have their psychological 
justification. Both are one-sided in that they fail to see and take account of 
those factors which do not fit in with their typical attitudes. The one underrates 
the world of consciousness, the other the world of the One Mind. The result is 
that, in their extremism, both lose one half of the universe; their life is shut off 
from total reality. 
(CW 11: 786) 
lung believed that the Eastern mentality is fundamentally different from the Western 
as it has emerged from quite different history and cultural traditions. Consequently, 
lung warns against Western application of Eastern religious practices. lung wrote, 
If I remain so critically averse to yoga, it does not mean that I do not regard this 
spiritual achievement of the East as one of the greatest things the human mind 
has ever created. I hope my exposition makes it sufficiently clear that my 
criticism is directed solely against the application of yoga to the peoples of 
entirely different lines from that of the East and has therefore produced 
conditions which are the most unfavourable soil one can think of for the 
application of yoga. 
(CW 11: 876) 
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Leon Schlamm (2000) calls into question Jung's account of these psychic differences 
between East and West by exploring his letter to Oskar Schmitz, who is the author of 
the Psychoanalyse und yoga, written in1923.24 Schlamm argues that in this letter Jung 
claims, "whereas the Indian psyche experienced a healthy, uninterrupted religious 
development from the most primitive to the most spiritual states of consciousness, this 
development was aborted within the European psyche by its premature, psychically 
wounding, encounter with Roman Christianity" (Schlamm, 2000: 5). Due to the 
historical suppression of its indigenous polytheism, in European psyche there is a 
chasm between an undeveloped primitive form of culture and religion on the one hand 
and Christianity on a much higher level on the other. Thus Jung believed that "the 
only way to address the problem of the mutilation of the European psyche today is to 
attempt to encourage the repressed energy of the primitive in man to develop -
through a confrontation with the unconscious - in order to facilitate the flow of libido, 
the source of psychic vitality, into consciousness" (Schlamm, 2000: 5). Schlamm 
argues that "only by overcoming the split in the European psyche between the 
undeveloped, but dangerous, energy of the primitive and his own higher spiritual 
civilisation can a new experience of God be created, but this cannot be triggered by 
yoga exercises, which are experienced by the European, although not by the Indian, as 
24 In this letter Jung wrote, 
The product of the Oriental mind are based on its own peculiar history, which is radically 
different from ours. Those peoples have gone through an uninterrupted development from the 
primitive state of natural plolydemonism to polytheism at its most splended, and beyond that to 
a religion of ideas within which the originally magical practices could evolve into a method of 
self-improvement. These antecedents do not apply to us. The Germanic tribes, when they 
collided only the day before yesterday with Roman Chrisitanity, were still in the initial state of a 
polydemonism with polytheistic buds. There was as yet no proper priesthood and no proper 
ritual. Like Wotan's oaks, the gods were felled and a wholly incogruous Christianity, born of 
monotheism on a much higher cultural level, was grafted upon the stumps. The Germanic man 
is still suffering from this mutilation. I have good reasons for thinking that every step beyond 
the existing situation has to begin down there among the truncated nature-demons. In other 
words, there is a whole lot of primitivity in us to be made good. 
It therefore seems to me a grave error if we graft yet another foreign growth onto our 
already mutilated condition. It would only make the original injury worse. This craving for 
things foreign and faraway is a morbid sign. Also, we cannot possibly get beyond our present 
level of culture unless we receive a powerful impetus from our primitive roots. But we shall 
receive it only if we go back behind our cultural level, thus giving the suppressed primitive man 
in ourselves a chance to develop... We need some new foundation. We must dig down to the 
primitive in us, for only out of the conflict between civilised man and the Germanic barbarian 
will there come what we need: a new experience of God. I do not think this goal can be reached 
by means of artificial exercises. 
(Letters I : 1973, 39-40) 
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of a wholly spiritual nature and therefore divorced from the world of his instinctual 
experience" (Schlamm, 2000: 5). 
From these observations lung concludes that yoga practice constitutes a 
"royal road to the unconscious" (CW 11: 827) for the Indian, whereas the European 
inevitably misuses it to strengthen his will, in order to repress his unconscious 
contents, rather than exploring their many undeveloped, primitive features. Therefore 
lung claims that the intensity and narrowness of the European consciousness have a 
prohibiting effect on the unconscious, and that this effect should not be further 
emphasised by yoga which applies itself exclusively to the conscious mind, and is 
incapable of bringing about detachment from unconscious contents. Instead of a 
direct application of Eastern techniques, lung argues, "we should then be in a position 
to built our own ground with our own methods" (CW 11: 773). lung suggested that 
the Western alternative to yoga is his own method of active imagination in which, 
under the supervision of a therapist, the patient is "switching off consciousness, at 
least to a relative extent, thus giving the unconscious contents a chance to develop" 
(CW 11: 875). This is, lung claims, an especially suitable method for the Western 
psyche. Through this technique for liberating the unconscious from its rigidity, lung 
believes he can re-unite spirit with instinct, the civilised with the primitive, within the 
European psyche, and thereby heal its tragic would, created by the imposition of 
Christianity on the West.25 
3.3.4 Mahayana meditation: Pure Land Buddhist meditation 
The Mahayanin modified Calm (Skt. Samatha) and Insight (Vipasyana) meditation to 
their framework of belief and motivation. The meditator starts with a combination of 
Calm practices and the foundations of mindfulness (Skt. smrtyupasthana) in order to 
attain access concentration (Skt. anagamya) and full dhyana (Pali. jhana). The 
Mahayana version of Calm and Insight meditation is seen as a way of cultivating the 
Bodhisattva-path, and primarily involves techniques of visualisation or cultivating 
spontaneous insight. lung was more familiar with Mahayana Buddhist meditation 
practice. He often discusses Tantric visualisation in Tibetan Buddhism and koan 
25 However, there is a sharp contrast between active imagination and Eastern meditation, which will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter Four. 
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meditation in Zen Buddhism, which are discussed in the following chapters. This 
section focuses on Jung's understanding of Pure Land Buddhist meditation. 
The central figure in Pure Land Buddhism is the heavenly Buddha, Amitabha, 
also known as Amita in China or Amida in Japan, who is the focus of devotion as a 
saviour being.26 The Pure Land school was based on the three Sutras: the larger and 
smaller Sukhavati-vyuha, or 'Array of the Happy Land' Sutra, and the Amitayur-
dhyana, or 'Meditation on Amitayus' Sutra.27 These texts only exist in Chinese 
translation and have played an important role in shaping Pure Land Buddhism in 
China and Japan. The larger Happy Land Sutra tells how the monk Dharmakara 
aspired to become a Buddha, Amitabha, who resides over the far-distant Happy Land 
(Sukhavati) in the Western region of universe. 28 
The Sukhavati-vyuhopadesa Sutra outlines five kinds of mindfulness, which 
are used to awaken absolute faith in Amitabha Buddha. M. Kiyota (1978) describes 
the faith in tenns of the five items of mindfulness: "1. Worship, 2. Praise, 3. Vow, 4. 
Meditation, and 5. Transferring merits" (Kiyota, 1978: 256). This means that a person 
needs to worship the power of Amitayus, chant Amitabha 's name, 'namo mitabhaya 
buddhaya,' 'Honour to Amitabha Buddha,' and make a vow to express detennination 
to realise birth in Buddha-land. He needs, then, meditation to visualise the merits of 
Pure Land, Buddha Amitayus and bodhisattvas. The fifth mindfulness describes the 
process of enlightening others, which transfers the merit to help all beings gain rebirth 
in the Pure Land. Worship and praise are the practices of body and speech and 
generate a mental calm (samatha). Vow and meditation are the practice of mind-
perfection and promote an insight (vipasyana). 
The main theme of the Amityur-dhyana Sutra is a sennon which Shyakamuni 
delivers to Queen Vaidehi. Her son has seized power by imprisoning his father the 
26 The name 'amitabha' or 'Infmite Radiance,' is an expression of light symbolism, and the alternative 
name of 'Amit-ayus' means 'Infmite Life,' referring to the immeasurably long life of this Buddha 
(Harvey, 1990: 129). 
27 The larger Sukhavati-vyuha Sutra was composed by the late second century AD, and the Amitayur-
dhyana Sutra may have been composed in Central Asia or China (Harvey, 1990: 129). 
28 According to Harvey, after hearing of the Pure Lands of many Buddhas, Dharmakara decided to 
create one combining the best aspects of all of them. He then made forty-six Bodhisattva vows, 
affirming that he would only become a Buddha when his Bodhisattva path had been karrnically potent 
enough to produce such a Pure Land. Moreover, Dharmakata vowed that he would appear before any 
dying being who aspired to enlightenment and devoutly called him to mind, so as to conduct him to his 
Pure Land (Harvey, 1990: 129-30). 
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King and leaving him to starve to death. The Queen has also been imprisoned 
because of visiting her husband and smuggling food to him. Imprisoned by her son 
and unable to help her husband, the Queen in her agony prays to Shayakumi, who 
lives on a nearby mountain. The Queen is full of depravities and longs for rebirth in a 
world that is pure. In an act of her devotion, the Queen confesses her sins, and begs 
for his mercy and instruction. The Buddha responds to her devotion and projects from 
his forehead a visualisation of the pure and admirable countries of the Buddhas in the 
ten quarters. Queen Vaidehi declares that she wishes herself to be born in the realm of 
Buddha Amityus (Amitabha) in the world of highest happiness. Then Shayakamuni 
Buddha teaches her sixteen meditations: the first thirteen meditations describe in 
detail Amitabha Buddha and his Pure Land of Bliss (Sukhavati); the last three 
meditations describe the three grades of people who attain rebirth in Amitabha 's Pure 
Land in three different ways (Coward, 1992). 
3.3.5 Jung's understanding of Pure Land Buddhist meditation 
Pure Land is one of the schools of Mahayana Buddhism with which lung was 
familiar, but of the three major texts of Pure Land Buddhism, the Amitayur-dhyana 
Sutra is the only one which lung addresses directly. In 1943 lung gave a lecture on 
the Amitayur-dhyana Sutra, under the title of 'The Psychology of Eastern Meditation' 
(CW 11: 908-949). lung is not concerned with presenting a full account of this text, 
he stated, "I had no intention whatever of expounding classical Buddhism, but. .. my 
aim was to analyse the psychology of this particular text" (CW 18: 1675). 
lung used the text translated by 1. Takakusu in the nineteenth-century as 
Amitayur-dhyana Sutra: The Sutra of Meditation on Amitayus. In the first half of his 
essay, lung provided lengthy quotations from the text and in the second half he gave 
his interpretation of the text. As lung advised against Europeans imitating Buddhist 
meditation, he devised his own method for Europeans, using a series of symbols 
which are discussed in the text. lung argues, "If we wish to understand at all, we can 
do so only in the European way" (CW 11: 934). Through meditating on the symbols, 
such as the sun, the water, and the blue lapis lazuli, "the meditator can penetrate into 
the depths of the psyche's secrets. There he sees what should not be seen before, i.e., 
what was unconscious" (CW 11: 938). lung goes on to say, "By throwing light on the 
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unconscious one gets first of all into the chaotic sphere of the personal unconscious, 
which contains all that one would like to forget, and all that one does not wish to 
admit to oneself or to anybody else, and which one prefers to believe is not true 
anyhow" (CW 11: 939). Only the man who is strong enough to go through this 
darkness can make any further progress to a still deeper layer of the collective 
unconSCIOUS. The main aim of Jung's account of meditation is, "to establish 
scientifically a deeper layer of unity in the unconscious" (CW 11: 945). Jung argues 
that the mythological motifs which have been demonstrated by the exploration of the 
unconscious form a certain order which constitutes the true centre or essence of the 
collective unconscious. Jung called this the central symbol mandala. Thus the image 
of the Buddha sitting in the round lotus in the centre of the octagonal Amitabha land is 
for Jung a type of mandala which symbolises the centre of the psyche, the self. 
In his discussion of the text, Jung dismissed the aspect of faith, which is made 
supreme and is essential to deliverance in Pure Land Buddhism. P. Bishop (1989) 
argues, "Jung makes no mention of the question of faith and focuses instead upon the 
technical and symbolic details of the meditational visualisations" (Bishop, 1989: 1). 
Bishop (1993) argues that the image of 'science' has been used since the eighteenth 
century in attempts to legitimise and validate Eastern religion, particularly Buddhism, 
in the West. In the nineteenth century many Westerners claimed that rational, 
empirical Buddhism, rather than Christianity which relied on faith alone, was suited to 
healing the gap between religion and science. Because they believed that, "Buddhism 
apparently had no gods and did not depend on blind faith, it seemed pre-eminently 
suited to the scientific mind" (Bishop, 1993: 78).29 For this reason, it is 
understandable that Jung was ignorant of the aspect of faith in Pure Land Buddhism. 
Bishop argues that: "[Pure Land] Buddhism is not readily reduced to a technique, nor 
is it conductive to scientific status, and in addition it relies almost totally upon faith. 
Hence Pure Land beliefs do not easily fit the dominant scientific image that the West 
seems to want from Buddhism" (Bishop, 1993: 87). 
There are other significant difficulties with Jung's reading of Buddhism here. 
He failed to mention the three prerequisite requirements for entering the meditation: to 
29 This interpretation of Buddhism was not accurate, of course, as Buddhism was not atheistic but 
transpolytheistic, see section 3.2. 
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act filially toward parents, and serve and respect one's teachers; to take the vow of 
seeking refuge with three jewels and fulfil all moral precepts and ritual ceremonies; to 
give one's whole mind to the attainment of bodhi and deeply believe in dependent 
origination by studying the Mahayana sutras. Moreover, Coward argues that Jung 
dismissed the setting and interaction between Shyakamuni Buddha and Queen 
Vaidehi. He states, "Aside from one brief paragraph (para. 913) in which he simply 
sets the stage, all of Jung's attention is focused on an analysis of the first thirteen 
meditations ... Jung's omission of this material is most unfortunate, for it serves to 
foster the common Western misconception that Eastern meditation is detached from 
ethical considerations" (Coward, 1992: 249-250). 
3.4 Conclusion 
In his writings Jung addressed several traditions of Buddhist thought. However, it is 
sometimes confusing for the reader that Jung employed Buddhist terms without 
specifying the traditions or philosophical schools to which these terms belonged. This 
is particularly true with regard to his analysis of Buddhist meditation. Jung not only 
used the term yoga and meditation interchangeably, but also he failed to mention the 
varieties of practice within different traditions of Buddhism or schools of meditation. 
It becomes clear from his writings that Jung was more familiar with the Hinayana than 
Mahayana tradition, and Jung apparently had more a systematic understanding of 
Hinayana Buddhist thought. When he discussed Buddhist concepts, his understanding 
of them was actually based on his knowledge of the Hinayana tradition - and this is a 
particular problem because he wrote important commentaries on aspects of the 
Mahayana tradition from this perspective. In spite of the fact that Jung wrote 
psychological commentaries on Mahayana Buddhist texts and frequently mentioned 
Mahayana Buddhist concepts, he failed to address fundamental concepts in the 
Mahayana tradition such as the Bodhisattva, and failed to understand the meaning of 
sunyata. Nor did Jung mention two major philosophical schools in Mahayana: the 
Madhyamika and the Y ogacara schools. Furthermore, there are conceptual 
differences between Jung's standpoint and Buddhism. In the next chapter I will focus 
on Jung's relation to Tibetan Buddhism in order to show how he engaged with 
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Tibetan Buddhist materials such as The Tibetan Book of the Dead and The Tibetan 
Book of the Great Liberation, and Tantric mandala symbolism. 
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Chapter Four: 
Jung and Tibetan Buddhism 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter examines Jung's consideration of Tibetan Buddhism. Tibetan Buddhism 
is one of the Mahayana Buddhist traditions which Jung explored in depth. Jung was 
interested not only in its teachings but also its religious practices and symbolism. The 
aim of this chapter is to show the general concepts of Tibetan Buddhism which Jung 
discussed, how he understood these ideas from a psychological and psychoanalytical 
perspective, and to compare and contrast Tibetan Buddhist thought and Jung's use of 
it. This chapter consists of three parts: Jung's study of The Tibetan Book of the Dead, 
and The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation, for which he wrote psychological 
commentaries, and Tibetan tantric mandalas, which he discussed at great length in his 
writings. The main argument of this chapter is to show that there is a sharp contrast 
between Tibetan Buddhist concepts and Jung's use of them. Jung's hermeneutical 
approach allows him to interpret these Tibetan concepts by making analogies and 
metaphors. However, in so doing, Jung failed to understand these concepts within 
their own traditions and cultures. 
4.1 Jung and The Tibetan Book of the Dead 
4.1.1 General outline of The Tibetan Book of the Dead 
The Bardo Thadol was written by Padmasambhava, who came to Tibet in the eighth 
century (around 750 AD) in order to spread the tantric doctrines of Indian Mahayana 
Buddhism. This tantric form of Mahayana is also called Vajrayana, or the "Diamond 
Vehicle." The text was hidden by him for a later era, and was discovered by the 
renewed treasure-finder Karma Linga in the fourteen century. The Bardo Thadol was 
translated by Lama Kazi Dawa Samdupl and edited by W.Y. Evans-Wentz and 
published in 1927 under the title, The Tibetan Book of the Dead. This translation was 
I According to Evans-Wentz (1960), although the translating of the manuscript was done wholly by 
himself the chief credit should be given to Lama Kazi Dawa Samdup, who could read both Tibetan 
and En~lish and is the actual translator of the Bardo Thodol. I discusse this in more detail in section 
4.3.1. 
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given a Swiss publication, Das Tibetanische Totenbuch by Rascher Verlag in 1938, 
and it was for this version that Jung's 'Psychological Commentary' was first 
published.2 
The Bardo Thodo/ is first of all a book for the living, to prepare them, not only 
for the dangers of death, but also to give them an opportunity to make use of the great 
possibilities which offer themselves in the moment of relinquishing the body - either 
for a better rebirth or for final liberation. The Bardo Thodo/ is one of a series of 
instructions on six types of liberation. It focuses its attention on liberation through 
hearing. The other five types of instructions are concerned with liberation through 
weanng, liberation through seeing, liberation through remembering, liberation 
through tasting, and liberation through touching. The text is designed to be read in the 
presence of the corpse by a relative, friend, or preferably a guru. 
It is important to consider some of the key Buddhist concepts contained within 
The Tibetan Book of the Dead. The Buddha sawall life as ultimately suffering 
(dukkha). As long as man suffers from the circumstances of the world and his 
behaviour, he is not liberated and finds himself in ignorance, which arises through 
desire, through lasting attachment to worldly things and events, and through 
attachments to one's own falsely understood personality. Attachment is the opposite 
of liberation. All activity that deepens the immersion in samsara, the cycle of rebirth, 
will detract from the goal of liberation and lead to suffering and to actions that are bad 
or negative according to the law of karma. In Buddhist cosmology the death of an 
unliberated person is necessarily followed by his rebirth, in which the suffering of 
living and dying is repeated. Thus samsara is regarded as a long and often aimless 
process. All persons and things, including the living bodies of humans, animals, and 
plants are transitory, are subject to suffering through transformation and the 
perishability of their temporal form. Beyond all this there is the deathless realm of 
salvation, the totally Other, the immeasurable place of the Absolute, which in 
Buddhism is called nirvana, the goal of the teaching of the Tibetan Book of the Dead. 
All actions that loosen the attachments to the transitory world of existence are 
directed towards liberation and lead to good or positive deeds, which lead out of the 
circle of samsara. The law of karma indicates the conditionality of our actions and 
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the absolute effect of these actions upon the present and future path of our existence. 
The law of karma places man in a position of unconditioned responsibility for his 
actions, for every deed and even every resolution to act has inevitable visible or 
invisible consequences. According to this Buddhist view, man remains in the cycle of 
birth and death until perfected knowledge puts an end to it. Rebirth is a consequence 
of not having attained liberation in the previous life. Each life is the result of karma 
that has been formed by actions attached to the world. 
For instance, Buddhist cosmography lists five realms into which a person can 
be reborn: the sphere of gods (deva); humans; spirits (peta) , generally known as 
'hungry ghost'; animals; and hell (niraya). The realm of gods is sometimes divided 
into two, that of gods proper and of that demons (asura). The way we find ourselves 
reborn in any of these destinies results from our actions in previous lives. 1. M. 
Reynolds (1989) argues that, "our stream of consciousness becomes dominated by a 
particular passion, and thus with rebirth our consciousness finds itself in a space or 
situation which is structured in terms of that predominant passion" (Reynolds, 1989: 
89). The principle of karma is of interdependent origination, that is to say, one event 
occurs and this is followed by another event dependent on the occurrence of the first, 
and so on. Reynolds states, "The energy generated by our actions and stored in our 
stream of consciousness cannot be fully exhausted in a single lifetime and so this 
leads to the arising of experiences in future lives" (Ibid., 90). According to Buddhist 
teaching, karma is not mere fatalism. While our present circumstances, including our 
own material body, are the result of our karma, at the same time we are free to choose 
the course of our actions within the limitations of our capacities and external 
circumstances. Hence the development can take place on lower or on higher destinies, 
in better or worse circumstances with respect to salvation, depending on our karmic 
facts. The unavoidable and incorruptible law of life is the path that man can build, 
given that he recognises the significance of his actions and the meaning of the life that 
can lead to freedom. 
There is no Tibetan expression translatable as 'Book of the Dead.' The actual 
Tibetan title is the Bardo Thodo/ and simply means the 'intermediate state.' In 
Tibetan 'bar' means 'between' and 'do' is a numerical concept which designates the , 
2 Evans-Wentz, Preface to the third edition to The Tibetan Book of the Dead, p. vii. 
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equality or equilibrium between two things or between two weights, values, numbers, 
or contents. In the Bardo Thodol, 'bardo' indicates a state between two similar states 
or conditions, namely, the state 'between two lines' of kinds of existence in bodily or 
earthly form. In the context of the Bardo Thodol, which is oriented toward preparing 
for a successful use of the intennediate state to accelerate progress toward 
Buddhahood, the process of the sequence of lives, daily life, and the single lifetime 
can be described as the six intennediate states: sKye-gans bar-do (the bardo of the 
realm of life, place of birth), rMi-Iam bar-do (the bardo of the dream state), bSam-
gtan bar-do (the bardo of meditation), 'Chi-khai' bar-do (the bardo of the experience 
of death), Chos-nyid bar-do (the bardo of the experience of reality), Srid-pa'i bardo 
(the bardo of seeking rebirth). 
The doctrine of the 'three Buddha bodies' (Skt. Trikaya; Tib. sKu-gsum) is 
one of the indispensable foundations of Mahayana Buddhism. It constitutes an 
important background to understanding the structure of the teachings of The Tibetan 
Book of the Dead. The three Buddha bodies encompass the possibilities of Being, 
between the highest Being in the spiritual sense and objective existence in the world 
of fonn. Kaya in Sanskrit means body as a fonn of being and a plane of the working 
of dharma (law) between transcendence and immanence. For details of the doctrine 
of the Trikaya: Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya, and Nirmanakaya, see Chapter Three. 
4.1.2 Jung's approach to The Tibetan Book of the Dead 
Jung first became acquainted with Tibetan Buddhism in the inter-war years when 
Tibet was a remote and inaccessible region that few from the West had ever visited, 
and its philosophical systems were known only through often unreliable sources. In 
1927 The Tibetan Book of the Dead was published by the American scholar W. Y. 
Evans-Wentz. This book was a major step in the opening up of the religious culture 
of Tibet. The book itself clearly had a major impact on Jung who at this time was 
being initiated into the Chinese alchemy of The Secret of The Golden Flower. Jung 
agreed to write a 'Psychological Commentary' for the Gennan edition of The Tibetan 
Book of the Dead (1935), which played a major role in first bringing this text to the 
attention of the modem West. Moreover, for Jung, this commentary was, "an act of 
considerable professional courage at a time when he had barely established his own 
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reputation as a psychologist independently of Freud" (Clarke, 1994: 124). Jung 
emphasised the psychological nature of the Tibetan text, since he believed that the 
psychological tone of the Tibetan text fitted exactly with a Western belief in 
psychological reality. 
When Evans-Wentz asked Jung to write a psychological commentary, Jung 
was looking to the East for independent and parallel support for many of his own 
psychic discoveries. In The Tibetan Book of the Dead Jung believed he had found 
how psychological needs and fears are projected in the forms of divine beings, both 
good and evil. Jung was greatly impressed by the fact that in the Bardo Thodo/ not 
only the 'wrathful' but also the 'peaceful' deities are conceived as projections of the 
human mind. In Jung's reading, the projected deities of the mind are not only 
psychological but also real, since the processes of the mind are real. Jung said: 
.. .the Bardo Thodo/ offers one an intelligible philosophy addressed to human 
beings rather than to gods or primitive savages... Not only the 'wrathful' but 
also the 'peaceful' deities are conceived as samsaric projections of the human 
psyche, an idea that seems all too obvious to the enlightened European, because 
it reminds him of his own banal simplifications. But though the European can 
easily explain away these deities as projections, he would be quite incapable of 
positing them at the same time as real. The Bardo Thodo/ can do that, because, 
in certain of its most essential metaphysical premises, it has enlightened as well 
as the unenlightened European at a disadvantage. 
(CW 11: 833) 
In the first place Jung believed he had discovered in The Tibetan Book of the Dead an 
emphasis upon the importance of the psyche. Jung saw the Tibetan text as presenting 
a conception of the mind in which the psyche is taken to be the fundamental datum of 
the typically Western experience and that the material world is a proj ection of it. The 
Tibetan Book of the Dead is not only a set of instructions for the dying, but also can 
be seen at a much deeper level to represent an insight into the secrets of the human 
psyche. Jung asserted, 
The ever-present, unspoken assumption of the Bardo Thodo/ is the antinomian 
character of all metaphysical assertions, and also the idea of the qualitative 
difference of the various levels of consciousness and of the metaphysical 
realities conditioned by them. The background of this unusual book is not the 
niggardly European 'either-or', but a magnificently affirmative 'both-and' ... 
Metaphysical assertions... are statements of psyche, and are therefore 
psychological. 
(CW 11: 833-835) 
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In the Tibetan Book of the Dead the visionary images appear simultaneously as 
realities or as illusory images. In other words, they are on the one hand the highest 
reality and on the other the mere images of psychic projection. As D. I. Lauf (1977) 
argues, "the Tibetan Book of the Dead teaches that the buddhas are only the visible 
forms of the inner, pure Buddha-nature of awareness, representable manifestations of 
the enlightened nature of man which is always present in him" (Lauf, 1977: 224-5). 
From a psychological perspective all the images and visions are figures from one's 
own awareness. Lauf continues, "We thereby recognize them as proj ections, in which 
deep contents of consciousness are made accessible to us through images" (Ibid., 
225). These images are psychic, " ... because the visionary deities are recognized as 
symbols of the spirit, and because they are the archetypal symbolism of processes 
immanent in awareness" (Ibid., 225). 
Let us now move on to examine Jung's interpretation of Karma. In his 
psychological commentary on The Tibetan Book of the Dead, Jung clearly rejected 
any notion of personal rebirth. Jung argues that, "The Chonyid state is one of karmic 
illusion - that is to say, illusions which result from the psychic residua of previous 
existences" (CW 11: 845). Jung accepted the idea of karma only on the psychic level: 
that there are universal dispositions of the mind, that is, the archetypes. Jung asserts 
that, "According to the Eastern view, karma implies a sort of psychic theory of 
heredity based on the hypothesis of reincarnation, which is the last resort if an 
hypothesis of the supratemporality of the soul" (CW 11: 845). Jung went on to say, 
we may cautiously accept the idea of karma only if we understand it as psychic 
heredity in the very widest sense of the word. Psychic heredity does exist - that 
is to say, there is inheritance of psychic characteristics, such as predisposition to 
disease, traits of character, special gifts and so forth. 
(CW 11: 845) 
Jung was quite fascinated by the contents revealed by the Chonyid Bardo, which he 
equated with his developing notion of archetypes. Jung saw the idea of karma in 
Tibetan Buddhism as allowing psychic contents to be transmitted from one life to the 
next just as are the archetypes of the collective unconscious. Jung said, 
It is a primordial, universal idea that the dead simply continue their earthly 
existence and do not know that they are disembodied spirits - an archetypal idea 
which enters into immediate, visible manifestation whenever anyone sees a 
ghost. It is significant, too, that ghosts all over the world have certain features 
in common. I am naturally aware of the unverifiable spiritualistic hypothesis, 
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though I have no wish to make it my own. I must content myself with the 
hypothesis of an omnipresent, but differentiated, psychic structure which is 
inherited and which necessarily gives a certain form and direction to all 
experience. For ... the archetypes, as organs of the psyche, are dynamic, 
instinctual complexes which determine psychic life to an extraordinary degree. 
That is why I also call them dominants of the unconscious. The layer of 
unconscious psyche which is made up of these universal dynamic forms I have 
termed the collective unconscious. 
(CW 11: 845) 
lung was impressed by the Buddhist description of the visual images of a good or evil 
nature as hungry ghost, hell being, animal, human, demi-god or god, all of which lung 
had found in the form of archetypes. Therefore, for lung, there was evidence in The 
Tibetan Book of the Dead that archetypes with specific contents, both good and evil, 
were inherited. By 1942, in his writing 'The Psychology of the Unconscious' lung 
admits to "a deliberate extension of the archetype by means of the karmic factor" and 
states, "the karma aspect is essential to a deeper understanding of the nature of an 
archetype" (CW 7: p. 77f). Thus lung argues, 
the unconscious contents, as it were, two layers: the personal and the collective. 
The personal layer ends at the earliest memories of infancy, but the collective 
layer comprises the pre-infantile period, that is, the residues of ancestral life. 
Whereas the memory-images of the personal unconscious are, as it were, filled 
out, because they are images personally experienced by the individual, the 
archetypes of the collective unconscious are not filled out because they are 
forms not personally experienced. When, on the other hand, psychic energy 
regresses, going beyond even the period of early infancy, and breaks into the 
legacy of ancestral life, the ,mythological images are awakened: there are the 
archetypes. An interior spiritual world whose existence we never suspected 
opens out and displays contents which seem to stand in sharpest contrast to all 
our former ideas. 
(CW 7: 118) 
However, lung drew the line between his own and the Buddhist view of reincarnation. 
In the Buddhist view, such forms and contents are a direct karmic inheritance whereas 
lung believed that psychic inheritance could only be accepted in a collective sense 
and there was no individual reincarnation of the kind described in The Bardo Thodo/. 
lung clearly argued in his commentary: 
So far as I know, there is no inheritance of individual prenatal, or pre-uterine, 
memories, but there are undoubtedly inherited archetypes which are, however, 
devoid of content, because, to begin with, they contain no personal experiences. 
They only emerge into consciousness when personal experiences have rendered 
them visible. 
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(CW 11: 846) 
In his lecture entitled 'Concerning Rebirth' in 1940, Jung demonstrated a negative 
view towards personal inherited karma and argued that, "the Buddha himself 
experienced a very long sequence of such rebirths," but that, "it is by no means certain 
whether continuity of personality is guaranteed or not: there may be only a continuity 
of karma" (CW 9i: 200). In a letter to E.L. Grant Watson in 1956 Jung clearly 
distinguishes his understanding of the personal experience of inherited karma from 
what he considers to be the Indian view. 
Inasmuch as karma either a personal or at least an individual inherited 
determinant of character and fate, it represents the individually differentiated 
manifestation of the instinctual behaviour pattern, i.e., the general archetypal 
disposition. Karma would express the individually modified archetypal 
inheritance represented by the collective unconscious in each individual. I 
avoid the term of karma because it includes metaphysical assumptions for 
which I have no evidence, f.i. that karma is a fate I have acquired in a previous 
existence becoming my own. For such assumptions there is no empirical 
evidence I an aware of. 
(Letters II: 289) 
The questions of karma, the problem of personal rebirth, or the transmigration of 
souls were obscure to Jung, since, for him, these questions lacked epistemological 
evidence. Jung claims, 
Neither our scientific knowledge nor our reason can keep in step with this idea 
[karma]. There are too many ifs and buts. Above all, we know desperately 
little about the possibilities of continued existence of the individual soul after 
death, so little that we cannot even conceive how anyone could prove anything 
at all in this respect. Moreover, we know only too well, on epistemological 
grounds, that such a proof would be just as impossible as the proof of God. 
(CW 11: 845) 
Thus in his early thinking, for Jung, there is no personal inherited karma as such, but 
there is only the collective inherited karma of one's archetypes. Jung's understanding 
of karma as psychic heredity of one's archetypes sharply contrasts with the Buddhist 
theory of karma. Sogyal Rinpoche (1992) asserted, "Karma is often totally 
misunderstood in the West as fate or predestination; it is best thought of as the 
infallible law of cause and effect that governs the universe" (Sogyal Rinpoche, 1992: 
92). According to Buddhist teaching, however, karma does not mean mere fatalism. 
Reynolds argues that: "While it is true that our present circumstances, including our 
own material body, are the result of our karma, at this very moment we are free to 
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choose the course of our actions within the limitations of our capacities and external 
circumstances" (Reynolds, 1989: 93). Thus, by means of free moral choice in the 
present and its consequent actions, we create our own karma, which will bear its fruit 
in future lives. In this sense we are the creators of our own destiny, whether rebirth in 
heaven or hell, rebirth as a human or as an animal. Reynolds thus asserts that: "All is 
determined by what we do now" (Ibid., 93). 
However, Jung's attitude to karma was ambivalent. Clarke suggests that, "He 
[Jung] was happy to remain agnostic about metaphysical matters, and to view the 
account of the figures that appear on the soul's journey as indicative of the deep 
psychological understanding evident in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition" (Clarke, 1994: 
125). Shortly before his death, Jung seems to modify his earlier rejection of the 
notion of personal karma and its psychological function in rebirth. In his 
autobiography, Memories, Dreams, Reflections/ Jung asserts that, "Recently, 
however, I observed in myself a series of dreams which would seem to describe the 
process of reincarnation in a deceased person of my acquaintance... after this 
experience I view the problem of reincarnation with somewhat different eyes, though 
without being in a position to assert a definite opinion" (MDR: 351). Although Jung 
did not give any detailed analysis of the psychological process which would be 
involved in personal reincarnation, he offered a general speculation which brings him 
very close to traditional Buddhist thought, when he stated, 
I could well imagine that I might have lived in former centuries and there 
encountered questions I was not yet able to answer; that I had to be born again 
because I had not fulfilled the task that was given to me. When I die, my deeds 
will follow along with me - that is how I imagine it. I will bring with me what I 
have done. 
(MDR: 349) 
Coward (1986) argues that "in his later thought, Jung sees karma and rebirth in terms 
of a 'motivation toward knowledge' which may be personal or impersonal in nature" 
(Coward, 1986: 262). Jung asks "the question of whether the karma which I live is 
the outcome of my past lives, or whether it is not rather the achievement of my 
3 RJ. Woolger (1987) claims that, according to his colleague who visited Jung's daughters in order to 
interview them on Jung's past life beliefs, Jung apparently had written quite a lot about the subject in 
his autobiography, but it had all been excised by members of his family as being embarrassing to the 
family name. For the same reason, the chapter on Toni Wolf was also removed before publication 
(Woolger, 1987: 347). 
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ancestors, whose heritage comes together in me" (MDR: 349). Coward asserts that 
Jung answers this question in terms of a psychological motivation toward knowledge. 
Thus Jung perceives the meaning of his existence in terms of a question which life has 
addressed to him, a question which perhaps preoccupied him and/or his ancestors in a 
previous life, and which they could not answer. Jung admits that this question from 
the past could be the result of the collective karma of his ancestors or the result of his 
own karma acquired in a previous life. Thus the karmic motivation toward 
knowledge is the explanation for this life and the cause of the next (Coward, 1986: 
262-3). If Jung's way of posing the question of his answer proves unsatisfactory, then 
he says, "someone who has my karma - or myself - would have to be reborn in order 
to give a more complete answer" (MDR: 350). 
Jung even goes so far as to consider the Tibetan Buddhist concept of liberation 
from the cycle of rebirth to nirvana. Jung asserts, "It might happen that I would not 
be reborn again so long as the world needed no such answer, and that I would be 
entitled to several hundred years of peace until someone was once more needed who 
took an interest in these matters and could profitably tackle the task anew" (MDR: 
350). This statement suggests that Jung's point here is consistent with Buddhist 
theory of karma and rebirth. According to Lauf, karma is the personal experience of 
the fruit of one's own thoughts, intentions, and actions. All actions that loosen the 
attachments to the transitory world of existence are directed towards liberation, which 
lead out of the cycle of samsara. 
Karma as law signifies the conditionality of our actions and the absolute effect 
of these actions upon the present and future path of our existence. The law of 
karma places man in a position of unconditioned responsibility for his actions, 
for every deed and even every resolution to act has an inevitable visible or 
invisible consequence. 
(Lauf, 1977: 17) 
In the Buddhist view, man remains in the cycle of birth and death until perfected 
knowledge puts an end to it. Thus in Buddhism rebirth is a consequence of not having 
attained liberation in the previous life, for each life is the result of the working out of 
karma that has been formed by actions attached to the world in a previous life. This is 
very similar to Jung's following statement: 
The soul would vanish from the three-dimensional world and attain what the 
Buddhist call nirvana. But if a karma still remains to be disposed of, then the 
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soul relapses again into desires and returns to life once more, perhaps even 
doing so out of the realisation that something remains to be completed. 
(MDR: 353) 
In lung's own case it must have been "a passionate urge toward understanding which 
brought about my birth" (MDR: 353). lung suggests that the psychological processes 
resulting in psychic dissociation illness such as schizophrenia may be analogous to the 
understanding of life after death. For lung, just as in a disturbed person a split-off 
complex can manifest itself as a projected personification, so rebirth might be 
conceived as psychic projection. As evidence lung describes one of his dreams: 
I was walking along a little road through a hilly landscape; the sun was shining 
and I had a wide view in all directions. Then I came to a small wayside chapel. 
The door was ajar, and I went in. To my surprise there was no image of the 
Virgin on the altar, and no crucifix either, but only a wonderful flower 
arrangement. But then I saw that on the floor in front of the altar, facing me, sat 
a yogi - in lotus posture, in deep meditation. When I looked at him more 
closely, I realised that he had my face. I started in profound fright, and awoke 
with the thought: 'Aha, so he is the one who is meditating me. He has a dream, 
and I am it.' I knew that when he awakened, I would no longer be. 
(MDR: 355) 
Jung interpreted that his meditating yogi is the symbol or psychic projection of his 
self from the other worldly reality of the archetypes. Thus, empirical world is merely 
the projected karmic illusion and is characterised by an ego-conscious focus. Jung 
asserts, "the decisive question for man is: Is he related to something infinite or not?" 
MDR: 356). The problem with the modem Western world is that its karma is too ego-
centered. Thus what is needed is a shift of the karmic centre of gravity from the ego 
to the self. For lung this is the essence of transcendence in religious experience.4 In 
summary, Jung first rejected the Buddhist theory of karma due to its lack of empirical 
verification. What lung attempted to do is to reinforce his parallel between Western 
psychological theory and his reversed reading of the Bardo Thado/,s by identifying 
karma with the collective unconscious and hence adding weight to the argument that 
the Chanyid bardo (the' bardo of karmic illusion') corresponds with the collective 
4 In lung's psychology the religious experience requires the successful individuation of the self or God 
archetype. At this point Coward argues that, "lung's karmic understanding of the religious experience 
has had a significant impact on at least one contemporary Christian theologian namely Paul Tillich 
(Coward, 1986: 264). 
5 lung read the Bardo Thodol backward: from Sidpa Bardo, Chonyid Bardo, and fmally to Chikhai-
Bardo. lung believed the backward reading of a text helps Western readers to understand. I discuss 
this issue in detail in section 4.2.5. 
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layer of the psyche. He was fundamentally making an analogy between karma which 
is the mechanism of individual rebirth in Tibetan Buddhism and psychic heredity 
which is the mechanism of the collective unconscious in its effect on the individual 
psyche. He strove to tum this simile into a proof by posing an identity between karma 
and the collective unconscious. However this identity is clearly invalid as the karma 
as interpreted by Jung means something different from the karma of Tibetan 
Buddhism. In his later life, however, Jung's dream discussed above and his 
acquaintance's dream, which for him were empirical reality and thus gave him 
evidence, led him to a very positive assessment of the Buddhist theory of karma and 
rebirth. 
I will now examine Jung's view on the Dharmakaya. Jung was concerned 
with making analogies between his psychological thought and Tibetan Buddhist 
concepts, based on the assumption that the goal towards which the Bardo Thodo/ is 
oriented is the same goal towards which Jungian psychology strives. However these 
two goals are, in fact, extremely different. According to Tibetan Buddhism, those 
who meditate on the Great Perfection - the state of perfection, which is reached by 
way of perfected integration - and on the Great Symbol - the great attitude of 
unification and wholeness - will see the clear light and gain illumination in the 
moment of death and realise the state of liberation in the Dharmakaya (Govinda, 
1960). The Dharmakaya is the essence of doctrine and reality in Tibetan teachings. 
Lauf (1975) explains, 
As foundation, the dharmakaya is the principle of absolute totality, and in 
relation to pure matter it is spiritual Being. In their true essence the Buddha and 
all buddhas are identical with the nature of pure dharmakaya. Since the 
dharmakaya is absolute reality, beyond all ideas and concepts, there is also no 
image or form of it. It is not even possible to form an adequate conception of its 
absoluteness. 
(Lauf, 1975: 24) 
This concept relates directly to a difference of views between the dominant Western 
and Eastern traditions over the issue of the perfectibility of the person. The Bardo 
text presumes that not only is the person perfectible in theory, but also that such an 
exalted state is a necessary one if liberation from birth, death and rebirth is to be 
realised. The Bardo Thodo/, in describing the dying person's experience of the 
Chikhai Bardo, says that in the moment before death, a luminosity of clear light may 
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be seen and will last for a long time in a person who has practised much meditation 
and perfected the state of tranquillity. Coward points out that, "The perfected person 
will have a direct perception of the Buddha nature in the form of a pure and all 
encompassing light" (Coward, 1992: 264-5) Consequently, one's ignorance is 
eliminated, the attachment and grasping resulting from the predispositions of previous 
actions cease to operate, and the cycle of uncontrolled rebirth is ended. 
This notion of a perfectly clear mind, namely, one empty of all obscuring 
ignorance and in which there is only the steady radiance of the clear light of pure 
reality (the dharmakaya), is, Jung said, a very challenging notion to us in the West. 
To assimilate the identity of the dying person with the divine reality itself, which is 
the dharmakaya, is, from a Christian perspective, downright blasphemous. In Jung's 
view it is impossible for one to became a Buddha. Jung stated, "You cannot be a 
good Christian and redeem yourself, nor can you be a Buddha and worship God" (CW 
11: 772). Psychologically it suggests that one who claims to have such an experience 
is suffering from an unhealthy inflation of the ego, or a complete cessation of the ego, 
which is inconceivable in terms of the Jungian view of consciousness. Jung wrote, 
According to the teachings of the Bardo Thodo/, it is still possible for him, in 
each of the Bardo states, to reach the dharma-kaya by transcending the four-
faced Mount Meru, provided that he does not yield to his desire to follow the 
'dim lights'. This is as much as to say that the individual must desperately 
resist the dictates of reason, as we understand it, and give up the supremacy of 
egohood, regarded by reason as sacrosanct. What this means in practice is 
complete capitulation to the objective powers of the psyche, with all that this 
entails; a kind of figurative death, corresponding to the Judgement of the dead in 
the Sidpa Bardo. It means the end of all conscious, rational, morally 
responsible conduct of life, and a voluntary surrender to what the Bardo Thodo/ 
calls 'karmic illusion'. 
(CW 11: 846) 
For Jung, this amounts to a deliberately induced psychosis. Jung went on to say, 
The deliberately induced psychotic state, which in certain unstable individuals 
might easily lead to a real psychosis, is a danger that needs to be taken very 
seriously indeed. These things really are dangerous and ought not to be 
meddled with in our typical Western way. It is a meddling with fate, which 
strikes at the very roots of human existence and can let loose a flood of 
sufferings of which no sane person ever dreamed. 
(CW 11: 847) 
Coward argues that, "what Jung misses in the Buddhist analysis is that the cause of 
the psychotic terrors that worry him so much is nothing other than the 'grasping,' 
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'desiring' ego" (Coward, 1992: 269). In the view of The Bardo Thodo/, to transcend 
the ego is not to leave the psyche defenceless in the face of the complete realisation of 
the dharmakaya. Coward claims that, "Rooted in his Western conception of the 
absolute necessity of the ego for any conscious discriminating experience, Jung 
simply cannot put himself into the Buddhist perspective of seeing the ego as the root 
of desire, and thus the obstructer of the dharmakaya" (Ibid., 269). Yet in spite of his 
rejection of the Tibetan claim of the perfectibility of the person, Jung saw an 
important lesson that the West needs to learn from The Bardo Thodo/ that "the , 
radiance of the Divine comes to us through its reflection in the psychological 
processes of our own psyches" (Coward, 1992: 266), in other words, the Western 
experience of God comes to us through the individuation of the God or Self archetype. 
Another analogy that Jung drew is that between the Sidpa Bardo and Freudian 
psychoanalysis. According to The Bardo Thodo/, in the Sidpa Bardo you will see a 
future mother and father lying together and making love. Seeing them, you become 
emotionally drawn toward them and begin to spontaneously feel strong attachment or 
aversion toward them. Attraction and desire for the mother and aversion or jealousy 
toward the father will result in your being born as a male child, and the reverse as a 
female. However if you give in to such strong passions, not only will you be reborn, 
but that very emotion may draw you into a birth in a lower realm. In order to prevent 
rebirth and enable you to be reborn in one of the Buddha realms, you should try to 
generate a feeling of reunification of a future mother and father against being drawn 
into feelings of desire, and to think of the pure realms of the buddhas. If you fail to 
stabilise the mind enough to do even this practice, then there remains a method for 
choosing rebirth. If you intentionally wish to be reborn in order to pursue your 
spiritual path, you should not enter any but the human realms. For it is only there that 
conditions are favourable for spiritual progress. Sogyal Rinpoche accounts for the last 
stage of the Sidpa Bardo as follows: 
If you succeed in directing the mind toward a human birth, you have come full 
circle. You are poised to be born again into the natural bardo of this life. When 
you see your father and mother in intercourse, your mind is ineluctably drawn 
in, and enters the womb. This signals the end of the bardo of becoming, as your 
mind rapidly re-experiences yet again the signs of the phases of disillusion and 
the dawning of the Ground Luminosity. Then the black experience of full 
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attainment arises again, and at the same moment the connection to the new 
womb is made. 
So life begins, as it ends, with the Ground Luminosity. 
(SogyaIFUnpoche, 1992:298) 
Jung's comment on the Sidpa Bardo centres on the rather graphic descriptions in the 
text of how the being in the Intermediate State selects a womb to be born into. Jung 
paid attention to the mechanism that, when the intermediate being sees the future 
parents lying together, it desires the mother (if it is to be reborn as a male), or the 
father (if it is to be reborn as a female) and this desire causes the intermediate being to 
enter the womb to be reborn. This fact reminded him of the claims of the Oedipus 
complex of Freudian psychoanalysis, namely, the young boy who is sexually attracted 
to the mother, the young girl to the father. Jung argued, 
.. .in the Bardo Thodol, the initiation is a series of diminishing climaxes ending 
with rebirth in the womb. The only 'initiation process' that is still alive and 
practised today in the West is the analysis of the unconscious as used by doctors 
for therapeutic purposes. This penetration into the ground-layers of 
consciousness is a kind of rational maieutics in the Socratic sense, a bringing-
forth of psychic contents that are still germinal, subliminal and as yet unborn. 
Originally, this therapy took the form of Freudian psychoanalysis and was 
mainly concerned with sexual fantasies. This is the realm that corresponds to 
the last and lowest region of the Bardo, known as the Sidpa Bardo, where the 
dead man, unable to profit by the teachings of the Chikhai and Chonyid Bardo, 
begins to fall a prey to sexual fantasies and is attracted by the vision of mating 
couples. Eventually he is caught by a womb and born into the earthly world 
again. Meanwhile, as one might expect, the Oedipus complex starts 
functioning. If his karma destines him to be reborn as a man, he will fall in love 
with his mother-to-be and will find his father hateful and disgusting. 
Conversely, the future daughter will be highly attracted by her father-to-be and 
repelled by her mother. 
(CW 11: 842) 
Jung suggested it is unfortunate that Freud did not pursue the development of this 
complex backward to the intra-uterine experiences rather than forward into the 
problems created in adolescence and adulthood. He went on to say, 
I say 'unfortunately' because one rather wishes that Freudian psychoanalysis 
could have happily pursued these so called intra-uterine experiences still further 
back. Had it succeeded in this bold undertaking, it would surely have come out 
beyond the Sidpa Bardo and penetrated from behind into the lower reaches of 
the Chonyid Bardo. 
(CW 11: 842) 
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Although Jung attempted to draw analogies between the Sidpa Bardo and Freudian 
psychoanalysis, it is impossible to argue that the Bardo Thodo/ can be used to suggest 
Freudian psychoanalysis, as it is dealing with a completely different subject. Coward 
argues, "Jung draws the "tongue in cheek" line of theoretical speculation to a close 
but such a hold attempt to follow psychic evolution backward is doomed to failure, 
however, because it is impossible to find even some trace of an experiencing subject 
at the intra-uterine and pre-uterine stages" (Coward, 1992: 270). 
Jung suggested that since Westerners cannot give up their philosophical and 
scientific assumptions, the only way they can read the Bardo Thodo/ is backward. 
Tibetan Buddhists read the text in a right order, namely, Chikhai, Chonyid and Sidpa 
Bardo. Jung, however, read the text in a reverse order, that is, Sidpa, Chonyid and 
Chikhai Bardo. According to Jung, Freudian investigation backward into the 
beginnings of the Sidpa Bardo gives some insight into our biological drives, but is 
unable to go further. In order to go further into the Chonyid Bardo, we need to give 
up Freud's uncritical assumption that everything psychological is subjective and 
personal. Jung was able to read backward into the Chonyid state by using his own 
theoretical assumptions regarding the psychic reality of the collective unconscious. 
Coward suggests that for Jung, the Chonyid Bardo, "is not an Intermediate State 
between death and rebirth, but a valuable mythic description of the archetypal forms 
and contents of the collective unconscious" (Coward, 1992: 270-1), since Jung 
thought the Chonyid state, "are not mere fantasies or speculative metaphysical forms 
but psychic realities - psychic data that is real in itself' (Ibid., 271). However Jung's 
backward reading of the text failed to go further into the Chikhai Bardo, namely, into 
an understanding of the possibility of direct experience of the dharmakaya at the point 
of death. 6 
Jung asserted, "The reversal of the order of the chapters, which I have 
suggested here as an aid to understanding, in no way accords with the original 
intention of the Bardo Thodof' (CW 11: 855). His claim that the text must be made 
more intelligible for Westerners suggests that his real intention is to reorder the text 
until it produces some resemblance to something which is already familiar to Western 
6 For Jung's view on Dharmakaya, see section 4.2.3. 
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readers.7 Jung wrote, "it is characteristic of Oriental religious literature that the 
teaching invariably begins with the most important item, with the ultimate and highest 
principles which, with us, would come last" (CW 11: 842). But this statement is not 
always the case in Oriental teachings, and there are various instances in which the 
motion seems to move from the lowest level to the highest. For example, in kundalini 
yoga the practitioner's consciousness ascends from the lowest chakra, the muladhara 
located in the abdomen, towards the highest chakra, the sahasrara located at the top 
of the head.8 P. Bishop (1993) argues that, "he [Jung] wanted to tum these Eastern 
systems upside-down, inside-out, back-to-front, in order to adapt them to Western 
culture" (Bishop, 1993: 61). Bishop claims that this was because Jung saw the 
structure of the bardo text paralleled in the initiation rituals of the Western mystery 
religions, which are characteristically imagined as journeys, as rites of passage. 
During such processes one is conscious of being involved in a ritual, in a symbolic 
drama. But this Tibetan text is more than just an initiation ritual. Bishop asserts, 
In the Tibetan case ... the fine, but important, distinction between symbolic 
ritual and literal reality has collapsed. The book represents itself as the voice of 
omniscient consciousness describing Absolute Reality. It describes itself as 
being, not symbolic, but analytic, not as presenting a mystery but as outlining 
empirical fact. 
(Bishop, 1993: 61) 
4.1.3 A critical discussion of Jung's understanding of The Tibetan Book of the 
Dead 
At this point, something should be mentioned regarding the translation of the text 
upon which Jung based his commentary. The Evans-Wentz's edition of The Tibetan 
Book of the Dead contains many serious errors in its interpretation of the Tibetan text. 
7 Lama Anagarika Govinda asserts in his 'Introductory Foreword' to the Evans-Wentz edition of The 
Tibetan Book of the Dead: "To add to or omit from the Sacred Scriptures a single word or letter has 
ever been looked upon by Tibetans as a heinous sin, which even the most impious would fear to 
commit" (Evans-Wentz, 1960: liv-Iv) 
8 In his Psychological Commentary on Kundalini Yoga, Jung also reverses the order of the chakras so 
as to make it intelligible for the Westerners. He asserts: "It is all changed round, we begin in our 
conscious world, so our muladhara might be, not down below in the belly, but up in the head. You see 
that puts everything upside down ... In the East the unconscious is above, which with us it is below, so 
we can reverse the whole thing, as if we were coming down from muladhara, as if that were the 
highest centre" (Jung 1975; 12). For Jung the ascent towards the higher chakras is a path, not towards 
super-consciousness, but rather towards a greater integration with the unconscious. For detailed 
discussion of Jung's relation to Kundalini yoga, see Chapter 1. 
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Jung was sometimes led astray because he relied on a source text which is often 
inaccurate. Evens-Wentz was born on February 2, 1878 in Trenton, New Jersey and 
his readings of the bible as a child gave the peculiar Biblical tone to the translations 
he edited. Later he read extensively in the new Theosophical literature which was 
then appearing. Following the completion of a BA and MA at Stanford in 1907 he 
entered Jesus College, Oxford and studied Social Anthropology under the supervision 
of Sir John Rhys in Celtic studies. During the first World War he was in Egypt and 
stayed there for three years and sailed from there to Ceylon. The following year, 
1918, he was in South India and finally arrived in Darjeeling (Reynolds, 1989: 73-5). 
Evans-Wentz did not visit Tibet, nor did he live as a Buddhist monk. It is 
sometimes claimed that he spent three years in Darjeeling studying under Lama Kazi 
Dawa Samdup, but in fact he spent barely a few months among the Tibetans in 
Darjeeling and Sikkim. He did not even know or read any Tibetan language. Hence 
the Tibetan texts which he collected were first translated by Tibetan Lamas knowing 
English into a rough translation, and then these were reworked and edited by Evans-
Wentz over a number of years. He also composed lengthy introductions and copious 
footnotes to the translations, which formed a kind of running commentary to them. In 
The Tibetan Book of the Dead, the actual translations form only a small part, while the 
bulk of the text is so overwhelmingly taken up by the material written by Evans-
Wentz that, "we tend to overlook and forget who were the actual translators of the 
Tibetan texts" (Reynolds, 1989: 72). 
It is a crucial point that Evans-Wentz approaches Tibetan Buddhism from the 
standpoint of Theosophy.9 Moreover, this is combined with some knowledge ofNeo-
Platonic philosophy and modem popularised Advaita Vedanta,IO which he cited many 
times as sources for his interpretation of the text. Reynolds argues, "In this way he 
comes to impose on the rough translation he obtained from his Tibetan informants a 
conceptual construction, an odd mixture of ancient and modem, which has little 
9 Reincarnation, one of the principal themes of the Theosophical system, fIrst attracted Evans-Wentz to 
Theosophy. One of the founders of the Theosophical Society in N ew York, Madame Helena Petrovna 
Blavatsky, wrote The Secret Doctrine (1888) which gives an account of the origin of the world and the 
evolution of humanity from an occult standpoint, which had an important influence on Evans-Wentz. 
10 For instance, Evans-Wentz used the term 'the One Mind,' by which he meant "some sort of Neo-
Platonic hypostasis, a universal Nous, of which all individual minds are but fragments or appendages" 
(Evans-Wentz, 1954: 80). 
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relation to the actual meaning of the texts in Tibetan" (Reynolds, 1989: 79). His 
disregard for the differences between Hindu and Buddhist tantra was heightened by 
the fact that Evans-Wentz took advice from Sir John Woodroffe, who was an 
authority on Hindu tantra and also added a foreword to the text which is printed along 
with Jung's 'Psychological Commentary' in the Oxford pUblication of Evans-Wentz's 
version of the text. Coward asserts, "Evan-Wentz's [sic] references were mainly to 
Woodroffe's works on Hindu tantras which have little relevance for the Buddhist 
tantric tradition source text which is often inaccurate" (Coward, 1992: 263). 
Evans-Wentz and Lama Kazi Dawa Samdup in fact opened the text up to a 
psychological interpretation. Moreover, they rendered Tibetan concepts into the 
language of European thought without attention to the subtleties and implications of 
these concepts. F. Fremantle and C. Trungpa (1975) warned against such over-
enthusiastic use of specific Western intellectual terms, which brings about a danger of 
distorting the true meaning of the original text. In his introduction Fremantle argued, 
Translating into a twentieth-century European language presents an entirely 
different line from the vocabulary of East, and so if an English word is chosen 
from the vocabulary of philosophy or religion, it will inevitably contain all 
kinds of associations and implications which may be quite alien to the 
understanding assumptions of Buddhism. Conversely, the full range of meaning 
of a Sanskrit word may not be found in any single English word. In such cases 
an English equivalent would need just as much explanation as the original, 
while the Sanskrit word has the advantage of being free from possibly 
misleading associations in the reader's mind. 
Certain terms are therefore kept in Sanskrit, their original language, 
although the Bardo Th6tr61 was written in Tibetan. 
(Fremantle, 1975: xv) 
Lama Anagarika Govinda has clearly seen the need for a revision of the translation of 
The Tibetan Book of the Dead, which was faulty and inaccurate in many regards. In 
spite of Govinda's demand for a correction of Evans-Wentz's mistranslation of the 
text, the book was reprinted with all the original mistakes and misunderstandings. 
According to Govinda, in Tibet it is considered sinful to alter even one word of a 
sacred text and therefore, "the Tibetans themselves have put forth considerable effort 
to free their Scriptures from errors and non-Buddhistic accretions, and to ensure the 
correctness and reliability of their traditions" (Govinda, 1960: lvii-Iviii). For this 
reason, it is important that its translator and interpreter have a thorough knowledge of 
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its background and of the religious experience associated with it. However this is not 
often the case among Tibetologists. 
Our modern attitude, unfortunately, is a complete reversal of this; a scholar is 
regarded as being all the more competent ('scholarly') the less he believes in the 
teachings which he has undertaken to interpret. The sorry results are only too 
apparent, especially in the realm of Tibetology, which such scholars have 
approached with an air of their own superiority, thus defeating the very purpose 
of their endeavours. 
(Govinda, 1960: lxiii) 
In fact Evans-Wentz and Lama Kazi Dawa Samdup themselves did not regard their 
translation as final or infallible. In his introduction of The Tibetan Book of the Dead, 
Evans-Wentz wrote, 
The Tibetan of Tantric texts, such as ours, is especially difficult to turn into 
good English; and owing to the terseness of many passages it has been 
necessary to interpolate words and phrases, which are bracketed. 
In years to come, it is quite probable that our rendering - as has been the 
case with pioneer translations of the Bible - may be subj ect to revision. 
(Evans-Wentz, 1960: 78) 
Although Evans-Wentz was not a professional Buddhologist or Tibetologist, he 
nonetheless performed a great service by introducing this and other Tibetan texts in 
translation to the West for the first time. Reynolds (1989) asserts, "Much of what he 
was writing in his introductions and notes was Comparative Religion or Comparative 
Philosophy, both of which are valid intellectual pursuits on their own" (Reynolds, 
1989: 114). However, he also warned against taking a translation ofa Tibetan text out 
of its own traditional context in order to use it to justify some personal philosophy, 
since, "this is not fair to one's readers who do not know the Tibetan language and 
have no means to judge whether the translation and the use to which it is put is 
accurate or not" (Ibid., 114). In order to avoid great confusion and misunderstanding, 
"translation and comparative philosophy should be kept distinct" (Ibid., 114). 
Evans-Wentz asserted that the Tibetan account of rebirth in the Bardo Thodol 
is a kind of evolution through inevitable progress into higher forms. He said: "As set 
forth in my first important work, The Fairy-Faith in Celtic Countries, forty-four years 
ago, the postulate of rebirth implies a scientific extension and correction of Darwin's 
conception of evolutionary law ... man attains in the spiritual and psychic sphere that 
destined perfection which all life's processes and all living things exhibit at the end of 
their evolutionary course, and from which at present man is so far removed" (Evans-
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Wentz, 1960: x). However this conception of reincarnation contradicts the very 
principle of karma in the Buddhist tradition, for karma does not represent some sort of 
spiritualised Darwinism. Reynolds summarises this problem succinctly, "under the 
influence of the Hindu philosophy of Vedanta, as well as the beliefs of modem day 
Theosophists, Evans-Wentz made many mistakes in a field that was largely lain 
elsewhere in Celtic folk-lore studies" (Reynolds, 1989: 71). Consequently, Jung was 
misled by this translation and had no way to ascertain an accurate reading of the 
Tibetan text. Reynolds continues, "what Dr. Jung was commenting upon in his 
'Psychological Commentary' is not the psychic reality of the East but the psyche as 
represented by Evans-Wentz" (Ibid., 108). 
I will now assess Jung's understanding of the Tibetan Buddhist text. In his 
reading of The Tibetan Book of the Dead Jung never attempts to step outside of his 
own psychological theory. He was more interested in making analogies between 
Tibetan teachings and his own psychological theories. Thus, for example, karma is 
compared to archetypes, and the Tibetan account of the passage of the dead soul is 
likened to psychological transformation. Clarke (1994) argues, "He [Jung] hopes that 
by demonstrating the analogical connections between remote cultures he can penetrate 
through to the archetypal foundations on which the psyche itself is built" (Clarke, 
1994: 168). There is, however, a problem of whether the creation of analogies is 
capable of delivering any desired conclusion whatsoever, as it is often noted that 
anything can be compared with anything else, and analogies can be drawn almost at 
will between any pair of terms. Therefore when we look at Jung's interpretation, as 
Clarke asserted, "it is necessary to ask whether Eastern spiritual practices are being 
squeezed unnaturally to fit into his own model of psychological development" (Ibid., 
168). 
To understand Jung's approach to Tibetan Buddhism it is important to locate 
his study within the intellectual context of his time and the way that Tibet was 
perceived. In the nineteenth century many Westerners claimed that rational, empirical 
Buddhism, rather than a Christianity which relied on faith alone, was suited to healing 
the gap between religion and science. Because they believed that, "Buddhism 
apparently had no gods and did not depend on blind faith, it seemed pre-eminently 
suited to the scientific mind" (Bishop, 1993: 78). Bishop asserts that the metaphor of 
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'scientific' Buddhism, particularly in the case of Tibetan Buddhism, is based on the 
argument that the East is far superior to the West in spiritual matters is popular and 
convincing to the West. Jung presented this argument in his commentary not only on 
Tibetan Buddhist texts but also on Chinese philosophy, the Hindu tradition, and Zen 
and Pure Land Buddhism. Moreover, for Jung East and West are seen as being 
complementary, in that while the East was highly advanced in terms of spiritual 
technology, the West has achieved its mechanical technology. For example, the 
mandala in Tibetan Buddhism is the most popular of such spiritual tools. Bishop 
argues that, "since Jung's path-breaking psychological study of mandalas, they have 
became a household word" (Bishop, 1993: 144). Furthermore, it is frequently 
asserted that the East is more scientifically advanced than the West. For instance, 
recent theories of quantum and particle physics were anticipated thousands of years 
ago in the East with its non-dualistic and relativistic philosophies. Jung would agree 
with this third point in terms of the healing function in the symbolism of Tibetan 
Buddhism. 11 Bishop argues, "Contemporary Western interest in Tibetan Buddhism 
has largely focused upon its advanced and sophisticated religious practices ... 
However, this is not an account of Tibetan Buddhism in the sense of expounding upon 
its spiritual and philosophical mysteries, but a study of the Western imagination as 
revealed in the encounter with an Eastern spiritual system" (Bishop, 1993: 18). He 
claims that Jung considered not only the problems associated with the Western use of 
Eastern spiritual practices but also articulated this critique with his deep psychological 
respect for both Eastern spirituality and Western culture. But Bishop asserts, "Jung's 
pioneering work too can be located within the historical context of Western fantasies 
about Tibet" (Bishop, 1993: 18). 
Jung constantly warned Westerners against practising Eastern spiritual 
disciplines and methods of mind training. Instead he suggested the use of his own 
method called 'active imagination,' which is the waking practice of allowing images 
and symbols to spontaneously emerge from the unconscious, so that the analyst and 
more importantly the analysand may interpret them in order to understand the 
unconscious psyche. Jung suggested that the symbolic processes in the Eastern and 
Western psyche are fundamentally different because of their different cultural 
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histories. Jung believed that oriental methods such as the tantric visualisation of 
Tibetan Buddhism would repress this process and cause injury to the Western psyche. 
For this reason, he indicated that any Western spiritual methods must be based on the 
Christian tradition (CW 11: 876). 
Given that Jung was opposed to Westerners practising Eastern methods of 
meditation, the question could be asked whether a Westerner is capable, when he dies, 
of having the visions of the Peaceful and Wrathful Deities precisely as described in 
the Bardo Thodol. Jung apparently denied this possibility. Reynolds argues that, in 
Jungian terminology 'East' is in reality a projection of the shadow side of the Western 
European psyche. He asserts that, "Western Europe saw in the East everything that it 
denied in itself - the East is dark, sensual, passionate, corrupt, mystical, dreamy, 
irrational, feminine. Jung himself, otherwise a very wise and perceptive man, fell 
victim to this projection, having had little direct contact with Asians personality" 
(Reynolds, 1989: 147). In fact Jung often failed to see the significance of Tibetan 
Buddhism within its cultural traditions. Nevertheless, today there are a number of 
Westerners practising Tibetan spiritual practices under the guidance of the lamas. 
Reynolds argues that, "according to many Tibetan Lamas, to whom I have presented 
this question, if that Western individual has practised in this life the sadhana of the 
Zhi-khro, then indeed he would have the vision of the Peaceful and Wrathful Deities 
in the Bardo after death" (Ibid., 153). In the next section I will examine Jung's 
relation to The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation. 
4.2 Jung and The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation 
4.2.1 General outline of The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation 
The translation of the concepts on Dzogchen, which is the most esoteric teaching of 
the Buddha in Tibet, can be found in The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation by W. 
Y. Evans-Wentz. He employed two Lamas, Lama Sumdhon Paul and Lama Lobzang 
Mingyur DoIje, to translate the text for him. It was published in 1954 under the title 
of The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation: Herefollow the (Yoga oj) knowing the 
Mind, the Seeing of Reality, called Self-Liberation, from the Profound Doctrine of 
Self-Liberation by Meditation upon the Peaceful and Wrathful Deities. However, as 
II For a detailed discussion on this issue, see section 4.7.3. 
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with Evans-Wentz' translation of The Tibetan Book of the Dead, there are many 
serious errors in the translation of the text, which are addressed later in this chapter. 
The title of this text in Tibetan is Zab-chos zhi-khro dgons-pa rantg-gro/IRig-pa ngo-
sprod gcer mthong rang-gro/, and Reynolds (1989) has translated this as, "Self-
liberation through seeing with Naked Awareness, being a Direct Introduction to 
Intrinsic Awareness, from the Profound Teaching of Self-Liberation in the Primordial 
State of the Peaceful and Wrathful Deities." 
The term Dzogchen is usually translated as 'the Great Perfection' and is 
regarded as the highest teaching of the Buddha. The Lama introduces us to the nature 
of our own mind by means of symbols and explanations. Thus we come to 
distinguish between what is the nature of mind (sems nyid) and what is mind (sems). 
They are our thought process and the endless sequence of discursive thoughts (rnam-
rtog) which continuously arise within us. The Tibetan word, 'the nature of the mind' 
could be translated as 'Mind itself (sems nyid).' 12 This nature of the mind (sems-nyid) 
transcends the specific contents of mind, that is, the incessant stream of thoughts 
continuously arising in the mind which reflects our psychological, cultural, and social 
conditioning. Namkhai Norbu Rinpoche states, 
The nature of the mind is like a mirror which has the natural and inherent 
capacity to reflect whatever is set before it, whether beautiful or ugly; but these 
reflections in no way affect or modify the nature of the mirror. It is the same 
with the state of contemplation: There is nothing to correct or alter or modify 
(ma bcos-pa). What the practitioner does when entering into contemplation is 
simply to discover himself in the condition of the mirror. This is our Primordial 
State. 
(Namkhai Norbu Rinpoche, 1987: x) 
When we actually come to understand the nature of the mind and its capacity for 
intrinsic awareness, we will not be affected by our vicious actions, because all of our 
merits and sins (dge sdig) become liberated into their own condition (rang sar grol). 
At this moment we recognise our own intrinsic awareness (rig-pa ).13 We will not 
experience karmically the results of our actions, because we have transcended all 
duality and all notions of Samsara and Nirvana. By means of rig-pa we come to see 
12 Reynolds claims that Evans-Wentz translates sem nyid as "the Mind Self' which is completely 
wrong and un-Buddhist. (Reynolds, 1989:134) 
13 The opposite of rig-pa is ma rig-pa, which is the absence of awareness. This ignorance is the source 
of attachment and of all the suffering experienced in Samsara, the cycle of transmigration. 
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everything with a direct immediate presence, and eventually come to realise self-
liberation. 14 
4.2.2 Jung's approach to The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation 
In 1939 Jung wrote his Psychological Commentary to Evans-Wentz's edition of The 
Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation, which was published in 1954. The 
metaphysical implications of this work are apparently less prominent than in the case 
of the Bardo Thodo/, and hence Jung's hermeneutical struggles on this occasion are 
less strenuous. Nevertheless, Jung was largely attracted by the deep psychological 
insights in the text, which, he believed, provided important confirmation of his theory 
of the self as an image of the potential and the unity of the personality as a whole. 
Moreover, in The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation, Jung discovered a model of 
self-awareness which had the potential for uncovering and realising the self-liberating 
power of the mind and thereby opening the way towards a more adequate level of 
psychic integration and wholeness. Nevertheless Jung was well aware that this 
approach had its limitations, for it was bound to transcend the limitations of a purely 
scientific study. It is a mistake to suppose that the West should completely give up its 
highly developed scientific intellect. Jung said that religion is equally at fault for 
maintaining a pre-Kantian position in which it tries to remain a primitive mental 
condition. Jung claimed, "Faith ... tries to retain a primitive mental condition on 
merely sentimental grounds. It is willing to give up the primitive, childlike 
relationship to mind-created and hypostatized figures; it wants to go on enjoying the 
security and confidence of a world still presided over by powerful, responsible, and 
kindly parents" (CW 11: 763) To be overbalanced in consciousness is a sign of 
'barbarism' in Jung's word. 15 Thus the intuitive and feeling aspects of psychic 
14 Rig-pa or intrinsic awareness has been given many different names over the ages. It is called 
Tathagatagarbha, which is the embryo of Buddhahood, because emptiness has a core or heart. It is 
called Prajnaparamita, which is the Perfection of Wisdom, because it transcends everything else. It is 
called the Mahamudra, which is the Great Symbol, because it cannot be comprehended by the intellect 
and is free of all limitations. It is called Alaya, which is the basis of everything, because it is the basis 
of all the bliss of Nirvana and of all the sorrow of Samsara. It is also called ordinary awareness, 
because this awareness is present, lucidly clear, and ordinary. 
15 Coward (1985) writes: "In letters written in 1923, long before he outlined precisely his ideas on the 
progression of religions, lung employed the view that religions develop naturally as an argument 
against the practice of yoga. To Oskar Schmitz, author of Psychoanalyse und Yoga, lung described 
how the Germanic race was in its initial state of polydemonism developing into polytheism when 
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function must achieve an equally high development in Western consciousness in order 
to achieve a good balance of the psyche and a widening of consciousness. 
Jung's aim was, "'simply to bring ideas which are alien to our way of thinking 
within reach of Western psychological experience" (CW 11: 788). For instance, the 
gods mentioned in The Bardo Thadol are considered as archetypal thought forms and 
their peaceful and wrathful aspects are interpreted as complementary psychic 
opposites (CW 11: 791). The 'self-liberation,' which is the ultimate goal of the 
method taught in The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation, brings Jung back to his 
own teaching of the path of individuation. However, a central question needs to be 
raised as to whether the analogies Jung makes are valuable. The next section 
examines the question of the relevance of Jung's interpretation of The Tibetan Book of 
the Great Liberation. 
Before I explain the details of Jung's interpretation of the text, it is, I think, 
important to look at the misunderstanding and misrepresentation of Dzogchen that 
Evans-Wentz presented in his translations. More than half of Jung's commentary on 
the text is devoted to his own psychological theories but does not address the 
Dzogchen directly. The actual translation to which Evans-Wentz referred to in the 
title represents only a small portion of the entire book. The book, in fact, is composed 
of commentaries and explanation by the editor. There is a section giving an epitome 
of the life of Padmasambhava, translated by S.B. Laden La. Padmasambhava brought 
Tantric Buddhism to Tibet in about 747 CEo It was the second section of The Tibetan 
Book of the Great Liberation, called Book II: Here Follows the (Yoga oj) Knowing 
the Mind, The Seeing of reality, Called Self-Liberation, From 'The Profound Doctrine 
of self-Liberation by Meditation Upon the Peaceful and Wrathful Deities' that Evans-
Wentz considered to be the most important of all his works. In his introduction to 
Book II of The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation, Evans-Wentz wrote, "Our 
present treatise, attributed to Padma-Sambhava, which expounds the method of 
realizing the Great Liberation of Nirvana by yogic understanding of the One Mind, 
appertains to the Doctrine of the Great Perfection of the Dhyana School" (Evans-
Christianity was thrust upon it. A highly developed Mediterranean religion to the god incarnate was a 
shock to the northern European peoples. The archetypes were repressed as the sacred oaks were 
severed from their roots. What is most natural for Germans, therefore, is to allow the polytheistic 
barbarian to emerge so that their religious development can continue" (Coward, 1985: 83). 
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Wentz, 1954: 196). Evans-Wentz thought that all existence IS mind, and this 
translation only appeared to confirm his preconceptions. Furthermore, all minds and 
existing things are manifestations of the Absolute or One Mind. 16 Therefore, the path 
to liberation lies in the inner path of self-knowledge, and those who would attain the 
full awakening of Buddha hood, must understand that all things are illusory. 
Since Evans-Wentz could not read Tibetan, he worked on editing and 
explicating a translation made by Tibetan lamas. As a consequence he made a 
number of fundamental errors and misinterpretations of the text. F or instance, no 
such concept as Evans-Wentz' 'Knowing the One Mind, the Cosmic All-
Consciousness' is actually found in the original Tibetan text. This misinterpretation 
by Evans-Wentz not only led Jung astray but also generated a series of wrong 
conclusions regarding Dzogchen in particular and Tibetan spirituality in general. 
Namkhai Norbu Rinpoche asserted that the translation of Buddhist texts from Tibetan 
is not simply a matter of a scholar learning the Tibetan language and a Tibetan-
English dictionary. When one proceeds in this manner, he suggests, it is very likely 
that the real meaning of the text will elude the translator. Namkhai Norbu Rinpoche 
continues, "It is necessary that the translator have some direct experience in the 
practice of the teachings. He must unite textual meanings with his own understanding 
of the Natural State (rnal-rna). Otherwise, not perceiving the real meaning, he is 
likely to fall into idle speCUlation over the significance of the words of the text" 
(Namkhai Norbu Rinpoche, 1987: xii). 
I shall now examine Jung's view on the One Mind. In his Psychological 
Commentary Jung interpreted Evans-Wentz's 'the One Mind' as the unconscious. 
Jung wrote, "This section shows very clearly that the One Mind is the unconscious, 
since it is characterised as 'eternal, unknown, not visible, not recognized'" (CW 11: 
793). He went on to say, 
16 It might be interesting to compare Evans-Wentz' s thought and Y ogacara. Y ogacara is "a movement 
which tended to think of the teaching of Absolute Mind. Transcendental in tenns of Absolute Mind 
and which tried to explain why and how the seemingly objective universe came to evolve out of 
Absolute Mind" (Sangharakshita, 1957: 383). Absolute Mind in the Yogacara school is the sole reality 
and its principal theme is the perfect mutual interpretation of all phenomena. Evans-Wentz mentioned 
Yogacara school in his introduction to The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation: "Nagajuna and 
Ashvaghosha, the Patriarch of the Madhyamika School, named this beyond-Nature Reality the 
Voidness (Skt. Shunyata); Asanga, the founder of the Yogachara School, called it the Basic (or Root) 
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Should there be any doubt left concerning the identity of the One Mind and the 
unconscious, this section certainly ought to dispel it. 'The One Mind being 
verily of the Voidness and without any foundation, one's mind is, likewise, as 
vacuous as the sky.' The One Mind and the individual mind are equally void 
and vacuous. Only the collective and the personal unconscious can be meant by 
this statement, for the conscious mind is in no circumstances 'vacuous.' 
(CW 11: 820) 
As was shown before, this 'One Mind' is not found in the original Tibetan text, but 
this represents the speculation of Evans-Wentz in line with his understanding of N eo-
Platonism and Vedanta. Thus in his commentary Jung was merely discussing his own 
understanding of the unconscious psyche informed by Evans-Wentz's 
misinterpretation of the Tibetan text. However, R.H. Jones (1979) argued, 
... these positive features differentiate the two concepts in an important way: the 
type of enlightened mind he is describing is characterized as non-dual and void 
of any content. In his notion of the unconscious, the unconscious is populated 
by at least a few distinct archetypes, a feature which cannot but cause us to 
differentiate the two concepts. 
(Jones, 1979: 146) 
Reynolds pointed out that Jung was not concerned with Dzogchen, but with symbols 
and their transformations, which is, in Buddhist terms, the province of Tantra, the 
path of transformation. According to the Dzogchen teachings, in the tripartite division 
of our existence into Body, Speech, and Mind, the methods of Sutra correspond to 
Body, those of tantra to Speech, and those of Dzogchen to Mind. This Speech means 
the entire field of energy of the individual. It is with this level of individual existence 
that Jung's psychology is concerned (Reynolds, 1989: 110). 
The concept of 'self also concerns Jung greatly. Jung assumes that the term 
'self in the Evans-Wentz translation has the same significance as his own use of the 
term in German. In his commentary he wrote, 
The text goes on to say that the Mind is also called the 'Mental Self. The 'self 
is an important item in analytical psychology... The Mind as 'the means of 
attaining the Other Shore' points to a connection between the transcendent 
function and the idea of the Mind or Self. Since the unknowable substance of 
the Mind, i.e., of the unconscious, always represents itself to consciousness in 
the form of symbols - the self being one such symbol - the symbol functions as a 
'means of attaining the Other Shore,' in other words, as a means of 
transformation. In my essay on Psychic Energy I said that the symbol acts as a 
Awareness (Skt. Alaya-Vijnana), the all-transcendent consciousness of the One Cosmic Mind" (Evans-
Wentz, 1954: 14). 
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transfonner of energy. My interpretation of the Mind or self as a symbol is not 
arbitrary; the text itself calls it 'The Great symbol. ' 
(CW 11: 808-811) 
Reynolds asserts, however, "the tenn 'Mental Self has been coined by Evans-Wentz 
and is not found in the Tibetan text. 'The means of attaining the Other Shore' is 
Evans-Wentz's mistranslation of Prajnaparamita, which the text is equating with the 
nature of the mind (Reynolds, 1989: 145). This tenn indicates the perfection of 
wisdom, that is to say, the insight into the nature of reality which perceives that all 
phenomena are empty in their inherent nature. Moreover, this insight goes beyond all 
metaphysical concepts and mental constructions. Hence there is nothing about 
psychological symbols. The tenn Mahamudra may be translated as 'the Great 
Symbol,' but Jung gave it meaning out of context with its significance in the text. 
Reynolds claims that the Mahamudra is the final stage in the process of 
transfonnation in tantra and transcends both the visualisation process and the 
perfection process. Therefore it is called 'Great,' not because it is a symbol of the 
'Self,' but because it is a state of realisation beyond all symbols in the process of 
transfonnation (Reynolds, 1989: 145-6). 
4.2.3 A critical discussion of Jung's understanding of The Tibetan Book of the 
Great Liberation 
Jung's main concern was with symbols and their transfonnation as they spontaneously 
manifest themselves from the unconscious. These manifestations are held to indicate 
not only the psychic affliction of the patient, but also the process of healing or 
becoming whole, which Jung called individuation. Hence he put emphasis on the 
integration of opposites. In his Commentary on The Tibetan Book of the Great 
Liberation, Jung wrote that in the Tibetan practice of meditation the experiences of 
different gods are symbolic representations of various aspects of the pairs of 
opposites, which when taken together constitute the whole, the Self in Jung's term. 
Jung wrote, 
In keeping with this hypothesis, the text goes on to say that the Mind is also 
called the 'Mental Self.' The 'self is an important concept in analytical 
psychology ... Although the symbols of the 'self are produced by unconscious 
activity and are mostly manifested in dreams, the facts which the idea covers are 
not merely mental; they include aspects of physical existence as well. In this 
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and other Eastern texts the 'Self represents a purely spiritual idea, but in the 
Western psychology the 'self stands for a totality which comprises instincts, 
physiological and semi-physiological phenomena. To us a purely spiritual 
totality is inconceivable ... 
(CW 11: 808) 
Jung believed that the self is the totality of the psyche which includes the ego. In the 
process of individuation one places the ego in subordinate relation to the self. In so 
doing, the ego is no longer the centre of the personality, but the self, which unites all 
opposites, is the centre. Jones argues that, for Jung, "it is impossible to abolish the 
conscious ego, and so the objective of therapy is to bring about a balance between, or 
integration of, the conscious and unconscious" (Jones, 1979: 14). Clearly Jung did 
not understand the meaning of the non-dual state, which in Buddhism is called 
samadhi and advayajnana. He wrote in his commentary, 
Whenever there is a lowering of the conscious level we come across instances of 
unconscious identity, or what Levy-Bruhl called 'participation mystique.' The 
realization of the One Mind is, as our text says, the 'at-one-ment of the 
Trikaya'; in fact it creates the at-one-ment. But we are unable to imagine how 
such a realization could ever be complete in any human individual. There must 
always be somebody or something left over to experience the realization, to say 
'I know at-one-ment, I know there is no distinction.' The very fact of the 
realization proves its inevitable incompleteness. One cannot know something 
that is not distinct from oneself. Even when I say 'I know myself,' an 
infinitesimal ego - the knowing'!' - is still distinct from 'myself.' In this as it 
were atomic ego, which is completely ignored by the essentially nondualist 
standpoint of the East, there nevertheless lies hidden the whole unabolished 
pluralistic universe and its unconquered reality. 
(CW 11: 817) 
Jung simply denied the non-dual states of Buddhist thought because he could not 
conceive of the consciousness without the ego. Although acceptable from a Buddhist 
non-dualistic perspective, the obliteration of the distinction between subject and 
object, for Jung, is contradictory. Jung stated, "If there is no ego there is nobody to be 
conSCIOUS of anything" (CW 11: 774). In Mahayana Buddhist teachings, the 
individual self and the phenomenal world are regarded as an illusion, and are 
constructed by the subject/object discrimination. However, this false assumption of 
the world can only be removed by the knowledge of the very empty 'nature' of all 
phenomena, namely emptiness, which is totally transcended by the subject/object 
duality. In Buddhism it is called, thusness, the very nature of reality. According to 
T.R.V. Murti (1998), the Madhyamika school philosophy puts forward a non-dual 
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(advaya) state which is the very heart of the reality (prajna), and is knowledge freed 
of conceptual distinctions. The highest wisdom (prajnaparamita) in the Madhyamika 
is non-dual knowledge, which is "the abolition of all particular viewpoints which 
restrict and distort reality" (Murti, 1998: 214). Jung failed to understand the Buddhist 
non-dualist perspective, as his horizons were limited by the prescriptions of his own 
theory of psychology. In contrast to Jung's approach, a phenomenologist of religion 
argues that, "any method of interpreting religion must include the recognition that 
religious experience cannot be reduced to other elements of human life" (Streng, 
1976: 59). The lack of such awareness limits the study of religion to non-religious 
factors. In Jung's case, he tends to see the Buddhist non-dualist perspective only from 
a psychological point of view and fails to see the Buddhist concepts within their own 
cultural context. 
The Mahayana meditation, such as Calm (Skt. Samatha) and Insight (Skt. 
Vipasyana) meditations, seeks to overcome the subject/object duality, and eventually 
allows a full realisation, a liberating insight into emptiness. However, Jung was 
strongly opposed to importing Oriental techniques of meditation into the West. 
Clarke argues that, while Jung warned against the undisciplined adoption of Eastern 
practices, "his failure to encourage or to anticipate the growth of a responsible and 
disciplined practice of yoga must be seen as a serious shortcoming in his bridge-
building enterprise" (Clarke, 1994: 173). Today there are many individuals and 
organisations which have taken these religious practices seriously and which practise 
and teach them in a serious and responsible way. These techniques are not without 
their risks but they have enriched cultural life in the West and have provided for many 
individuals the opportunity for spiritual and personal growth. Hence, Clarke claims 
that, "it is difficult to imagine that Jung could have maintained his disapproval had he 
been able to witness developments during recent decades" (Ibid., 173). 
I will now examine Jung's argument of the extraverted West and introverted 
East. Jung contended that all psychic activity is composed of reaction, function and 
compensations of energy processes. He tended to see opposition and harmony all 
around him as necessary. One of the major significant dualities is a division between 
Eastern and Western religions: 
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The East bases itself upon psychic reality, that is, upon the psyche as the main 
and unique condition of existence. It seems as if this Eastern recognition were a 
psychological or temperamental fact rather than a result of philosophical 
reasoning. It is a typically introverted point of view, contrasted with the equally 
typical extraverted point of view of the West. Introversion and extraversion are 
known to be temperamental or even constitutional attitudes which are never 
intentionally adopted in normal circumstances. In exceptional cases they may 
be produced at will, but only under very special conditions. Introversion is, if 
one may so express it, the 'style' of the East, an habitual and collective attitude, 
just as extraversion is the 'style' of the West. 
(CW 11: 770) 
Western religion sees God at work in the historical events of the external world, 
whereas Eastern religion finds spiritual information and guidance mainly through 
introspection. This lead Jung to conclude that the religious attitude of the West is 
extraverted while that of the East is introverted. But Jung also said, 
Both are one-sided in that they fail to see and take account of those factors 
which do not fit in with their typical attitude. The one underrates the world of 
consciousness, the other the world of the One Mind. The result is that, in their 
extremism, both lose one half of the universe; their life is shut off from total 
reality, and is apt to become artificial and inhuman. In the West, there is the 
mania for 'objectivity,' the asceticism of the scientist or of the stockbroker, who 
throwaway the beauty and universality of life for the sake of the ideal, or not so 
ideal, goal. In the East, there is the wisdom, peace, detachment, and inertia of a 
psyche that has returned to its dim origins, having left behind all the sorrow and 
joy of existence as it is and, presumably, ought to be. 
(CW 11: 786) 
Jung was certainly not suggesting an abandonment of the whole Western scientific 
outlook. In his view, the East is equally biased, because of its supposed detachment 
and inertia. Hence, he pointed out in his commentary that it is more important to seek 
a balanced view in which the demands of both matter and spirit and of extraversion 
and introversion are met. 
Given Jung's claim that the spiritual development of the West has been along 
entirely different lines from that of the East, then it is important to raise the question 
what the 'East' exactly means. To answer this question, we need to understand that 
the term 'the East' is in fact, a fictional entity created by Western intellectuals and 
writers without having any historical or cultural consideration. China, Japan, India, 
Arab and Islamic countries and these countries have different languages, religions, 
cultures and histories. Nevertheless, these different religions, cultures and histories , 
were united as the 'East' in the nineteenth century as the result of European 
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imperialist expansion. The East is often characterised as mystical, dream-like, 
irrational, intuitive, pessimistic, and so on. By contrast, the West is usually 
characterised as being realistic, practical, progressive, and so on. As Reynolds argues, 
What this amounts to is a stereotyping of Asians and of non-Europeans in 
general, as being 'a lesser breed without the Law.' This becomes, especially in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a rationalization for European imperialist 
expansion as 'the white man's burden.' 'They' are different from us and this 
difference implies their inferiority. The same stereotyping was also used to 
demonstrate the moral and practical superiority of Christianity over such 
'Eastern' religions as Hinduism and Buddhism. 
(Reynolds, 1989: 146-7) 
In the light of this Eurocentric view of the East, we can understand why Jung was 
reluctant to see Westerners apply Eastern spiritual disciplines such as yoga, insisting 
that the Eastern mentality is fundamentally different from the Western one. Reynolds 
argues, in Jungian terminology 'the East' is in reality a projection of the shadow side 
of the Western European psyche. Western Europe saw in the East everything that it 
denied in itself, and therefore the East is dark, sensual, corrupt, mystical, dreamy, 
irrational, feminine. These images of the East which frequently emerge from Jung's 
writings also come from his Westernised view towards Eastern religion. 
Lastly, I shall take up the question of the contemporary relevance of Jung's 
dialogue with the East for the practice of hermeneutics. 17 Jung's approach to the East 
is governed by the spiritual needs of 'modem man,' and the clinical needs associated 
with the development of psychotherapy, and therefore Jung draws ancient oriental 
texts into modem Western discourse. However Clarke asserted Jung's interpretation 
of the Eastern texts seems to be reductive in that he tended to reduce the spiritual to 
the psychic, "and thereby of failing to grasp the full significance of the philosophical 
systems of the East" (Clarke, 1994: 175). 
There is an important issue to discuss here: whether Jung's approach is 
essentially hermeneutical, in other words, whether Jung's approach allows sufficient 
space for the East to speak for itself. According to Gadamer's hermeneutical model, 
any dialogue with the textual past must take account of the historical situation both of 
the text itself and of the reader of the text. In the case of the former this means 
17 I use henneneutics in tenns of the art of interpreting texts, particularly the texts from the past whose 
meaning may seem to be elusive. For a detailed discussion of Gadamer's henneneutics in relation to 
lung's method of interpretation, see Chapter Two. 
177 
allowing the text to speak for itself and in the case of the latter it indicates the 
recognition of one's own agenda and pre-judgement. Clarke (1994) argues that the 
problem with Jung's approach is that it pays much more attention to the latter than to 
the former. It is true that one cannot simply abandon one's culturally shaped 
conceptual apparatus and penetrate the meanings of foreign texts without any pre-
suppositions, as Gadamer says that one's prejudices and prejudgements represent an 
essential component of all meaningful exchange. However Jung clung too firmly to 
his own cultural territory. As mentioned earlier, Jung's approach is based on the 
postulation of analogies. Jones (1979) adopted a highly critical view towards Jung's 
tendency to draw analogies between the Eastern religious concepts and his own 
psychology. He claimed, 
... Jung distorts the intention of the Eastern texts by bringing in concepts as 
parallels which are essentially foreign in intent. Of course conceptual schemes 
are by their nature selective (since each deals with only certain problems), but in 
simplifying they still may be useful. Jung's error is to substitute his theoretical 
constructs as parallels or equivalents to religious concepts. 
(Jones, 1979: 143-4) 
According to Gadamer, in a hermeneutical approach there is no such thing as 
correctness of interpreting the texts. Gadamer stated that, "To interpret [a text] means 
precisely to use one's own preconceptions so that the meaning of the text can really be 
made to speak for us" (Gadamer, 1975: 358). It is important that the task of 
interpreting a text or historical event can never be completed and is always in the 
process of revision. In the light of this, we can say that the readings which Jung 
offered in the 1930's will now appear to some extent inadequate and dated. Clarke 
asserts, "From a purely historical point of view it is important when trying to assess, 
Jung's contributions to the East-West dialogue to take full account of their historical 
relativity, namely to see them in the context of his time and culture, and not simply to 
judge him in retrospect" (Clarke, 1994: 177). In conclusion, while Jung did succeed 
in introducing the Tibetan text to a Western audience, he did this at the cost of altering 
both the substance of the text and its very nature. His interpretation of the text may 
well include valid material but it has little relation to the Tibetan text itself. In the 
next section I will examine Jung's relation to the Tibetan Tantric mandalas. 
4.3 Jung and Tibetan Tantric Mandalas 
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4.3.1 General outline of the Tantric mandala 
In Tibet mandalas are used in invocations, meditation and temple services. The series 
of diagrams in mandalas constitutes a simplified illustration of the structure of the 
universe (see figures 4.1-4.4.). Tucci states, "[The mandala] is, above all, a map of 
the cosmos. It is the whole universe in its essential plan, in its process of emanation 
and of reabsorption" (Tucci, 1973: 23). Robert A.F. Thurman (1998) states that in 
Buddhist usage, a mandala is a matrix or model of a perfect universe, and is "a 
blueprint for Buddha-hood conceived as attainment not only of an individual's 
ultimate liberation and supreme bliss, but also as the attainment of such release and 
bliss by an individual fully integrated with his or her environment and field of 
associates" (Thurman, 1998: 127). The traditional definition oftantra is "a process of 
demolishing the samsaric world by removing its ignorance, and rebuilding the 
foundation on the basis of wisdom. Within the tantric tradition, "mandalas are models 
used for creating Buddha-world" (Thurman, 1998: 127). 
mandala is a matrix of embodiment. It is the architecture of enlightenment in its 
bliss- and compassion-generated emanations. It is a womb palace within which 
infinite wisdom and compassion can manifest as forms discernible to ordinary 
beings. It is also a structure perceived by misknowledge-dominated ordinary 
beings as symbolic of the qualities of enlightenment. 
(Thurman, 1998: 130) 
Mattieu Richard (1995) asserts that in Vajrayana "mandala refers to a divine abode, a 
perfect Buddha-field, and to the enlightened deities, or buddhas, abiding in it" 
(Richard, 1995: 158). There is a main deity at the centre of the mandala, surrounded 
or not by a retinue of other deities. Each aspect of the divine deities is highly 
symbolic and is meant to develop in practitioners enlightened qualities related to the 
path of enlightenment. The mandalas are elaborate designs based on a number of 
concentric squares and circles studded with numerous figures of Buddhas, which are 
contained within a circle inscribed in the form of a stylised lotus. J. Blofeld states, 
"Almost the entire surface is covered with intricate designs, all with precise symbolic 
meanings" (Blofeld, 1970: 103). Mandalas are sometimes drawn in colour on the 
ground but are more often seen in scroll paintings. The outermost circle, which is 
painted in lotus form, represents the universe's periphery. The middle circle contains 
five Buddha-figures called Jinas (see diagram 4.1). E. Conze (1964) argues, 
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[The five Buddhas] serve ... as symbols not only of the final perfection that is the 
goal of the aspirant, but also as symbols of those very evils which bind him to 
existence and also of his won fivefold personality and of the fivefold sacrament 
employed in the rite. The set of five symbolizes then both the condition of 
nirvana and the condition of samsara, as well as the means towards the 
realization of their essential identity, which is the aim of all the endeavour. 
(Conze, 1964: 248) 
The Jinas are arranged with one in the centre and one at each compass point. "This 
part of the mandala signifies the core of the universe, i.e., the fivefold emanation of 
energy-wisdom from the void (equated with pure mind)" (Blofeld, 1970: 103, 
Blofeld's bracket). This form is repeated in all the other circles, and makes a replica 
of the larger pattern, which signifies the interpretation of all things and the identity of 
microcosm and macrocosm. The five Jinas are easily distinguishable from one 
another, for their colours, symbols and the positions of arms, hands and fingers are 
different from each other. The five different kinds of wisdom are inherited by each 
Jina. The Jinas are also equated with many sets of concepts, realms of existence, 
types of evil to be remedied, elements, seasons, times of day, etc. 
The characteristic of the Tantric method of mediation is visualisation and is 
often based on the mandala. 18 Conze (1964) argues, 
The Mandala is a circle of symbolic forms, which is either just mentally 
produced for special purposes of meditation, or actually marked out on the 
ground for the purpose of special ritual. Its function is always the same, mainly 
as a means towards the reintegration of the practitioner. 
(Conze, 1964: 246) 
Blofeld asserts that the mandala, "is recognized as a valid diagram of the interlocking 
forces which in their contracted form comprise the entire universe and in their 
contracted form fill the mind and body of every individual being" (Blofeld, 1970: 85). 
His account for the purpose of the tantric visualisation method is, "to gain control of 
the mind, become skilled in creating mental constructions, make contact with 
powerful forces (themselves the products of mind) and achieve higher states of 
consciousness in which the non-existence of own-being and the non-dual nature of 
reality are transformed from intellectual concepts into experiential consciousness -
18 This visualisation practice is called sadhana and involves the use of mudras (sacred gestures), 
mantras (invocations), bija-mantras (the seed-syllables from which the visualisations spring) and 
whirling dharanis (revolving strings of syllables). The mudras, mantras and visualisations correspond 
to body, speech and mind. (Blofeld, 1970: 85-6) 
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non-duality is no longer just believed but felt" (Blofeld, 1070: 84). M. Eliade (1958) 
argues, "the mandala serves as a 'support' for meditation; the yogin uses it as a 
'defence' against mental distractions and temptations" (Eliade, 1958: 225). By 
mentally entering the mandala, the yogin approaches his own centre. This spiritual 
exercise can be understood in two senses: 
(1) to reach the center the yogin re-enacts and masters the cosmic process, for 
the mandala is an image of the world; (2) but since he is engaged in meditation 
and not in ritual, the yogin, starting from this iconographic 'support,' can find 
the mandala in his own body. 
(Eliade, 1958: 225) 
According to Eliade, the mandala is an imago mundi, therefore its centre corresponds 
to the infinitesimal point perpendicularly traversed by the axis mundi (Ibid., 225). As 
soon as the disciple has entered the mandala, he is in a sacred space, outside of time. 
A series of meditations, for which the disciple has been prepared in advance, 
help him to find the gods in his own heart. In a vision, he sees them all emerge 
and spring from his heart; they fill cosmic space, then are reabsorbed in him. In 
other words, he 'realizes' the eternal process of the periodic creation and 
destruction of worlds; and this allows him to enter into the rhythms of the 
cosmic great time and to understand its emptiness. He shatters the plane of 
samsara and enters a transcendent plane ... 
(Eliade, 1958: 225) 
Richard states, "In the Buddhist tradition, mandalas are objects of meditation with a 
specific purpose: to transform our ordinary perception of the world into a pure 
perception of the Buddha nature which permeates all phenomena (Richard, 1995: 
157). The pure perception, the important concept of Vajrayana Buddhism (Diamond 
Vehicle), is to recognise Buddha nature in all sentient beings and to see primordial 
purity and perfection in all phenomena. Every sentient being is endowed with the 
essence of buddhahood. In Vajrayana one makes use of mandalas to train into pure 
perception. The way we usually experience the outer world, our bodies and our 
feelings is impure, in the sense that we perceive them as substantially existing entities. 
With this erroneous perception the negative emotion arises, and thus leads to 
suffering. However, with a careful examination, one will find that they have no true 
existence, and that they appear as a result of various causes and conditions. To see 
things as truly existing is in fact the deluded perception underlying samsara. 
Ignorance is therefore a transient veil without intrinsic existence. When one 
recognises this, however, there is no impure perception. There is no need to try to get 
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rid of samsara or to suppress suffering, because neither samsara nor suffering actually 
even exist. The karmic patterns and negative emotions that lie at its root are severed. 
This is the experience of the purity of nirvana. Richard asserts that, "it is to be free of 
grasping that one trains in recognizing all appearances as a mandala, a Buddha-field 
with all beings considered as deities. To see things in this way transforms one's 
perception of the world into primordial purity and allows one to realize all the 
qualities of buddha hood" (Richard, 1995: 158). 
As mentioned earlier, a central feature of Tibetan tantric meditation is 
visualisation. In practising meditation, a practitioner must find a suitable lama to act 
as his spiritual guide. When he finds his lama and is accepted as a disciple, he will 
then implicitly obey all his lama's instructions. After the practitioner has carried out a 
number of preliminaries to purify himself, his lama will initiate him into the 
Mantrayana. 19 An initiation (Skt. abhiseka) helps to remove spiritual obstructions in 
the practitioner, and also transmits a spiritual power from the lama. Moreover, it 
helps the practitioner to properly understand and practice the teachings and oral 
instructions. It also authorises the practitioner to address himself to a certain holy 
being or deity. At the initiation, the lama selects a mantra and yi-dam, which is a 
chosen deity appropriate to the practitioner's character type, and introduces him to the 
mandala of the yi-dam. The mantras are sacred words and consist of syllables, which 
give an arrangement of a sacred sound, Om Mani Padme hum.20 
The yi-dam is a holy being who is in harmony with the practitioner's nature, 
and acts as his guiding deity. The yi-dam reveals aspects of his character that he was 
overlooking by visual representations. The yi-dam also enables the practitioner to 
change the energy of his characteristic fault into a wisdom. The yi-dam is composed 
of five families of the main Mantrayana Buddhas (Skt. Jina). The first of these is the 
central Buddha and is seen as a personification of the Dharma-body. The other four 
jinas are seen as dwelling in Pure Lands: Aksobhya in the east, Ratnasambhava (The 
Jewel-Born One) in the south, Amitabha (Infinite Radiance) in the west, and 
Amoghasiddhi (Infallible Success) in the north (Harvey, 1990: 262). The yi-dams 
may be male or female, and peaceful or wrathful. The male peaceful ones are the five 
19 It is one of the four schools (Vajrayana, Mantrayana, Kalacakrayana, and Sahajayana) in Tantrayana 
Buddhism ('Vehicle of the Tantra texts'). 
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jinas and the ordinary Bodhisattvas of the Mahayana. The male wrathful yi-dams are 
called Heruka.
21 
The female peaceful yi-dams are called Tara, which are the Green 
and White form of the Bodhisattva. The wrathful female yi-dams are called Dakini, 
"which are seen as playful but tricky beings, often portrayed wielding a chopper and 
holding a skull-cup containing poison (human faults) transformed into the nectar of 
Deathlessness" (Harvey, 1990: 262). These peaceful and wrathful yi-dams are seen as 
the consorts of the male peaceful and wrathful yi-dams. A consort is called the 
'Wisdom' (Skt. Prajna) of her male partner, and represents the wise and passive 
power which makes possible the active and energetic skilful means of the male. The 
male and female forms are often represented as Yab (father) and Yum (mother) in 
sexual union, and symbolise that sexual union, the union of skilful means and 
wisdom, which leads to enlightenment. 
A mandala or sacred circle was developed in India between the seventh and 
twelfth centuries and portrays the luminous world of specific holy beings. It is 
constructed by coloured sand or fragrant powders on a horizontal platform, or it is 
painted on a hanging scroll. Depending on the rites in which the mandala is used, the 
deities' vary, but the one portraying the five jinas is the most important. When the 
practitioner is introduced to his yi-dam's mandala, he can familiarise himself with the 
deities world. Harvey asserts, "by visualisation of the deity and his or her world, he 
may master and integrate the psychic forces they represent, and achieve a wholeness 
in his life" (Harvey, 1990: 264). The pattern of a mandala is based on that of circular 
Stupa with a square base oriented to the four directions. When the practitioner 
visualises himself entering the mandala, he comes to the central citadel, representing 
the temple of his own heart. 
When the tantric practitioner has been given a yi-dam, mantra and mandala by 
his lama, he can go on to perform various meditations in the form of sadhana or 
'accomplishing. ' Sadhana involves a vivid visualisation, chanting mantras and the 
use of mudras, which are ritual gestures showing a certain state of mind. The practice 
of sadhana has two stages. The first is the stage of Generation (Skt. Utpanna-krama) 
and is the process of building up the visualisation. The second is that of Completion 
20 Jung translated the mantra as "Om! Behold the jewel in the lotus" (CW 6: 298 and NZ I: 264). 
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(Skt. Sampanna-krama) in which the adept draws on the energIes and spiritual 
qualities of the archetypal visualised fonn. The adept first familiarises himself with 
the paintings and detailed description of the deity and his mandala-world. He then 
gradually learns to build up a mental image of the deity till it is seen in full reality as a 
living, moving being. By visualising himself as the deity, the adept takes on some of 
its powers and virtues, which are symbolically expressed in many details of its 
appearance. Finally, the whole visualisation gradually dissolves into emptiness, so as 
to overcome any attachment to it. Visualisation and dissolution are repeated until the 
meditator attains mastery of the visualised world. When the visualisation is fully 
established, the stage of Completion is entered, where there is a manipUlation of the 
meditator and yi-dam's energies and qualities. This takes great discipline and 
application and is usually done in a retreat setting. He may develop a great inner heat 
and an ego-transcending 'Great Bliss'; meditate on his reflection in a mirror; gain 
meditative control of dreams; retain awareness even in dreamless sleep; prepare 
himself to understand the intennediary period (Tib. bar-do) between rebirths, so as to 
accelerate spiritual progress then; and learn how to transfer his consciousness to 
Amitabha's Pure Land at death (Harvey, 1990: 166-7). The Tantric mandala and its 
meditation method based on visualisation have been discussed thus far. I will next 
examine Jung's approach to the understanding of mandala symbolism. 
4.3.2 Jung's approach to mandala symbolism 
Jung was concerned with the problem of the West's spiritual crises. He believed that 
Buddhism "had developed ways of tapping into and assimilating material from the 
deeper levels of the psyche, the unconscious which in the West we have tended to 
block off through our excessive refinement of rational consciousness" (Clarke, 1994: 
72). Jung recognised a need for psychic wholeness whereby Westerners come to 
tenns with the non-rational aspects of their nature. Wholeness is an important notion 
in Jung's thought. Jung believed wholeness represents the goal of human activity, the 
fullest realisation of the human personality which can give the individual a sense of 
true value and purpose in life. Jung was interested in the Tantric mandala and 
21 The anger which the yi-dam shows is to help open up the practitioner's heart by devastating his 
hesitations, doubts, confusions, and ignorance (Harvey, 1990: 262). 
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interpreted it as a symbol of psychic wholeness. In his Commentary on The Secret of 
the Golden Flower Jung argues that the mandala appears as the image of circulation, 
in which a rotation from one pole to another, from light to darkness, brings about a 
progressive sense of integration and completeness. Clarke (1994) asserts, 
The 'circumambulation of the self was a favourite image of Jung's that he used 
to express the dynamic process of self-discovery whereby the ego is seen to be 
contained in the wider dimensions of the self, the self being both the centre and 
the circumference of the psychic life. The circular motion implies a sense of 
both a marking off and of a process of integration which are essential to the 
process of individuation, the coming-to-be of the self. 
(Clarke, 1994: 85) 
Jung first discussed the term mandala in his Commentary on The Secret of the Golden 
Flower in 1929. According to Jung, "Mandala means 'circle,' more especially a 
magic circle" (CW 13: 31), and are found not only throughout the East but also in 
Christian and Egyptian traditions and among the Pueblo and Navaho Indians. Most 
mandalas take the form of a flower, cross, or wheel and are based on the figures of the 
square and circle. The mandala which is used in the East for ritual and meditation 
purposes, is not only confined to Buddhism but is also characteristic of Hindu tantra. 
However, Jung's interest was largely confined to its manifestation in the Tantric 
Buddhism of Tibet. He asserted that, "The most beautiful mandalas are, of course, 
those of the East, especially the ones found in Tibetan Buddhism" (CW 13: 31). The 
Buddhist mandalas or circles of Tibetan origin, "consist as a rule of a circular padma 
or lotus which contains a square sacred building with four gates, indicating the four 
cardinal points and the seasons. The centre contains a Buddha, or more often the 
conjunction of Shiva and his Shakti, or an equivalent dorje (thunderbolt) symbol" 
(CW 11: 113), as shown in Figure 4.6. Jung stated that the mandala of this sort is 
known as yantra, an instrument of contemplation. In Jung's opinion a mandala of this 
kind, "is meant to aid concentration by narrowing down the psychic field of vision 
and restricting it to the centre" (CW 9i: 630). He continued, 
The mandala shown here depicts the state of one who has emerged from 
contemplation into the absolute state. That is why representation of hell and the 
horrors of the brutal ground are missing. The diamond thunderbolt, the dorje in 
the centre, symbolizes the perfect state where masculine and feminine are 
united. The world of illusions has finally vanished. All energy has gathered 
together in the initial state. 
(CW 9i: 636) 
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For Jung the mandala is the unIOn of opposites like yin and yang in Chinese 
philosophy, the state of everlasting balance and immutable duration. 22 Jung 
discovered the mandala symbol during a turbulent period of his life following his split 
with Freud. From 1912 onwards, Jung's imagination was invaded by frightening 
fantasies. His method of coping with these fantasies was to express them outwardly 
in drawing, painting and in building models with stones. In so doing, he found 
himself creating regular, symmetrical images which he later identified as mandalas 
(figures 4.8-4.12). In his autobiography Jung wrote, 
Only gradually did I discover what the mandala really is: 'Formation, 
Transformation, Eternal Mind's eternal recreation.' And that is the self, the 
wholeness of the personality, which if all goes well is harmonious, but which 
cannot tolerate self-deceptions. 
(MDR: 221) 
Jung considers mandala as psychological phenomena. Jung states that mandala 
spontaneously appear in dreams and in visions and images caused by schizophrenia. 
Jung says, "As a rule a mandala occurs in conditions of psychic dissociation or 
disorientation" (CW 9i: 714), for example, in the case of children whose parents are 
about to be divorced, in adults with neurosis, or in schizophrenics. In such cases a 
circular image of mandala is commensurate with the disorder of the psychic state. 
Jung observed that mandalas "have the purpose of reducing the confusion to order, 
though this is never the conscious intention of the patient" (CW 9i: 645). The circular 
image of the mandala compensates for the disorder and confusion of the psychic state 
through the construction of a central point to which everything is related. 
Jung states, "This is evidently an attempt at self-healing on the part of Nature, 
which does not spring from conscious reflection but from an instinctive impulse" 
(CW 9i: 714). Jung examined a number of mandala images derived from the dreams 
and fantasies of his patients (figures 4.13 - 4.17). Jung discovered that the mandalas 
produced by his patients have an intuitive and irrational character, and exert a 
retroactive impact on the unconscious. The mandala pictures become effective 
because "the patient's subjective imagination motifs and symbols of the most 
22 One mandala Jung did not discuss is the mandala called Yabyum, involving the union of the two 
people of opposite sex (Father-Mother). Blofeld suggests, "they symbolize the union of the forces of 
wisdom and compassion by analogy to a physical union which is the source of the highest bliss next to 
spiritual ecstasy" (Blofeld, 1970: 72). 
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unexpected kind that confonn to law and express an idea or situation which their 
conscious mind can grasp only with difficulty. Confronted with these pictures, many 
patients suddenly realize for the first time the reality of the collective unconscious as 
an autonomous entity" (CW 9i: 645). 
Jung designates archetypes as a fonnal aspect of instinct and found a 
fundamental confonnity in mandalas. The individual mandalas spontaneously 
produced by Jung's patients usually contain a motif of a quatemity or a multiple of 
four, such as a cross and a square. The 'squaring the circle' is one of the most 
important archetypal motifs from the psychological point of view and is what Jung 
called the "archetype a/wholeness" (CW 9i: 715). Jung asserts that whereas ritual 
mandalas always display a definite style and motifs, the individual mandalas reveal 
various motifs and symbolic allusions which attempt to express "the totality of the 
individual in his inner or outer experience of the world, or its essential point of 
reference" (CW 9i: 717). Jung states, 
Their object is the self in contradiction to the ego, which is only the point of 
reference for consciousness, whereas the self comprises the totality of the 
psyche altogether, i.e., conscious and unconscious. It is therefore not unusual 
for individual mandalas to display a division into a light and a dark half, 
together with their typical symbols. 
(CW 9i: 717) 
For Jung the mandala implies a circular movement focused on the centre. It is a 
mental image which aims at engaging all sides of one's personality, namely, all the 
positive and the negative opposites of one's nature. Jung suggested that the mandala 
best symbolises the archetype of the self and helps to integrate the personality until 
the state of self-knowledge is finally realised. Clarke argues that, "Jung's attempt to 
make sense of this [mandala] image as a universal, archetypal, phenomenon by means 
of a whole network of analogical links to a wide range of cultural phenomena, West as 
well as East, modem as well as ancient, was nothing less than a henneneutical tour de 
force" (Clarke, 1994: 136). Jung elaborated the mandala and the archetypes of the 
self in the following passage: 
[The mandala's] basic motif is the premonition ofa centre of personality, a kind 
of central point within the psyche, to which everything is related, by which 
everything is arranged, and which is itself a source of energy. The energy of the 
central point is manifested in the almost irresistible compulsion and urge to 
become what one is, just as every organism is driven to assume the fonn that is 
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characteristic of its nature, no matter what the circumstances. This centre is not 
felt or thought of as the ego but, if one may so express it, as the self. Although 
the centre is represented by an innermost point, it is surrounded by a periphery 
containing everything that belongs to the self - the paired opposites that make 
up the total personality. This totality comprises consciousness first of all, the 
personal unconscious and finally an indefinitely large segment of the collective 
unconscious whose archetypes are common to all mankind. 
(CW 9i: 634) 
Jung came to understand the mandala to be a uniting symbol or an archetype of 
wholeness, which symbolises Jung's notion of the self. The goal of the mandala, for 
Jung, is to express the unity of psychic dissociation so that the focal point of the 
personality is shifted from the conscious ego to the self, which is the totality of the 
psyche. Hence, both the conscious and the unconscious are brought into harmony and 
balance. Jung argued that, "the mandala is the centre. It is the exponent of all paths. 
It is the path to the centre, to individuation" (MDR: 222). Jung's dream discussed 
above and his mandala paintings, which for him were empirical reality and thus gave 
him evidence, and also Wilhelm's translation of the Secret of the Golden Flower led 
Jung to confirm that the mandala is the symbol of the self. Jung claims that his 
patients' mandalas were new and uninfluenced products, and concluded that there is a 
transconscious disposition in every individual, constantly producing similar symbols 
at all times and in all places. Thus, all the mandalas which Jung accumulated from his 
patients and his own dream provided him with an important confirmation of the 
theory of the collective unconscious and the existence of primordial images, the 
archetypes. To sum up, the significance of mandala for Jung lies in the self-healing 
aspect and the archetype of the self, the symbolic representation of the totality of the 
psyche between the conscious and the unconscious. 
4.3.3 Comparison between Buddhist mandala and Jung's mandala 
Jung claims that mandalas are symbols of psychic wholeness. Is this incompatible 
with their Buddhist use as cosmic symbols and as aids to meditation? In order to 
answer this question, I will compare and contrast Jung's mandala as symbol of 
psychic wholeness with Buddhist use of the mandala as cosmic symbols. In Tantric 
Buddhism the mandala is a model of the perfect universe, divine abode, perfect 
Buddha-world. There are the main deities at the centre of the mandala (jina), each 
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aspect of the divine deities is highly symbolic and is meant to develop enlightened 
qualities in practitioners related to the path of enlightenment. By contrast, Jung 
claims that the individual mandalas which were spontaneously produced by his 
patients show various motifs and symbols which attempt to express the totality of the 
psyche, the archetype of the self. The significance of the mandala in a Jungian sense, 
which symbolises psychic wholeness, that is, both the conscious and the unconscious 
in a good balance has a sharp contrast with the Buddhist mandala as a cosmic symbol 
of Buddha-world. 
A further difference lies in the way in which the mandala is utilised between 
Jung's psychology and Tantric Buddhism. A number of mandala-like figures, which 
spontaneously appear in dreams and visions of Jung's patients suffering from psychic 
dissociation such as schizophrenia, have an irrational character and retroactive impact 
on the unconscious. They have a therapeutic effect on the patients, striving towards 
self-healing, which derives from an instinctive nature of the collective unconscious. 
Jung believes that the circular image of the mandala compensates for the disorder and 
confusion of the psychic state through the construction of a central point to which 
everything is related. Jung, therefore, was mainly concerned with psychological 
utilisation of the mandala images for the purpose of the treatment of his patients. By 
contrast, the Tantric Buddhist mandala is an object of meditation with specific 
purpose. i.e., to transform our ordinary perception of the world into a pure perception 
of the Buddha-nature which permeates all phenomena. The Tantric mandala is used 
only for religious and ritual purposes under the strict guidance and instruction of a 
lama. With the clear chasm between Jung and the Buddhist significance of the 
mandala, it is crucial to emphasise that the mandala in Jungian psychology is not 
compatible with Buddhist use of the mandala. 
I will now examine in detail the relation between Tantric visualisation and 
Jung's method of active imagination. In 1938 in the monastery of Bhutia Busty, near 
Darjeeling, Jung had the opportunity of talking with a Lamaic rimpoche, Lingdam 
Gomchen, about the mandala. From the conversation with the Lama J ung understood, 
"the true mandala is always an inner image, which is gradually built up through 
(active) imagination, at such times when psychic equilibrium is disturbed or when a 
thought cannot be found and must be sought for, because it is not contained in holy 
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doctrine" (CW 12: 123). This statement suggests that Jung equated the Tantric 
visualisation with his method of active imagination. Jung invented the method called 
active imagination, which is, "a special training for switching off the consciousness, at 
least to a relative extent, thus giving the unconscious contents a chance to develop" 
(CW 11: 875). Jung argues, 
[The active imagination] is a method (devised by myself) of introspection for 
observing the stream of interior images. One concentrates one's attention on 
some impressive but unintelligible dream-image, or on a spontaneous visual 
impression, and observes the changes taking place in it. Meanwhile, of course, 
all criticism must be suspended and the happenings observed and noted with 
absolute objectivity. Obviously, too, the objection that the whole thing is 
'arbitrary' or 'thought up' must be set aside, since it springs from the anxiety of 
an ego-consciousness which brooks no master besides itself in its own house. In 
other words, it is the inhibition exerted by the conscious mind on the 
unconSCIOUS. 
(CW 9i: 319, Jung's bracket) 
The aim of this method is that, "it brings a mass of unconscious material to light" 
(CW 9i: 320). Jung claims, however, "the method is not without its dangers and 
should, if possible, not be employed except under expert supervision" (CW 8, p. 68). 
Jung described three possible dangerous aspects of the active imagination. The first 
danger is that, "the procedure may not lead to any positive result, since it easily passes 
over into the so-called 'free association' of Freud, whereupon the patient gets caught 
in the sterile circle of his own complexes, from which he is in any case unable to 
escape" (Ibid., 68). The second possible danger is that the patient evinces an 
exclusively authentic interest in the unconscious contents, which was produced 
through the active imagination, and consequently he, "remains stuck in an all-
enveloping phantasmagoria, so that once more nothing is gained" (Ibid., 68). Finally, 
a third danger, which may cause very serious psychological damage to the patients, is 
that, "the subliminal contents already possess such a high energy charge that, when 
afforded an outlet by active imagination, they may overpower the conscious mind and 
take possession of the personality. This gives rise to a condition which temporarily, at 
least - cannot easily be distinguished from schizophrenia, and may even lead to a 
genuine 'psychotic interval. '" (Ibid., 68). The crucial point is that while the active 
imagination aims at bringing spontaneously the unconscious contents to the 
conscious, the ego must be at work to some extent. 
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There are differences between Tantric visualisation and Jung's method of 
active imagination. Firstly, Blofeld argues that the tantric visualisation method aims 
at controlling the mind in order to achieve a higher state of consciousness, in which 
the non-dual nature of reality is transformed from intellectual concepts into 
experiential consciousness. But the aim of the active imagination is to enable us to 
bring the unconscious contents to the conscious level. Secondly, the spontaneity of 
Jung's active imagination is in sharp contrast to Tantric visualisation, in which the 
meditator practices visualisation step by step by using religious discipline and 
applications. This causes the fundamental difference between the two systems, that is, 
Tantric visualisation is a religious practice but active imagination is designed as a 
therapeutic method for patients. 
I will now briefly look at the Tibetan Wheel of Life, which Jung also 
mentioned in his psychological writings. At the entrance to most Tibetan gompas 
(monastery), there is a large fresco of the Wheel of Life, which is a painting 
signifying Samsara as the plaything of delusion (see figure 4.5 and diagram 4.2). 
Humphreys argues that, "The Tibetans make great use of pictures of the Wheel to 
bring before the mind the nature of existence" (Humphreys, 1994: 216). According to 
Blofeld, there are three creatures in the centre of the wheel: a) a cook signifying 
craving and greed; b) a snake signifying wrath and passion; and c) a pig signifying 
ignorance and delusion. Around them is d) a narrow circle half of which is filled with 
happy-looking but rather worldly people going up, and half with naked wretches 
falling down. Then there are e) six segments of the circle representing the six states 
of existence separately (gods, asuras, humans, animals, hungry ghosts and denizens of 
hell). The rim f) is divided into twelve sections each with a picture signifying one of 
the links in the twelvefold chain of causality whereby beings are ensnared life after 
life. The whole wheel is in the grasp of g) a huge and hideous demon who dresses in 
five skulls. Near the top of the picture stands h) the Buddha pointing at i) another 
simple and beautiful wheel with eight spokes, that is, Asoka's wheel, which for more 
than two thousand years has been symbol of the Dharma, the Doctrine of Buddha 
(Blofeld, 1970: 119). 
The significance of the picture in the Wheel of Life is: a, b and c) Three 
creatures, which signify craving, wrath and ignorance, are the three fires of evil and 
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make sentient beings the victims of Avidhya, i.e., primordial delusion. d) As a result 
of karmic actions, sentient beings rise or fall within Samsara 's round. All these beings 
endlessly revolve among the six states. e) Conditions in each state of existence are 
depicted graphically. f) The twelve links in the chain of causation are illustrated as 
follows, 
1 A blind man Primordial ignorance 
2 A potter Fashioning: ignorance giving rise to elemental 
impulses 
3 A monkey playing with a Tasting good and evil: impulses giving rise to 
peach conSCIousness 
4 Two men in a boat Personality: consciousness giving rise to name 
and form 
5 Six empty houses Six senses (including mind): personality 
giving rise to sense perception 
6 Love-making Contact: the senses giving rise to desire for 
contact with their objects 
7 Blinded by arrows in both eyes Feeling of pleasure and pain: contact giving 
rise to blind feeling 
8 Drinking Thirst: feeling giving rise to thirst for more 
9 A monkey snatching fruit Appropriation: thirst giving rise to grasping 
10 A pregnant woman Becoming: grasping giving rise to continuity 
of existence 
11 Childbirth Birth: birth giving rise to rebirth 
12 A corpse Decay: rebirth giving rise to renewed death 
and further rounds of birth and death for ever 
and ever 
(Blofeld, 1970: 121) 
g) Yam a, Lord of Death, represents Avidhya23 with the entire universe in its clutch. 
The five skulls in Y ama' s head-dress represent the five senses, the five illusory 
perceptions, the five kinds of wrongdoing, the five aggregates of being. h and i) The 
Buddha points to a proper understanding of the Doctrine and conformance with 
Universal Law as the only way to Liberation. 
I will look at lung's approach to the Tibetan Wheel of Life. The tantric 
mandala lung discussed most extensively is the Tibetan World Wheel (sidpe-korlo) 
23 A vidhya means ignorance or lack of enlightenment. It also is the fundamental root of evil, and the 
ultimate cause of the desire which creates the dukkha of existence. (Humphreys, 1994: 40) 
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(figure 4.6), and he suggested that the World Wheel represents the course of human 
existence in its various forms as conceived by the Buddhists. lung asserts that, "the 
World Wheel is based on a ternary system in that the three world-principles are to be 
found in its centre: the cock, equalling concupiscence; the serpent, hatred or envy; and 
the pig, ignorance or unconscious (avidya)" (CW 12: 123). The wheel has six spokes 
near the centre and twelve spokes round the edge. The numerical aspects of the 
World Wheel largely attracted lung. lung argues, 
The incomplete state of existence is, remarkably enough, expressed by a triadic 
system. The relation between the incomplete and the complete state therefore 
corresponds to the 'sesquitertian proportion' of 3 : 4. This relation is known in 
Western alchemical tradition as the axiom of Maria. 
(CW 9i: 644) 
This statement suggests that lung interprets the Wheel of Life through his 
interpretation of Christianity, in which he enlarged the Trinity into the Quaternity by 
including the autonomous devil as the fourth. lung believed that the Tibetan Wheel of 
Life, "is a close parallel to the our Western cosmological, geographical, and 
physiological representations, of which you find plenty of examples in alchemistic 
philosophy and in the early mystical texts" (Letters I: 225). According to lung, there 
are two kinds of mandala: mandala proper for purposes of magic and worship, 
generally yoga practices; and the cosmic, geographical 'scientific' mandala. The 
Tibetan Wheel of Life belongs to the latter category (Letters I, 225). lung asserted 
that in the Western alchemistic philosophy the trinity is very frequently the centre and 
such mandalas are usually based upon even numbers. But lung claims that he "has 
not come across Buddhist mandalas based upon 3, 5, or 6 (2 x 3)" (Letters I: 225). 
Contrary to lung's statement regarding these numbers 3, 5, and 6, the number 3 is 
significant in the Buddhist mandala, in terms of the Trikaya. Moreover, the number 5 
in the Buddhist mandala, as I mentioned earlier, is the simple set of symbolic forms in 
the tantric mandala in Tibetan Buddhism, which normally consists of the group of the 
five Buddhas, called Jina, and signifies the core of the universe and the fivefold 
emanation of energy-wisdom from the void. Blofeld argues: "Christians ... share the 
Buddhist and Hindu belief in the threefold aspect of divinity which in Buddhism 
accounts for the Trikaya or Three Body concept, but the essential fivefold basis of the 
mandala might be more difficult to fit into a Christian framework, even though the 
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cross itself is a symbol that exactly conforms with the mandala's core" (Blofeld, 
1970: 109). The number 6 is also a significant figure, particularly in the Wheel of 
Life, which represents six segments of the circle symbolising the six states of 
existence - gods, asuras, humans, animals, hungry ghosts and denizens of hell. Jung 
states that the mandalas which he observed usually contain a motif of a quaternity or a 
multiple of four, which is an important psychological motif, i.e., the archetype of the 
self. This may have let Jung disregard other mandalas which contain the number 3, 5 
or 6, which does not fit with Jung's psychological theory. 
Jung collected a wide range of mandala-like figures from a variety of different 
historical and cultural traditions. Jung believed that the idea of psychological and 
spiritual wholeness can be seen in a number of mandala-like motifs in the 
representation of Christ. Within 'Eastern' traditions, Jung mainly dealt with a few 
specific tantric mandalas in Tibetan Buddhism, although there are a number of 
mandalas in the Hindu tantra. Jung's selective choice of mandala or mandala-like 
figures results from his psychological purpose. Clarke claims that, "What he hoped to 
uncover through the accumulation of such data was evidence of the underlying 
archetypal structure of the human psyche, and confirmation of his belief that this 
structure applied universally and, as such, was part of the inheritance of mankind" 
(Clarke, 1994: 137). Jung's study of mandala symbols was to search out their 
psychological significance, as Jung believed they matched his psychological theory. 
To summarise: in Tibetan Buddhism mandalas are regarded as objects of 
meditation for the purpose of transforming our ordinary perception of the world into a 
pure perception of the Buddha nature which transcends subject/object duality. The 
Tantric mandalas are used for practising visualisation under the strict guidance and 
instruction of a lama. Jung interpreted mandala-like figures spontaneously appearing 
in dreams and fantasies as the archetype of the self, which symbolises the totality of 
the psyche between the conscious and the unconscious. Jung believed that the 
mandala images become the self-healing aspect: the centre of the personality is shifted 
from the conscious ego to the self, and psychic dissociation is brought into a 
harmonious whole. However, this chapter has shown that there is a difference 
between the Buddhist use of the mandala as a cosmic symbol and as aids to 
meditation, and Jung's understanding of the mandala as symbols of psychic 
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wholeness. The fonner is to the path of enlightenment for a strictly religious purpose, 
whereas the latter is to express the totality of the psyche and have a therapeutic effect 
on the patients striving towards self-healing. Jung failed to understand the 
significance of the Tibetan wheel of Life, as he grasped it through his interpretation of 
Christianity. 
As has been already argued in Chapter Two, Jung's approach to the Tantric 
mandala demonstrates some features of hermeneutic doctrine. Jung's understanding 
of the mandala symbols is largely based on the postulation of making analogies, a 
method which he often employed in his work as a psychotherapist. Therefore, Clarke 
asserts that, "the transcultural manifestation of the mandala image is postulated by 
drawing analogies between patterns and diagrams found in different media in different 
cultures" (Clarke, 1994: 167). For instance, Jung believed the pig, one of the symbols 
in the Tibetan Wheel of life, signified the unconscious, which is equivalent to 
advidhya in his view. However, according to Humphreys, advidhya simply means 
ignorance or lack of enlightenment and also is the root of evil, the ultimate cause of 
the desire which creates the dukkha of existence. Jung applied a hermeneutical 
method, namely, the postulation of analogies, to enable him to understand the 
mandala as a symbol of the self. But the problem with Jung's method is that Jung 
failed to understand the significance of Tibetan tantric mandalas within their own 
cultural context and thus they are moulded to fit into his own model of psychological 
development. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined Jung's understanding of Tibetan Buddhism, particularly 
his engagement with The Tibetan Book of the Dead, The Tibetan Book of the Great 
Liberation, and with Tibetan tantric mandalas. Jung's approach was hermeneutical 
and thus he interpreted Tibetan Buddhist concepts by making analogies and 
metaphors with his own psychological thinking. As a consequence a sharp contrast 
emerges between Tibetan Buddhist concepts within their own tradition and Jung's use 
of them. Jung frequently dismissed the significance of the religious phenomena in 
their own cultural and traditional context. By contrast, a phenomenologist of religion 
would insist that religious phenomena cannot be reduced to other elements of human 
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life. However, Jung often slips into psychological reductionism in his study of 
Tibetan Buddhism. Although Jung was not concerned much with the rich cultural and 
doctrinal context of Eastern religious traditions, he was careful to distinguish between 
the European and Asian traditions. It seems, however, that there is a contradiction in 
Jung's positions: on the one hand, Jung ignores Asian traditions, but on the other 
hand, he creates an East/West difference. It needs to be noted that the contradiction 
may be caused by Jung's Orientalist conception of the Eastern religions, i.e., "the East 
with which he claims to be in conversation is, in the final analysis, something of his 
own making, a diction conjured out of his own peculiarly Western needs" (Clarke, 
1994: 187). Thus Jung not only dismissed the religious traditions of the East but he 
also conveyed a distorted image of some aspects of Buddhism. 
The Bardo Thadol presents itself as a description of the sequence of 
experiences which happen after one dies, in the period of forty-nine days between 
death and rebirth, and of the way in which one should respond to these experiences in 
order to achieve nirvana and avoid being reborn. Jung was concerned with the 
Tibetan concept of karma. In his early thought on karma, Jung believed that there is 
no personal inherited karma as such, but there is only the collective inherited karma 
of the archetypes. However, his attitude to karma and rebirth changed dramatically 
over the years and he appears to have softened his earlier rejection of the notion of 
personal karma and its psychological function in rebirth in later life. Jung suggested 
that when a Westerner approached an Eastern spiritual text he or she should entirely 
reverse the instructions, in order to adapt the Oriental text to Western culture. Evans-
Wentz with his theosophical background, mistranslated both of the texts, the Bardo 
Thadol and the teaching of Dzogchen. This eventually lead Jung to further 
misinterpret the Tibetan texts. 
In his commentary on The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation, Jung 
developed his argument on psychic relativism: an extraverted tendency in the West 
and an introverted tendency in the East. Jung's attempt to identify the dominant 
psychological attitude of West and East played a major role in his argument that 
Westerners should not imitate Eastern religious practices such as Tibetan tantric 
visualisation. J ung claims that, due to their historical and cultural difference, the 
Europeans must not throwaway their tradition. The current situation of Buddhist 
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studies in the West bears out Jung's concerns to a certain extent, but in fact there are a 
number of possibilities and opportunities for Westerners to practice Eastern religious 
traditions without problems. 
Jung was interested in mandala symbols in Tibetan Buddhism, which, he 
believed, help the Western one-sided consciousness to seek a psychic wholeness. For 
Jung psychic wholeness is an important idea, which indicates the fullest realisation of 
the human personality. He asserted the mandala symbolises the archetype of the self 
and helps to integrate the personality until the state of self-knowledge is realised. The 
goal of the mandala is to express the unity of a state of psychic dissociation so that the 
conscious and the unconscious are brought into harmony. However, Jung had a very 
selective approach to Tibetan tantric mandalas, since his main concern was a 
psychological one. Jung discussed only a few tantric mandalas, particularly the 
Tibetan Wheel of Life, which he believed matched his psychological theory. But he 
completely dismissed other tantric mandalas, which bore no parallels with his 
psychological thinking. Nor was he concerned with the ritual usage of Tibetan tantric 
mandalas. The following chapter pursues these concerns further through an 
examination of Jung's interest in Zen Buddhism. 
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Chapter Five: 
Jung and Zen Buddhism 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter examines Jung's relation to Zen Buddhism. In Zen Jung believed he had 
discovered a profound link between his psychological theory and Oriental thought, 
which put its stress on wholeness as a balance between the opposites. However, Jung 
disagreed with some of a concepts between Zen Buddhism. As a psychologist, Jung's 
main concern was not with solely bringing Oriental thought to the West but with 
finding the parallel of Zen Buddhist thought and his psychology. Nevertheless, there 
appear to be mis-understandings and mis-interpretations of Zen Buddhism in Jung's 
work and eventually there becomes a sharp contrast between Jung and Zen. Jung was 
not able to escape from this pitfall for several reasons, most importantly Jung's 
ontological account of no-mind (emptiness/sunyata) which allowed him to interpret 
the unconscious within the framework of his idea of psychic structure, and D.T. 
Suzuki's emphasis on the psychological aspect of Zen Buddhism might have affected 
Jung's understanding of Zen Buddhism. In this chapter I intend to assess Jung's 
engagement with Zen Buddhism and also examine the difficulties and problems he 
had in his task of discussing the dialogue between East and West. 
This chapter firstly provides a historical overview of Zen Buddhism so as to 
show its strong connection with Indian Buddhism and Chinese Taoism and to show 
how Zen was brought to and developed in Japan. This section also examines the way 
in which Zen was introduced to the West and the extent to which Zen had an influence 
on Western scholars, not only in the field of Religious Studies but also in 
psychological research. A key figure is D.T. Suzuki, who took a major role in 
bringing Zen to the West. Jung, in fact, wrote a foreword to Suzuki's An Introduction 
to Zen Buddhism. Secondly it examines Jung's understanding of Zen Buddhist 
concepts, particularly sa tori enlightenment and no-mind, both of which are important 
concepts in Zen Buddhism. It also examines the conversation which took place 
between Jung and the Japanese Zen scholar, Hisamatsu in detail. Lastly, the chapter 
considers a possible dialogue between Jung or Western psychology and Zen 
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Buddhism by looking at on-going research on the Christian Zen Buddhist dialogue 
undertaken by W. Johnston and looking at M. Miyuki's investigation of the strong 
connection between Zen ox-herding pictures and Jung's individuation process. 
5.1 General outline of Zen Buddhism 
5.1.1 Historical background to Zen Buddhism 
The way of Zen meditation, its practice of zazen and the koan, and its goal of the 
satori experience of enlightenment, has its origins in China, where the first Zen master 
taught and the first Zen schools sprang up. It must be mentioned that Zen is strongly 
influenced by the indigenous Taoism (Daoism). Chinese Ch'an (Jap. Zen) combines 
the spirit of Mahayana Buddhism with Taoism and there is obviously a close 
connection between their teaching and the practice of meditation. 1 However, H. 
Dumoulin (1979) states the Zen way has its roots deeply embedded in Indian 
Buddhism, since firstly Zen is connected to Shakyamuni/ the founder of the Buddhist 
religion, and secondly it is closely linked to the ancient Indian tradition of Yoga. In 
many Japanese Zen temples the image of Shakyamuni is set up as the primary object 
of veneration. Dumoulin argues that the similarity of Zen and Yoga is evident in their 
basic techniques of meditation: in sitting, breathing, and concentrating, although the 
Zen way of meditation is simpler than the yogic technique. 
Buddhism was transplanted from India to China over a period of three to four 
hundred years in the first centuries CEo Zen is a product of the fusion of Indian 
Buddhism with Chinese culture. Its founder was Bodhidharma3, who is assumed to 
have transported Zen from India to China. This legendary founder of Zen is an 
obscure figure. According to legend, Bodhidharma is known in the tradition as an 
offspring of the Brahmin class of southern India and came to southern China during 
the reign of the emperor Wu-ti (502-50). After meeting the emperor he crossed the 
wide Yangtze River on a reed and propagated a new version of the Mahayana 
doctrines and a new way of meditation in North China. 
I The Chinese term Ch'an is an abbreviated translation of the Sanskrit dhyana, referring to the state of 
deep meditation (Pali.jhana). (Harvey, 1990: 153). 
2 Shakyamuni is venerated by the faithful of all Buddhist schools as the Buddha. He was a historical 
figure who lived in the fifth century B.C. 
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After Bodhidharma, the Sixth Patriarch, Hui-neng (638-713?), is the important 
figure in the history of Ch'an in China. There was a vigorous dispute between the 
Southern and the Northern schools of Chinese Ch'an, and it ended with the total 
victory of the Southern school. The Northern school4 soon disappeared, and Hui-neng 
was recognised as the sixth patriarch of Ch'an. Chinese Ch'an as initiated by Hui-
neng is characterised by his way of sudden awakening, contrary to Shen-hsiu's 
Northern school of gradual enlightenment. Hui-neng says, "Fundamentally not one 
thing exists" (Hui-neng cited by Dumoulin, 1979: 48). For the nothingness of Hui-
neng signifies not nihilism but a supreme affirmation of the ultimate reality that lies 
beyond all categories. Enlightenment is attainable only by breaking through rational, 
dualistic thinking. Hui-neng also advocates that practice and enlightenment are not 
causally connected but identical. This means that meditation is not an indispensable 
means to attain enlightenment but a spiritual discipline contributing to the process of 
one's enlightenment. However, this does not mean that Hui-neng rejected practice in 
general. Rather, Hui-neng emphasises that external practice is to no avail if one's 
inner nature is not activated. Therefore Hui-neng is more accurately to be seen as the 
defender of the true practice, as oppose to false, quietistic exercises (Dumoulin, 1979: 
49). 
The great Ch'an masters, Matsu Tao-I (709-88) and Chih-t'ou His-ch'en (700-
790), who lived in the third generation after Hui-neng, were based in present day 
Kiangsi (Jiangxi) Province. The Golden Age of Ch'an started in the middle of the 
eighth century during the T'ang period, and lasted some 150 years. Lin-chi I-Shiian 
(d. 867), who was the founder of the Lin-chi (Jap. Rinzai) school, lived in the last 
generation of the Ch'an masters of the T'an period. Linchi's style of teaching Ch'an 
is strict and harsh. His name is associated with the shout of ha! (Jap. Katsu). Such 
shouts are intended to shock and awaken the disciple (Dumoulin, 1979: 53-620). 
During the Kamakura period (1185-1336) Zen Buddhism was introduced to Japan 
3 There are some doubts about truth of this tradition. Fung Yu-Ian suggests that the Bodhidharma story 
was a pious invention of later times, when the Zen school needed historical authority for its claim to be 
a direct transmission of experience from the Buddha himself, outside the sutras. (Watts, 1957: 104) 
4 The fifth patriarch, Hung-jen (601-74), attracted a large number of disciples to the seat of his 
monastery on the East Mountain. One of these disciples, Shen-hsiu (606?-706) inherited the Dharma 
seal of succession from his master. His school of Zen was called the Lankavatara school. Later the 
Lankavatra school of Zen spread throughout North China and came to be known as the Northern 
school. 
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from China through the Rinzai and Soto schools. Eisai (1141-1215) was the first to 
transmit the Rinzai tradition to Japan in 1191, establishing monasteries at Kyoto and 
Kamakura under imperial patronage. The Soto School was introduced in 1227 by 
Dogen (1200-53), who established the great monastery of Eiheiji, refusing, however, 
to accept imperial favours. When this transplanting took place during the Sung period 
in China, the Neo-Confucianism of the Chu Hsi school established connections with 
Zen. Hence Zen and Neo-Confucianism were transported to Japan at the same time. 
For instance, many Zen monasteries in Japan had tera-koya (temple schools) attached 
to them where Confucianism was taught. Many of the highly educated Zen monks 
studied Buddhism and Confucianism. The ethical dimension of Japanese Zen, that is, 
its Confucian element, is evident in many writings of Japanese Zen masters. It should 
be noted that Zen arrived in Japan when the military dictator Yoritomo and his 
samurai followers had seized power from the hands of the decadent nobility. This 
historical coincidence provided the samurai class with a form of Buddhism which 
appealed to them strongly because of its practical qualities and the directness and 
simplicity of its approach. Thus there arose a way of life called bushido, the Tao of 
the warrior, which is essentially the application of Zen to the arts of war. The 
contribution of Zen to Japanese culture has not only been confined to bushido, but has 
also entered into almost every aspect of people's lives. A large number of arts and 
skills are called 'way' in Japan and they are inspired by Zen: a way of flower (kado), a 
way of tea (sado), a way of sword (ken do ), of archery (kyudo), of self-defence (judo), 
a way of poetry (kado), and of calligraphy (shodo). The ink drawing and the style of 
gardening are also inspired by the spirit of Zen (Dumoulin, 1979: 77-82). 
5.1.2 The Rinzai school of Zen 
The main characteristic of the Rinzai school is a koan practice, which is a method 
leading to enlightenment. The practice of koans became widespread in the Rinzai 
school that flourished in the Sung period in China. The literal meaning of the Chinese 
kung-an (Jap. koan) is 'public notice' or 'public announcement,' and the term came 
into vogue toward the end of the T'ang dynasty. From the beginning, mondo, which 
are exchanges between master and disciple, were the source of material for the koan. 
Besides these mondo, the expressions of the masters, anecdotes from the daily life of 
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the Zen monastery were used as koans. When the master gives one of the koans to the 
disciple, the disciple was to solve the koan by concentrating and devoting all his 
attention to it until he gave up rational thinking and made headway into the 
supranational realm of enlightenment. The number of koan cases is estimated at 
1,700, or more. The two most important koan collections in Zen literature are the 
HeJdganroku (Ch. Pi-yen-Iu), and the Mumonkan (Ch. Wu-men-kuan). The 
Hekiganroku is an exacting work of literature. Each piece consists of a directive, a 
core case, comment on the case, explanation of the case, and so on. The Mumonkan 
collection, also known as the Collection of Forty-eight Koans, was compiled about 
one century later and is simpler than the Hekiganroku. Japanese Zen masters prefer 
the koans of the Mumonkan precisely for their simplicity and succinctness. 
Mental concentration is the first effect of koan practice. Concentrating on the 
koan literally day and night, the practitioner enters a hyperalert state in which he is 
aware of nothing but koan. This concentration gives rise to a search. The practitioner 
utilises all his intellectual powers and exerts himself with all his might, but to no 
avail, because the illogical nature of the koan cannot be solved by logical thinking. 
Then he enters into a state of helplessness and runs up the same wall again and again. 
He searches for a way out, although the door is open. To see the opening, a one 
hundred-and-eighty-degree turnabout is necessary. D.T. Suzuki (1969) asserts that the 
koan practices are to shut up all possible avenues to rationalisation (D.T. Suzuki, 
1969: 1 08). Your whole personality must be thrown directly against the iron wall of 
the koan. 
This throwing your entire being against the koan unexpectedly opens up a 
hitherto unknown region of the mind. Intellectually, this is the transcending of 
the limits of logical dualism, but at the same time it is a regeneration, the 
awakening of an inner sense which enables one to look into the actual working 
of things. 
(D.T. Suzuki, 1969: 109) 
The koan practice takes place under the master's supervision. There is a fonnal 
interview, called dokusan or sanzen, in which the disciple reports to his master on the 
progress of his practice, experiences or even disturbances such as visions, fantasies, 
and hallucinations known as makyo (devil' s realm). These hallucinations are 
terrifying and exhilarating and must be unconditionally dismissed (Dumoulin, 1979: 
73). During the practice session, called sesshin in Japanese, each disciple has a daily 
202 
interview with the master for instruction, encouragement and correction. In Zen 
monasteries, disciples spend the practice session in meditation which includes zazen 
and the koan practice. 
The Rinzai school stresses personal identity cnses resolved only by the 
achievement of satori, a sudden enlightenment, whereas the Soto school puts 
emphasis on the zazen practice, which is often referred to as gradual enlightenment. 
The Soto school of Zen argues that the koan system is much too artificial as it is used 
as a prerequisite for satori. The koan lends itself too easily to that very seeking for 
satori, and might induce an artificial satori. Alan Watts (1957) asserts, 
Adherents of the Rinzai School sometimes say that the intensity of the satori is 
proportionate to the intensity of the feeling of doubt, of blind seeking, which 
precedes it, but for Soto this suggests that such a satori has a dualistic character, 
and is thus no more than an artificial emotional reaction. Thus the Soto view 
was that proper dhyana lay in motiveless action (wu-wei), in 'sitting just to sit', 
or 'walking just to walk'. 
(Watts, 1957: 126) 
5.1.3 The Soto school of Zen 
The Soto school of Zen was derived from Dogen (1200-1253). Dogen is the 
recognised master of zazen5, which is one of the best guides to the way of 
enlightenment. According to T.P. Kasulis (1981), Dogen was trained in the literery 
arts and Chinese poetry. Dogen lost his parents in his youth, refused an opportunity to 
become the heir of an aristocratic uncle who fostered Dogen, fled home and was 
eventually ordained monk at Mount Hiei in Kyoto, which is the centre of the Tendai 
branch of Buddhism in Japan and was one of the most influential temples at the time. 
But Dogen was not satisfied with merely gaining knowledge and eventually left 
Mount Hiei. Dogen then moved to the Kennin-ji monastery of Kyoto, where Eisai had 
implanted Zen after returning from China, and he conceived the theory and teaching 
on the one hand, and practice and experience on the other. He realised that only 
practice and experience would bring him the goal he sought for, and in search for the 
source, he went to the Zen monastery on Mount Tien-ts'ung in China in 1223. There 
5 Although his main emphasis is zazen, Dogen does not completely reject the practice of koans. He 
often cites koan cases of the Chinese masters of old, and koan-like expressions often appear in his own 
explications (Dumoulin, 1979: 94). 
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Dogen practised under his master Ju-ching (Jap. Nyojo, 1163-1228) and finally 
attained the Great Enlightenment (Kasulis, 1981: 65-7). 
From his new standpoint, Dogen thought that the initial issue posed on Mount 
Hiei had falsely separated practice from realization, and cultivation (shu) from 
authentication (sho) (Kasulis, 1981). That is to say, meditation had been taken to be a 
means to an end, a technique by which one might achieve enlightenment or satori. 
Dogen believed such distinction between methods and goals was erroneous. He says 
zazen is not a technique by which to achieve enlightenment, it is enlightenment itself. 
As Dumoulin (1979) puts it, 
Practice must be continued, because it is practice in enlightenment. And 
enlightenment must continually be confirmed in practice. The enlightenment of 
the practitioner and the practice of the enlightenment are rooted in the same 
ground and are absolutely necessary for the confirmation of Buddha-nature. 
(Dumoulin, 1979: 95) 
For Dogen it is the Buddha-nature that is realised in zazen, seated meditation, which 
he calls 'body-and-mind-casting-off (Jap. shinjindatsuraku). Dogen had a very 
strong experience of sa tori when a disciple sitting next to him in Ju-ching's Zen hall 
in China kept dozing off and was scolded and struck by the master, who shouted, 
'Shinjin datsuraku/' Upon hearing these words, Dogen awoke to the Great 
Enlightenment. This is a state in which 'body and mind are fallen off in a experience 
of self-transcendence known as the state of 'serene observation' (Jap. moku shu), "a 
clear awareness in the tranquillity of a state where thought has stopped" (Harvey, 
1990: 271). At this stage the natural purity and calm of man's 'original nature' is 
realised. 
The hallmark of Dogen's Zen is shikantaza, 'nothing but sitting.' Upon 
returning to Japan, Dogen's first work was a brief description of the method of sitting 
in zazen. It was written in Japanesed Chinese (kambun), and was called Fukanzazengi 
(Universal promotion of the principle of zazen). Dogen recorded his lectures and 
compiled his essays into a collection known as Shobogenzo (Treasury of the correct 
dharma-eye), which is Dogen's main work and is composed of ninety-five-chapters 
written in Japanese. The text itself is rather complex partly because of the creative 
style of his writing. Kasulis states that: "Pushing the medieval Japanese language to 
its expressive limits, Dogen interweaves the idiomatic and the traditional: even the 
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most complex and convoluted discussions are interlaced with strikingly concrete and 
poetic images" (Kasulis, 1981: 68). Dogen also derives new words when it suits his 
purpose. Because of all these elements, it is difficult to interpret Shobogenzo 
conclusively. 
The central focus of Dogen's thought is Buddha-nature (Skt. buddhata, Jap. 
bussho). In the 'Buddha-Nature' chapter of the Shobogenzo Dogen takes a saying of 
Shakyamuni that has been handed down in the Mahaparinirvana Sutra: 
'Issai wa shujo nari; shitsuu wa bussho nari; Nyorai wa jojunishite mu nari, u 
nari, henyaku nari': 'All are sentient beings, all beings are (all being is) the 
Buddha-nature; Tathagata is permanent, non-being, being and change.' 
(Dogen cited by Abe, 1985: 27) 
Dogen interprets this sutra passage on the Buddha-nature of all sentient beings in a 
wider sense so that he includes not only plants or animals but also the inanimate world 
as well. What Dogen means to say by this passage is that not merely living beings but 
all of reality itself, i.e., everything that exists, has the Buddha-nature. It is important 
to mention that Dogen presents the passage by retaining the central concepts in 
translating the Chinese ideograms into Japanese, but changing the syntax for his own 
purpose to read: "All living beings are Buddha-nature." This grammatically 
unjustifiable translation gives a new sense to the quotation. M. Abe (1985) asserts: 
Dogen insists that, to attain the Buddha-nature, one must transcend one's ego-
centrism, homo-centrism, and living being-centrism, and thereby ground one's 
existence in the most fundamental plane, that is, in the 'being' dimension, which 
is the dimension of Dogen's shitsuu, i.e., 'all beings'. The realization of 
impermanence of shitsuu is absolutely necessary for the attainment of the 
Buddha-nature. 
(Abe, 1985: 41-2) 
Four sections of the 'Buddha-Nature' chapter treat the 'nothingness of Buddha-nature 
(mu-bussho), ' which Dogen opposes to the 'being of Buddha-nature (u-bussho).' 
Traditionally the term mu-bussho means living beings have no Buddha-nature within 
themselves. However, Dogen is not concerned with having or not having the Buddha-
nature but with the Buddha-nature itself which is non-substantial. Dogen says, "Since 
the Buddha-nature is empty it is called mu (no-thing)" (Dogen cited by Abe, 1985: 
45). In other words, mubussho indicates that people are freed from dichotomous 
thoughts as to whether or not they have the Buddha-nature. This freedom, which is 
the nothingness of Buddha-nature itself, is the genuine realisation of Buddha-nature. 
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Hence Dogen's idea of the nothingness of Buddha-nature means "the non-
substantiality of the Buddha-nature by rejecting both the 'etemalist' view which 
substantializes and is attached to the idea of the Buddha-nature, and the 'nihilistic' 
view which also substantializes and is attached to the idea of no Buddha-nature" 
(Abe, 1985: 45). Furthennore, Dogen calls this non-dualistic and dynamic oneness of 
all beings and the Buddha-nature mujo-bussho, the impennanence of the Buddha-
nature. The impennanence of Buddha-nature is possible because the Buddha-nature is 
non-substantial (and thus the nothingness of Buddha-nature) and because all beings 
are limitless and boundless. When Dogen reaches the dimension of 'all beings,' 
impennanence common to all beings is thoroughly realised as impennanence, he 
achieves a complete and radical reversal, that is, reversal from the realisation of 
'impennanence itself is the Buddha-nature' to the realisation of 'the Buddha-nature in 
itself is impennanence.' His idea of mujo-bussho, the impennanence of the Buddha-
nature is the outcome of this reversal. (Abe, 1985: 51). 
Regarding the characteristics of Rinzai and Soto schools of Zen, these two 
schools of Zen Buddhism are distinct in many ways, particularly in their practical 
training. Rinzai Zen stresses a personal identity crisis resolved only by the 
achievement of safori, which is often called a sudden enlightenment, whereas Soto 
Zen is referred to as gradual enlightenment because of its emphasis on the dynamics 
of zazen practice. The Rinzai Master, Hakuin Ekaku (1685-1768) centres his 
discussion on realisation, but Dogen concentrates on the unity of cultivation and 
authentication. As Kasulis suggests, "Dogen is speaking from the enlightened 
viewpoint of the Zen Master; Hakuin, as if from the unenlightened viewpoint of his 
students" (Kasilis, 1981: 104). Although Rinzai Master might agree with Dogen's 
view that there is complete realisation when zazen is practised perfectly, he might 
question whether the identification between cultivation and authentication is 
intelligible to the student who has not yet sat in true zazen. 
5.1.4. Zen Buddhism in the West 
European research into Buddhism began in the nineteenth century. Research into Zen 
was initiated after its introduction in the West, and its enonnous development is one 
of the defining features of Zen in the twentieth century. Robert H. Sharf (l 995) points 
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out that: "Zen was introduced to western scholarship not through the efforts of 
Western orientalists, but rather through the activities of an elite circle of 
internationally minded Japanese intellectuals and globe-trotting Zen priests, whose 
missionary zeal was often second only to their vexed fascination with western culture" 
(Sharf, 1995: 108). The most significant figure in bringing Zen to the West is 
probably D.T. Suzuki. 
D.T. Suzuki was born In 1870 in Kanazawa, north Japan, and he entered 
Tokyo University in 1890. He spent most of his time with the Zen master, Imagita 
Kosen (1816-92),6 and his successor, Shaku Soen (1858-1919), in Engakuji, 
Kamakura. Shaku Soen was invited to the World's Parliament of Religions convened 
as part of the 1893 World's Fair in Chicago, but "unfortunately Zen Buddhism was 
less forcefully presented by [him], whose English was not adequate to the occasion" 
(Dumoulin, 1992: 4). At the conference, Shaku Soen met Paul Carns, who later wrote 
the book The Gospel of Buddha, which D.T. Suzuki translated into Japanese. After 
Suzuki had many conversations with Cams, D.T. Suzuki gradually became convinced, 
Westerners did not understand Buddhism. Consequently, rather than writing on 
Zen from the outset, I first wrote in English my Outline of Mahayana 
Buddhism.7 That book got me started, and from that, my translation of the 
Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana naturally followed. 
(D.T. Suzuki, 1986: 24) 
It was D.T. Suzuki that constituted the first step in the recent interest and popularity of 
Zen in the West. There were some scholars who wrote books in English, which 
addressed Zen Buddhism. For instance, Tenshin Okakura wrote The Book of Tea, 
which shows the relationship between Zen and the way of Tea. Chikudo Ohazama put 
out, in German, a book entitled Das Lebendige Buddhismus (Living Buddhism).8 
Kaiten Nukariya, a scholar of the Soto sect, wrote The Religion of the Samurai, which 
6 Imagita Kosen was Shaku Soen's predecessor as abbot of the historic Rinzai temple Enkakuji in 
Kamakura. He was familiar with Anglo-American culture and the English language (Dumoulin, 1992). 
7 According to his autobiographical account, D.T. Suzuki (1986) states that Christmas Humphreys of 
The Buddhist Society of London said to D.T. Suzuki that he wanted to publish D.T. Suzuki's books, 
and took copies of his writings to England and published them there. D.T. Suzuki's translation of The 
Awakening of Faith was published in 1900 and his Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism in 1907. 
8 According to Dumoulin (1992), in Germany, Zen was also introduced by Rudolf Otto who is the 
Marburg philosopher of religion. He wrote the preface to the first book on Zen in German in 1925, and 
a collection of classical texts translated by a Zen Buddhist Ohasama Shuei, under the title Zen - Living 
Buddhism in Japan. Although Otto acknowledged his debt for his precocious appreciation of Zen to 
essays published by D.T. Suzuki in The Eastern Buddhist in 1922, his own sensitivity to the art of Zen 
remains remarkable (Dumoulin, 1992). 
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deals with Zen. However, D.T. Suzuki asserts that: "I guess I was the first to make a 
special study of Zen in English" (D.T. Suzuki, 1986: 21), since none of them 
mentioned above focused on Zen itself in the way D.T. Suzuki did. D.T. Suzuki 
wrote a number of books on Zen: Three Essays in Zen Buddhism (19271193211933), 
Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra (1930), Introduction to Zen Buddhism (193?), the 
Manual o/Zen Buddhism (1935), Zen and Japanese Culture (1940) and so forth. He 
also founded The Eastern Buddhist in 1927. D.T. Suzuki was talented in languages -
English, German, Japanese, Chinese, Sanskrit and Pali. He gave lectures on Zen 
several times in America and Europe. 
Given his academic approach, it is understandable that D.T. Suzuki had a great 
influence on Western Buddhist scholarship. L.A. Fader (1986) asserts: "Not only did 
[D.T. Suzuki] translate Buddhist and Zen materials into English, but he also had a 
significant effect on such other translators as Paul Carus ... Dwight Goddard, Edward 
Conze, and R.H. Blyth" (Fader, 1986: 98-99).9 D.T. Suzuki's contribution to the West 
was not only the area of religious dialogue and Buddhist scholarship but also the field 
of psychology and psychotherapy. Particularly, D.T. Suzuki had a profound influence 
on Carl Jung, Erich Fromm, and Karen Homey. Jung wrote the Foreword to Heinrich 
Zimmer's 1939 German translation of Suzuki's An Introduction to Zen Buddhism, 
which originally published in English in 1934. Jung met D.T. Suzuki during the 1953 
Eranos conference and invited him to lecture in Switzerland (Fader, 1986). Fromm 
learned of Zen Buddhism through D.T. Suzuki's writings and by attending his lectures 
at Columbia University during the 1950's. In 1957 he organised a workshop on Zen 
Buddhism and psychoanalysis in Cuernavaca, Mexico. It was an important point of 
contact between the field of psychology and D.T. Suzuki's interpretation of Zen. D.T. 
Suzuki's speech at the workshop was later published as 'Lectures on Zen Buddhism' 
together with Fromm's address entitled 'Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism' and that 
of Richard DeMartino entitled 'The Human Situation and Zen Buddhism,' in a 
volume which Fromm edited and called Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis (1960). 
9 Such personalities as C. Humphreys, Alan Watts, A.C. March, H.P. Blavatsky also came under D.T. 
Suzuki's influence. Moreover, thinkers of the stature of Martin Heidegger, James Bisset Pratt and 
Arnold Toynbee; writers and artists like Jackson Pollack, Herbert Read, Rudolf Ray, J.D. Salinger, 
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5.1.5 D.T. Suzuki's Zen Buddhism 
It is important to discuss the role of D.T. Suzuki in introducing Zen Buddhism to the 
West as Jung's understanding of Zen was mainly based on his commentaries. D.T. 
Suzuki was specially interested in the psychology of Zen, for he had discovered the 
significance of Zen for individual development. In his autobiographical account, D.T. 
Suzuki asserts: 
Technology and science are quite splendid, but they tend to create an attitude of 
indifference toward the value of the individual. Individuality is much talked 
about in the West, but it is in legal or political terms that it is prized. In terms of 
religion or faith, however, concern among Westerners with regard to 
individuality is extremely weak. Furthermore, with industrialization or 
mechanization, man comes to be used as a thing, and, as a result, the unbounded 
creativity of mankind is destroyed. Therefore, in order to emphasize the 
importance of true individuality and human creativity, I consider it necessary to 
write about Zen more and more. 
(D.T. Suzuki, 1986: 25) 
D.T. Suzuki's psychologising style of writing mainly resulted from the influence of 
William James (1842-1910).10 Clarke (1997) argues: "[D.T. Suzuki's] thinking owes 
a lot to that of William James, not so much because of the latter's interest in Eastern 
thought, but because of James's pragmatic approach to religion, his emphasis on 
experience rather than metaphysical theory, and most especially because of his 
phenomenological analysis of mysticism" (Clarke, 1997: 152). For instance, in an 
early essay D.T. Suzuki expanded William James's characteristics of mystical states 
of mind - ineffability, transience, and passivity - to eight characteristics of saton· -
irrationality, intuitive insight, authoritativeness, affirmation, sense of the beyond, 
impersonal tone, feeling of exaltation, and momentariness. Especially after his 
meeting with Jung, psychological issues such as the unconscious and the self 
frequently appear in D.T. Suzuki's writings. 11 Moreover, D.T. Suzuki was also 
influenced by German Romanticism and was stimulated into theorising about the 
unconscious by C.G. Caruso Furthermore he was influenced by Christian mysticism 
as a result of the work of Meister Eckhart (Dumoulin, 1979: 6). In view of all these 
Merce Cunningham, Jackson MacLow or Dizzy Gillespie; Philosophers of religion such as John Cobb, 
Richard DeMartino or Huston Smith, were also influenced by D.T. Suzuki (Fader, 1986). 
10 According to Sharf (1995), D.T. Suzuki's American wife, Beatrice Erskine Lane (1878-1938) had 
contact with William James. Jung was also influenced by James whom he met in America 1909. For 
the details of Jung's meeting with James, see Chapter 1. 
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Western influences on D.T. Suzuki, it is also likely that D.T. Suzuki was greatly 
influenced by Jung himself and his psychological theory. 
Dumoulin takes a critical view of D.T. Suzuki's psychologised writings on 
Zen and argues, "[D.T. Suzuki's] achievement in releasing Zen from its maternal 
Buddhist soil and his penchant for psychologizing and universalizing inevitably 
tended to obscure the original Buddhist character of Zen" (Dumoulin, 1992: 8). As a 
Rinzai Buddhist, D.T. Suzuki focused on the experience of enlightenment, satori, and 
on the paradoxical koans that lead to that experience. Therefore satori and koan 
became the most familiar Zen terms in the West. However, he neglected the other 
major school of Soto Zen which emphasises the insistence on meditation in everyday 
life. Dumoulin asserts: "This neglect is not merely a superficial deficiency; it 
profoundly affects the character of what has been called 'Suzuki Zen,' leading to an 
excessive emphasis on the paradoxical and irrational" (Ibid., 5). 
Particular mention should also be made concerning Zen, D.T. Suzuki and 
Japanese nationalism. First of all, Zen was introduced to Western scholarship not 
through the efforts of Western orientalists, which was the case with most other 
Buddhist traditions, but through activists belonging to an elite circle of internationally 
minded Japanese intellectuals and Zen priests. These Japanese Zen propagators 
emerged out of the profound social and political turmoil engendered by the rapid 
Westernisation and modernisation of Japan in the Meiji period (1868-1912). In the 
early years of the Meiji, religion had become the subject of a devastating critique and 
persecution known as abolishing Buddhism and destroying the teachings of 
Shakyamuni' (Jap. haibutsu kishaku). The early Meiji Japanese Government 
considered Buddhism to be a corrupt, decadent, antisocial, superstitious creed and 
inimical to Japan's need for scientific and technological advancement. The university 
educated intellectuals admitted to the corruption and decay of Buddhism but at the 
same time they insisted that such corruption lies not in Buddhism itself but merely 
resulted from the fact that Buddhism had strayed from its pure spiritual roots. The 
solution was to reform Buddhism from within and the result came to be know in Japan 
as the New Buddhism (Jap. shin bukkyo), which was modem, cosmopolitan, 
11 D.T. Suzuki first met Jung during the 1953 Eranos conference and since then his tendency to 
psychologise Zen was often seen in his works. 
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humanistic, and socially responsible. Sharf asserts that: "This reconstructed 
Buddhism, under the guise of 'true' or 'pure' Buddhism, was conceived of as a 'world 
religion' ready to take its rightful place alongside other universal creeds" (Sharf, 
1995: 110). 
Sharf argues that D.T. Suzuki was very much a product of Meiji New 
Buddhism. While Zen experience is the universal ground of religious truth, D.T. 
Suzuki attempted to characterise Zen as an expression of a uniquely Japanese 
spirituality. D.T. Suzuki's notion of nihonjinron (the discourse on 'Japaneseness') 
argues that Zen typifies the innate spirituality of the Japanese, a position which is 
contradictory to the fact that Zen originated in China. To resolve this issue D.T. 
Suzuki simply said there are differences between Chinese and Japanese Zen, for 
Chinese Zen did not permeate the everyday life of the people unlike Japanese Zen 
(Sharf, 1995: 128). Not only D.T. Suzuki but also Nishida Kitaro,12 Hisamatsu 
Shin'ichi, and their followers were most responsible for laying the intellectual 
foundation for Zen in the West. However they did not emerge from traditional Zen 
monastic settings but were educated proponents of post-Meiji New Buddhism (Sharf, 
1995: 135). They were university graduates who successfully pursued academic 
careers in their own country. The universities in which they studied and later taught 
were modelled on systems largely imported from the West. Thus on the one hand 
students were introduced to Western thought and European philosophy, and on the 
other hand teachers actively sought to formulate a Japanese response to the challenge 
posed by Western culture, science, and technology. This response identifies and 
defends a spiritual sensibility, which is characterised as uniquely Japanese. Sharf 
argues: " their agenda was a species of nihonjinron - a popular discursive enterprise 
decocted to the delineation and explication of the unique qualities of the Japanese, 
which invariably touts the cultural homogeneity as well as the moral and spiritual 
superiority of the Japanese vis-a.-vis other peoples" (Sharf, 1995: 136). 
Nihonjinron thought created by men such as D.T. Suzuki, and Hisamatsu is 
very popular among Western scholars. 13 However, Sharf argues, 
12 Nishida is a Japanese philosopher and his major work is Zen no Kenkyu [A Study of the Good], 
1991. 
13 Nishitani Keiji, who is a student of both Nishida and Heidegger, also had considerable influence on 
Western students of Japanese philosophy, theology, and Zen thought. 
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The irony ... , is that the 'Zen' that so captured the imagination of the West was in 
fact a product of the New Buddhism of the Meiji. Moreover, those aspects of 
Zen most attractive to the Occident - the emphasis on spiritual experience and 
the devaluation of institutional forms - were derived in large part from 
Occidental sources. Like Narcissus, Western enthusiasts fails to recognize their 
own reflection in the mirror being held out to them. 
(Sharf, 1995: 140) 
Sharf argues that the popular conception of Zen in the West is indeed, "not only 
conceptually incoherent but also a woeful misreading of traditional Zen doctrine, 
altogether controverted by the lived contingencies of Zen monastic practice" (Sharf, 
1995: 107). It would seem that the writings of D.T. Suzuki and Hisamatsu are not 
representative of traditional and pre-Meiji Zen definitions, and that the style of Zen 
training familiar to Western Zen practitioners is influenced by Meiji New Buddhism 
and has little impact from the traditional Rinzai or Soto monastic orthodoxies. The 
popular conception of Zen in the West is in fact of relatively marginal status within 
authentic Japanese Zen monasticism. Sharf asserts, "while Suzuki, Nishida, and their 
intellectual heirs may have shaped the manner in which Westerns have come to think 
of Zen, the influence of these Japanese intellectuals on the established Zen sects in 
Japan has been negligible" (Sharf, 1995: 141). The problem is that many Western 
scholars, including Jung, "uncritically accept these Japanese missionaries as living 
representatives of an unbroken tradition, and ... refuse to acknowledge the ideological 
and rhetorical dimensions of the Zen of men like Suzuki" (Ibid., 145). Thus Jung, 
who was misled by D.T. Suzuki's Zen and uncritically embraced the distortion and 
confusion which were brought forth by D.T. Suzuki as Zen wisdom, had unfortunately 
no way to ascertain the orthodox reading of Zen Buddhism. 
5.2 Jung's relation to Zen Buddhism 
5.2.1 Jung's view on sator; 
lung's interest in Zen was triggered by D.T. Suzuki's Introduction to Zen Buddhism, 
which was translated into German by Heinrich Zimmer and published in Germany in 
1939, and for which Jung wrote a foreword. Jung was interested in Zen, particularly 
in its characteristic of transcending rational thinking and words, and its reliance on 
experience rather than on theories or written teachings. Jung believed that: "there was 
a point at which the understanding and transformation of the psyche could only 
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proceed along a path that went beyond words" (Clarke, 1994: 130). Jung assumed 
that Zen is not offering a system of thought but a certain kind of experience. Jung 
asserted, 
The intellect is essentially concerned with elaboration. A rare philosophic 
passion is needed to compel the attempt to get beyond intellect and break 
through to a 'knowledge of the knower.' Such a passion is practically 
indistinguishable from the driving force of religion; consequently this whole 
problem belongs to the religious transformation process, which is 
incommensurable with intellect. 
(CW 11: 892) 
Jung found the satori or enlightenment experience, which is 'the raison d 'etre of 
Zen', and 'a strange conception' (CW 11: 877). Jung gave an example to illustrate the 
enlightenment experience by quoting from D.T. Suzuki's book, 
A monk once went to Gensha, and wanted to learn where the entrance to the 
path of truth was. Gensha asked him, 'Do you hear the murmuring of the 
brook?' 'Yes, I hear it,' answered the monk. 'There is the entrance,' the Master 
instructed him. 
(CW 11: 878) 
However bizarre satori may be, Jung believed that satori, "is not a question of 
mystification and mumbo-jumbo, but rather of an experience which strikes the 
experient dumb" (CW 11: 881). Therefore satori can be experienced as something 
utterly unexpected. Jung asserted, "The occurrence of satori is interpreted and 
formulated as a break-through, by a consciousness limited to the ego-form, into the 
non-ego-like self' (CW 11: 887). Jung agreed with Kaiten Nukariya's view on satori 
enlightenment as, "an emancipation of mind from illusion concerning self' (CW 11: 
884). In Jung's view the illusion concerning the nature of self means "the common 
confusion of the self with the ego" (CW 11: 884). He continued, 
[The self] is always something other than the ego, and inasmuch as a higher 
insight of the ego leads over to the self, the self is a more comprehensive thing 
which includes the experience of the ego and therefore transcends it. Just as the 
ego is a certain experience I have of myself, so is the self an experience of my 
ego. It is, however, no longer experienced in the form of a broader or higher 
ego, but in the form of a non-ego. 
(CW 11: 885, Italics added) 
Jung understood the satori experience to be, "a suppression of the ego by the self, 
which is endued with the 'Buddha nature' or divine universality" (CW 11: 888). 
Similarly, in Jung's view, yoga in India and Buddhism in China supplies the driving 
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force for attempts to wrench oneself free from bondage to a state of consciousness. 
Jung also saw a similar tradition in Western mysticism and said, "its texts are full of 
instructions as to how man can and must release himself from the 'I-ness' of his 
consciousness, so that through knowledge of his own nature he may rise above it and 
attain the inner (godlike) man" (CW 11, 890, Jung's bracket). Consequently it creates 
a new state of consciousness. 
This new state of consciousness born of religious practice is distinguished by 
the fact that outward things no longer affect an ego-bound consciousness, thus 
giving rise to mutual attachment, but that an empty consciousness stands open to 
another influence. This 'other' influence is no longer felt as one's own activity, 
but as that of a non-ego which has the conscious mind as its object. It is as if 
the subject-character of the ego had been overrun, or taken over, by another 
subject which appears in place of the ego. 
(CW 11, 890, Italics added) 
This statement suggests that in sa tori experience the ego becomes itself the object of 
another subject, the self. Jung clearly asserted that, "The occurrence of satori is 
interpreted and formulated as a break-through, by a consciousness limited to the ego-
form, into the non-ego-like self' (CW 11: 887, Jung's italics). This is very close to 
Jung's idea of the individuation process in which there is a shifting of the centre of 
gravity from the ego to the self. However, Jung's view on satori may seem to be 
inconsistent. In the letter to 1. Kirsch in 1958, Jung claimed that to interpret satori 
experience as an imageless condition is un-psychological, and thus it is 
incomprehensible. Jung insisted that in satori experience there must be an image, as 
one should always have a conscious memory of it. Jung said if no conscious ego is 
present, and nothing ever can be perceived, and thus there can be no conscious 
memory. J ung wrote, 
If there are people in the East who claim to have had an imageless experience, 
you must always remember that the report is as a rule highly unpsychological. 
It is the tradition that satori experience is imageless and they therefore say it was 
imageless. That it cannot possibly have been imageless is proved by the fact 
that they remember something definite. Had it been totally imageless they could 
never say they remember something, since the memory is an image of 
something that has been... I have never really succeeded in convincing an 
Indian that if no conscious ego is present there can be no conscious memory 
either... But in the satori experience something is perceived, namely that an 
illumination or something of the sort has occurred. This is a definite image 
which can even be compared with the tradition and brought into harmony with 
it. I therefore regard this assertion of an imageless condition as an uncritical and 
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unpsychological statement due to lack of psychological differentiation. This 
lack also explains why it is so difficult for us to have any real contact with such 
people, and it is no accident that the only person who was able to give you a 
satisfactory answer is himself an observant psychologist. It is simply not to be 
comprehended how an experience can be established as having happened if 
nobody is there who has had it. This 'nobody' who establishes it is always an 
ego. If no ego is present nothing whatever can be perceived. 
(Letters II: 466-7) 
This statement suggests that Jung saw satari experience only through his 
psychological framework in which there is no consciousness without the ego. Hence 
Jung interpreted satari as non-ego state, the concept of which he does not agreed with. 
The problem with Jung's view on satari is that in some places Jung misunderstood its 
concept by interpreting it as the loss of ego like in the last stage of yoga, samadhi, in 
which the flow of consciousness is so completely identified with the object alone that 
there is a complete loss of ego consciousness. Yet, satari enlightenment in Zen 
Buddhism does not indicate the complete loss of the ego but an empty state of mind, 
no-mind (mu-shin). Shunryu Suzuki (1970), the Japanese Soto Zen master, states that 
when you sit in zazen you will have a genuine experience of an empty state of mind. 
The idea of emptiness is the most important concept in the Prajna Paramita Sutra. 14 
In fact the emptiness of mind is the original essence of mind in Zen Buddhism. As 
discussed earlier, Jung never conceived of consciousness without the ego. However, 
his earlier claim of the objectification of the ego (the ego becomes itself the object of 
an another subject, the self) does not seem to indicate the loss of the ego but is similar 
to the concept of emptiness or Hakuin's concept of 'great death', in which one has to 
objectify one's ego and to abandon any intentional standpoint at all and thus create 
empty consciousness. 
Satari enlightenment is described by Hakuin in terms of his idea of the 'great 
doubt' and 'great death.' Hakuin considered the great doubt to be a necessary stage 
on the path to enlightenment. Kasulis argues that the ultimate aim of the great doubt 
is to help the student enter into without-thinking - a nonconceptual, nondiscriminating 
consciousness (Kasulis, 1981: 112). But students normally think this impossible 
14 In The Zen Doctrine of No Mind D.T. Suzuki argues, "Hui-neng's concept of nothingness (wu-i-wu) 
may push one down into a bottomless abyss, which will no doubt create a feeling of utter forlornness. 
The philosophy of Prajnaparamita, which is also that of Hui-neng's, generally has this effect. To 
understand it a man requires a deep religious intellectual insight into the truth of Sunyata" (D.T. 
Suzuki, 1949: 24). 
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because "the more effort exerted in trying to break down thinking, the more deeply 
one is entrapped in nihilistic non-thinking" (Kasulis, 1981: 113). P. Harvey argues 
that in a profound state of perplexity, the student meets the 'doubt sensation', "a pure, 
countless, existential 'great doubt'" (Harvey, 1990: 274). Only when the student 
pushes on and on, throwing himself into the abyss of doubt, the breakthrough comes 
suddenly. "The deeper he goes into the doubt, the more through will be the 'great 
death' - the death of aspects of ego" (Harvey, 1990: 275). Kasulis points out the great 
death of the ego in the following passage: 
Hakuin's Great Death did not allow any conceptualization to enter 
consciousness; but this was unsatisfactory. To detach oneself wilfully from all 
thinking, one has to objectify one's own thought process, and in so doing one 
takes an intentional attitude toward thought. This means that one has also 
objectified one's self - one has not yet experienced the Great Death of the ego. 
When that last residual sense of the self is finally abandoned, however, one no 
longer takes any intentional standpoint at all. As pure without-thinking, one's 
formally empty consciousness is suddenly filled by the simple sounding-of-the-
bell. There is no I and no bell but rather the hearing of the bell: the 
apprehending of perfect genjokoan. This is the pure state of without-thinking. 
(Kasulis, 1981: 115) 
Harvey asserts that, "the conceptual, reasoning mind has reached its absolute dead-
end, and the 'bottom' of the mind is broken through, so that the flow of thoughts 
suddenly stops, in a state of no-thought, and realization erupts from the depths" 
(Harvey, 1990: 273). Therefore, there is nothing but a blissful, radiant emptiness 
beyond self and other, words or concepts. 
Jung interpreted the koan practice as aiming at the complete destruction of the 
rational intellect and consequently creating an almost perfect lack of conscious 
presuppositions. Jung asserts that in koan technique these conscious presuppositions 
are "excluded as far as possible, but not unconscious presuppositions - that is, the 
existing but unrecognized psychological disposition, which is anything but empty or a 
tabula rasa" (CW 11: 895). Jung believes that if consciousness is emptied of its 
contents, they will fall into a state of unconscious. Jung saw this displacement occur 
in Zen koan technique. The displacement usually results from, "the energy being 
withdrawn from conscious contents and transferred either to the conception of 
'emptiness' or to the koan" (CW 11: 898). Jung then argues that, "the energy thus 
saved goes over to the unconscious and reinforces its natural charge to bursting point. 
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This increases the readiness of the unconscious contents to break through into 
consciousness" (CW 11: 898). lung argues that the complete destruction of the 
rational intellect aimed at the koan training creates an almost perfect lack of conscious 
presuppositions. lung claims, 
What the unconscious nature of the pupil presents to the teacher or to the koan 
by way of an answer is, manifestly, satori. This seems, at least to me, to be the 
view which, to judge by the descriptions, formulates the nature of satori more or 
less correctly. 
(CW 11: 895) 
Toshihiko Izutsu (1977) examines the two theoretical possibilities of the state of 
sa tori enlightenment in terms of the relation between the interior and exterior. He 
describes them as "(1) The interior becoming exterior, or the externalization of the 
internal. (2) The exterior becoming interior, or the internalization of the external 
world" (lzutsu, 1977: 199). Izutsu argues that in the first case one suddenly 
experiences one's 'I' losing its own existential identity and becoming completely 
fused into, and identified with, an 'external' object. That is to say, "the 'I' is no 
longer an I as an independent entity: It is no longer a subject standing against the 
objective world" (lzutsu, 1977: 199, Italics added). The very absorption of the whole 
person - the mind-and-body - in the external activity, for example, sweeping the 
ground, has exactly the same function as that of being absorbed in profound 
meditation. Izutsu asserts that, "it is the actualization of what Zen usually calls the 
state of the 'no-mind' (wu-hsin, l.: mu-shin)" (lzutsu, 1977: 202). Since there is no 
consciousness of the 'I' as distinguished from the things, there is here no distinction 
between the interior and exterior. 
In the second case, Izutsu argues, what has heretofore been regarded as 
'external' to one's self becomes suddenly taken into the mind. Then everything that 
happens and is observed in the 'external' world comes to be seen as a working of the 
mind, as a particular self-determination of the mind. Thus even 'external' events 
come to be seen as an 'internal' events. Izutsu describes this as, "the sudden 
realization of the ontological transparency of all things, including both the things 
existing in the 'external' world and the human subject which is ordinarily supposed to 
be looking at them from the outside. Both the 'external' things and the 'internal' of 
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man divest themselves of their ontological opaqueness, become totally transparent, 
pervade each other, and become submerged into one" (Izutsu, 1977: 203-4). 
Izutsu's account of satari experience in which'!, is no longer an I as an 
independent entity but is no longer a subject standing against the objective world 
seems to be very similar to Jung's notion of objectification of the ego by the self 
during individuation. For Jung the self is higher than the ego and it is now the self as 
an ultimate subject that experiences and perceives through the ego. This is the heart 
of the process of individuation. Izutsu then claims everything that is observed in the 
external world comes to be seen as a working of the mind, namely external events 
come to be seen as internal events. This is also very similar to what Jung calls the 
shifting of the centre of gravity from the ego to the self (CW 11: 958). 
Jung regards satari as psychological problem. Thus he was not concerned 
with whether a person is really enlightened or not, but with what the person has 
experienced as a satari. For Jung, whatever the person experiences is a psychic fact. 
Therefore it is not important for Jung whether the person has an actual satari 
experience or just had an imaginary experience. Jung argued, 
... we can never decide definitely whether a persona is really 'enlightened' or 
'released,' or whether he merely imagines it. We have no criteria to go on. 
Moreover, we know well enough that an imaginary pain is often far more 
agonising than a so-called real one, since it is accompanied by a subtle moral 
suffering caused by a dull feeling of secret self-accusation. In this sense, 
therefore, it is not a question of 'actual fact' but of psychic reality, i.e., the 
psychic process known as satori. 
(CW 11: 888) 
Jung believed that every psychic process is an image and imagining, therefore the 
consciousness could exist and the occurrence has phenominality. Jung went on to say, 
The person who has the enlightenment, or alleges that he has it, thinks at all 
events that he is enlightened. What others think about it decides nothing 
whatever for him in regard to his experience. Even if he were lying his lie 
would still be a psychic fact. Indeed, even if all the reports of religious 
experiences were nothing but deliberate inventions and falsifications, a very 
interesting psychological treatise could still be written about the incidence of 
such lies, and with the same scientific objectivity with which one describes the 
psychopathology of delusional ideas. 
(CW 11: 889) 
Contrary to Jung's view, Erich Fromm argues that, "It is very important to understand 
that the state of enlightenment is not a state of dissociation or of a trance in which one 
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believes oneself to be awakened" (Fromm, 1960: 116). Fromm criticised Jung's, 
"general relativistic position with regard to the 'truth' of religious experience" (Ibid. 
116). Fromm believed that "a lie is never' a spiritual fact,' nor any other fact, for that 
matter, except that of being a lie" (Ibid., 116). In contrast to Jung's interpretation of 
sa tori experience, Fromm argues, 
Jung's position is certainly not shared by Zen Buddhists. On the contrary, it is 
of crucial importance for them to differentiate between genuine satori 
experience, in which the acquisition of a new viewpoint is real, and hence true, 
and a pseUdo-experience which can be of a hysterical or psychotic nature, in 
which the Zen student is convinced of having obtained satori, while the Zen 
master has to make it clear that he has not. It is precisely one of the fictions of 
the Zen master to be on guard against his student's confusion of real and 
imaginary enlightenment. 
(Fromm, 1960: 116) 
As mentioned earlier, in the course of Zen Buddhist practice, the mind experiences 
various disturbances, which hinder progress and divert one from the goal of 
enlightenment. These disturbances are called makyo. Philip Kapleau (1965) accounts 
for the illusory visions and sensations during the Zen practice. Kapleau argues that, 
"Makyo are the phenomena - visions, hallucinations, fantasies, revelations, illusory 
sensations - which one practising zazen is apt to experience at a particular stage in his 
sitting" (Kapleau, 1965: 41). Ma means devil and kyo is the objective world. Makyo 
are disturbing phenomena and, "become a serious obstacle to practice only if one is 
ignorant of their true nature and is ensnared by them" (Kapleau, 1965: 42). Zen 
masters warn against the fascination of makyo, which "are all the more dangerous the 
less student recognizes them for what they are" (Dumoulin, 1979: 141). When a 
student confuses them with enlightenment, he would be led far astray. It is the 
master's task to prevent the student from being affected by makyo and guide the 
student to a healthy state. W. Johnston (1970) argues that the one big difference 
between Jung's view on visions and imaginations and the makyo of Zen is that 
"whereas the Zen tradition regards all visions as nonsensical things to be rejected, 
Jung looked upon these as important and significant messages from the unconscious" 
(Johnston, 1970: 58). 
Satori, for Jung, "is not that something different is seen, but that one sees 
differently, [and] is as though the spatial act of seeing were changed by a new 
dimension" (CW 11: 891, Jung's italics). Thus, for Jung, "Zen is anything but a 
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philosophy in the Western sense of the word" (CW 11: 881) because it goes beyond 
the sphere of intellect. Likewise, 
Nietzsche's Zarathustra is no longer philosophy at all: it is a dramatic process 
of transfonnation which has completely swallowed up the intellect. It is no 
longer concerned with thought, but, in the highest sense, with the thinker of 
thought - and this on every page of the book. A new man, a completely 
transfonned man, is to appear on the scene, one who has broken the shell of the 
old and who not only looks upon a new heaven and a new earth, but has created 
them. 
(CW 11: 892) 
lung's understanding of satori is based on his psychological theory of the 
compensatory relationship between the conscious and unconscious, "the unconscious 
contents bring to the surface everything that is necessary in the broadest sense for the 
completion and wholeness of conscious orientation" (CW 11: 899). To attain 
wholeness, not only consciousness but also the unconscious are necessary. lung 
argued that, "consciousness is always only a part of the psyche and therefore never 
capable of psychic wholeness: for that the indefinite extension of the unconscious is 
needed" (CW 11: 906). He claimed the goal of psychotherapy is to achieve psychic 
wholeness, which he called the individuation process. 
Individuation for lung denotes, "the process by which a person becomes a 
psychological 'in-dividual,' that is, a separate, indivisible unity or 'whole'" (CW 9i: 
489). The Individuation process is a vital concept in lung's contribution to the 
theories of personality development. It is a natural process, which sometimes may 
pursue its course without the knowledge of the individual. "The meaning and purpose 
of the process is the realization, in all its aspects, of the personality originally hidden 
away in the embryonic genn-plasm; the production and unfolding of the original, 
potential wholeness" (CW 7: 186). The process of individuation is a model and 
guiding principle for lung's method of treatment. lung believed that Zen 
demonstrated the significance of achieving completeness, "This Eastern method of 
psychic 'healing' - i.e., 'making whole'" (CW 11: 905) and it attracted him greatly 
because he believed it fitted very well with his theory of individuation process. 
The enlightenment experience in Zen Buddhism erupts when you finally 
complete the process of maturation, which is facilitated by intensive koan exercise. 
The enlightenment experience occurs suddenly, sometimes at the sound of the evening 
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bell, the stroke of a clock, or rain pattering outside. These sounds act as the catalyst. 
Shibayama Zenkei (1894-1874), the abbot ofNanzenji Temple in Kyoto, analysed and 
evaluated the remarks of Wu-men Hui-k'ai on the first kaan of the Mumankan. 
Shibayama explains in order to achieve the satari experience, 
one has to cut his ordinary self away and be reborn as a new Self in a different 
dimension. In other worlds, the student must personally have the inner 
experience called satori, by which he is reborn as the True self. This 
fundamental experience of awakening is essential in Zen. Although various 
different expressions are used when talking about the fact of his religious 
awakening, it cannot be real Zen without it. 
(Shibayama cited by Dumoulin, 1992: 132) 
Although the equation of enlightenment with the experience of the True Self 
corresponds to the tradition of the Sixth Patriarch, Shibayama uses the expression 
kensha, which means a vision of the essence or (one's own) nature (Dumoulin, 1992: 
133). The True Self, which is also called the original face one had before birth, is, in 
Shibayama's sense, identical to the essence or nature. Zen Master Yasutani's account 
of the essence of Zen enlightenment is as follows: 
Enlightenment means seeing through to your own essential nature, and this at 
the same time means seeing through to the essential nature of the cosmos and of 
all things. For seeing through to essential nature is the wisdom of 
enlightenment. One may call essential nature truth if one wants to. In 
Buddhism, from ancient times it has been called suchness or Buddha-nature or 
the one Mind. In Zen it has also been called nothingness, the one hand, or one's 
original face. The designations may be different, but the content is completely 
the same. 
(Yasutani cited by Dumoulin, 1979: 152) 
Satari enlightenment is the way to emptiness through which you can see your own 
essential nature, that is, Buddha-nature. By contrasting Jung's individuation process 
with the path to satari enlightenment in Zen Buddhism, it is clear that both processes 
are involved with personal transformation to a certain extent. As Shibayama asserted 
earlier, satari enlightenment is seen as an 'experience of awakening of the True Self,' 
and it is as if 'one has to cut his ordinary self away and be reborn as a new Self in a 
different dimension.' This is similar to Jung's idea of the individuation process, 
which "embraces our innermost, last, and incomparable uniqueness, it also implies 
becoming one's own self' (CW 7: 266). It involves the development of personality 
through a realisation of our whole being, that is, both parts of the total psyche, 
consciousness and the unconscious, are linked together. Jung stated that, "the goal [of 
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psychotherapy] is transformation - not one that is predetermined, but rather an 
indeterminable change, the only criterion of which is the disappearance of egohood" 
(CW 11: 904). But Jung emphasised that for Europeans, "a conscious ego and a 
cultivated understanding must first be produced through analysis before one can even 
think about abolishing egohood or rationalism" (CW 11: 904), because Jung believed 
that, "Zen and its technique could only have arisen on the basis of Buddhist culture , 
which it presupposes at every tum" (CW 11: 904), and thus that it is not a difficult 
task for a Zen adept to annihilate a rationalistic intellect. 
Nevertheless, the goal of Zen Buddhism differs from that of lung's 
individuation process. In the individuation process one strives for a psychic 
wholeness, which Jung calls the self. lung argues, 
What this means psychologically can be seen from the simple reflection that 
consciousness is always only a part of the psyche and therefore never capable of 
psychic wholeness: for that the indefinite extension of the unconscious is 
needed ... The attainment of wholeness requires one to stake one's whole being. 
Nothing less will do; there can be no easier conditions, no substitutes, no 
compromIses. 
(CW 11: 906) 
For Jung the self is a totality of the psyche which consists of both consciousness and 
the unconscious. It is therefore never completely known to the subject, because the 
part of it is unconscious. Zen, however, speaks of the self-awakening, that is, the self 
is most clearly awakened to itself. Thus in Zen enlightenment the student can 
experience the True Self, which is identical with one's own essential nature. I discuss 
this issue in more detail in the next section. 
5.2.2 Jung's view on no-mind (emptiness/sunyata) 
Before I discuss Jung's understanding of no-mind, the Zen Buddhist perspective on 
this term should be clarified. The Japanese characters for the term no-mind are 
composed of mu, which is no or nothingness, and shin, which means mind, spirit or 
heart. The term no-mind is historically related to no-thought (lap. munen, Ch. wu-
nien), which is the sixth Chinese Zen patriarch, Hui-neng's main doctrine of Zen. 
Upanishadic Philosophy emphasises the oneness of Brahman and atman, which is 
expressed only negatively in terms of neti, neti, and is understood as eternal, 
unchangeable and substantial. Buddhist tradition rejects the substantial nature of 
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atman, and instead advocates anatman or absence of eternal self and anitya or 
impermanence (Abe, 1985: 125). Another basic principle of Buddhism is pratitya 
samutpada, which can be translated as, "the conditional or causal interdependence of 
all things" (Kasulis, 1981: 43). In Buddhist teachings, it is important that everything 
is impermanent and is also despondently co-arising without an eternal and substantial 
selfhood. For instance, when one does not realise this truth, and becomes attached to 
one's possessions and oneself as though they are permanent and imperishable, one is 
under an illusion and will inevitably suffer. However when one awakens to this truth, 
one frees oneself from illusion and suffering, and eventually attains nirvana (Abe, 
1985: 126). The doctrine of no-mind is really an extension of all these ideas of 
anatman or absence of an eternal self, the impermanence of all things and dependent 
origination. 
Nagarjuna (ca. A.D. 150-250), the Indian founder of Madhyamika Buddhism, 
firstly established the idea of sunyata or emptiness. IS Nagarjuna's idea of emptiness 
is, "not nihilism but a supreme affirmation of the ultimate reality that lies beyond all 
categories and concepts" (Dumoulin, 1979: 48). Liberation from every possible 
duality concerning affirmation or negation, being or non-being as the standpoint of 
emptiness, is what Nagarjuna called the Middle Path. Its philosophy intends to seek 
something positive in all its negations. Abe states, 
[Nagarjuna's] idea of Emptiness is not a mere emptiness as opposed to fullness. 
Emptiness as Sunyata transcends and embraces both emptiness and fullness. It 
is really formless in the sense that it is liberated from both 'form' and 
'formlessness.' Thus, in Sunyata, Emptiness as it is Fullness and Fullness as it 
is Emptiness; formlessness as it is form and form as it is formless. This is why, 
for Nagarjuna, true Emptiness is wondrous Being. 
(Abe, 1985: 126-7) 
Logically speaking, sunyata is realised not only by negating the 'eternalist' view but 
also by negating the 'nihilist' view, which negates the former. This means that 
sunyata is not based on a mere negation but on a negation of the negation. This 
double negation is an absolute negation, which is at the same time an absolute 
affirmation, since the negation of the negation is affirmation. Yet, this absolute 
affirmation is not a mere and immediate affirmation, as it is realised only through 
double negation. Therefore, "absolute negation is absolute affirmation and absolute 
15 For the detailed discussion of the Madhyamika school, see Chapter Three. 
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affirmation is absolute negation" (Abe, 1985: 127). This paradoxical statement well 
express the structure of sunyata. Nishitani Keiji (1973) argues, 
[The] emptiness is not an emptiness represented as something besides being, 
apart from being. It is not simply an 'empty nothing' (kumu). It is an absolute 
emptiness which has emptied also these kinds of represented emptiness. 
Moreover, and for that reason, it is from the beginning at one with being. Being 
also is from the beginning one with emptiness. At the root of being, where 
being appears as originally one with emptiness, in the home-ground of being, 
emptiness appears as originally at one with being. 
(Nishitani, 1973: 72) 
Dumoulin argues that, "The insight into the nature of the self that is awakened in 
sudden enlightenment is an insight into emptiness, into nothingness" (Dumoulin, 
1979: 59). In order to attain the true self as the great affirmation, the total negation of 
total negation is necessary. Thus, "the true Self is realized only through the total 
negation of no-self, which is in tum the total negation of the ego-self' (Abe, 1985: 
10). All these expressions are in part negatively and in part positively formulated, 
such as non-seeing, non-thinking, non-clinging, non-form, no-mind, nature, self, 
mind, form suchness, sameness, equally indicate ultimate reality, such as Dharma, 
and Buddha (Dumoulin, 1979: 50). 
Jung saw the no-mind (emptinesslsunyata) as the unconscIOUS, as it is 
unknown to the subject. However, no-mind or sunyata is different from Jung's 
concept of the unconscious. As shown in Chapter Three, Jung failed to understand the 
concept of sunyata. In Jung's view sunyata means void. 
'As long as Sunyata is cognized by a subject it remains object.' But when the 
subject enters Sunyata and becomes identical with it, the subject itself is 
Sunyata, namely void. And when the void is really void, there is not even a 
cognizing subject in it. The subject has vanished and there cannot be a 
consciousness of this fact, because there is nothing left any more. There can be 
no memory of it, because there was nothing. 
(Letters I: 263, Jung's italics) 
Thus Jung claims that, "to experience Sunyata is therefore an impossible experience 
by definition ... and it is also impossible to experience consciousness in a field of 
which I know nothing" (Letters I: 263). Jung went on to state, 
If the highest psychic condition is Sunyata, then it cannot be consciousness, 
because consciousness is by definition the relationship between the subject and 
a representation. One is conscious of something. As long as you are conscious 
of Sunyata it is not Sunyata, because there is still a subject that is conscious of 
something. Void is even void of consciousness. 
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(Letters I: 249-50) 
These passages suggest that Jung ontologised the nature of sunyata and considered it 
as something substantial such as his idea of the unconscious. Kasulis claimed that , 
"No-thought or no-mind is not an unconscious state at all; it is an active awareness of 
the contents of experience as directly experienced (before the intervention of complex 
intellectual activity)" (Kasulis, 1981: 47-8). Dogen categorised threefold ways of 
thinking: thinking, not-thinking, and without-thinking. Thinking is considered as a 
conscious activity and the intent of weighing ideas. Not-thinking is an intentional 
activity and a certain fonn of thinking which negates or denies attitude. Without-
thinking, which is equivalent to the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness, sunyata, involves 
no intentional attitude whatsoever as it neither affinns nor denies. "It is a non-
conceptual or prereflective mode of consciousness" (Kasulis, 1981: 75). Kasulis 
continues, 
prereflectively there had been a continuity of consciousness or awareness even 
with the lack of intentional directionality. Even though the reflection on the act 
later revealed a content of which one had been conscious at the time of the act, 
there was, prereflectively, no assumptive, unconscious intentional attitude to 
constitute that content into a meaning-bearing object. 
(Kasulis, 1981: 75) 
Kasulis also argues that, "no-mind or no-thought is a state of consciousness in which 
the dichotomy between subject and object, experiencer and experienced, is overcome" 
(Kasulis, 1981: 47). Nagarjuna emphasised the idea of the non-differentiating, non-
objectifying insight or wisdom, which is called prajna. Kasulis states, "Prajna, a 
state of consciousness achieved through meditation ... , it is invaluable in reinforcing 
the awareness that all ideas, their pragmatic usefulness notwithstanding, stand on 
emptiness (sunyata)" (Kasulis, 1981: 25). The world itself is not illusory but our 
characterisations of the world are fundamentally self-contradictory, relative and 
tentative. Yet, "the enlightenment... is attainable only by breaking through rational, 
dualistic thinking; no finite object is grasped, but rather prajna, or transcendental 
wisdom is at work in a non-objective way" (Dumoulin, 1979: 48). There is an 
ontological difference between the concept of sunyata in Zen Buddhism and Jung's 
understanding of it. Zen Buddhist teaching does not discuss sunyata in tenns of 
ontology, whereas Jung's discussion of the unconscious, his explanation of sunyata, 
can be interpreted as assuming such an ontology, i.e., a substance-like thing. It would 
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seem that Jung was not aware of the ontological difference between sunyata in Zen 
and his concept of the unconscious, and that he interpreted Zen Buddhist literatures in 
terms of ontological assumptions with which he was familiar. 
There is a further difference between Jung's understanding of no-mind as the 
unconscious and Zen doctrine of no-mind as emptiness or sunyata. The unconscious 
of Jungian analytical psychology is composed of the personal unconscious, which is 
derived from individual experience, and the collective unconscious, which does not 
derive from the subjective but has a universal character. They are both unknown to 
the subject. Whereas no-mind in Zen is, 
not only known, but most clearly known, as it is called 'Kaku' (awakening) or 
'ryoryo jochi' (always clearly comprehending). But this is not a state in which 
something is merely known. Rather, it is a clear 'self-wakening in and to itself 
that is without a separation between knower and known, 'No-Mind' is a state in 
which self is most clearly awakened to itself, such as when we are utterly 
absorbed in our work. 
(Hisamatsu, 1992: 117) 
In view of the fact that the self in Zen is most clearly awake to itself, Jung's notion of 
the self is not parallel to the concept of the self in Zen Buddhism. In Jung's view the 
self is made up of both the ego-consciousness and the unconscious, which is unknown 
and disturbs the ego. By contrast, the self in Zen is unbounded self-awakening and 
perfect liberation from every possible duality concerning affirmation or negation, 
being or non-being. Therefore, "the' Self of Zen is neither the ego of psychoanalysis, 
which is excited and disturbed by the unconscious, nor is it the self, which is 
composed of ego and unconscious" (Hisamatsu, 1992: 117). Abe (1992) argues that, 
"there is no suggestion of the realization of the No-self in Jung. Since the No-self that 
is the nonsubstantiality of self, is not clearly realized in Jung, it therefore remains as 
something unknown to the ego" (Abe, 1992: 133-4). In sum, a fundamental 
distinction between Zen Buddhist no-mind/self and Jung's concept of the self is that 
the former is the non-substantiality of the self and is fully awaken to itself; and the 
latter is an ontological concept involving both the conscious and the unconscious, and 
is not fully known to the ego-consciousness, as it is partly unconscious. 
5.3 A dialogue between Jung's Analytical Psychology and Zen Buddhism 
5.3.1 Jung-Hisamatsu dialogue 
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On May 16, 1958, Shin'ichi Hisamatsu, who is a Zen scholar and professor of 
Buddhism at Kyoto University, visited Jung at his home in Kiisnacht, Switzerland, 
and they discussed the relationship of Jung's psychology to Zen, in particular, Jung's 
notion of the self and the Zen concept of no-mind. This dialogue is of great 
significance for Jung's understanding of Zen and it has been of great importance to 
Jung scholars. However the context of the dialogue and the transcripts made available 
are problematic. According to DJ. Meckel and R.L. Moore (1992), the transcription 
of the dialogue was complied by Koichi Tsujimura (in Japanese) and by Aniela Jaffe 
(in Gennan). In 1960 Koji Sato, the editor of Psychologia, a Japanese journal 
published in English, asked Jung to revise an English translation of the Japanese text 
for pUblication. However Jung declined because he believed there was a lack of a 
satisfactory mutual understanding between Jung and Hisamatsu during their 
conversation. After Jung's death, the Japanese text was first published in Fushin, a 
magazine connected to Hisamatsu's group. In 1968, seven years after Jung's death, 
Tsujimura's Japanese version of a protocol of the text was translated into English by 
Sachi Toyomura, and published under the title "On the Unconscious, the Self, and the 
Therapy: A Dialogue," in Psychologia, Vol. 11. 1968, pp. 25-32. The text of the 
dialogue was reprinted, with both Jung and Hisamatsu's commentaries on the 
conversation, and was edited and revised by Daniel J. Meckel and Robert L. Moore, 
Self and Liberation: Jung/Buddhism Dialogue, 1992, pp. 100-118. However, in this 
translation from Tsujimura's Japanese transcription, there are a number of 
misunderstandings and mistranslations. Recently, the Gennan text transcribed by 
Jaffe was translated into English by Muramoto Shoji and published in The Couch and 
the Tree: Dialogue in Psychoanalysis and Buddhism, pp. 37-51. Muramoto clarified 
mis-translations and misunderstandings of Tsujimura's Japanese transcription. 
Muramoto's transcription is clearly superior and is the one used in this chapter. In the 
conversation Hisamatsu asked Jung for a definition of no-mind: 
SH: To date there have been many interpretations of wu-hsin. It is, therefore, 
absolutely necessary to find a true and strict definition for the tenn from the 
standpoint of Zen. This is extremely important. I would like to hear your 
thoughts on the matter? 
CGJ: It is the unknown which affects me psychologically, the unknown which 
disturbs or influences, whether positively or negatively. Thus I notice that 
it exists, but what it is, I don't know. 
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SH: Is this 'unknown' something different from the unconscious? From the 
collective unconscious? 
CGJ: The unknown disturbs or influences me in certain forms, otherwise I could 
not speak of it. Sometimes I sense that a personal memory is bothering me, 
or exerting an influence on me; other times I have dreams, ideas or fantasies 
that do not have a personal origin. Their source is not the subjective; rather 
they have a universal equality. For example, the image I have of my father 
is a personal image. But when this image possesses a religious quality, it is 
no longer solely connected to the personal realm. 
(Jung and Hisamatsu in Muramoto, 1998: 40-1) 
In this conversation Jung suggested no-mind is something which is unknown, and is 
equivalent to the unconscious. Jung believed that the unconscious is unknown in the 
sense that it stands behind the ego. The ego is the centre of consciousness, and all our 
experience of the outer and inner worlds must pass through our ego in order to be 
perceived. Thus, "relations to the ego that are not perceived as such are the 
unconscious" (CW 6: 700). In the conversation Hisamatsu asked Jung for his idea of 
the self. 
SH: Which then is our real self, our putative'!': the unconscious or conscious? 
CGJ: Consciousness refers to itself as '1.' The self is no mere '1.' The self is 
the whole personality - you as a totality - consisting of consciousness and 
the unconscious. This is the whole, or the self, but I know only 
consciousness; the unconscious remains unknown to me. 
SH: In your view, the self is a totality. This prompts the following question: Is 
I -consciousness different from self-consciousness? 
CGJ: In ordinary usage, one says self-consciousness, but that only means 1-
consciousness, psychologically speaking. The self is unknown because it 
indeed designates the whole of the person, both conscious and unconscious. 
The conscious person you are is known to you, but the unconscious person 
you are is unknown to you. The human self is beyond description, because 
it is only one-third, or perhaps two-thirds, in the realm of experience, and 
that part belongs to the '1.' That which is known, however, does not 
encompass the self. The vernacular expression 'self-consciousness; 
translates psychologically as I-consciousness. The self is much more than 
the '1.' 
SH: So the selfis unknown? 
CGJ: Perhaps only half of it is known, and that is the '1.' The half of the self. 
(Jung and Hisamatsu in Muramoto, 1998: 42) 
This is the key passage in relation to Jung's quotation earlier where Jung said that the 
ego, during individuation, becomes itself the object of another subject, the self.
16 
Apparently, however, this passage above suggests that the ultimate subject is 
16 See lung's quote (CW 11: 890) in the section 5.2.2. 
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restricted by its object, the ego. Jung asserts, "The ego stands to the self as the moved 
to the mover, or as object to subject, because the determining factors which radiate out 
from the self surround the ego on all sides and are therefore supraordinate to it. The 
self, like the unconscious, is an a priori existent out of which the ego evolves" (CW 
11: 391). But Jung also recognises that the two systems need each other, since 
without the ego nothing whatever can be perceived and thus the self remains without a 
presence. Jung claims: "Everything requires for its existence its own opposites, or 
else it fades into nothingness. The ego needs the self and vice versa" (CW 11: 961). 
It is very important to note that Jung made a crucial statement over the issue of 
liberation from suffering. In the following dialogue, Jung answered negatively a 
question concerning the possibility of gaining freedom from suffering all at once. 
SH: Yes. Can psychotherapy liberate us from suffering in one fell swoop? 
CGJ: Liberate from suffering? One tries to reduce suffering yet some suffering 
is always present. There would be nothing beautiful if the beautiful were 
not in contrast with ugliness or suffering. The German philosopher 
Schopenhauer once said: 'Happiness is the cessation of suffering.' We 
need suffering. Otherwise, life would no longer be interesting. 
Psychotherapy must not disturb the problem of suffering too much in 
people. Otherwise, people would become dissatisfied. 
SH: Suffering is, in a sense, necessary for life. You are right. Nevertheless, we 
have a genuine wish to be liberated from it. 
CGJ: Of course, if there is too much of it. The physician strives to reduce 
suffering, not to put an end to it. 
(Jung and Hisamatsu in Muramoto, 1998: 44-5) 
In the following conversation, however, Jung answered in the affirmative when 
Hisamatsu asked Jung whether one can release oneself from the collective 
unconSCIOUS. 
SH: The essential issue in this liberation is: how does one reach a fundamental 
self, one that is no longer captivated by the ten thousand things? How to 
get there, that is the problem. Is it necessary to liberate oneself from the 
collective unconscious as well, or from the conditions it imposes on us? 
CGJ: If someone is caught in the ten thousand things, it is because that person is 
also caught in the collective unconscious. A person is liberated only when 
freed from both. One person may be driven more by the unconscious and 
another by things. One has to take the person to the point where he is free 
from the compulsion to either run after things or be driven by the 
unconscious. What is needed for both compulsions is basically the same: 
nirdvanda [sic]. 
SH: From what you have said about the collective unconscious, might I infer 
that one can be liberated from it? 
229 
CGJ: Yes!17 
SH: What we in Buddhism and especially in Zen, usually call the 'common self 
corresponds exactly to what you call the 'collective unconscious.' Only 
through liberation from this self does the authentic self emerge. 
(Jung and Hisamatsu in Muramoto, 1998: 45-6) 
It is important to note that the key word, which is missing in Hisamatsu's question of 
liberation from the collective unconscious, is 'completely.' Thus Jung's affirmative 
answer to Hisamatsu's question may suggest that Jung meant 'free from compulsion 
to either run after things or be driven by the collective unconscious.' But this is 
hardly possible without the total knowledge of the unconscious. For Jung clearly 
asserted in the dialogue, "What is needed for both compulsions is basically the same: 
nirdvanda [sic]". Muramoto (1992) argues that nirdvandva is a Sanskrit word for 
'freedom from opposites,' and refers to an idea in which dualism is presupposed and 
at the same time overcome. In Meckel and Moore's edition of the Jung-Hisamatsu 
dialogue which is based on Tsujimura's transcription, Jung's statement was translated 
as: "Both are fundamentally the same: Nirvana" (Jung and Hisamatsu in Meckel and 
Moore, 1992: Ill). However, with a confirmation from Jaffe, Muramoto believes 
that in the Tsujimura's protocol the word nirdvandva was mistranslated into nirvana. 
Muramoto argues, 
It is no wonder that Jung adopted this word [nirdvandva], as it fits well with his 
mode of thinking which is expressed, for example, in his key concept of the 
'transcendent function' - namely, an attitude or a capacity to sustain the tension 
of opposites, from which a reconciling symbol can then emerge from the depths 
of the mind. The word nirvana, on the contrary, originally meaning 'extinction 
of fire,' suggests an absolute transcendence or denial of dualism to nothingness 
- reflecting a mode of thinking which is foreign to Jung. 
(Muramoto, 1998: 48) 
In fact Jung often uses the word nirdvandva in his writings and he interpreted it as 
"the freedom from opposites, which is shown as a possible way of solving the conflict 
through reconciliation" (CW 9i: 76). Therefore Jung's affirmative answer, 'Yes!' 
17 Muramoto provided a rather psychoanalytical examination of Jung's affIrmative answer 'Yes!' in the 
following passage: "Hisamatsu's immediately preceding question is, in my opinion, the gravitational 
center of the entire conversation, comparable with a critical confrontation between a Zen Master and 
his disciple in Zen mondo (question and answer). We are told, in fact, in Vol. 1 of his Complete Works 
that both he and Tsujimura found Jung's 'Yes!' very unexpected. Unfortunately, however, we don't 
know what kind of 'yes' it was. Was Jung's reply a heartfelt affIrmation, an expression of 
exasperation, or a 'yes' which was somehow forced from his mind, perhaps even against his will, by 
Hisamatsu's penetrating and somewhat intrusive questioning? Personally, I believe the latter was the 
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may seem to be inconsistent with his previous argument on 'free from compulsions' 
to nirdvandva. For, in Jung's view, one can not be completely liberated from 
opposites, that is, conscious and unconscious, but can be only partially liberated from 
them to sustain the tension of opposites through reconciliation. From this context, we 
can assume that in the earlier conversation Jung may have suggested that the suffering 
cannot be eliminated objectively but can be eliminated subjectively by adopting some 
kind of attitude to the problem of psychic suffering. Elsewhere Jung stated, 
Suffering that is not understood is hard to bear, while on the other hand it is 
often astounding to see how much a person can endure when he understands the 
why and the wherefore. A philosophical or religious view of the world enables 
him to do this, and such views prove to be, at the very least, psychic methods of 
healing if not of salvation. 
(CW 18: 1578) 
What Jung emphasises here IS not the termination of suffering but rather the 
transformation of suffering, namely, the way in which we see the suffering is 
transformed from the objective level to the SUbjective. This seems to be the aim of 
both Jung's psychology and Zen Buddhism. P. Young-Eisendrath (1999) discusses 
the transformation of human suffering from the perspective of Jung's psychology and 
Buddhism based on both her Zen Buddhist training and clinical experience in America 
and she argues, 
Buddhism ... opened a new avenue for appreciating psychodynamic practices in 
America. Because Buddhism presents a spiritual argument for the 
transformation of suffering, it has assisted me in being able to address audiences 
about the principles and uses of psychodynamic psychotherapy. American 
depth psychology also has something to offer Buddhism, I believe, especially in 
our study of individual symbolic meaning and the transformation of 
psychological complexes - especially the ego-complex - in psychotherapy. 
(Young-Eisendrath, 1999: 5) 
5.3.2 The Christian-Zen Buddhist dialogue 
Jung's attitude towards the Eastern religions appears to be ambivalent in some places. 
Johnston (1990) states that, "On the one hand he was enthusiastically eloquent about 
the achievements of the oriental mind; on the other hand, he was very, very wary 
about the use of Zen and yoga by Westerners. For one thing he did not like to see 
case, and suspect that this was one of the reasons why Jung refused to have the conversation published 
in Ps),chologia" (Muramoto, 1998: 48). 
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Westerners abandon their own tradition" (Johnston, 1990). Jung was certain that, "a 
direct transplantation of Zen to our Western conditions is neither commendable nor 
even possible" (CW 11: 905), because he believed: "satori ... designates a special kind 
and way of enlightenment which it is practically impossible for the European to 
appreciate" (CW 11: 877). Furthermore, Jung argued, 
Great as is the value of Zen Buddhism for understanding the religious 
transformation process, its use among Western people is very problematical. 
The mental education necessary for Zen is lacking in the West. Who among us 
would place such implicit trust in a superior Master and his incomprehensible 
ways? This respect for the greater human personality is found only in the East. 
(CW 11: 902) 
Jung was very much concerned with the danger for Westerners of applying Eastern 
spiritual methods indiscriminately. Jung was very sceptical of the possibility of 
Europeans attaining safari, which he believed, is a non-ego state and thus leads to 
psychosis. IS For the same reason, Jung was critical of the Western application of 
yoga. 19 
As a psychotherapist, Jung was principally concerned with the healing power 
of Zen. Jung's interpretation of Zen is to see it as a method to make the unconscious 
conscious, leading to an integration of the whole personality and abolishing conflicts 
that might exist between the conscious and unconscious elements. In this sense the 
application of Zen method to Western man is possible. Jung asserted: "the satori 
experience does occur also in the West" (CW 11: 903). Jung was more interested in 
the psychological basis of Zen than in its Buddhist origins. Certainly Jung was not 
the only one to explore the therapeutic possibilities of Zen. Modem Japanese 
psychology, for instance Morita therapy, is investigating some links between 
psychotherapy and Zen.20 
18 However, Jung misunderstood the nature of the satari experience. As mentioned earlier, in satari 
enlightenment, the ego does not disappear but it is the empty state of mind (sunyata). 
19 Jung's warning against the application of yoga in the West is based on his psychic relativism 
between East and West. For Jung's warning against the application of yoga in the West, see CW 11: 
876. For my detailed examination of Jung's critical comment on yoga, see Chapter One. 
20 Morita therapy was founded by a Japanese doctor, Morita Shoma (1874-1938). Morita himself 
denied that Morita therapy has any direct influence by Zen but it is assumed Morita therapy was largely 
based on Zen because of Morita's constant quotations from old Zen masters in support of his theories. 
Morita therapy is directed toward a group of hypochondriacal conditions characterised as nervousness 
(lap. shinkeishitsu), and the specific symptoms are headaches or insomnia. Morita thought that the 
self-conscious focus on one's own psychological states is perfectly normal but the trouble begins when 
one is caught in the mode in which the flow of consciousness is blocked (Jap. taraware). Johnston 
asserts that: "Morita therapy aims at creating a state in which the mind flows smoothly and 
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In contrast with Jung's claims that Westerners cannot practice Eastern spiritual 
discipline due to their different traditional background, there is a recent movement 
called 'Christian Zen' whereby Christians turns to Zen for assistance in their own 
spiritual way. The German Jesuit H.M. Enomiya-Lassalle took a pioneering role in 
introducing Zen meditation for Christians in Germany. The Irish Jesuit William 
Johnston and the English Benedictine Aelred Graham also researched on Christian 
Zen. Johnston believed that there is a possible dialogue between Zen Buddhism and 
Christianity at the level of mystical and artistic experience. He said, "the Zen 
technique can teach the Christian how to relax, how to be claim, how to think in a 
deeper way, how to dispose himself to receive God's love, how to conceive the truth 
of faith not only in his brain but in his whole body" (Johnston, 1970: 180). Johnston 
believes this is possible, "because the psychic life of man is everywhere the same; his 
fundamental aspirations vary but little. Put more concretely, what is common to both 
is vertical thinking, the supraconceptual grasp of reality without words or concepts or 
images" (Johnston, 1970: 184). He calls this kind of thinking 'vertical,' as opposed to 
the ordinary 'horizontal' thinking when images are filtering across the mind. Vertical 
thinking means that the stream of images is halted, the mind goes down and down, the 
horizon of consciousness is extended, broadened, and deepened. In Zen terminology 
this is breaking through layer after layer of consciousness until one reaches the bottom 
layer and is identified with the universe. Johnston explains that when one meditates 
vertically this leads to a sense of detachment and interior liberty which is the hallmark 
of Buddhist art. Eventually one can liberate one's mind from inordinate desires and 
distractions and is enabled to seek the deepest truth lying at the heart of reality. From 
the Christian perspective, "vertical meditation creates the detachment that allows the 
mind to go out to truth ... , to God" (Johnston, 1970: 187). 
Of course one must cling to God but he does not need to cling to views and 
ideas about God. "Contemplative prayer demands the rejection of concepts of God; 
continuously without being arrested by attachment to anything; but especially it aims at the state where 
one is forgetful of self' (Johnston, 1970: 59). To forget the self and return to just what is (Jap. 
arugamama) is the way out of the vicious cycle, which causes suffering and is being trapped in self-
reflection. The therapy itself begins with a week of complete bed rest and no activity whatsoever is 
allowed. A patient is told simply to think what he thinks and to feel what he feels. Eventually, the 
patient develops a desire to perform some activity and is gradually given increasingly complex duties. 
Finally, the patient reaches the point when he can see what has to be done on his own initiative 
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and John of Cross asks for the most rigorous of detachment from all thoughts, ideas, 
and images of any kind, as well as from all formulations of dogma" (Johnston, 1970: 
190). In this sense Johnston clearly asserts: "the kind of satari resulting from an utter 
detachment from all things making one fall into the void is not impossible for the 
Christian" (Johnston, 1970: 191). The enlightenment is a true change of 
consciousness when it reaches its climax in which one's ego is lost to be replaced by 
that of Christ. 
'I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me,' 'Let that mind be in you which was in 
Christ Jesus,' 'Not this is etemallife that they may know Thee the One true and 
Jesus Christ whom Thou has sent'21 
(Galatians 2:20 cited by Johnston, 1970: 192). 
Christian Zen meditation attempts to see the Zen practice as a way to union with God. 
However, a question can be asked whether or not this Christian experience of being 
one with God can be called satari experience. Here are two more important questions 
raise by Dumoulin, "can the specific practice of Zen meditation be so totally divested 
of its religious and metaphysical underpinnings that Christian can take up the practice 
without endangering their faith? And second, can a Zen so radically severed from its 
Buddhist foundations still properly be called Zen?" (Dumoulin, 1979: 11). In the case 
of adaptations of Zen serious problems inevitably arise. For instance, Jung (and 
perhaps D.T. Suzuki also) tended to exaggerate the psychological aspects of Zen at the 
expense of religious connections, and the Buddhist basis was not his main concern. In 
the case of Christian adaptation of Zen, a similar sort of shift of emphasis is 
unavoidable, since the world view of Zen Buddhism and Christianity differ radically. 
However Dumoulin states that, "the Christian Zen movement..., is not a monolithic 
block of teaching and practice; a multiplicity of endeavours is involved. All of them 
are convinced of the overall value of Zen meditation and attempt to integrate the 
(Kasulis, 1981: 149). For the detailed discussion of Morita's relation to Zen Buddhism, see Bruno 
Rhyner (1992) 'The Image of Healing in a Zen-Therapy,' Eranos-Jahrbuch, Vol. 61. 
21 lung quoted this line of Paul in comparison with Buddhist standpoint: "Between the Christian and 
the Buddhist mandala there is a subtle but enormous difference. The Christian during contemplation 
would never say '/ am Christ,' but will confess with Paul: 'Not I, but Christ liveth in me' (Gal. 2:20). 
Our sutra [the Amitayur-dhyana Sutra], however, says: 'Thou wilt know that thou art the Buddha.' At 
the bottom the two confessions are identical, in that the Buddhist only attains this knowledge when he 
is anatman, 'without self.' But there is an immeasurable difference in the formulation. The Christian 
attains his end in Christ, the Buddhist knows he is the Buddha. The Christian gets out of the transitory 
and ego-bound world of consciousness, but the Buddhist still reposes on the eternal ground of his inner 
nature, whose oneness with Deity, or with universal Being, is confrrmed in other Indian testimonies." 
(CW 11: 949, lung's italics). 
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specific merits of the Zen way into Christianity" (Dumoulin, 1979: 12). The 
coexistence of Zen and Christianity gives rise to a pluralism, which is bound to 
generate a new path of spiritual exploration (Dumoulin, 1992, 143). The American 
Trappist monk, Thormas Merton insisted: 
we have now reached a stage of (long-overdue) religious maturity at which it 
may be possible for someone to remain perfectly faithful to a Christian and 
Western monastic commitment, and yet to learn in depth from, say, a Buddhist 
or Hindu discipline and experience. 
(Merton cited by Clarke, 1997: 148) 
Yet the Christian-Zen Buddhist dialogue IS still an experimental phase and the 
questions raised above not yet fully resolved. 
5.3.3 The Ox-Herding pictures 
It is interesting to note that in his writings complied in the Collected Works there is no 
mention of The Ten Ox-Herding Pictures, despite Jung's well-known interest in 
symbols and transformation, such as the Rosarium Philosophorum, the series of 
German alchemical pictures which Jung examined in 1946. In his detailed 
examination of the Rosarium Philosophorum, Jung illustrates transference in relation 
to the individuation process. The series of ten ox-herding pictures in Zen Buddhism 
also seem to reveal a remarkable parallel to Jung's theory of the individuation process. 
Marvin Spiegelman and Mokusen Miyuki, both graduates of the C.G. Jung Institute, 
Zurich, researched the ten Ox-Herding Pictures and, "analysed them by employing 
Jungian methodology and his conceptual framework, and by viewing them as 
portraying what C.G. Jung calls 'the individuation process'" (Miyuki, 1985: 29). 
In Chinese Ch'an Buddhism there developed a story which shows the 
experience of satori. It is the tale of the ox and the oxherd, and in China and Japan 
came to be portrayed in a series of pictures, which is usually called, 'The Ten Ox- (or 
Cow-) herding Pictures. '22 The story of these pictures is that, "the ox and the oxherd, 
two at the start, become united in the course of the way, for the ox symblizes the true, 
profound Self, and the oxherd stands for nothing less than the human being" 
(Dumoulin, 1979: 155). D.T. Suzuki suggested, "these pictures ... may better be 
22 D.T. Suzuki asserted that the cow has been worshipped by the Indian for long time and its allusions 
are found in the Buddhist scriptures such as 'On the Herding of Cattle' in a Hinayana Sutra, in which 
the eleven ways ofpropedy attending cattle are described (D.T. Suzuki, 1949: 367). 
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regarded as stages of training for the man and not for the animal" (D.T. Suzuki, 1955). 
Only a few sets of the Oxherding Pictures exist today. There are two well known sets: 
the one with ten prefaces and verses was done by a Zen master, Kaku-an Shien (Ch. 
Kuo-an) of the Sung dynasty; another earlier version with ten verses was drawn by the 
Zen master, Seikyo (Ch. Pu-ming).23 According to D.T. Suzuki, Seikyo illustrated 
stages of spiritual progress by a gradual whitening of the cow until it itself 
disappears.24 There pictures are entitled: 1) Undisciplined, 2) Discipline begun, 3) In 
Harness, 4) Faced Round, 5) Tamed, 6) Unimpeded, 7) Laissez Fa ire, 8) All 
forgotten, 9) The Solitary Moon, and 10) Both Vanished (Miyuki, 1985: 30). These 
pictures focus on gradual achievement of satari enlightenment, Miyuki argued, "The 
concept of whitening that which is black is based on the Buddhist doctrine of 
tathagatagarbha, the realization of the Buddha-nature, or the genuine self' (Miyuki, 
1985: 30). 
Kaku-an presented the ox-herding pictures in a different manner. His pictures 
are entitled: 1) Searching for the Ox, 2) Seeing the Traces, 3) Seeing the Ox, 4) 
Catching the Ox, 5) Herding the Ox, 6) coming Home on the Ox's Back, 7) The Ox 
Forgotten, 8) The Ox and the Man Both Forgotten, 9) Returning to the Origin, Back to 
the Source, and 10) Entering the City with Bliss-bestowing Hands (Miyuki, 1985: 30). 
D.T. Suzuki translated the preface and verse of the Kaku-an's ox-herding pictures.25 
According to D.T. Suzuki's translation, the first picture shows that the oxherd has lost 
his ox and stands alone on the vast pasture. In the second picture he searches and 
catches the tracks of the ox. However, the preface states, "he is unable to distinguish 
what is good from what is not; his mind is still confused as to truth and falsehood" 
(D.T. Suzuki, 1955: 302). In the third picture he finds the ox. "He finds the way 
through the sound; he sees into the origin of things, and all his senses are in 
hannonious order" (Ibid., 302). The fourth picture shows he tamed the ox with a lot 
of effort, although the cow is very hard to keep under control. Then, in the fifth 
picture, he set the ox out to pasture under surveillance. These two pictures illustrates 
23 Kaku-an's and Seikyo's versions of The Ox-Herding Pictures are given in appendix 5.1 - 5.20. 
24 Although the Ox-Herding Pictures show the gradual achievement of satari, the transit~on from 
ignorance to enlightenment is abrupt. D.T. Suzuki says: "it is like a freezing of water, whIch takes 
place abruptly" (D.T. Suzuki, 1926: 362). 
25 D.T. Suzuki, 'The Ten Cow-Herding Pictures,' Essays in Zen Buddhism: First Series, 1949, pp. 363-
376, and 'The Awakening ofa New Consciousness in Zen,' Eranas-lahrbuch, 1955, pp. 275-304. 
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the severe and painful practice in Zen hall until enlightenment is achieved. The 
preface says, "Through enlightenment all this turns into truth; but falsehood asserts 
itself when confusion prevails... Do not get the nose-string loose; hold it tight, and 
allow yourself no indulgence" (D.T. Suzuki, 1955: 303). In the sixth picture, with 
complete certainty, the oxherd straddles the back of the ox and rides home 
triumphantly, playing flute. Dumoulin argues, "the joy of the oxherd and the head of 
the ox, no longer bent in craving for grass, intimate the perfect freedom attained" 
(Dumoulin, 1979: 155). Now that the oxherd in his freedom no longer needs for the 
ox, he forgets it and stands alone in the seventh picture. In the eighth picture both 
oxherd and ox have disappeared in the nothingness of the circle. The circle 
symbolises the idea that, "We all - including the man come from the abyss of absolute 
nothingness, and we are once more to return to it" (D.T. Suzuki. 1955: 299). In the 
ninth picture, when the oxherd reappears everything around him is just as it was. The 
tenth picture illustrates that the oxherd enters the town and the market place, carrying 
a gourd/6 and returns home. Dumoulin accounts for the last picture as follows, "The 
enlightened one lives with his fellow human beings and lives like them, but the 
benevolence he radiates has its source in his enlightenment" (Dumoulin, 1979: 155). 
According to Miyuki, the ox-herding pictures represent the Zen concept of 
mind, which could be taken as equivalent to Jung's concept of the total psyche, or the 
self. In terms of Jung's idea of the relationship of consciousness to the unconscious, 
"the Oxherding Pictures can be understood as depicting the attempt of the oxherd, or 
the ego, to creatively relate itself to the inexhaustible treasure of the 'mind-ox,' or the 
unconscious" (Miyuki, 1985: 31). Miyuki argues that in Kaku-an's version of the ten 
ox-herding pictures, the third picture, 'seeing the Ox,' represents the Zen goal of 
seeing into nature itself, then the fourth picture, 'Catching the Ox,' represents attained 
wholeness or completion. Thus, as soon as the fourth state is realised, a new struggle 
begins on a higher level of consciousness. In the seventh picture, 'The Ox Forgotten, 
Leaving the Man Alone,' depicting the completion of the second ternary series, 
Miyuki argues that, "individuation or self-realization - in terms of the dialectical 
confrontation of the ego (the oxherd) and the Self (the ox) - has led the individual to 
experience a transformation of personality symbolized as 'the Man'" (Miyuki, 1985: 
26 D.T. Suzuki asserts that the gourd symbolises emptiness (sunyata). 
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35). The eighth picture, which is depicted as the empty circle, represents, "the fully 
manifested activity of the Buddha-nature, or the Self, in the conscious life of the 
practitioner whose ego functions in the service of the Self' (Miyuki, 1985: 37). The 
last two pictures continue to describe the 'Self-centric' functioning of the psyche. To 
sum up, in Miyuki's interpretation, the ox-herding pictures portray the individuation 
process in an art form. Thus he believes that psychological understanding of satari 
enlightenment in Zen is equivalent to the urge of the Self to realise itself through the 
ego's integration of the unconscious contents. 
Miyuki equated the satari enlightenment with Jung's concept of the 
individuation process. Miyuki also argues that, "the Zen concept of mind could be 
taken as equivalent to Jung's concept of the total psyche, or the Self' (Miyuki, 1985: 
31). However, given my earlier comment on the different goals of Zen Buddhism and 
Jung's individuation process, Miyuki's account of the oxherding pictures as the 
individuation process may seem to be inconsistent with Jung's standpoint. 
Nevertheless, Miyuki' s analysis of the relation between the oxherding pictures and the 
individuation process demonstrates a similarity: both processes are involved with 
personal transformation to a certain extent. Miyuki argues that the Self in Zen must 
not be confused with ego-dissolution or ego-depotentiation. This is the point where 
Jung did misunderstand the concept of satari, as I discussed earlier. Miyuki asserts 
that, "the integrated ego is strong and flexible enough to develop the attitude of 
listening in order to function harmoniously with the Self. The ego thus strengthened 
can function in union with, and in the service of the Self' (Miyuki, 1985: 37). This 
statement seems to be parallel to Jung's earlier quotation of "[the self] is no longer 
experienced in the form of a broader or higher ego, but in the form of a non-ego," 
(CW 11: 885) and "It is as if the subject-character of the ego had been overrun, or 
taken over, by another subject which appears in place of the ego" (CW 11: 890). 
Miyuki argues that the word 'forgotten' used in Kuo-an's title, 'The Ox and the Man 
both Forgotten,' designates the emptying activity of the Buddha-nature or the Self, 
which is supraordinate to the function of the ego. Hence, "once the 'Self-centric' 
function of the psyche takes place, the 'ego-centric' functioning of the psyche is 
'forgotten. '" (Ibid., 37). Miyuki claims that, "What is overcome is not the ego itself 
but the function of the ego which is to be characterised as 'ego-centric. '" (Ibid., 37). 
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This statement displays a remarkable similarity with Jung's notion of the 
individuation process. Jung argues that in the course of individuation there is "a shift 
of the psychological centre of personality from the personal ego to the impersonal 
non-ego, which is now experienced as the real 'Ground' of personality" (CW 9i: 638). 
Miyuki argues that in Buddhism the 'ego-centric is described as the ego's 
appropriating orientation which, "is conditioned by the darkness or ignorance and the 
egoistic passion of defilement and which, accordingly, obscures the genuine activity 
of the Buddha-nature" (Ibid., 38). Therefore Miyuki asserts that, "the word 
'forgotten' indicates the psychological condition of 'being emptied' (kung, sunyata) 
wherein the ego is opened to the service of the activity of the Self, the matrix of life" 
(Ibid., 38). In this way the Buddha-nature or the Self, "realizes itself in and through 
the receptive, flexible ego" (Ibid., 38). Miyuki's account of the ox-herding pictures 
demonstrates that Jung 's position is not so different from Zen Buddhism, as both 
fundamentally involve the same process: for Jung the individuation process 
demonstrates "the shifting of the centre of gravity from the ego to the self' (CW 11: 
958), and for Zen the path to the satari experience shows that the self-centric function 
of the psyche is supraordinate to the function of the ego, and thus the ego can function 
in the service of the self. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Jung became familiar with Zen by way of D.T. Suzuki's writings on Zen Buddhism. 
It is significant that D.T. Suzuki one-sidedly emphasised the Rinzai school of Zen, 
had a psychologised view on Zen, and his Zen is highly influenced by a reaction to 
Japanese nationalism at that time. Jung may not have been aware of these aspects of 
D.T. Suzuki's Zen, but they undoubtedly affected Jung's understanding of Zen 
Buddhism. Jung was fascinated by the psychological aspect of Zen and found a 
parallel between the satari experience of Zen and his idea of the individuation 
process. Jung's interpretation of the satari experience as the experience of the ego by 
the self is in fact very similar to Jung's idea of the individuation process in which 
there is a shifting of the centre of gravity from the ego to the self. Although Jung's 
view on satari may seem to be inconsistent when he rejected the possibility of 
attaining satari as he misunderstood its concept by interpreting it as the loss of ego 
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like in the last stage of yoga, samadhi, in which the flow of consciousness is so 
completely identified with the object alone that there is a complete loss of ego 
consciousness. However, the concept of satori enlightenment in Zen Buddhism is not 
the complete loss of the ego but the empty state of mind, no-mind (mu-shin). Despite 
his misunderstanding, Jung's earlier claim of the objectification of the ego does not 
seem to indicate the loss of the ego but is similar to the concept of emptiness or 
Hakuin's concept of Great Death, in which one has to objectify one's ego and to 
abandon any intentional standpoint and thus create empty consciousness. There is a 
difference in the notion of the self in Jung and Zen. In Zen the self is fully awaken to 
itself (ryoryo jochi), whereas Jung's notion of the self, which consists of both 
consciousness and the unconscious, is not completely known but remains something 
unknown to the ego. 
In the conversation between Jung and Hisamatsu, Hisamatsu asked Jung 
whether one can be liberated from the collective unconscious. Jung answered 'Yes!' 
However Jung's affirmative answer is inconsistent with his previous argument 
concerning the impossibility of gaining freedom from suffering all at once. The key 
word, which is missing in Hisamatsu's question of liberation from the collective 
unconscious, is 'completely.' Thus Jung's affirmative answer to Hisamatsu's 
question may suggest that Jung meant, 'free from compulsion to either run after things 
or be driven by the collective unconscious.' But this is hardly possible without the 
total knowledge of the unconscious. Jung clearly asserted in the dialogue that what is 
needed for both compulsions is basically the same: nirdvandva, which is the freedom 
from opposites and is, in his view, a possible way of solving the conflict through 
reconciliation. For, in Jung's view, one cannot be completely liberated from 
opposites, that is, conscious and unconscious, but can be only partially liberated from 
them to sustain the tension of opposites through reconciliation. From this context, we 
can assume that in the conversation Jung may have suggested that suffering cannot be 
eliminated objectively but can be eliminated subjectively by adopting some kind of 
attitude to the problem of psychic suffering. What Jung emphasises is not the 
termination of suffering but rather the transformation of suffering, namely, the way in 
which we see the suffering is transformed from the objective level to the subjective 
one. This seems to be the aim of both Jung's psychology and Zen Buddhism. 
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It can be assumed that, compared with his relation to Tibetan Buddhism, in 
overall Jung's position is not enormously different from the Zen Buddhist standpoint. 
In fact, Jung's engagement with Buddhism seems to reveal there is a possible mutual 
point in the dialogue between Western psychology and Zen Buddhism. In particular, 
Miyuki's research for the ox-herding pictures in Zen Buddhism discloses that these 
pictures have similar features shared in common with Jung's theory of the 
individuation process. In this sense Jung's engagement with Zen Buddhism could be 
regarded as an important contribution to strive for opening up a fruitful dialogue 
between Western psychology and Eastern religious traditions. Even outside of Jung's 
engagement, there are also other attempts to explore a link between Western 
psychology and Zen Buddhism such as Morita therapy, which is based on Zen and 
was invented by the Japanese psychotherapist, S. Morita. Furthermore, in contrast 
with Jung's claim that Europeans should not practice Eastern spiritual discipline due 
to their different traditional background, W. Johnston investigated so-called Christian-
Zen, which is devised for Christians to apply Zen mediation practice. This relatively 
new movement may also verify the idea that East and West could find a way to a 
mutual point of departure in the dialogue through understanding each other's religious 





The purpose of this thesis has been to examIne C.G. lung's hermeneutcial 
engagement with Buddhism, particularly with Tibetan and Zen Buddhist Traditions. 
It is certainly true that lung was in some ways a pioneer of a dialogue with Eastern 
religions. He took the East seriously - and as a consequence of his study of the East, 
aspects of thought and psychology were addressed which had been previously 
ignored, such as mandala symbols. As a consequence of his pioneering work many 
others followed by studying the relationship between Buddhism and psychology. 
This thesis has attempted to show that the dialogue between lung's Analytical 
Psychology and Eastern thought is highly problematic, and at times erroneous, 
because of lung's misunderstanding and misrepresentation of Buddhist thought and 
spiritual practice. lung's method of understanding Buddhism displays elements of 
hermeneutics. lung believed that he found a number of similarities between Buddhist 
teachings and his psychological theory. Through making analogies, lung often seems 
to suggest that Analytical Psychology is Buddhism in a Western form. This thesis 
especially focused on such statements in order to argue that lung in fact 
misrepresented Buddhist concepts. This thesis also discussed the issue of Orientalism 
in relation to lung's dialogue with Buddhism, his tendency to psychological 
reductionism, his selective reading of Buddhist texts (made more significant by his 
use of questionable translations), his proposition of psychic relativism between an 
introverted East and extraverted West, his blanket warning against the application of 
yoga and meditation by Westerners, his inconsistent position on science and 
metaphysics, i.e., his hermeneutic method as opposed to his insistence on being a 
phenomenologist, and his ambivalent attitude towards Buddhist thought. 
6.1 Findings 
Chapter One provided a chronological survey of lung's dialogue with Eastern 
thought. In his early career, lung studied a large variety of Eastern texts, including 
the myths and symbols of Hindu and Buddhist literatures. lung frequently affirms his 
role as psychologist and healer of the psychological problems of Western men, who 
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tend to focus their attention on the outer material world and to overlook their inner 
psychic needs, and eventually had lost touch with their individual and cultural 
meanings. Jung believed, however, that the study of myths and religious symbols 
gives meaning to the life of man, and that the true meaning which mythical and 
religious symbolism has for us is not exhausted by merely knowing about the symbol 
but by our appropriating it as an inner fact. Jung was fascinated by Eastern religion 
and philosophy, which were rich in sources of archetypal myths, images and symbols. 
Jung was particularly sympathetic toward Chinese Taoism, since he believed the 
concept of yin/yang bore a striking similarity to his theory of psychic opposites. 
However, Jung could not agree with the Hindu concept of samadhi, in which the flow 
of consciousness is so completely identified with the object alone that there is a 
complete loss of ego consciousness. This represented for Jung a philosophical and 
psychological impossibility, as he believed there is no consciousness without the ego. 
Jung was particularly attracted to Buddhist thought, in contrast to his relation to the 
Hindu tradition. Jung believed he had identified a number of affinities between his 
concept of the individuation process and the Buddhist path to salvation, since he 
believed both methods attempt to achieve self-transformation and are based on the 
direct experience of the individual seeker. It must be stressed that Jung's relation to 
Buddhism appears to be inconsistent. Jung addressed, on the one hand, the Buddhist 
view on suffering, and admired the way in which the Buddhist objectively observes 
suffering and its causes, and the Buddha extricates people from it. Jung, on the other 
hand, denied the possibility of the complete termination of suffering as presented in 
Buddhist teaching. Jung's ambivalence towards Buddhism can be seen in his writings 
on Tibetan, Zen, and Pure Land Buddhist materials. 
Jung considered himself first and foremost as a psychologist working in the 
tradition of empirical science. Jung declared, "I am an empiricist and adhere as such 
to the phenomenological standpoint" (CW 11: 2). Jung was interested in world 
mythology and religions, which are typically regarded as un-scientific matters. But 
Jung believed that he addressed these issues seriously and examined them 
scientifically and phenomenologically. Nevertheless, there is certainly an issue here 
about the scientific credentials of Jung's phenomenological approach, namely, in what 
way Jung's method was scientific as he believed, and to what extent he was a scientist 
who took a phenomenological and empirical standpoint. In some places Jung 
expressed reservations about the empirical character of analytical psychology. Jung 
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frequently points out that there are no ultimate or final conclusions in the world of 
psychology. Jung believed that human knowledge is conditional and our hypotheses 
must be altered by new facts which come to light. Jung emphasised that we must not 
regard the language of Analytical Psychology as a final or conclusive body of 
knowledge but as an 'as if language. Jung wrote, 
The only certain thing is our profound ignorance, which cannot even know 
whether we have come nearer to the solution of the great riddle or not. Nothing 
can carry us beyond an 'It seems as if except the perilous leap of faith, which 
we must leave to those who are gifted or graced for it. Every real or app"arent 
step forward depends on an experience of facts, the verification of which is, as 
we know, one of the most difficult tasks confronting the human mind. 
(CW 10: 681) 
John A. Sanford (1971) argues that Jung's approach suggests, "when one gains 
knowledge of the psyche there is peculiarly SUbjective factor at work" (Sanford, 1971: 
102). Jung himself pointed out that, "Science cannot exist without hypotheses" (CW 
10: 1041). In some places, Jung believed that no science, including all psychology, 
could discount human SUbjectivity. For instance, his theory of archetypes IS a 
speculative hypotheses designed to explain a wide range of psychic phenomena. The 
subjective orientation of Jung's work may appear principally a hermeneutic doctrine 
rather than an empirical science in a strict sense of the word. Jung writes, 
Analytical psychology is fundamentally a natural science, but it is subject far 
more than any other science to the personal bias of the observer. The 
psychologist must depend therefore in the highest degree upon historical and 
literary parallels if he wishes to exclude at least the crudest errors in judgement. 
(MDR: 200) 
This statement would suggests that Jung's approach, which he claims to be empirical 
and phenomenological, demonstrates an element of hermeneutics. As has been 
discussed in Chapter Two, Jung's approach, particularly his method of amplification, 
is involved with the recognition on the one hand of "the radical finitude of the human 
mind and the human condition, historically grounded and limited, and on the other of 
the infinite possibilities that language, dialogue and interpretation open up for us" 
(Clarke, 1994: 53). 
Sanford argues that Jung's phenomenological approach acknowledges the 
limits of human knowledge. Jung claims that what we know directly is the events 
present in consciousness. Thus the 'facts' are in essence events on one's screen of 
consciousness. It follows that there is "a definite limit on what we can expect to 
know of the world which we presume exists beyond consciousness as the original 
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source of our impressions. Whether we regard the impressions on our state of 
consciousness as arising from a physical realm via the senses, or psychic realm via 
immediate intuition or perception, we can never hope to have direct knowledge of 
what lies beyond consciousness" (Sanford, 1971: 94). Sanford asserts that, 
"essentially lung's scientific epistemological viewpoint is that of Kantian dualism, in 
which the existence of reality beyond consciousness always remains an assumption" 
(Sanford, 1971: 94). With this epistemological outlook lung consistently rejected the 
use of metaphysical explanations in his psychological work, and claimed that there 
can be no such thing as metaphysical knowledge, which is gained in any way other 
than through experience. lung rejected, "the claim of metaphysicians to be able to 
attain to ultimate knowledge, or to knowledge of any sort which transcends what can 
be known empirically," and emphasised that such a metaphysical assumption "is not 
to be confused with science, and only science can claim to have knowledge" (Sanford, 
1971: 95). 
Clarke also points out that lung's scepticism with regard to metaphysics, or 
any claims to knowledge that transcend the limits of experience is derived from Kant 
(Clarke, 1992: 32-3). lung was highly critical of the Hindu Upanishadic teaching in 
which the Brahman becomes one-sidedly identified as pure consciousness and has no 
longer any interaction with the physical world. In lung's view, losing balance 
between the external world and the inner psychic world leads to pathology, that is to 
say, being either caught up in the unconscious or over-focussed on the external 
consciousness. lung was also critical of the last stage of yoga, samadhi, in which the 
flow of consciousness is so completely identified with the object alone that there is a 
complete loss of ego consciousness. From his empiricist and Kantian perspective, 
Jung could not conceive of any consciousness without reference to ego. Hence Jung 
dismissed the metaphysical assumptions and imported his own psychological 
assumptions into his account of the phenomenal experience of the Eastern religions. 
In his commentary on The Secret of the Golden Flower, Jung asserts that, "I quite 
deliberately bring everything that purports to be metaphysical into the daylight of 
psychological understanding... One cannot grasp anything metaphysically, one only 
can do so psychologically. Therefore I strip things of their metaphysical wrappings in 
order to make them objects of psychology" (CW 13: 73). 
However, lung was not always consistent on this point and sometimes 
engaged in metaphysical speculation. While lung avowed scepticism concerning 
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Eastern metaphysical beliefs, and c1aming that in any case these beliefs are 'really' 
psychological in nature, Jung himself has a tendency to make metaphysical claims. 
For example, Jung examined the images in the dreams or fantasies of his patients, 
which were similar to mythical motifs and religious symbolism, and characterised 
them as archetypes, which are autonomous psychic entities and located in the 
collective unconscious. Contrary to his earlier insistence of his scientific standpoint, 
the concept of archetypes moved Jung beyond the limits of empirical science and 
involved his psychology in metaphysical questions that are fundamentally religious in 
nature. For Jung, the archetypes have a numinous character which is described as 
spiritual, a factor which is also significant in his understanding of the psychology of 
religion. With reference to his concept of the psychoid archetype Jung wrote, 
We are so accustomed to regard meaning as a psychic process or content that it 
never enters our heads to suppose that it could exist outside the psyche.... If, 
therefore, we entertain the hypothesis that one and the same (transcendental) 
meaning might manifest itself simultaneously in the human psyche and in the 
arrangement of an external and independent event, we at once come into 
conflict with the conventional scientific and epistemological views. 
(CW 8: 915) 
This statement may suggest that Jung himself tacitly concedes his own ambivalence: 
on the one hand Jung certainly sought to establish his psychological theory from 
clinical experience through the empirical and phenomenological approach; on the 
other hand, however, his theories are not always 'devoid of metaphysical import' 
(Aziz, 1990: 173). According to Aziz, Jung's description of the archetype as a 
psychoid factor is involved with a form of metaphysics. Aziz points out that for Jung 
the concept of the archetype is lifted out of the strictly intrapsychic realm, and comes 
to be regarded as 'transcendental meaning.' Aziz states, "with this progression from 
the intrapsychic to the transcendental. .. what we indeed have, in part, is a progression 
from 'metapsychology' to 'metaphysics', for what Jung is now theorizing about with 
his concept of the psychoid archetype is not simply the structure of the psyche, but the 
nature of reality itself' (Aziz, 1990: 174-5). At this point it must be stressed that 
Jung's concept of the archetype does come from a metaphysical speculation. As was 
discussed in Chapter Three, Buddhism is also derived from metaphysical beliefs. The 
problem is that Jung did not seem to acknowledge his own metaphysical position, or 
the metaphysics of the Eastern religions, but he merely wants to be of a scientific 
status. Such an ambivalent attitude, therefore, would lead to an inconsistency in 
Jung's writings on science and metaphysics. 
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Chapter Two examined J ung' s hermeneutical approach to understanding 
Eastern religion utilising insights from Gadamer's theory of hermeneutics and from 
the phenomenology of religion. Jung's method of understanding patients, alchemy, 
mythology, Occidental and Oriental religions demonstrates features of a 
hermeneutical approach. Above all, Jung's hermeneutical strategy is expressed by 
explaining his method of amplification, which seeks to clarify psychic contents by 
linking them within a network of meanings expressed in symbols and images through 
using metaphors and analogies derived from mythological and religious contexts. 
However, the problem with Jung's tendency to make parallels between Buddhism and 
Analytical Psychology is that Buddhist concepts are squeezed to fit into his own 
psychological terminology. Watts (1971) accused Jung of 'psychologism' in the 
sense that Jung's view of the unconscious and of the content of the liberation 
experience in Buddhism is too narrowly psychological. Jung says all experience is 
psychological experience because it happens in the psyche, but Watts argues, 
the unconscious which needs to be examined for man's liberation contains 
physical, biological, and social relationships which are repressed not so much 
by a 'psychological organ,' such as the ego, as by defective communication and 
language. Nor is the content of the liberation experience - satori, nirvana, 
'cosmic consciousness,' etc. - something psychological in the sense of a flash of 
subjective light. Its content is the physical world, seen in a new way. 
(Watts, 1971: 112) 
In contrast to the hermeneutical method, a phenomenological approach to religion 
develops a different understanding of religion. The main characteristics of the 
phenomenology of religion are epoche, which indicates suspension of one's own 
judgement presupposition, and eidetic vision, which involves a form of SUbjectivity 
and implies an intuitive grasp of the essentials of a situation in its wholeness. From 
the perspective of the phenomenology of religion, Jung's methodology lacks 
objectivity and fails to exercise epoche and thus he tends to dismiss religious 
phenomena from their own standpoint. Jung applies, however, the method of eidetic 
vision, namely, he brings his own subjective assumption into his account of Eastern 
religions. At this point we can say that the phenomenology of religion takes a similar 
position to the fundamental hermeneutical principle. Brook argues that Jung's 
approach demonstrates features of existential phenomenology, which considerably 
overlaps with hermeneutics. Thus for Jung, pathological symptoms, dreams and 
religious experiences are interpreted as texts, which express their own meanings. 
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lung exercised the method of amplification in order to specify the essential meaning 
of these psychological phenomena. 
Chapter Three examined lung's understanding of the Hinayana and Mahayana 
Buddhist traditions. Jung was particularly attracted by the psychological aspects of 
Buddhism, which he regarded as a useful tool and possible basis of a therapeutic 
method. Thus lung studied Buddhism from a particular perspective and with a 
particular aim. lung often failed to understand Buddhist concepts within their own 
cultural context. For instance, lung not only ontologised the concept of nibbana (Skt. 
nirvana), but also sometimes interpreted it through his understanding of Hinduism. 
lung was highly selective in his study of Buddhism and did not offer any systematic 
account of Buddhism. Jung appears to have paid considerable attention to Mahayana 
Buddhism, and wrote psychological commentaries for translations of particular 
Mahayana texts of Tibetan and Zen Buddhism. He also gave lectures on Pure Land 
Buddhist meditation. However, lung only looked at these specific texts and 
teachings. Most of the other Mahayana traditions, for example such significant 
concepts as the Bodhisattva or NagaIjuna's concept of the Middle Way, are excluded 
from his attention. A careful examination of lung's study of Buddhism shows that 
lung was more familiar with Hinayana Buddhist thought and thus Mahayana 
Buddhism was sometimes interpreted through his knowledge of Hinayana Buddhism. 
Yet, lung hardly discussed the Theravada meditation practices such as vipassana 
meditation. 
lung's selective reading of the text, his psychologised VIew of Oriental 
religions, and his failure to understand Buddhist concepts are not entirely caused by 
himself, but in part derive from the limitations of the translations of the original texts 
he used. Chapter Four discussed that Evans-Wentz' edition of The Tibetan Book of 
the Dead has a number of serious mis-translations and mis-interpretations, which 
consequently led Jung to misunderstand several concepts of Tibetan Buddhism. 
Chapter Five has examined Suzuki's work on Zen Buddhism which mainly addressed 
itself to the work of the Rinzai school and hardly discussed the Soto school of Zen. 
Chapter Three discussed lunjiro Takakusu's technical problems with his translation of 
the Pure Land Buddhist texts he worked on. The Secret of the Golden Flower 
translated by Richard Wilhelm also has serious flaws in grammar, terminology, and 
conceptual structures. Cleary has presented his new translation of The Secret of the 
Golden Flower (1991) and in his introduction he argues, 
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~lthough Jung credited The ~ecret of th~ G~lden Flower with having clarified 
hIS own work on the unconscIOUS, he maintaIned serious reservations about the 
practice taught in the book. What Jung did not know was that the text he was 
reading was in fact a garbled translation of a truncated version of a corrupted 
recession of the original work. 
(Cleary, 1991: 3) 
Cleary points out that Wilhelm's mis-translation was caused by the difficulty of the 
original text that uses Taoist alchemical language mixed with several types of 
Buddhist Chinese, and that there were no facilities for Westerners to learn these 
languages and symbol systems at that time. Clarke points out, "part of the problem ... 
is that translations are not ideologically neutral but are shaped by the background and 
outlook of the translator" (Clarke, 1997: 185). For example, in the case of Evans-
Wentz, the work of translating Tibetan texts was affected by his theosophical beliefs, 
and in the case of Richard Wilhelm his translation of the Eastern texts was affected by 
his Christian missionary background. As shown in Chapter Five D.T Suzuki's work 
was affected by Western psychology and his Japanese nationalist background. 
Chapter Four examined Jung's understanding of Tibetan Buddhism: his study 
of the W.Y. Evans-Wentz edition of The Tibetan Book of the Dead, and The Tibetan 
Book of the Great Liberation, for which Jung wrote psychological commentaries, and 
Tibetan Tantric mandalas, which he discussed at great length in his writings. The key 
argument of his psychological commentary on The Tibetan Book of the Dead 
addressed the Buddhist theory of karma, which Jung regarded as psychic heredity. 
Jung was fascinated by the contents revealed by the Chonyid Bardo, which he equated 
with his developing notion of archetypes. However, Jung first expressed reservations 
about the Buddhist view of karma, and believed that psychic inheritance could only 
be accepted in a collective sense and there was no individual reincarnation of the kind 
described in The Bardo Thodol. But, in his later life Jung appeared to modify his 
earlier rejection of the notion of personal karma and its psychological function in 
rebirth and offered a general speculation which brings him very close to traditional 
Buddhist thought. Jung suggests that the psychological processes resulting in psychic 
dissociation illness such as schizophrenia may be analogous to the understanding of 
life after death. For Jung, a split-off complex can manifest itself as a projected 
personification, so rebirth might be conceived as psychic projection. Jung argues that 
the empirical world is merely projected karmic illusion and is characterised by an 
ego-conscious focus. The problem with the modem Western world is that its karma is 
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too ego-centred. Thus what is needed is a shift of the kannic centre of gravity from 
the ego to the self. This is, in lung's view, the essence of transcendence in religious 
expenence. 
In his psychological commentary on The Tibetan Book of the Great 
Liberation, lung extensively discusses what he believes to be the major significant 
divisions between Eastern and Western mentalities. In lung's view, the East had 
developed the introverted aspect of the psyche, associated with the control of the inner 
world, whereas the West had developed the psychological qualities of introversion, 
associated with rational understanding and control of the external world. lung 
considers the distinction between introverted aspect of the East and the extraverted 
aspect of the West as the discovery of a complementary aspect of the human 
personality. However, it seems that lung's emphasis on the difference between the 
introverted East and the extraverted West is overly simplistic and he fails to see that 
there is also the possibility of an extraverted tendency in the East and an introverted 
one in the West. lung's idea that the extraverted type includes the whole Western 
world and that it is opposed to an introverted attitude type which covers all kinds of 
Eastern religions was based on a stereotyped view of both the Eastern world and the 
Western world. Because of this stereotyped view of Eastern religions, lung 
discouraged Europeans from practising Eastern meditation. Coward (1985) states, 
The impasse of East-West religious differences is based on the model of the 
total psyche balanced by unconscious and conscious attitudes and is further 
supported by lung's idea of the natural development of religion. The real lesson 
to be learned from the contemporary encounter of world religions is that the 
total psyche possesses all capabilities and specifically an introverted tendency 
which has been neglected in the European and American developments in 
SCIence. 
(Coward, 1985: 88) 
In his study of Eastern spiritual practices such as yoga and meditation, lung did not 
recommend that Europeans inattentively imitate such practices. lung's warning 
against the European's adoption of yoga and Buddhist meditation is based on his 
general view of cultural identity and differences between the Orient and Occident. 
lung insisted that the Eastern mentality is fundamentally different from the Western 
one, because it is the product of a different history and culture. Due to these 
differences, lung warns Westerners away from trying to practise Eastern fonns of 
meditation, since he believed that Europeans lacked the cultural basis for practising 
Eastern disciplines (CW 11: 876). Thus lung believes that Eastern religious ideas and 
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concepts in the East are unknowable to Westerners. Jung believed it would be a 
mistake to discard one's own history and simply to transplant ideas and practices from 
one tradition to another. Jung suggested, therefore, that the West must develop 
methods from its own history and culture. 
Odajnyk asserts that Jung's warnings about the uncritical adaptation of Eastern 
spiritual thought and practices by Westerners appear at times overstated. He suspects 
that, 
sometimes ... the warnings were meant more for [Jung] himself than for anyone 
else, for he probably feared being intellectually and emotionally subsumed by 
the more evolved and sophisticated Eastern conceptions, which turned out to be 
so close to his own personal psychological experiences and discoveries. 
(Odajnyk, 1993: 114) 
Cleary argues it would be a useful warning not to encourage blind imitation of 
techniques, and not to be overtaken by the wrong motivations and attitudes. However 
he asserts, "it is not necessary to believe ... that all Westerners will inevitably behave 
in this manner toward Eastern teachings" (Cleary, 1991: 135). Cleary points out that 
it would have been a stronger caution if Jung had been able to distinguish authentic 
spiritual practice from cultic behaviour, which inhibits the efficiency of spiritual 
practice. Today many Westerners have more opportunities to engage with Eastern 
teachings and with psychological studies of cultism than in Jung's days. There are 
probably as many Easterners as Westerners for whom the adaptation of yoga is 
inappropriate. But there are also Westerners no longer contained by Western 
religions. Cleary claims that if Eastern meditation is rightly understood and correctly 
practised, "it does not have the dangers Jung attributed to it because it does not submit 
to the fascination of what he referred to as unconscious contents of mind" (Cleary 
1991: 142). Odajnyk argues, "Jung might have been surprised by the number of 
Westerners who have actually acculturated themselves to Hinduism and Buddhism 
and practise these religions not just in a superficial, imitative way" (Op. Cit. 115). 
In his dialogue with oriental religion Jung's strong opinions demonstrate an 
awareness of its strangeness and alienness. As a result, in spite of all his enthusiasm, 
Jung kept his distance from Eastern thought. In his encounter with the Indian 
tradition, Jung was comfortable with its alien mentality and culture. Clarke argues, 
"A distinct feeling of ambivalence towards the East becomes noticeable, and his 
normal hermeneutical openness to the 'other' gives way at times to bafflement and to 
a tendency to retreat into his European enclave" (Clarke, 1994: 62). According to 
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Clarke, enclavism is the VIew that cultures, societies, and nations are relatively 
encapsulated entities with a specific identity of their own. If it is extreme, each 
culture is locked within its own conceptual boundaries, meanings cannot be conveyed 
from one to the other, and there is no possible communication between cultures 
(Clarke, 1994: 152). According to Gadamer's hermeneutics, our prejudices and 
prejudgements represent an essential component of all meaningful exchange. In 
Jung's case, however, Jung's sceptical attitude towards yoga and Buddhist meditation 
seems to suggest that Jung ties ideas so closely to his own cultural territory, and that 
he fails to allow the Eastern religious tradition to speak for itself. Thus Jung 
constantly warns Europeans not to imitate Eastern spiritual practice and claims that 
the Western men must build their own ground with their own methods. In his study 
of Eastern religion Jung frequently dismissed its cultural and traditional settings. 
Clarke asserts that, however, in Jung's own approach to the East it becomes an unreal 
object controlled and manipulated for his own purposes, an imagination which is 
effectively blind to the real East, deaf to its real voice (Clarke, 1994: 165). 
It is noticeable, for example, that in his approach to the Tantric mandala lung 
was mainly concerned with psychological utilisation of the mandala for the purpose of 
the treatment of his patients. The significance of the mandala for Jung is the self-
healing aspect and the archetype of the self, which is an important concept of 
Analytical Psychology and represents the totality of the psyche between the conscious 
and the unconscious. By contrast, the Tantric Buddhist mandala is an object of 
meditation to transform one's ordinary perception into a pure perception of the 
Buddha-nature, and is used only for religious and ritual purposes under the strict 
guidance and instruction of a lama. The problem with Jung's method is that he fails 
to understand the significance of Tibetan Tantric mandalas within their own cultural 
context and thus they are moulded to fit into his own model of psychological 
development. 
Chapter Five examined Jung's relation to Zen Buddhism. Despite all the 
disagreements between Jung's and the Buddhist position, which has been discussed 
thus far, in his understanding of Zen Buddhism Jung became closer to a Zen Buddhist 
standpoint. In his foreword to Suzuki's An Introduction to Zen Buddhism (1939), 
Jung wrote his view on the satori experience. Jung understood in the satori 
experience the ego becomes itself the object of an another subject, the self. This 
view is very close to Jung's idea of the individuation process in which there is a shift 
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of the centre of gravity from the ego to the self. Furthermore, Jung's claim of the 
objectification of the ego is similar to the concept of the path to emptiness, or 
Hakuin's concept of 'great death,' in which one has to objectify one's ego and to 
abandon any intentional standpoint at all and thus create empty consciousness. It is 
also noticeable that both Jung's individuation process and the path to the satari 
enlightenment are involved with personal transformation to a certain extent. For Jung 
the individuation process involves the development of personality through a 
realisation of our whole being, that is, both parts of the total psyche, conscious and 
unconscious, are linked together. In Zen Buddhism, the way to the satari 
enlightenment is seen as an experience of awakening of the True Self, and it is as if 
one has to cut his ordinary self away and be reborn as a new self in a different 
dimension. 
Nevertheless, the goal of Zen Buddhism fundamentally differs from that of 
Jung's individuation process. In the individuation process one strives for a psychic 
wholeness, which Jung calls the self. In Zen enlightenment the student can 
experience the True Self, which is identical with one's own essential nature, in other 
words, it is called no mind, emptiness or sunyata. As has been discussed in Chapter 
Three, there is an ontological difference between the concept of sunyata in Zen 
Buddhism and Jung's understanding of it. Jung interpreted sunyata as the 
unconscious in terms of ontology, assuming that sunyata is a substance-like-thing. 
Zen Buddhist no-mind refers to the non-substantiality of the self and is fully 
awakened to itself. This sharply contrasts with Jung's concept of the self, which is an 
ontological concept, involving both the conscious and the unconscious, and thus is not 
fully known to the ego-consciousness, as it is partly unconscious. 
Suffering was a central issue for Jung's psychological theory. Jung was 
attached to the Buddhist position concerning the notion of suffering. In some places, 
Jung's statements concerning the Buddhist concept of suffering seem to imply that he 
was in agreement with the Buddhist position in which one can transcend suffering. 
However, Jung also claims that one cannot get rid of suffering completely but "the 
only way to overcome it is to endure it" (Letters I: 236). It would seem, therefore, 
that there is an inconsistency in Jung's understanding of suffering: on the one hand, in 
his earlier quote, Jung showed his positive attitude towards the Buddhist treatment of 
the problem of suffering; on the other hand, he showed a negative attitude towards the 
Buddhist teaching of the termination of suffering and rejected its possibility. What 
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Jung emphasises here is that through therapeutic assistance, one can modify and 
transform his or her attitude towards the problem of suffering. It seems, therefore, 
that Analytical Psychology does not provide the method of the tennination of 
suffering, but rather that of the transformation of suffering, namely, the way in which 
we see the suffering is transformed from the objective level to the sUbjective one. 
This does not seem to be so much different from what Zen Buddhism aims to offer 
regarding the notion of suffering. 
6.2 Implications 
This thesis has discussed Jung's hermeneutical engagement with Buddhism, 
particularly with the Tibetan and Zen Buddhist traditions. Jung's efforts to build a 
henneneutical bridge with Buddhism revealed a number of limitations and problems. 
There is, however, something we can learn from Jung's engagement with Buddhism. 
Jung's own achievement lay in the fact that he seriously attempted to illustrate 
psychological discussions through a detailed comparison with religious and 
philosophical ideas of the East in his own creative manner. In his early career Jung 
was warned by Freud that if he pursued his comparative studies in occult spiritualism, 
mythology and world religions he was in danger of being dismissed as a mystic. 
However, Jung took up this challenge in moving outside the European tradition and 
publicly exploring Eastern ideas which were an important European interest at the 
time but also tended to be ignored in psychoanalytical circles. After the break with 
Freud, Jung needed to establish his own reputation as a psychologist, and he 
attempted to study Buddhism, Hinduism and Chinese philosophy scientifically and 
phenomenologically. J. Borelli argues that Jung, " wanted to be as scientific as 
possible and to maintain the respect of his colleagues" (Borelli, 1985: 82). Clarke 
argues that Jung's interest in the historical materials such as the wisdom of Oriental 
religion and philosophy was motivated by his concern for the present, that is, "the 
construction of a new sense of meaning, a new path of self-discovery, one compatible 
with a modem outlook" (Clarke, 1994: 180). For instance, in his study of I Ching, 
Jung attempted to link Chinese cosmological ideas with modem physics by means of 
the concept of synchronicity. 
Jung should be regarded as a pioneer in the field of research addressing the 
relationship between psychology and Buddhism and his writings had a major impact 
on later studies of the various traditions of Buddhism and meditation in relation to 
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Western psychology and its therapeutic techniques. Jung's influence on later studies 
of the relationship between Buddhism and Western psychology seems to suggest that 
his engagement with Buddhism does create an opportunity to open up the dialogue 
between East and West. B. Ulanov asserts that, "Jung's explorations of Eastern 
thought and religion, strong, unquenchable, alternately sober and gleeful, have stirred 
responses almost as far-ranging and full of feeling as his psychological 
investigations" (Ulanov, 1992: 46). Jung is frequently referred to within religious and 
anthropological studies, even though his specific views and writings are not often 
examined in detail. Scholars who have engaged with Jung's ideas in this field in one 
way or another would include names such as Arnold Toynbee, Mary Douglas, Rodney 
Needham, Paul Tillich, R.C. Zaehner, Ninian Smart, Mircea Eliade, Joseph Campbell, 
and Alan Watts (Clarke, 1994: 182). 
Despite his achievement, however, the major theme of this thesis is a critical 
assessment of Jung's engagement with Buddhist thought. The thesis has argued that, 
on balance, Jung's understanding of Buddhism was faulty and highly problematic. 
Namely, Jung's inconsistent position on science and metaphysics; his tendency to 
psychological reductionism; his selective reading of Buddhist texts; the problematic 
proposition of an introverted East and extraverted West; his blanket warning against 
the application of yoga and meditation by Westerners; his ambivalence towards 
Buddhist thought; and a failure to come to a mutual-understanding between his 
psychology and Zen Buddhism show that Jung at times misunderstood and 
misrepresented Eastern thought. Jung's method of understanding Buddhism displays 
elements of hermeneutics, as opposed to his claim that his approach is scientific and 
phenomenological. As I mentioned earlier, there is the issue about the inconsistency 
inherent in Jung's phenomenological approach. Jung, on the one hand, admits 
scepticism concerning Eastern metaphysical beliefs. However, on the other hand, 
Jung claims that these beliefs are 'really' psychological in nature and are regarded as 
the archetype. Thus Jung himself has a tendency to make metaphysical claims. The 
problem here is that Jung does not seem to acknowledge his metaphysical position 
and merely insists on being a scientist. As discussed in Chapter Two, Jung's usage of 
phenomenology lacks the essential phenomenological method, epoche. Therefore, 
Jung brought his own psychological assumptions into his interpretation of Buddhism, 
and failed to understand the significance of Buddhism within its own traditions. 
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These limitations and misuses of the phenomenological method may suggest that Jung 
should be characterised as a hermeneut, a thinker and an interpreter of the East. 
In his study of Buddhism, Jung believed that he discovered a number of 
analogies between Buddhist thought and his psychological theory. The Buddhist 
ideas which Jung paid attention to became a confinnation in the fonnation of his 
Analytical Psychology. However, it is important to note that Jung's interpretation of 
Buddhism often represents a distorted view of Buddhism. A question that emerges at 
this point can be expressed as follows: Why is Jung's 'misinterpretation' of the 
Eastern religions an issue? Why does it matter that Jung interpreted Buddhism in 
terms of Analytical Psychology, given that he does not claim to be an Orientalist and 
constantly reaffirms his role as psychologist and healer of Western ills? To answer 
this, I will focus my attention on the issue of Jung' s ambiguous relationship with the 
Orient: on the one hand, lung demonstrates his sympathetic attitude towards Buddhist 
concepts; on the other hand, he provides us with a mis-representation of Buddhism. 
In his psychological commentary on The Secret of the Golden Flower (1929), 
Jung confesses that, "we do not understand the utter unworldliness of a text like this 
[the Secret of the Golden Flower] - that actually we do not want to understand it" 
(CW 13: 6). Yet, lung attempted to explore in what way Europeans are able to relate 
to such alien elements within themselves. Jung believes the Western psyche is 
different from the Eastern psyche because of a different history and tradition. "The 
spirit of the East has grown out of the yellow earth, and our spirit can, and should, 
grow out of our own earth" (CW 13: 73). Thus lung claims, "denial of our historical 
foundations would be sheer folly," and, "only by standing finnly on our own soil can 
we assimilate the spirit of the East" (CW 13: 72). It has been discussed earlier that, 
in dealing with Oriental texts, lung had no intention of understanding metaphysical 
concepts involved with these texts (CW 13: 73). For lung, metaphysics is of no 
practical use and therefore in order to understand it we must do so only from a 
psychological perspective (CW 13: 74). Jung asserts, "my aim is simply to bring 
ideas which are alien to our way of thinking within reach of Western psychological 
experience" (CW 11: 788). lung writes, 
The purpose of my commentary is to attempt to build a bridge of psychological 
understanding between East and West... it seems to me important. above all to 
emphasize the agreement between the psychic ~tates and symbohsms of East 
and West. These analogies open a way to the Inner chambers of the Eastern 
256 
mind, a way that does not require the sacrifice of our own nature and does not 
confront us with the threat of being tom from our roots. 
(CW 13: 83) 
It would seem, therefore, that it is not Jung's aim to introduce the teachings of the 
Eastern religions, but to interpret them within his own psychological thinking and use 
them as a 'confirmation' of his psychological theories. Jung employed the method of 
making analogies in his interpretation of Buddhism, which demonstrates a distinctive 
feature of the hermeneutical approach. I Jung amplified the meaning of satari in Zen 
Buddhism and equated it with the individuation process. The Buddha and the Tibetan 
Tantric mandala are both compared with Jung's concept of the archetype of the self. 
This seems to be a part of Jung's strategy to establish religion as a way of psychic 
healing for the West. In this way Buddhism seems to offer a confirmation for Jung's 
psychological theory. Jung says, "religions are systems of healing for psychic illness. 
This is especially true of the two greatest religions of humanity, Christianity and 
Buddhism" (CW 11: 531). 
There is, however, certainly an issue concernIng Jung's ambiguous and 
somewhat unclear attitude in this regard. Indeed, Jung sometimes speaks as if he has 
some kind of intellectual authority over Asian religions, that his psychological 
interpretation is the 'correct' one, and that religions are indeed nothing but systems of 
psychic healing. Jung states, "what is ordinarily called 'religion' is a substitute to 
such an amazing degree that I ask myself seriously whether this kind of 'religion,' 
which I prefer to call a creed, may not after all have an important function in human 
society" (CW 11: 75). Religion in Jung's sense plays an important role in the 
individuation process and thus there is an significant "relation between psychotherapy 
and religion in its practical aspects" (Letters II: 566). He provides us with an example 
of religion as a cure for neurosis. 
As a neurosis starts from a fragmentary state of human consciousness, it can 
only be cured by an approximative totality of the human being. Religious ideas 
and convictions from the beginning of history had the aspect of the mental 
pharmakan. They represent the world of wholeness in which fragments. can be 
gathered and put together again. Such a cure cannot be effected by pIlls and 
injections. 
(Letters II: 625) 
It must be stressed here that Jung seems to suggest to the reader that what Analytical 
Psychology is doing with Buddhism is in fact Buddhism in Western fonn. For 
I See Chapter Two. 
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instance, Jung claims that the Buddha figure is the same as the archetype of the self, 
as it represents a psychic totality, i.e., uniting a symbol of conscious and unconscious 
(CW 9i: 248, 9ii: 304, 10: 779, Letters I: 66, Letters II: 84, 275, 267, and 305). Jung 
compared the Buddhist concept of the middle way with a function of mediation 
between the opposites: rational consciousness and irrational unconscious (CW 6: 326, 
and 11: 797). The teaching of the Buddha is likened to psychological transformation 
which occurs in the individuation process (CW 10: 1002-6). Furthermore, Jung 
equated the individuation process with Taoism and Zen Buddhism (CW 9i: 602, 9ii: 
260, and 14: 771). Jung writes, "the phases and aspects of my patient's inner process 
of development can therefore express themselves easily in the language of the I 
Ching, because it too is based on the psychology of the individuation process that 
forms one of the main interests of Taoism and of Zen Buddhism" (CW 9i: 602). 
Elsewhere Jung also claimed that the individuation process takes the form of "a satori 
experience in Zen (,show me your original face'), or psychological process of 
development in which the original propensity to wholeness becomes a conscious 
happening" (CW 9ii: 260). Jung says, "the secret passion which keeps Zen and other 
spiritual techniques alive through the centuries is connected with an original 
experience of wholeness - perhaps the most important and unique of all spiritual 
experiences" (Letters II: 602). Jung believes that the similarity between 
individuation and the satari lays in the fact that both share the same goal towards 
which "the method of psychic 'healing' - i.e., 'making whole' is striving" (CW 11: 
905). It seems, therefore, that through making these analogies Buddhism became a 
confirmation for Jung's Analytical Psychology. 
The question can be put as follows: is Analytical Psychology really the same 
as Buddhism in Western form as Jung claimed? The question is crucial in this thesis. 
This thesis has extensively examined and compared Buddhist thought and Jung's 
understanding of it. It reveals that there is a chasm between Jung and Buddhism, 
since Jung unfortunately failed to understand Buddhist concepts within the traditional 
and cultural context, and thus provided a misrepresentation of Buddhism. This could 
be called an 'exploitation' and 'appropriation' of Buddhist thought. Gomez argues, 
"The Asian practice is reconceived and appropriated through the lens of a 
reconception and appropriation of Jungian ideas" (Gomez, 1995: 223). Jung's 
privileged way of looking at Eastern religions and his appropriation of them would 
eventually be adopted by many of his followers seeking a way of constructing a 
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spiritual crisis of the West from Eastern religions.2 For example, Radmia Moacanin's 
lung's Psychology and Tibetan Buddhism: Western and Eastern Paths to the Heart 
(1986) is an example of the utilisation of Jung's supposed authority and questionable 
interpretation of Tibetan Buddhism. She not only applies Jung's view to the 
interpretation of Oriental materials but also speaks as if she had an authoritative voice 
regarding Tibetan Buddhism. Moacanin asserts, 
Tibetan Buddhists urge Westerners not to abandon the values of their own 
culture. In fact a proper understanding of one's own culture and being deeply 
rooted in it - they would say - is a prerequisite for venturing into and benefiting 
from practices of a foreign tradition. There is also always the danger of 
grasping the literal rather than the intrinsic meaning of symbols and rituals, and 
thereby going astray and getting lost in one's practices. 
(Moacanin cited by Gomez, 1995: 224) 
She suggest that the solution for the Western psychic crisis in the twentieth century is 
some kind of self-liberation. She wrote, 
According to Jung - and this is the same idea that Tibetan Buddhists are 
proposing - the change must begin with individuals, in their own psyche, their 
greatest instrument. To Jung that implies self-knowledge, knowing the dark 
side of the psyche, the unconscious as well as its conscious aspects, and to 
reconcile the polarities ... 'Action comes from right thinking, and ... there is no 
cure and no improving of the world that does not begin with the individual 
himself,' says Jung. The right action and right thinking, is that not what 
Buddha taught 2500 years ago? 
(Moacanin cited by Gomez, 1995: 224-5) 
Gomez argues that Moacanin's statements above "advocate a particular interpretation 
of Jung as a nonnative standard for Buddhist orthodoxy and orthopraxis" (Gomez, 
1995: 225). Moacanin's example suggests that Jung's Analytical Psychology 
provides the authority for appropriating Eastern Asian religious ideas. This may be 
justified from a henneneutical point of view, namely, a text is no longer read in its 
contexts and its interpretation continuously opens up. Gadarmarian methodology 
would suggest that interpretations of Buddhist texts and traditions are never-ended. 
Jung himself adopted a relativistic position, in which the hermeneutical circle can 
never be closed, and thus there is no absolute, single correct interpretation of the text. 
Clarke argues, however, "the trouble here is that the drawing of analogies is a 
notoriously inexact science which, at its worst, is capable of delivering any desired 
2 Odajnik (1993) also follows Jung's interpretation of Asian religions in relation to meditation and 
active imagination. 
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conclusion whatsoever. .. anything can be compared with anything, and analogies can 
be drawn almost at will between any pair of terms" (Clarke, 1994: 168). 
A question that emerges is whether there is a 'correct' interpretation of 
Buddhism which Jung failed to grasp but which we now have. Once again, it is 
important to focus on the Buddhist concept of sunyata, which Jung often discussed in 
his psychological writings, in order to show there is a correct interpretation of sunyata 
in the Buddhist community. Jung's ontological and annihilistic account of sunyata 
which allowed him to interpret the unconscious within the framework of his idea of 
psychic structure sharply contrasts with sunyata in the Buddhist perspective which is 
not a substance-like-thing or nothingness, but refers to reality as incapable of 
ultimately being given a clear detail of its concept. T.R.V. Murti (1987) clarifies the 
definition of sunyata from the perspective of the Madhyamika philosophy, and 
asserts, "Correctly understood, Sunyata is not annihilation, but the negation of 
negation; it is the conscious correction of an initial unconscious falsification of the 
real" (Murti, 1998: 271). Murti also argues that sunyata is "the contention of the 
Madhyamikas that the final release is possible only through Sunyata" (Murti, 1998: 
269). In other words, to become aware of one's essential emptiness (sunyata) is to 
achieve liberation (nirvana) from the cycle of rebirth (samsara). The definition of 
sunyata in the Buddhist position is not the same as Jung's ontological interpretation of 
sunyata as void or nothingness, in which there is no ego as a cognising subject, there 
is no consciousness, and thus it is merely the unconscious. It needs to be noted, 
therefore, that Jung's hermeneutical understanding of Buddhism ignored the crucial 
issue that the 'right' understanding is pivotal in any Buddhist traditions. 
In conclusion, having critically examined Jung's relation to Buddhism, this 
thesis attempted to demonstrate that Jung's hermeneutical approach has a number of 
limitations and shortcomings for his understanding of Buddhism. It also revealed that 
there is a chasm between the standpoint of Jung's Analytical Psychology and that of 
the Buddhist religious traditions. From the perspective of a theory of phenomenology 
of religion, Jung failed to realise the significance of Buddhist teachings within their 
own contexts. Jung failed to understand that the 'right' understanding of Buddhist 
teachings and meditation practice is essential for the Buddhist community, the 
practitioner must be guided under the strict instruction of a religious guru, lama or 
roshi, who helps to prevent himlher from misunderstanding. Jung dismissed the 
metaphysical aspect of Buddhist teachings and brought his own psychological 
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assumptions into his account of the phenomenal expenence of Buddhists. 
Furthermore, because of the influence of Orientalist bias and a colonial frame of 
mind, Jung provided a distorted view of Buddhist thought. It is a very important issue 
in this thesis, therefore, to understand Jung's 'misinterpretation' of Buddhism, 
because many Jungians blindly followed his understanding of Buddhism without 
critical reflection, not being aware of the crucial fact that Jung's use of certain 
Buddhist concepts sharply contrasts with their vernacular Buddhist usage. 
Consequently they may be misled by his distorted view of Buddhism. 
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States developed on the basis of Calm meditation 
Harvey, 1990: 251 
States arising from Calm alone 
THE FORMLESS REALM 
States present: one-pointedness, 
equanimity 
8 The sphere of neither-cognition-
nor-non-cognition 
7 The sphere of nothingness 
6 The sphere of infinite consciousness 
5 The sphere of infinite space 
THE REALM OF PURE FORM 
States present 
When comhined with Insight 
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One-pointedness, happiness, equanimity 
One-pointedness, happiness, joy 
One-pointedness, happiness, joy, examination, 
applied thought 
THE SENSE-DESIRE REALM 
111 Access concentration, based on 'counterpart sign'. 
11 Work on 'acquired sign', so as to suspend the hindrances. 
Work on 'preliminary sign ' (e.g. the breath or a kasi1)a-ma1)cfala) 
Figure 4 I 
Vairocanabhisambodhi-mandala 











Tibetan Mandala drawn by sand 
Tanaka, 1992: 81 
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Figure 4.5 
The Tibetan Wheel of Life 
Blofeld, 1970: 121 
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Figure 4.6 
Tibetan mandala discussed by Jung 
CW 9i: fig. 1 and CW 12: p. 100 
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Figure 4.7 
Tibetan W orId Wheel (sidpe-korlo) 
CW 9i: fig. 3 and CW 12: p. 97 
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Figure 4.8 
'Mandala of a Modem Man' painted by Jung in 1916 
CW 9i: frontispiece 
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Figure 4.9 
Mandala painted by Jung 
CW 9i: fig. 6, CW 13: A6, and MDR: p. 224 
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Figure 4.10 
Mandala painted by Jung 
CW 9i: fig. 36, CW 13 A10 
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Figure 4.11 
Mandala painted by Jung 
CW 9i: fig. 28, and CW 13: A6 
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Figure 4.12 
Mandala painted by Jung 
CW : 9i: fig. 29 
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Figure 4.13 
Mandala painted by Jung's patient 
CW 9i: fig. 9, and CW 13: Al 
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Mandala painted by Jung' s patient 
CW 9i: fig. 25 and CW 13: AS 
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Figure 4.15 
Mandala painted by Jung's patient 






Mandala painted by Jung's patient 
CW 9i: fig. 37 and CW 13: A8 
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Figure 4.17 
Mandala painted by Jung's patient 




The lotus or mandala of the five Dhyani-Buddhas with their female aspects, qualities 
and symbols, according to the teachings of the Bardo Thodol 
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Looking for the Cow 
The ten ox-herding pictures by Kaku-an Shien (Ch. Kuo-an) 
(D.T. Suzuki, 1926: Plate J) 
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Figures 5.2 
Seeing the Traces of the Cow 
The ten ox-herding pictures by Kaku-an Shien (Ch. Kuo-an) 
(D.T. Suzuki, 1926: Plate II) 
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Figures 5.3 
Seeing the Cow 
The ten ox-herding pictures by Kaku-an Shien (Ch. Kuo-an) 
(D.T. Suzuki, 1926: Plate III) 
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Figures 5.4 
Catching the Cow 
The ten ox-herding pictures by Kaku-an Shien (Ch. Kuo-an) 
(D.T. Suzuki, 1926: Plate IV) 
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Figures 5.5 
Herding the Cow 
The ten ox-herding pictures by Kaku-an Shien (Ch. Kuo-an) 
(D.T. Suzuki, 1926: Plate V) 
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Figures 5.6 
Coming Home on the Cow's Back 
The ten ox-herding pictures by Kaku-an Shien (Ch. Kuo-an) 
(D.T. Suzuki, 1926: Plate VI) 
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Figures 5.7 
The Cow Forgotten, Leaving the Man Alone 
The ten ox-herding pictures by Kaku-an Shien (Ch. Kuo-an) 
(D.T. Suzuki, 1926: Plate VII) 
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Figures 5.8 
The Cow and the Man Both Gone Out of Sight 
The ten ox-herding pictures by Kaku-an Shien (Ch. Kuo-an) 
(D.T. Suzuki, 1926: Plate VIII) 
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Figures 5.9 
Returning to the Origin, Back to the Source 
The ten ox-herding pictures by Kaku-an Shien (Ch. Kuo-an) 
(D.T. Suzuki, 1926: Plate IX) 
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Figures 5.10 
Entering the City with Bliss-bestowing Hands 
The ten ox-herding pictures by Kaku-an Shien (Ch. Kuo-an) 




The ten ox-herding pictures by Seikyo (Ch. Pu-ming) 




The ten ox-herding pictures by Seikyo (Ch. Pu-ming) 
(Spiegelman and Miyuki, 1985: 104) 
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The ten ox-herding pictures by Seikyo (Ch. Pu-ming) 





Figures 5. 14 
Faced Round 
The ten ox-herding pictures by Seikyo (Ch. Pu-ming) 




The ten ox-herding pictures by Seikyo (Ch. Pu-ming) 




The ten ox-herding pictures by Seikyo (Ch. Pu-ming) 
(Spiegelman and Miyuki, 1985: 106) 




The ten ox-herding pictures by Seikyo (Ch. Pu-ming) 
(Spiegelman and Miyuki, 1985: 107) 
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Figures 5 18 299 
The ten ox-herdin ~I Forgo~en 
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Figures 5.19 
The Solitary Moon 
The ten ox-herding pictures by Seikyo (Ch. Pu-ming) 





The ten ox-herding pictures by Seikyo (Ch. Pu-ming) 
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